Stewardship as Formed Competence: A Non-Utopian Account of Shared Life


Abstract

The dominant theoretical positions in commons governance literature divide between pessimism—the Hobbesian tradition in which self-interest makes shared governance chronically unstable without coercive authority—and optimism—the communitarian tradition in which restored solidarity and shared values can recover what modernity has fragmented. This paper argues that both positions fail as foundations for commons theory because both misidentify the relevant explanatory variable. The question is not whether human beings are by nature selfish or cooperative but whether they have been formed in the specific capacities that shared governance requires: externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and the tolerance of imperfect coordination. Drawing on virtue ethics, developmental psychology, institutional theory, and the theological tradition of stewardship, the paper proposes a third position—stewardship as formed competence—that is neither Hobbesian nor communitarian, neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but diagnostic. It identifies stewardship not as a natural disposition, a moral achievement of will, or an act of self-denial, but as a set of learnable, teachable, and institutionally supportable competencies that make sustained participation in shared governance possible. The paper concludes that the formation of these competencies is the primary practical challenge for commons governance and that the failure of that formation—not the intractability of human nature—is the proximate cause of commons collapse.

Keywords: stewardship, formation, commons governance, virtue ethics, externality awareness, boundary discipline, shared constraint, competence


I. Introduction: Between Hobbes and Rousseau

The literature on commons governance has, for much of its history, been organized around two large theoretical intuitions that function less as empirical hypotheses than as background assumptions shaping the questions that get asked and the answers that seem plausible. The first is the Hobbesian intuition: that human beings are fundamentally self-interested, that this self-interest is the primary driver of commons failure, and that sustainable governance therefore requires either external coercive authority or the structural elimination of the commons through privatization. The second is the communitarian or Rousseauian intuition: that self-interested behavior is a product of modern individualism rather than human nature as such, that traditional communities embodied forms of solidarity and shared value that made sustainable commons governance possible, and that the recovery of those forms of solidarity is both the goal and the means of commons restoration.

Hardin’s (1968) essay gave the Hobbesian intuition its most influential modern expression. The communitarian response—articulated in various forms by scholars working in the tradition of civic republicanism, social capital theory, and communitarian political philosophy—has generated a substantial counter-literature insisting that solidarity, trust, and shared norms are both real and causally significant in commons governance. Both positions have produced important insights; neither has produced a satisfactory foundation for commons theory.

The Hobbesian position fails because it cannot explain the historical record. As the preceding paper in this series documented, commons governance systems have succeeded—in some cases for centuries—without either coercive authority or privatization. If self-interest invariably drives toward extraction and enclosure, these cases are inexplicable. The communitarian position fails because it cannot explain variation. If solidarity and shared values are sufficient conditions for commons success, we need an account of why some communities with strong social ties and shared normative traditions nonetheless fail to govern their commons sustainably—and the communitarian literature does not reliably provide one. More fundamentally, the communitarian position tends toward nostalgia: it locates the conditions for successful governance in the past and treats modernity as their destruction, generating a politics of recovery that is often more evocative than practical.

This paper proposes a third position that does not require the pessimism of Hobbes or the nostalgia of communitarianism. It proposes that the relevant question for commons theory is neither “are human beings selfish?” nor “can solidarity be recovered?” but rather: what specific capacities does successful participation in shared governance require, and under what conditions are those capacities formed, sustained, or lost?

The answer this paper develops is that shared governance requires a set of competencies—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—that are neither natural nor impossible but formed: developed through practice, supported by institutional structure, and susceptible to both cultivation and atrophy. The theoretical framework that best captures this account is the tradition of virtue ethics, supplemented by developmental psychology and institutional theory, and grounded in the theological concept of stewardship as accountable governance rather than ownership or self-denial.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II examines the failures of both Hobbesian pessimism and communitarian optimism as foundations for commons theory. Section III develops the concept of formation as the missing theoretical variable and situates it in relation to virtue ethics and developmental psychology. Sections IV through VII analyze the four core competencies of shared governance in turn. Section VIII develops the distinction between stewardship and asceticism that is central to the paper’s constructive argument. Section IX addresses the institutional conditions that support or undermine formation. Section X concludes with a statement of what a formation-based account of stewardship contributes to commons theory and practice.


II. Why Both Pessimism and Optimism Fail

The Hobbesian tradition in political theory begins with a claim about human nature: that human beings are by nature competitive, distrustful, and oriented toward self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. Left without coercive authority, this nature produces a condition of chronic conflict in which life is, famously, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 1651/1994). The political conclusion Hobbes drew was the necessity of a sovereign power capable of compelling compliance with rules that individuals would otherwise violate in pursuit of self-interest. Translated into commons governance terms, this becomes Hardin’s prescription: privatize or coerce.

The empirical failures of this position have been extensively documented. Ostrom’s (1990) comparative institutional analysis, McKean’s (1992) cross-cultural case studies, and the broader literature on common pool resources have demonstrated that communities do develop and sustain governance institutions without coercive external authority, and that these institutions can be effective over extended periods of time. The Hobbesian tradition cannot account for this evidence without ad hoc qualification, and the qualifications required are substantial enough to call the original position into serious question.

But the Hobbesian tradition’s failure is not merely empirical. It is theoretical. The tradition treats self-interest as a psychological given—a fixed feature of human motivational structure that governance institutions must work around or suppress. This treatment is inconsistent with what we know from developmental psychology, moral philosophy, and the anthropological record about the actual variability of human motivational structure. Human beings do not come into the world with fixed preferences; they come into the world with the capacity to develop preferences, and the preferences they develop are substantially shaped by the social practices, institutional environments, and relational contexts within which they are formed. The self-interested actor of Hobbesian theory is not a description of human nature in the abstract; it is a description of human nature under specific—and specifiable—conditions of formation and social context. Treating this description as universal eliminates precisely the variable—formation—that explains the variation in human motivation that the historical record displays.

The communitarian tradition identifies this error and attempts to correct it by insisting on the social constitution of individual identity and motivation. MacIntyre (1981), Sandel (1982), Taylor (1989), and others in the communitarian philosophical tradition argued against the liberal assumption of the pre-social individual, insisting that human beings are constituted by their membership in social practices, narratives, and communities of value, and that the fragmentation of these communities under modernity produces the impoverished motivational structure that Hobbesian theory takes as natural. The recovery of community, on this account, is the recovery of the conditions under which human beings can act as genuinely social creatures rather than as the isolated, self-interested individuals that liberal theory both describes and, in describing, produces.

This tradition has generated important insights. The social constitution of identity and motivation is a genuine theoretical advance over the liberal assumption of the pre-social individual, and the communitarian analysis of modernity’s fragmentation of social practices and communities captures real phenomena. But the communitarian position faces its own characteristic failures.

First, it tends toward idealization of pre-modern communities that is difficult to sustain against historical scrutiny. Pre-modern communities were not uniformly characterized by solidarity, shared values, and sustainable governance; they were characterized by the same range of governance success and failure that the comparative institutional literature documents across all periods. Solidarity and shared values are necessary but not sufficient conditions for commons success; communities with high social cohesion have managed commons badly, and communities with significant internal conflict have managed commons well, when the relevant institutional conditions were present or absent respectively.

Second, the communitarian position tends to treat formation as a consequence of community membership rather than analyzing the specific content of what needs to be formed. Knowing that human beings are constituted by social practices and communities does not tell us which practices and communities produce the specific competencies that shared governance requires. Not all social practices are formative in the relevant direction; some communities form their members in habits of extraction, domination, and norm violation rather than shared constraint, externality awareness, and cooperative governance. The communitarian framework identifies the mechanism—social formation—without specifying the content—what needs to be formed and by what means.

Third, the communitarian position’s political orientation toward recovery of the past generates a practical agenda that is difficult to act on in contemporary institutional contexts. The conditions of modernity—geographic mobility, market integration, institutional complexity, and cultural pluralism—cannot be reversed, and governance frameworks that depend on reversing them are not practically useful regardless of their theoretical attractiveness.

The third position this paper proposes avoids these failures by accepting from the Hobbesian tradition the insight that human motivation is not reliably cooperative by default, while accepting from the communitarian tradition the insight that human motivation is substantially formed by social practices and institutional context—and then moving beyond both to specify the content and conditions of the formation that shared governance requires.


III. Formation as the Missing Variable: A Theoretical Account

The concept of formation—the process by which human beings develop the capacities, dispositions, and motivational orientations that constitute a mature and competent agent—has a long history in philosophy, theology, and education, but it has been largely absent from commons governance theory. Its absence is the primary theoretical gap that this paper addresses.

The concept derives most rigorously from the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics. For Aristotle, virtues are stable dispositions to act, feel, and perceive in ways appropriate to one’s situation—dispositions that are acquired through practice rather than given by nature, and that constitute genuine excellence of character rather than mere compliance with external rules. Aristotle’s account of virtue as formed through habituation—through the repeated performance of virtuous acts under the guidance of practical wisdom—establishes the basic framework within which the concept of formation operates: human beings have the capacity for excellent functioning, but the actualization of that capacity requires sustained practice within appropriate social contexts (Aristotle, trans. 1999).

