The Politically Incorrect Guide To The Great Depression And The New Deal, by Robert P. Murphy, Ph.D

As someone who is a fan of the series to which this book belongs, I expected this book to at least give me a smile, and it gave me a few, but the book also has some serious points as well.  One of the benefits of this series, whether or not one always agrees with it, is that it presents one with a view that is opposite to the generally received view of history, and that perspective can help make one better informed.  In this particular case, I find a great deal to agree with when it comes to the critique that the author makes of the behavior of the Fed before and after the crash in 1929 and of the behavior of both Hoover and FDR when it comes to massive expenditures and protectionist folly that only deepened the depression and kept it from being resolved in the way that previous panics had been resolved relatively quickly in earlier American history.  The author is also quite savvy as to some of the reasons why the recovery from the Great Recession has in many ways been so shallow.

This particular book is a short one at less than 200 pages.  It begins with the (correct) assertion that everything one has learned about the Great Depression and New Deal is wrong, at least from most American history textbooks and media comments.  After that comes a chapter at the crisis just before the Depression (1) as well as a look at how Hoover’s big-government policies made the Depression “great” (2).  This leads into a discussion of the inflationary policies of the Fed that propped up losers and kept the market from rebalancing (3).  After that the author notes that it was not conservative policies that caused the depression (4), and then moves into a short chapter on how the New Deal failed in various ways (5).  The author spends a bit more time talking about the outrages of the New Deal and how FDR behaved corruptly (6), and even discusses a great deal of the ways that wartime prosperity was a myth (7) because the difference between wartime and civilian production is often disregarded and because warfare tends to be inherently destructive.  Finally, the book closes with a chapter on some of the lessons of the Great Depression for today (8), as well as acknowledgments, notes, and an index.

This book manages to offer a great deal despite its small size.  For one, it notes the larger philosophical differences that separate a conservative from someone who believes that government intervention and interference in markets is going to make things better.  The author’s perspective is pretty straightforward and clear:  the ability of free markets to invisibly encourage the well-being of others depends on having clear signals, and inflationary monetary policy as well as bailouts distort the signals that the market is receiving and prevent the market from balancing itself based on actual supply and demand, thus preventing the best possible outcomes from happening economically.  Sadly, human beings often cannot leave well enough alone even when that is by far the wisest option available, and that was certainly the case in both 1932 and 2008.  Moreover, it is the policy of economic progressives, of whatever stripe of red or pink, to let no crisis go to waste when it comes to seeking increased government control over the economy as well as foolish rules and regulations that seek to prevent people from operating according to their own best interests, which ultimately tends to serve the best interests of the public as well.  Consider this book a classic case of revisionist libertarian economic history, and treat it accordingly.