This framework was developed with particular sophistication in the Christian intellectual tradition, where formation (formatio) referred to the process by which human beings were shaped into conformity with a pattern of excellence—in the Augustinian tradition, ultimately the image of God recovered through grace and practice. The concept of stewardship in this tradition is inseparable from formation: stewardship is not a natural disposition but a developed capacity, and its development requires the specific practices, communities, and institutional contexts that make it possible. The theological tradition will be engaged more fully in the sixth paper of this series; what is relevant here is the concept of formation as a technical term for the process by which competencies that are genuinely human but not naturally given are developed through sustained practice within appropriate social contexts.

Contemporary developmental psychology provides empirical grounding for the virtue-theoretic framework. The literature on self-regulation—the capacity to modulate one’s own behavior in pursuit of goals that extend beyond immediate impulse—documents with precision the developmental trajectory, social determinants, and institutional supports of precisely the kind of capacity that shared governance requires. Baumeister and Tierney (2011), Mischel (2014), and the broader literature on executive function and self-regulation demonstrate that the capacity to defer immediate gratification, to monitor the consequences of one’s actions for others, and to sustain cooperative behavior in the face of short-term temptations to defect is a genuinely developmental achievement—one that varies substantially across individuals and contexts, that is substantially shaped by early relational experience and social environment, and that can be supported or undermined by institutional design.

This developmental literature does not support either the Hobbesian view that self-interest is the fixed default or the communitarian view that solidarity is natural to traditional communities. It supports a more complex and more useful picture: that human beings have genuine capacities for both self-regulation and self-interested behavior, that the relative development of these capacities is substantially shaped by developmental experience and social context, and that institutional design can either support or undermine the self-regulatory capacities that cooperative governance requires.

McCay and Acheson’s (1987) foundational collection on the question of the commons, and subsequent work by Stern et al. (2002) on the conditions for sustainable governance of common pool resources, point toward the same conclusion from the institutional side: governance success is not simply a function of incentive structure but of the motivational and cognitive capacities of participants—their ability to identify the long-term consequences of their behavior, to take the perspective of other participants, to regulate their extractive behavior in light of collective need, and to sustain cooperative commitment in the face of uncertainty and defection by others. These are not incentive responses; they are competencies. And competencies are formed, not given.

The four competencies that this paper identifies as central to shared governance are not an exhaustive list. They are, rather, the competencies that the evidence—historical, empirical, and developmental—most consistently identifies as the proximate difference between successful and failed commons governance at the level of individual participants. They are: externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and the tolerance of imperfect coordination.


IV. Externality Awareness as a Learnable Competence

The concept of externality, borrowed from economics, refers to the costs or benefits of an individual’s actions that are borne by others rather than by the actor. In commons governance, the relevant externalities are primarily costs: the degradation of shared resources by extractive behavior whose benefits accrue to individual users while its costs are distributed across the user community. Hardin’s herdsman externalizes the cost of each additional animal onto the shared pasture and the community of users; the benefit of the additional animal is his alone.

The standard economic treatment of externalities frames them as a structural problem—a market failure that requires correction through pricing, regulation, or property rights assignment. This treatment is not wrong as far as it goes, but it is incomplete in a way that matters for commons governance. Externalities are not only structural problems; they are also perceptual and cognitive problems. Before the structural question of how to internalize externalities can be addressed, the prior question of whether actors perceive and attend to the external consequences of their behavior must be answered. And the answer, in the developmental and psychological literature, is that externality awareness is a learnable competence that varies substantially across individuals and contexts—not a universal feature of rational agency that can be assumed.

Batson et al.’s (1995) research on perspective-taking and prosocial behavior demonstrated that the capacity to perceive the consequences of one’s actions for others is not automatic but requires the active exercise of cognitive and affective capacities that can be cultivated through practice and social modeling. Children develop the capacity for perspective-taking through developmental processes that require appropriate social scaffolding; adults vary substantially in the habitual exercise of this capacity depending on their developmental history and current social context. The capacity to track the external consequences of one’s own behavior is not a fixed feature of rational agency but a developed competence that is more or less present depending on formation.

In commons governance terms, externality awareness is the competence to perceive—habitually and without special effort—how one’s resource use affects the sustainability of the shared resource and the access of other users. This competence has both cognitive and affective dimensions. The cognitive dimension involves the ability to model the consequences of one’s behavior across time and across the community of users: to understand that the fish taken today reduce the breeding stock available for future seasons, that the water diverted now reduces the supply available to downstream users, that the noise made in a shared living space degrades the quality of that space for others. The affective dimension involves the disposition to care about these consequences—to experience them as morally relevant rather than as irrelevant background conditions for one’s own extractive behavior.

Both dimensions are formed rather than given. The cognitive dimension is developed through education, practice, and the kind of engaged participation in commons governance that makes the consequences of individual behavior visible and salient. Ostrom’s (1990) design principle of effective monitoring is relevant here: governance systems that make the state of the shared resource visible to users are systems that support the development and exercise of externality awareness by ensuring that the consequences of extractive behavior are perceivable. The affective dimension is formed through the social practices, relational contexts, and normative environments that cultivate care for others as a stable disposition rather than a contingent response to situational factors.

The implications for institutional design are significant but not straightforward. Institutions can support externality awareness by making the consequences of individual behavior visible, by creating social contexts in which those consequences are discussed and attended to, and by structuring participation in commons governance in ways that require participants to attend to the resource state and the claims of other users. But institutions cannot substitute for the affective dimension of externality awareness: governance systems that rely entirely on monitoring and enforcement to produce externality-sensitive behavior are systems that have failed to form the competence and are attempting to compensate for that failure through structural means. As Bowles’s (2016) analysis of the crowding-out effect demonstrates, this compensation is often counterproductive, undermining the intrinsic motivation for externality awareness that effective formation would have produced.

The formation of externality awareness, then, is not primarily a design problem; it is a practice problem. It requires the sustained exercise of perspective-taking, consequence-modeling, and care for others within social contexts that make these practices meaningful, visible, and valued. Communities that have developed these practices—through participation in governance institutions, through social norms that make externality-blind behavior visible and sanctionable, through educational and religious traditions that cultivate care for the commons as a genuine good—have the foundational competence for shared governance. Communities that have not developed these practices face a governance problem that institutional design alone cannot solve.


V. Boundary Discipline: Distinguishing Legitimate Claim from Enclosure

The second competence required for successful commons governance is what this paper terms boundary discipline: the capacity to distinguish between the legitimate assertion of one’s own claim within a shared governance system and the enclosure of shared space or resources through the appropriation of control that exceeds one’s legitimate entitlement.

This distinction is less obvious than it appears. In any commons governance system, individual users have legitimate claims—entitlements to specific uses of shared resources, defined by the governance rules of the community and grounded in membership, contribution, and need. The assertion of these claims is not merely permissible; it is essential to the functioning of the governance system, since a system in which no user ever asserted a legitimate claim would be a system without meaningful entitlement structure. Boundary discipline is not the suppression of legitimate claim assertion; it is the competence to know where legitimate claim ends and enclosure begins.

This distinction is genuinely difficult, not because the conceptual boundary is unclear but because the psychological and social pressures that drive claim expansion are powerful and often operate below the level of explicit awareness. The progression from legitimate claim assertion to enclosure typically does not occur through a conscious decision to appropriate shared resources; it occurs through a series of small expansions, each of which can be individually justified, that cumulatively produce a pattern of appropriation that exceeds legitimate entitlement. The herdsman who adds one more animal to the shared pasture because the pasture appears to have capacity is not consciously choosing to externalize costs; he is making a locally reasonable judgment that has, when multiplied across all users, catastrophic collective consequences.

Boundary discipline is the competence to interrupt this progression—to perceive the gap between locally reasonable judgment and collectively sustainable behavior, and to regulate one’s own behavior in light of that gap rather than in light of the local judgment alone. This requires both the cognitive competence of externality awareness—understanding how one’s behavior affects the shared resource and other users—and a second, distinct competence: the capacity to constrain one’s own behavior in light of what one knows, rather than in light of what one wants.

This second capacity is what Baumeister and Tierney (2011) identify as self-regulation in the developmental psychology literature: the ability to modulate behavior in pursuit of goals that extend beyond immediate impulse and immediate self-interest. Self-regulation is a genuine developmental achievement, substantially shaped by early relational experience and the availability of social models who demonstrate the practice of self-constraint in shared contexts. It is not reliably present across all adults, and it is subject to depletion under conditions of stress, resource scarcity, and chronic uncertainty—precisely the conditions under which commons governance is most frequently tested.

The theological tradition of stewardship is particularly instructive at this point. The biblical concept of stewardship—most fully articulated in the parables of Jesus concerning the management of entrusted resources (Matthew 25:14–30; Luke 12:42–48; Luke 16:1–13) and in the Torah’s land tenure provisions—does not frame the steward’s constraint as self-denial but as the appropriate recognition of the limits of one’s entitlement. The steward does not own the resources under management; the steward is accountable for them to a higher authority. This framing removes the psychological tension between self-interest and constraint by redefining the self’s interest: a steward whose self-understanding is constituted by accountability to an owner does not experience constraint as a sacrifice but as the appropriate exercise of a role. The constraint is internal to the identity rather than external to it.

This observation has implications beyond the specifically theological context in which it arises. Governance systems that can establish a meaningful account of stewardship—of resource use as accountable management rather than sovereign ownership—create the conditions under which boundary discipline can be exercised without the chronic motivational struggle that the Hobbesian tradition assumes. Where stewardship is constitutive of role identity, boundary discipline is the expression of that identity rather than its suppression.

Conversely, governance systems that frame resource entitlement in terms of ownership—even within formally common property regimes—create conditions under which boundary discipline is continuously undermined by the psychological logic of property: if I own this, the question of how much I may appropriately take is answered only by what I can take, not by what the resource system or the user community can sustain. The conceptual and psychological shift from ownership to stewardship is not merely semantic; it is motivationally consequential, shaping the frame within which individual resource decisions are made in ways that either support or undermine boundary discipline.


VI. Role Containment and the Rejection of Sovereignty Fantasy

The third competence required for shared governance—role containment—addresses a specific failure mode that is distinct from both externality blindness and boundary indiscipline, though it is related to both. Role containment is the capacity to exercise one’s legitimate function within a shared governance system without expanding that function into domains that belong to other roles, and without treating the authority appropriate to one’s role as a license for broader control over shared space and governance processes.

The failure of role containment produces what Paper 2 of this series terms the sovereignty fantasy: the progressive expansion of individual control over shared space and governance processes that is driven not by extractive interest in resources but by psychological need for control that shared governance frustrates. The sovereignty fantasy is recognizable in multiple institutional contexts: the committee member who attempts to exercise executive authority over a deliberative body, the department manager who appropriates organizational resources and processes that fall outside the department’s mandate, the homeowner association member who treats shared community standards as a vehicle for imposing personal preferences on neighbors. In each case, the driver is not greed for resources but the inability to tolerate the constrained and negotiated character of shared authority.

Role containment is the competence that the sovereignty fantasy lacks. It involves the capacity to exercise one’s legitimate role fully and effectively without collapsing the distinction between one’s own role and the governance system as a whole. This distinction is both cognitive and psychological. Cognitively, it requires an accurate understanding of what one’s role is, what authority it carries, and where its limits lie—an understanding that is often less clear in practice than governance frameworks assume. Psychologically, it requires the capacity to function within those limits without experiencing the limits themselves as threats to one’s identity or competence.

The psychological dimension of role containment has been examined in the organizational literature on role conflict and role overload (Kahn et al., 1964) and in the clinical literature on narcissistic personality organization (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1977). Both literatures identify the experience of role limits as potentially threatening to individuals whose sense of competence and identity depends on maintaining an expansive sense of agency and control. For such individuals, governance systems that require role containment—that define roles with clear limits and require deference to other roles for decisions that fall outside one’s own—are experienced as frustrating and demeaning rather than as appropriate expressions of shared governance. The response is often the kind of informal role expansion and sovereignty assertion that Paper 2 identifies as proto-enclosure behavior.

The formation required to support role containment involves the development of what Erikson (1963) termed ego integrity in the developmental sense: a stable sense of identity that does not depend on the continuous expansion of control, that can tolerate the experience of constrained agency without experiencing it as diminishment, and that can find competence and satisfaction in excellent performance within defined limits rather than requiring unlimited scope as a condition of self-worth. This is not a naturally given disposition; it is a developmental achievement that requires appropriate relational and institutional conditions.

In the context of commons governance, role containment requires governance institutions that clearly define roles, communicate those definitions to participants, and maintain them consistently enough that role expansion is visible and correctable before it becomes entrenched. But it also requires, at the level of participant formation, the development of a self-understanding that is constituted by role excellence rather than role expansion—a self-understanding in which doing one’s own job well within appropriate limits is a genuine source of satisfaction rather than a frustrating constraint on the expression of competence.

The stewardship tradition again provides a relevant formative frame. The biblical steward’s competence is defined by the excellence of management within the scope of entrustment: the faithful steward is the one who does well with what has been entrusted, not the one who expands the scope of entrustment without authorization (Luke 16:10). This framing supports role containment by defining excellence in terms of faithful performance within defined limits rather than in terms of the expansion of those limits—a definition that is motivationally quite different from the definition implied by an ownership frame, in which the expansion of control is a natural expression of proprietorial interest.


VII. Accepting Imperfect Coordination: The Hardest Formation Task

The fourth competence required for shared governance is, in practice, the most demanding: the capacity to accept that shared governance systems will not produce perfect outcomes, that coordination will often be imperfect, that decisions will sometimes be wrong, that one’s own legitimate interests will sometimes be inadequately served, and that none of these inevitable features of shared governance constitutes a sufficient reason to withdraw from the system, to defect to individual or extractive behavior, or to seek control as a substitute for tolerable but imperfect coordination.

This competence is the hardest because the alternatives—defection, withdrawal, or control-seeking—are genuinely attractive responses to the experience of imperfect coordination, and because the temptation to pursue them is strongest precisely when the governance system most needs participants to remain engaged and constructive. Commons governance systems that work do so not because they produce perfect outcomes but because their participants have developed the capacity to remain committed to the system through the experience of imperfect outcomes—to distinguish between failures that indicate the need for reform and failures that are endemic to the constrained and negotiated character of shared governance itself.

The theoretical literature on collective action identifies the vulnerability of cooperative systems to defection under conditions of uncertainty and perceived non-reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom et al., 1994). Governance participants who observe that others are not fully complying with shared rules face a genuine dilemma: continued compliance in the face of non-reciprocity places them at a disadvantage relative to defectors, while defection contributes to the collapse of the cooperative system from which they benefit. Axelrod’s (1984) analysis of the evolution of cooperation demonstrated that stable cooperation is possible under repeated interaction but is vulnerable to defection under conditions of uncertainty about others’ intentions and limited information about others’ behavior—precisely the conditions that characterize many real commons governance situations.

The capacity to tolerate imperfect coordination is, in part, a response to this structural vulnerability. It involves the cognitive capacity to distinguish between defection that is genuinely threatening to the governance system and deviation that is within the normal range of variance in any cooperative system; the affective capacity to manage the frustration and anxiety that perceived non-reciprocity produces without defaulting to retaliatory defection; and the motivational capacity to remain committed to the long-term project of shared governance even when short-term experience is disappointing.

These capacities are not developed in isolation. They require what psychologists studying attachment and relational development have identified as the capacity for secure functioning under stress: the ability to maintain cognitive clarity and constructive engagement in relationships and institutions that are experienced as frustrating or inadequate, without either anxious over-investment that collapses appropriate self-differentiation or avoidant withdrawal that sacrifices the relationship or institution entirely (Bowlby, 1988; Ainsworth, 1978). The developmental conditions that produce this capacity in individuals are those that provide sufficient relational security that the experience of frustration does not feel like abandonment, sufficient experience of repair after rupture that imperfect relationships are not treated as failed relationships, and sufficient practice of constructive engagement under conditions of conflict that the response to governance failure is reform rather than defection.

Sandel’s (1982) analysis of community membership is relevant here: participants in shared governance systems who have what Sandel calls a constitutive commitment to the community—whose identity is partly constituted by membership in the shared project—have a motivational resource for tolerating imperfect coordination that participants with merely instrumental commitment to the system do not. For the constitutively committed participant, the experience of imperfect coordination is experienced as a problem within a valued relationship rather than as evidence that the relationship is not worth maintaining. This motivational difference is significant for governance resilience under stress.

The institutional conditions that support this competence include the conflict resolution mechanisms that Ostrom (1990) identified as a design principle of successful commons—mechanisms that make constructive engagement with governance failure available as an alternative to defection—and the graduated sanction systems that allow deviation to be addressed without the kind of punitive response that escalates conflict rather than resolving it. But the institutional conditions are again necessary rather than sufficient; what they support is the exercise of a competence that must have been formed in participants before the institutional conditions can be effective.

A governance participant who has not developed the capacity to tolerate imperfect coordination will not be helped by accessible conflict resolution mechanisms; such a participant will experience the mechanisms themselves as additional arenas for sovereignty assertion rather than as resources for constructive resolution. The formation of tolerance for imperfect coordination is prior to the institutional design that the design principle literature specifies—and it is the prior condition that the design principle literature does not adequately address.


VIII. Stewardship and Asceticism: A Critical Distinction

Having identified the four competencies that shared governance requires, the paper now addresses a potential misunderstanding that the concept of stewardship as formed competence is likely to generate: the conflation of stewardship with asceticism.

Asceticism, in the tradition from which the term derives, refers to the practice of self-denial for its own sake—the disciplined suppression of desire, appetite, and self-interest as a spiritual or moral discipline. In its religious forms, asceticism has often been understood as the mortification of the flesh and the subordination of natural desire to spiritual discipline. In its secular forms, it appears as the suppression of individual preference in the name of collective good, or the valorization of self-sacrifice as such. Both forms share the basic structure of identifying individual desire or interest as the problem and its suppression as the solution.

The account of stewardship as formed competence that this paper proposes is not ascetic in this sense, and the distinction matters both theoretically and practically.

Theoretically, the distinction matters because asceticism and stewardship rest on fundamentally different accounts of the relationship between individual interest and shared governance. The ascetic account treats individual interest as inherently in tension with shared governance, requiring suppression for the sake of the collective. The stewardship account, as developed in this paper, treats the relevant capacities—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, tolerance of imperfect coordination—not as suppressions of individual interest but as expressions of a more adequately understood individual interest. The person who has developed externality awareness does not suppress the desire to extract resources; she perceives consequences that make unlimited extraction contrary to her own genuine interest as a participant in a sustainable shared system. The person who exercises boundary discipline does not sacrifice what is rightfully his; he has developed a self-understanding within which appropriating what is not rightfully his has no genuine attraction.

This is the point at which the virtue ethics tradition is most clearly relevant. For Aristotle, virtue is not the suppression of desire but its appropriate formation: the virtuous person desires the right things, in the right measure, at the right time, and in the right relation to others—not because desire has been suppressed but because it has been educated and formed (Aristotle, trans. 1999, II.3). The just person does not suppress the desire for more than her fair share; she has been formed in such a way that taking more than her fair share has no genuine attraction, because her sense of what is desirable has been shaped by her understanding of just relationship. The courageous person does not suppress fear; she has been formed in such a way that the things worth fearing are genuinely feared and the things not worth fearing do not occasion disproportionate anxiety.

Stewardship, understood as formed competence, operates in the same register. The genuine steward does not suppress extractive desire through an act of will; she has been formed in such a way that the role of steward—accountable governance of shared resources for the benefit of the community and in accordance with the terms of entrustment—is genuinely satisfying, and that the enclosure behaviors that asceticism would merely suppress have lost their attraction through the formation of an alternative self-understanding.

Practically, the distinction matters because asceticism as a governance strategy is fragile in precisely the ways that shared governance needs to be robust. Governance strategies that depend on participants suppressing their own interests through acts of will are strategies that will fail under conditions of sustained stress, resource scarcity, and perceived non-reciprocity—precisely the conditions under which governance resilience is most needed. The suppression of desire is a motivational resource that is subject to depletion; the formation of desire in accordance with a stewardship self-understanding is a motivational resource that is replenished by the very practices of shared governance that it supports.

This distinction also has implications for how the cultivation of stewardship competence is understood as a social and institutional project. If stewardship were asceticism, the relevant educational and formative project would be one of moral exhortation: convincing people to suppress their self-interest for the sake of the commons. This project has a poor track record, for the obvious reason that moral exhortation does not reliably produce genuine motivation—it produces, at best, temporary compliance and, at worst, the kind of moralistic performance that masks unchanged motivational structure. If stewardship is formed competence, the relevant project is the design of social practices, institutional contexts, and educational environments that genuinely form the competencies required for shared governance—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—by providing the conditions under which these competencies are practiced, reinforced, and made constitutive of participants’ self-understanding.

The difference between these two projects is the difference between governance that depends on moral performance and governance that depends on genuine formation. The first produces compliance; the second produces competence. And it is competence, not compliance, that commons governance requires.


IX. Institutional Conditions That Support Formation

The argument of this paper has insisted throughout that formation is prior to institutional design—that governance systems cannot substitute for the formative conditions that produce the competencies shared governance requires. This priority does not mean that institutional design is irrelevant to formation; on the contrary, institutional contexts are among the most powerful formative environments available, and the design of governance institutions has consequences for the formation of participants that are distinct from, and in some cases more important than, the governance consequences that design principle analysis typically addresses.

Several institutional features are particularly relevant to the formation of the competencies identified in this paper.

Participatory governance structures support the formation of all four competencies by creating regular occasions for the exercise of externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and coordination under imperfect conditions. Commons governance systems that require active participant engagement in monitoring, rule modification, and conflict resolution are systems that provide regular practice in the competencies required for shared governance—practice that is formative in the Aristotelian sense of constituting the habits through which stable dispositions are developed. Governance systems that reduce participant involvement to passive compliance with externally determined rules eliminate these formative occasions and, over time, atrophy the competencies that they do not provide occasions to exercise.

Transparent monitoring and feedback systems support the development of externality awareness by making the consequences of individual behavior visible to participants in ways that support the cognitive and perceptual dimensions of that competence. Governance systems that provide participants with regular, accurate, and accessible information about the state of shared resources—information that connects individual use patterns to resource condition—are systems that support the habit of consequence-tracking that externality awareness requires.

Narrative and memorial practices support the formation of stewardship identity by embedding individual resource use within a larger account of community history, responsibility, and relationship. Communities that maintain active memory of their governance history—including both successes and failures, and the stories that make both meaningful—provide participants with the narrative resources for a stewardship self-understanding that is constitutive rather than merely instrumental. The importance of such practices is documented across the diverse commons cases in the historical literature, from the oral traditions of Japanese fishing communities to the written records of Swiss alpine corporations, and their atrophy is consistently associated with the weakening of the governance systems they support.

Graduated entry and mentorship structures support formation by creating the conditions under which less experienced participants learn the competencies of shared governance from more experienced ones—not through explicit instruction alone but through the observation and imitation of practiced stewardship in action. Governance systems that provide structured pathways for entry into participation, and that embed new participants in relationships with experienced ones, are systems that make the transmission of formed competence from one generation of participants to the next possible. Systems that lack such structures must either import competence from elsewhere or face the progressive atrophy of the competencies on which they depend.

None of these institutional features is sufficient to produce formation without the relational and social conditions that the earlier sections of this paper identified as necessary. But they are the institutional expressions of those conditions—the ways in which governance systems can create and maintain the environments within which formation occurs.


X. Conclusion: What a Formation-Based Account Contributes

The argument of this paper can be stated in summary form as follows. Commons governance theory has been organized around two large theoretical intuitions—the Hobbesian intuition that self-interest makes shared governance chronically unstable, and the communitarian intuition that solidarity and shared values can recover sustainable commons from modernity’s fragmenting effects—neither of which provides an adequate foundation for the theory or practice of commons governance. The missing variable in both traditions is formation: the process by which human beings develop the specific competencies that shared governance requires.

The four competencies identified in this paper—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—are neither natural nor impossible. They are formed: developed through practice in appropriate social and institutional contexts, supported by governance structures that create occasions for their exercise, and constitutive of a stewardship self-understanding that is the motivational foundation of sustainable shared governance. The formation of these competencies is prior to institutional design in the sense that it is the condition without which institutional design cannot be effective; it is also shaped by institutional design in the sense that governance institutions are themselves powerful formative environments.

The concept of stewardship as formed competence is the constructive alternative to both Hobbesian resignation and communitarian nostalgia. It is non-utopian: it does not assume the best of human nature, does not depend on the recovery of pre-modern solidarity, and does not require the suppression of individual interest through moral exhortation. It is, however, genuinely hopeful: it insists that the competencies required for shared governance are real, learnable, and institutionally supportable—that the tragedy of the commons is not the inevitable expression of human nature but the contingent result of formative failure, and that formative failure is neither universal nor irreversible.

The practical implication is both demanding and specific. Commons governance that succeeds in the long term must attend not only to the design of incentive structures, monitoring systems, and sanction mechanisms, but to the formation of participants in the competencies that those structures presuppose. This attention to formation is not supplementary to governance design; it is its foundation. And the recognition of that foundation is the contribution that a formation-based account of stewardship makes to the theory and practice of commons governance.


Notes

Note 1. The term “formation” is used throughout this paper in its technical sense as a process of dispositional development rather than in its colloquial sense of training or education, though it includes both. The distinction matters because formation in the technical sense refers to the development of stable dispositions—habits of perception, motivation, and action—rather than the acquisition of information or skills that can be applied without dispositional change. A participant who has been trained in the rules of a commons governance system has received education; a participant who has developed the habit of externality awareness, boundary discipline, and constraint tolerance has undergone formation. Governance systems frequently provide the former while assuming the latter.

Note 2. The relationship between the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition and the institutional theory of commons governance has not been extensively developed in the literature, despite the obvious theoretical affinity between Aristotle’s account of virtue as formed through practice in social contexts and Ostrom’s account of governance competence as developed through participation in well-designed institutions. MacIntyre’s (1981) After Virtue provides the most sophisticated recent account of virtue ethics in relation to social practice theory and is an essential resource for developing this connection. The theological development of this connection, particularly in the Thomistic tradition, is relevant to the sixth paper in this series.

Note 3. The crowding-out effect documented by Bowles (2016) and independently by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) represents one of the most significant findings for the argument of this paper. If the introduction of external incentive structures undermines intrinsic normative motivation, then governance systems designed on the assumption that participants lack the relevant competencies—and that therefore rely on incentive structures to compensate for that lack—are likely to produce the very motivational deficit they assume, over time. The practical implication is that governance design should be calibrated to the actual motivational structure of participants, supporting existing competencies rather than assuming their absence.

Note 4. The distinction between stewardship and asceticism developed in Section VIII has theological as well as philosophical significance. The Christian ascetic tradition, in some of its forms, has treated the body, desire, and material creation as inherently problematic—as obstacles to spiritual development requiring suppression rather than as good things requiring formation and right ordering. The biblical tradition of stewardship does not support this view. The creation is good (Genesis 1); the mandate to steward it is a positive commission rather than a disciplinary constraint; and the formation required is the formation of desire in accordance with good creation rather than the suppression of desire as such. This theological distinction has practical implications for how stewardship formation is understood as a social project: it supports formation through positive practice and participation rather than through exhortation to self-denial.

Note 5. The four competencies identified in this paper are not equally difficult to form, and they are not equally well supported by existing institutional frameworks. Externality awareness is the most cognitively tractable and the most amenable to institutional support through monitoring and feedback design; it is also the most extensively studied in the environmental psychology and behavioral economics literatures. Tolerance of imperfect coordination is the most psychologically demanding and the least amenable to direct institutional support; it depends most heavily on the relational and developmental conditions that governance institutions can support only indirectly. This asymmetry has implications for governance design: systems that provide strong support for externality awareness while neglecting the formation of tolerance for imperfect coordination are systems that will be vulnerable to collapse under the conditions of stress and uncertainty that make that tolerance most necessary.

Note 6. The narrative and memorial practices identified in Section IX as institutional supports for formation deserve more attention than the commons governance literature has given them. The importance of community memory to governance resilience is implicit in much of the historical literature—the long institutional memory of successful commons is consistently noted—but has not been theorized as a formative mechanism. Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981) account of the role of narrative in constituting practice-based communities provides the theoretical resources for this analysis, and it is a direction that the present suite’s subsequent work will explore.

Note 7. The concept of secure functioning under stress, derived from the attachment theory tradition of Bowlby (1988) and Ainsworth (1978) and applied here to governance participation, points toward a dimension of the formation question that the commons governance literature has not addressed: the relationship between developmental history and governance competence. If the capacity to tolerate imperfect coordination under stress is substantially shaped by early relational experience—as the attachment literature suggests—then the formation of this competence in adults requires attention to the relational conditions of adult life as well as to governance institutional design. This observation does not translate into a simple therapeutic agenda for commons governance, but it does suggest that the conditions of social life within which governance participants are embedded—housing security, economic stability, relational support—are not merely background conditions for governance design but constitutive elements of the formative environment within which governance competence is sustained or lost.

Note 8. The Jubilee legislation of Leviticus 25, addressed more fully in the sixth paper of this series, is relevant to the argument of this paper because it represents the most fully developed legislative expression of stewardship as a constitutive rather than merely instrumental framework for resource management. The Jubilee provision—the return of land to its ancestral holders every fiftieth year, the release of debt, and the liberation of those enslaved through debt—is not merely a redistributive mechanism; it is a structural instantiation of the theological claim that the land belongs to YHWH and that human tenure is stewardship rather than ownership (Leviticus 25:23). This framing transforms the governance question from “how much am I entitled to extract?” to “how am I required to manage what has been entrusted to me?”—a transformation with precisely the motivational consequences that the analysis of stewardship vs. asceticism in Section VIII describes.


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From the Office Refrigerator to the Aquifer: Commons Failure as a Scale-Invariant Pattern


Abstract

Commons failure has been studied almost exclusively at the scale of natural resource systems—fisheries, aquifers, forests, grazing land—on the implicit assumption that the governance challenges of large-scale resource commons are structurally distinct from the governance challenges of smaller shared spaces and institutions. This paper contests that assumption by demonstrating that commons failure exhibits a scale-invariant pattern: the same four-stage structural sequence—private appropriation of shared resources or governance authority, externalization of maintenance costs onto the remaining commons community, moralization of contributors who continue to invest in shared governance, and narrative justification of enclosure as the rational response to commons inadequacy—recurs with remarkable fidelity across radically different scales, resource types, and institutional contexts. The paper argues that this scale-invariance is not a superficial analogy but reflects a common underlying dynamic: the formation failure analyzed in Paper 2 of this series produces the same behavioral sequence regardless of the scale at which it operates, because the psychological mechanism of enclosure—the externalization of internal disorder through domination of shared space—is not sensitive to the size or type of the resource being appropriated. The paper treats micro-scale vignettes—the office refrigerator, the shared living room, the departmental commons, the neighborhood association—as primary analytic data rather than illustrative metaphor, arguing that their analytic value derives from their accessibility to direct observation and from the clarity with which they expose the formative dynamics that large-scale commons research tends to obscure behind structural and incentive-structural analysis. It concludes that the scale-invariance of commons failure has significant methodological implications for commons governance research, significant practical implications for governance intervention, and significant theoretical implications for the formation-based account of commons governance that this suite develops.

Keywords: scale-invariance, commons failure, micro-scale commons, pattern analysis, private appropriation, externalized maintenance, moralization, narrative justification, formation failure, institutional commons


I. Introduction: The Scale Assumption and Its Costs

The literature on commons governance has a scale problem. Not in the sense of lacking attention to scale—the governance challenges of scaling from local commons to regional and global resource systems have received sustained theoretical and empirical attention, particularly in the work that has followed Ostrom’s (1990) foundational institutional analysis and the subsequent development of social-ecological systems frameworks (Ostrom, 2007; Folke et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 2003). The scale problem runs in the opposite direction: the literature has been so focused on large-scale natural resource systems that it has systematically neglected the smaller-scale commons that constitute the immediate governance environment of most people’s daily lives, and has thereby missed the analytic leverage that small-scale commons provide precisely because of their smallness.

The implicit assumption organizing this neglect is that commons governance at different scales involves structurally distinct problems—that the governance of a fishery or an aquifer raises analytical questions that have no meaningful relationship to the governance of an office kitchen or a residential common room, and that the study of one cannot illuminate the other. This assumption is institutionally reinforced by the disciplinary organization of commons research: environmental economists study fisheries, hydrologists study water governance, urban planners study neighborhood commons, organizational sociologists study workplace governance, and family therapists study household dynamics. The disciplinary boundaries reproduce the scale assumption by establishing separate analytical frameworks for commons at different scales and thereby making the cross-scale structural relationships invisible by construction.

This paper argues that the scale assumption is false, and that its falsity has significant costs for both commons governance theory and practice. The central claim is that commons failure exhibits a scale-invariant pattern—a four-stage structural sequence that recurs with sufficient fidelity across radically different scales and contexts to constitute a recognizable and analyzable phenomenon. The four stages are: private appropriation of shared resources or governance authority; externalization of maintenance costs onto the remaining commons community; moralization of contributors who continue to invest in shared governance; and narrative justification of the enclosure that the preceding stages have produced. This sequence appears in household shared spaces and in civilizational resource commons, in office kitchens and in municipal water systems, in residential associations and in global fisheries governance—not as a superficial metaphorical resemblance but as a structural identity that reflects a common underlying dynamic.

That common underlying dynamic is the formation failure analyzed in Paper 2 of this series: the absence of the psychological capacities for shared constraint—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—that shared governance requires. Formation failure produces the same behavioral sequence regardless of the scale at which it operates because the psychological mechanism of enclosure—the externalization of internal disorder through domination of shared space—is not sensitive to the size or type of the resource being appropriated. The herdsman who cannot tolerate the constrained and negotiated character of shared pasture governance and the corporation that cannot tolerate the accountability requirements of shared water governance are instances of the same formation failure, operating at different scales with consequences proportional to their scale but structurally identical in their mechanism.

The paper’s methodological claim—that micro-scale vignettes should be treated as primary analytic data rather than illustrative metaphor—follows directly from the scale-invariance thesis. If the pattern of commons failure is structurally identical across scales, then the study of commons failure at smaller scales provides genuine analytic access to the underlying dynamic, not merely rhetorical illustration of findings derived from larger-scale research. Micro-scale commons have analytic advantages that large-scale research cannot replicate: they are accessible to direct observation in ways that large-scale resource systems are not, they expose the formative and relational dynamics of commons failure with a clarity that is obscured by the institutional complexity of large-scale governance systems, and they permit the kind of dense ethnographic analysis that the formation-based account requires but that large-scale institutional analysis typically cannot provide.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops the theoretical case for scale-invariance as a genuine structural claim rather than a rhetorical device. Section III presents the four-stage failure sequence as a formal description applicable across scales. Sections IV through VII examine the sequence at four scales in turn: household and intimate commons, organizational and workplace commons, meso-institutional commons at the neighborhood and municipal level, and macro-scale natural resource and environmental commons. Section VIII addresses the methodological implications of the scale-invariance thesis for commons research. Section IX examines the practical implications for governance intervention. Section X concludes with a statement of the theoretical implications for the formation-based account that this suite develops.


II. Scale-Invariance as a Theoretical Claim

The claim of scale-invariance requires precise statement to distinguish it from two weaker claims with which it might be confused. The weaker claims are: first, that commons failure at different scales is metaphorically similar—that the dynamics of large-scale resource commons can be illuminated by analogy with smaller-scale shared governance situations; and second, that commons failure exhibits some common structural features across scales while differing in other significant respects. The claim of this paper is stronger than either: that commons failure exhibits a structurally identical four-stage sequence across scales, that this identity reflects a common underlying mechanism rather than surface resemblance, and that the study of commons failure at any scale provides genuine analytic access to the underlying mechanism rather than merely illustrative analogy.

The theoretical case for this strong claim rests on three arguments. The first is that the underlying mechanism of commons failure—formation failure producing the sovereignty fantasy that Paper 2 analyzed—is a psychological mechanism that operates at the level of individual actors regardless of the scale of the commons they participate in. The corporation that appropriates shared water resources and the roommate who appropriates shared refrigerator space are both exhibiting the same basic behavioral pattern: the failure of boundary discipline that produces the progressive expansion of individual appropriation beyond legitimate entitlement. The scale of the resource being appropriated affects the magnitude of the consequences but not the structure of the mechanism that produces the appropriation.

The second argument is that the four-stage failure sequence reflects a logic of social interaction that is equally available to actors at any scale. Private appropriation generates externalized maintenance costs because the logic of free-riding on shared governance investment is not scale-specific: whether the shared resource is a refrigerator or a fishery, the actor who appropriates more than her share of the resource while contributing less than her share of the maintenance costs is taking advantage of the same structural possibility—the gap between individual benefit and collective cost that shared governance systems create. The moralization and narrative justification stages are equally scale-general: the rhetorical grammar of enclosure analyzed in Paper 4 of this series is deployed at every scale at which enclosure occurs, because its function—legitimating appropriation by attributing commons failure to the character defects of contributors—is as necessary at the household scale as at the civilizational scale.

The third argument is empirical and will be developed in the case analysis of Sections IV through VII: the four-stage sequence appears with sufficient structural fidelity across a range of scales and contexts to support the claim of structural identity rather than mere metaphorical resemblance. The fidelity is not perfect—each scale and context introduces specific variations in the sequence’s expression that the analysis must account for—but the variations are surface variations within a stable structural pattern rather than modifications of the pattern itself.

The theoretical resources most directly relevant to the scale-invariance claim are drawn from systems theory, fractal geometry, and the study of complex adaptive systems. Mandelbrot’s (1982) analysis of fractal geometry demonstrated that certain natural patterns—coastlines, mountain ranges, tree branching—exhibit self-similarity across scales: the pattern visible at any scale of observation is structurally identical to the pattern visible at other scales. The claim of scale-invariance in commons failure is structurally analogous: the pattern of commons failure visible at the household scale is structurally identical to the pattern visible at the civilizational scale, not because the social processes involved are natural in the physical sense but because they are driven by a common underlying mechanism that generates the same sequence regardless of the scale at which it operates.

Bateson’s (1972) concept of the pattern that connects—the meta-pattern that relates the patterns visible at different levels of biological and social organization—provides a related theoretical framework. Bateson argued that the most important level of analysis for understanding complex systems is not the level at which specific phenomena are observed but the level at which the pattern connecting phenomena at different levels can be identified. The scale-invariant failure sequence is precisely such a connecting pattern: its identification at the meta-level of structural analysis connects phenomena—household commons failure, organizational commons failure, natural resource commons failure—that discipline-specific analysis tends to treat as separate and unrelated.

Kauffman’s (1993) analysis of self-organization in complex adaptive systems provides a third relevant framework. Kauffman demonstrated that certain behavioral patterns emerge spontaneously across a wide range of complex adaptive systems—not because of specific causal connections between instances of the pattern but because the underlying dynamics of the systems are structurally similar in ways that generate similar emergent patterns. The four-stage failure sequence in commons governance may be understood as an emergent pattern of this kind: a behavioral sequence that emerges wherever the underlying conditions—inadequate formation, shared resources, and the availability of private appropriation—are present, regardless of the scale or type of the specific governance system in which they appear.


III. The Four-Stage Failure Sequence: A Formal Description

Before examining the sequence at specific scales, the paper requires a precise formal description of each stage and its relationship to the others. The description that follows is intended to be scale-neutral: each stage is defined in terms that apply equally to household and civilizational commons, to physical and institutional shared resources, and to formal and informal governance arrangements.

Stage One: Private Appropriation

Private appropriation is the first stage of the failure sequence and its initiating event. It consists in the unilateral claim by one or more actors to a disproportionate share of the shared resource, or to governance authority over the shared resource that exceeds the actor’s legitimate entitlement under the commons governance system. Private appropriation is distinguished from legitimate claim assertion—the exercise of one’s proper entitlement within the governance system—by two features: it exceeds legitimate entitlement, and it is unilateral rather than negotiated through the governance system’s legitimate processes.

Private appropriation takes two characteristic forms that frequently occur together: resource appropriation, in which a disproportionate share of the material shared resource is claimed; and governance appropriation, in which disproportionate authority over the governance of the shared resource is claimed. The sovereignty fantasy analyzed in Paper 2 typically drives both forms simultaneously: the actor who cannot tolerate the constrained and negotiated character of shared governance seeks both to take more of the resource and to control who else can take how much. The two forms of appropriation are mutually reinforcing: resource appropriation reduces the resource available to other actors, weakening their investment in the governance system; governance appropriation reduces other actors’ meaningful participation in governance, weakening the accountability mechanisms through which resource appropriation would otherwise be constrained.

Stage Two: Externalized Maintenance

The second stage follows structurally from the first: as one or more actors appropriate a disproportionate share of the shared resource or its governance authority, the costs of maintaining the commons—the labor, attention, and resource investment required to keep the shared governance system functioning—are progressively externalized onto the remaining commons community. This externalization has two dimensions. The material dimension is the literal underfunding of commons maintenance: the actor who takes more than her share of the refrigerator space and contributes nothing to cleaning it has externalized the maintenance cost of the space she dominates onto the roommates who remain invested in the shared space’s viability. The governance dimension is the increasing burden on remaining participants: as some actors withdraw from governance investment, those who remain must contribute more to sustain the governance system at a level adequate to the commons’ needs, producing a progressive asymmetry between the contributions and entitlements of different participants.

The externalization of maintenance creates a structural dynamic that Olson (1965) identified in his analysis of collective action: as maintenance costs are externalized, the remaining contributors experience declining returns on their governance investment—they are doing more to sustain a commons that is producing less for them, because the appropriating actors are extracting an increasing share of what the commons produces. This declining return creates the incentive structure for sequential defection: each remaining contributor calculates that her contribution is subsidizing the appropriating actors’ extraction, and the individually rational response to this calculation is to reduce or eliminate her contribution. This sequential defection is the mechanism through which the commons transitions from Stage Two to Stage Three.

Stage Three: Moralization of Contributors

The third stage is the moralization of the contributors who continue to invest in shared governance—a development that Paper 4 of this series analyzed as the central mechanism of enclosure legitimation. As the commons degrades under the combined pressure of private appropriation and externalized maintenance, and as some contributors begin the sequential defection that declining returns incentivize, the appropriating actors deploy the rhetorical grammar of enclosure to represent the degrading commons as evidence of contributor irresponsibility rather than as the consequence of their own appropriation.

The moralization at Stage Three has a specific and important function that distinguishes it from general moral discourse about commons governance: it preemptively delegitimates the claims of those contributors who have maintained the highest investment in shared governance. These actors—the ones who have continued to clean the shared refrigerator, to attend the governance meetings, to invest in the maintenance of the shared resource—are precisely the actors whose governance investment represents the most compelling evidence against the appropriating actors’ narrative of contributor irresponsibility. Their moralization—the representation of their continued investment as naïvety, enabling behavior, or evidence of their own inferior status within the commons—eliminates the most potentially disruptive counter-evidence to the enclosure narrative before it can be effectively deployed.

The moralization of Stage Three also performs the function identified in Paper 2 as the projection of internal disorder onto the governance system: the appropriating actor’s own formation failure—her inadequate constraint tolerance, her externalization of maintenance costs, her governance appropriation—is projected onto the commons system and onto its remaining contributors, who are represented as the source of the disorder that the appropriating actor’s enclosure is designed to correct.

Stage Four: Narrative Justification of Enclosure

The fourth stage completes the sequence by providing the narrative framework within which the enclosure that the preceding stages have produced—or are about to produce—is represented as the rational, inevitable, and morally appropriate response to the commons failure that the narrative attributes to contributor irresponsibility. The narrative justification draws on the enclosure grammar analyzed in Paper 4: the disorder premise, the efficiency claim, and the naturalization of private management as the destination of rational governance analysis are deployed to convert the political choice of enclosure into the technical conclusion of competent governance assessment.

The narrative justification at Stage Four is not merely retrospective—it is not only a post-hoc rationalization of enclosure that has already occurred. It is also prospective and constitutive: it establishes the interpretive framework within which subsequent governance developments will be understood, making the continuation of enclosure appear as the natural consequence of the governance analysis rather than as a political choice, and making resistance to enclosure appear as the expression of irrationality, sentimentality, or special pleading that the moralization of Stage Three has already established as the characteristic failure of the commons’ remaining contributors.

The four stages form a closed and self-reinforcing sequence: the narrative justification of Stage Four provides the legitimating framework within which further appropriation—Stage One again, at a higher level of intensity or a larger scale—appears as governance correction rather than as enclosure. The sequence is recursive: each cycle through the four stages consolidates the appropriating actors’ position, weakens the governance resources available to the commons community, and deepens the narrative framework within which resistance to enclosure is delegitimated.


IV. Household and Intimate Commons: The Micro-Scale Evidence

The household is the most immediate commons environment for most people—the shared space of kitchen, living room, bathroom, and residential common areas that must be governed through ongoing negotiation among people with different preferences, different investment levels, and different capacities for the constrained and negotiated character of shared domestic life. Household commons are also the most theoretically neglected in the commons governance literature: they appear, when they appear at all, as illustrative analogies rather than as objects of systematic governance analysis. The scale-invariance thesis implies that this neglect is analytically costly, and the present section undertakes the kind of systematic governance analysis of household commons that the literature has not provided.

The office or household refrigerator is the paradigmatic micro-scale commons: a shared resource with finite capacity, multiple users with competing claims, governance requirements for its maintenance and use, and a characteristic failure sequence that any person who has lived in shared housing or worked in an office will recognize immediately. The refrigerator commons is bounded, clearly defined, and simple enough in its governance requirements that the four-stage failure sequence is visible with a clarity that the institutional complexity of large-scale resource commons tends to obscure.

The pattern of failure in shared refrigerator commons is sufficiently regular to constitute a recognizable social script. Stage One—private appropriation—begins with a gradual and typically unannounced claim to a disproportionate share of the refrigerator’s space: the occupant who places a large container in the most accessible location, who stores items that expand over time to occupy spaces not originally claimed, or who uses the shared resource at times or in ways that consistently preclude access by other users. The appropriation is rarely announced as such; it presents itself as a series of individually reasonable choices—this is the only place this item fits, these things need to be kept together, this space was empty so I used it—that cumulatively constitute a pattern of disproportionate appropriation.

Stage Two—externalized maintenance—follows as the appropriating occupant’s disproportionate use of the space is not matched by disproportionate contribution to the refrigerator’s maintenance: the cleaning, the disposal of expired items, the reorganization that the management of a shared food storage system requires. The maintenance costs are externalized onto the other occupants, who must either invest additional effort to maintain the shared resource under conditions of disproportionate use or accept a deteriorating commons—a refrigerator that is increasingly inaccessible, increasingly disorganized, and increasingly inadequate as a shared resource.

Stage Three—moralization—appears as the remaining occupants who continue to invest in the refrigerator’s maintenance are represented, explicitly or implicitly, as having a different and somehow lower relationship to the shared resource than the appropriating occupant: they are the ones who care about these things, who are fussy about the refrigerator, who need to learn to be more flexible or more practical. Their continued investment in the shared resource—the very investment that is maintaining the commons at a level adequate to the remaining users’ needs—is reframed as a personal quirk, an excessive attachment, or evidence of their lower social status within the shared household.

Stage Four—narrative justification—completes the sequence as the appropriating occupant constructs an account of the refrigerator governance system that represents her appropriation as the rational adaptation to a commons that was inadequately managed before her intervention, and represents the remaining occupants’ investment in shared governance as the expression of attachment to an inefficient system that her private management has improved. The narrative may be explicit—articulated in the shared household’s discussions of domestic governance—or implicit, expressed through the behavioral norms that the appropriating occupant’s conduct has established as the de facto governance system of the shared space.

The analytic value of this micro-scale vignette is not that it proves the scale-invariance thesis by itself—a single household case cannot bear that argumentative weight—but that it exposes the mechanism of the failure sequence with a clarity that large-scale research cannot provide. In the refrigerator case, the formation failure is directly observable: the appropriating occupant’s behavior exhibits the inadequate boundary discipline, the externalization of maintenance costs, and the moralization of remaining contributors that the formation-based account predicts. The psychological mechanism is available to direct inspection rather than being mediated by the institutional complexity of large-scale governance systems.

Hochschild’s (1989) foundational analysis of the second shift—the disproportionate burden of domestic labor that falls on women in heterosexual households—provides important empirical context for the household commons analysis. Hochschild documented with precision the way in which the maintenance costs of domestic commons are systematically externalized onto women within households characterized by a gendered division of domestic labor: the emotional work, the organizational labor, and the physical maintenance of the domestic commons are contributed disproportionately by women while the governance authority over the domestic space—the decisions about how it is organized, what it contains, and how it is used—is exercised disproportionately by men. The pattern exhibits all four stages of the failure sequence at the household scale: disproportionate resource appropriation, externalized maintenance, moralization of the contributor (the woman is fussy, controlling, or unable to relax about domestic standards), and narrative justification that represents the existing arrangement as natural, efficient, or the expression of different but equally valid approaches to domestic life.

DeVault’s (1991) analysis of feeding the family as a social organization of gender extends Hochschild’s analysis to the specific commons of household food management—a commons whose governance includes not only the physical refrigerator space but the planning, shopping, cooking, and emotional labor associated with sustaining a shared nutritional commons. DeVault’s findings document the same pattern: the governance labor of the food commons is externalized onto women while the benefits of that commons are shared, and the narrative justification represents this arrangement as the natural expression of different interests and capacities rather than as the systematic appropriation of governance labor that it constitutes.

The residential common spaces of shared housing—the living room, the bathroom, the laundry room, the entrance hallway—exhibit the four-stage sequence with variations that are analytically revealing. The living room commons presents a governance challenge that the refrigerator commons does not: it is a space that must be simultaneously used and maintained, and the governance of simultaneous use—the negotiation of competing preferences for temperature, sound level, social activity, and aesthetic arrangement—creates governance demands that the management of exclusive-use storage space does not. The failure sequence in living room governance typically begins with the governance appropriation characteristic of Stage One rather than with material resource appropriation: the actor who establishes the norms of living room use—the sound level, the social expectations, the acceptable range of aesthetic arrangement—without negotiation through shared governance processes has appropriated governance authority over a shared space in a way that the subsequent stages of the sequence will consolidate and legitimate.

Goffman’s (1959) analysis of front stage and back stage regions in social performance is relevant to understanding the household commons as a governance challenge. Goffman’s distinction between the front stage—the region where social performance is managed for an audience—and the back stage—the region where the performance apparatus is maintained and where performers can relax the demands of front stage management—implies that the household is both a front stage (managed for visitors and social presentation) and a back stage (the site of the maintenance work that front stage performance requires). The governance of household commons is complicated by this dual character: the appropriating actor who dominates the front stage governance of the household—whose preferences determine the aesthetic arrangement and social norms of the shared space as it is presented to visitors—may simultaneously externalize the back stage maintenance labor onto other household members, creating the pattern of disproportionate governance authority combined with externalized maintenance costs that Stage One and Stage Two of the failure sequence describe.


V. Organizational and Workplace Commons: The Meso-Micro Scale

The organizational commons—the shared resources of office and workplace environments, including physical space, equipment, information systems, budget, and the governance processes through which organizational decisions are made—represents a scale of commons governance between the intimate scale of the household and the institutional scale of neighborhood and municipal governance. Organizational commons are significant analytically because they are governed within formal institutional structures that create a level of governance complexity not present in household commons, while remaining small enough that the formation-based dynamics of the failure sequence are directly observable without the institutional obscuration characteristic of larger-scale governance systems.

The office kitchen commons exhibits the four-stage failure sequence with particular clarity because it combines the physical shared resource challenges of the household kitchen with the organizational governance context that the household lacks. The appropriation of office kitchen commons frequently takes the governance form characteristic of Stage One: the actor who establishes the informal norms of kitchen use—who decides what items can be left in shared storage, what cleaning standards are expected, and whose food claims take precedence in cases of refrigerator scarcity—without formal governance process has appropriated governance authority over the shared space in ways that will be consolidated through the subsequent stages. The externalization of maintenance at Stage Two is documented in organizational research: Tenbrunsel et al. (1997) found consistent patterns of free-riding in the maintenance of shared office resources, with contributors to maintenance consistently undercompensated relative to non-contributors by the implicit governance norms of office culture.

The departmental commons—the shared budget, staff time, equipment, and organizational infrastructure of an academic department, a government agency, or a corporate division—presents a more complex governance challenge that the failure sequence describes at a higher level of institutional elaboration. Stage One appropriation in departmental commons characteristically takes the governance form: the actor—typically a senior faculty member, a division manager, or a unit head—who progressively concentrates departmental resource allocation decisions in her own hands without formal governance process has appropriated governance authority in ways that allow Stage Two externalization to proceed without the accountability mechanisms that formal governance would provide. The externalization of departmental maintenance—the administrative labor, the committee service, the advising and mentoring work that sustains the department as a shared governance community—onto junior members while senior members appropriate a disproportionate share of the department’s prestige, resources, and governance authority, is a pattern documented in the organizational sociology of academic departments (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) and in the broader literature on organizational power and resource allocation (Pfeffer, 1981).

Pfeffer’s (1981) analysis of power in organizations provides a theoretical framework for understanding the institutional dimension of organizational commons failure. Pfeffer argued that organizational resources—budget, positions, space, and decision-making authority—are allocated through political processes in which the relative power of actors and coalitions determines outcomes that are subsequently legitimated as the rational allocation of organizational resources in pursuit of organizational goals. The narrative justification characteristic of Stage Four in organizational commons failure is the specific application of this broader political legitimation process to the enclosure of organizational commons: the appropriating actor’s disproportionate claim to organizational resources is represented as the rational allocation of resources to high-value activities, the moralization of remaining contributors represents their governance investment as excessive or misdirected, and the enclosure of organizational commons is naturalized as the efficient organization of organizational resources that good management requires.

The informational commons of organizational life—the shared knowledge, institutional memory, professional networks, and organizational learning that constitute the epistemic commons on which organizational governance depends—is subject to the four-stage failure sequence in ways that have received systematic attention in the knowledge management literature. Stage One appropriation of the informational commons characteristically takes the form of knowledge hoarding: the actor who withholds relevant information from shared organizational processes, who develops personal rather than shared professional networks, or who cultivates expertise in organizational processes in ways that make her indispensable rather than in ways that develop shared governance capacity, has appropriated the informational commons in forms that generate the Stage Two externalization of governance costs (other actors must manage organizational processes with inadequate information) and the Stage Three moralization (those who continue to share information freely are represented as lacking strategic intelligence or as failing to protect their own interests).

Wenger’s (1998) analysis of communities of practice—the social learning communities through which professional knowledge and governance competence are developed and transmitted—is directly relevant to the informational commons analysis. Wenger’s account of the conditions under which communities of practice sustain productive shared learning—conditions that include legitimate peripheral participation, shared repertoire, mutual engagement, and joint enterprise—describes precisely the governance conditions under which the informational commons is maintained rather than enclosed. The failure of communities of practice—their transformation from shared learning communities into competitive knowledge-hoarding environments—exhibits the four-stage sequence: the appropriation of shared knowledge for competitive advantage, the externalization of knowledge development costs onto junior members, the moralization of knowledge-sharing as naïvety, and the narrative justification of knowledge hoarding as appropriate professional self-management.

The physical workspace commons—the shared office, the meeting room, the collaborative work area—has been transformed significantly by the development of open-plan office design and, more recently, by the shift to hybrid work arrangements that have created new forms of workspace commons governance. Baldry’s (1999) analysis of office space as a site of power relations documented the way in which the governance of physical office space reflects and reproduces organizational hierarchies: the appropriation of premium workspace by senior actors, the externalization of workspace maintenance onto administrative and support staff, and the narrative justification of hierarchical workspace allocation as the rational distribution of organizational resources according to organizational value. The open-plan office, presented in its organizational rhetoric as a democratization of workspace—a commons made available to all organizational members rather than parceled out in private offices—exhibits the failure sequence in its own characteristic form: the appropriation of the most desirable workspace locations by actors with sufficient organizational power to enforce informal claims, the externalization of the ambient costs of open-plan work (noise, interruption, reduced privacy and concentration) onto those with insufficient organizational power to resist them, and the moralization of those who resist open-plan work as individualistic, antisocial, or resistant to the collaborative culture that the design is meant to foster.


VI. Neighborhood and Municipal Commons: The Meso-Institutional Scale

The neighborhood and municipal commons represents the scale at which the governance of shared space and resources transitions from informal or semi-formal institutional arrangements to formal governance institutions with recognized legal authority, explicit procedural requirements, and enforceable rules. At this scale, the four-stage failure sequence operates within and through formal governance institutions in ways that make the institutional dimension of commons failure—the capture of formal governance institutions by the interests of appropriating actors—particularly visible.

The homeowners association—the governance institution through which residential common interests in planned residential developments are managed—is among the most extensively documented sites of meso-institutional commons failure in the American context. McKenzie (1994) provided the foundational sociological analysis of the homeowners association as a governance institution: a private government with substantial authority over its members, organized around the management of shared amenities and the enforcement of architectural and behavioral standards, and structurally vulnerable to capture by the interests of the most engaged—and typically the most property-value-maximizing—members of the residential community. The failure sequence in homeowners association governance characteristically begins with the governance appropriation of Stage One: the self-selected minority of association members who attend governance meetings, serve on committees, and participate in the ongoing management of the association’s affairs progressively acquire governance authority disproportionate to their numbers and their representativeness of the association’s membership.

The Stage Two externalization in homeowners association governance is the externalization of governance labor costs: the members who do not participate in association governance—who contribute their assessments but not their time and attention to governance processes—free-ride on the governance labor of active participants while retaining the full benefit of the association’s governance outputs (maintained common areas, enforced architectural standards, managed property values). This free-riding is structurally enabled by the association’s governance design: in most homeowners associations, the benefits of association governance are available to all members regardless of governance participation, creating the incentive structure for precisely the kind of free-riding that Olson (1965) identified as the central challenge of collective action.

The Stage Three moralization in homeowners association governance is directed not at the non-participants who free-ride on governance labor—their non-participation is typically represented as a governance problem to be solved through outreach and incentive—but at the participants who invest most heavily in governance processes that challenge the interests of property-value-maximizing members. The neighbor who raises concerns about the exclusionary implications of architectural standards, the member who advocates for governance processes more accessible to working members, the resident who contests the association’s enforcement priorities as serving the preferences of dominant members rather than the shared interests of the association community—these actors are represented through the Stage Three moralization as troublemakers, complainers, or failures to understand the proper purpose of the association’s governance, rather than as commons contributors whose governance investment the association should value.

The municipal commons—the parks, roads, libraries, public transportation, water and sewer systems, and governance institutions through which shared urban life is organized—exhibits the four-stage failure sequence at a scale and with a complexity that makes the individual stages harder to observe directly but no less structurally present. Davis’s (1990) analysis of Los Angeles as a privatized city documented the progressive enclosure of urban commons through the combination of formal land use regulation and informal governance capture: the concentration of political influence in the hands of growth coalitions whose interests in real estate development progressively captured municipal governance institutions and redirected them from the management of shared urban commons toward the production of development opportunities for private capital. The Stage One appropriation in the Los Angeles case was governance appropriation: the progressive concentration of meaningful municipal governance authority in informal networks of developers, landowners, and growth coalition members who operated through but were not accountable to the formal municipal governance institutions that nominally governed the city’s shared resources.

The municipal park commons presents the four-stage failure sequence in a particularly instructive form because parks are explicitly designed as commons—as shared public spaces available to all residents regardless of economic status, social position, or cultural background—and their failure to function as genuine commons, where it occurs, is therefore visible as a governance failure rather than as the natural consequence of a resource that was never intended to serve commons functions. Low et al.’s (2005) ethnographic study of urban parks documented the ways in which parks that are formally available to all urban residents are effectively governed in ways that serve the preferences of dominant user groups—typically middle-class, white, and organized—at the expense of other users whose governance participation is structurally disadvantaged. The failure sequence proceeds through the characteristic stages: the appropriation of governance authority over park use by organized user groups, the externalization of park maintenance costs through the advocacy for volunteer maintenance programs that substitute for public maintenance investment, the moralization of less organized users as insufficiently invested in park governance, and the narrative justification of differential park quality across neighborhoods as the rational allocation of municipal resources to parks whose users are most invested in their maintenance.

Water governance at the municipal and regional scale provides the most extensively documented case of the four-stage failure sequence at the meso-institutional scale, and the case that most directly connects the meso-scale analysis to the macro-scale natural resource commons analysis of the following section. Bakker’s (2010) comparative analysis of urban water governance documented the progression of the failure sequence in water systems across multiple national contexts: the Stage One appropriation of governance authority over municipal water systems by interests oriented toward privatization and market integration, the Stage Two externalization of water system maintenance costs onto the public sector while private operators extracted profit from the system’s commercial operations, the Stage Three moralization of public sector water management as inefficient and irresponsible, and the Stage Four narrative justification of privatization as the rational response to public sector failure—a failure that the narrative systematically misrepresented as the consequence of inherent public sector incapacity rather than of the deliberate underfunding and governance capture that had preceded privatization.

Ostrom’s (1990) case studies of appropriator-governed water systems—the Spanish huertas, the Philippine zanjera irrigation associations, and the California groundwater systems—provide important comparative evidence that the meso-institutional commons failure sequence is not inevitable. These cases document governance systems that have successfully maintained shared water resources over extended periods through institutional arrangements that prevent the four-stage failure sequence by maintaining broad governance participation, enforcing boundary discipline on resource appropriation, distributing maintenance costs equitably, and providing conflict resolution mechanisms that address grievances before they accumulate to the moralization and narrative justification stages. The contrast between these successful governance cases and the failure cases documented by Bakker reinforces the formation-based thesis: the difference between commons governance success and failure at the meso-institutional scale is not the nature of the resource but the presence or absence of the governance capacities—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—that sustained commons governance requires.


VII. Natural Resource and Environmental Commons: The Macro Scale

The macro-scale natural resource and environmental commons—fisheries, aquifers, forests, grazing lands, and the atmospheric and oceanic commons of global environmental governance—are the scales at which the commons governance literature has been most extensively developed, and the scale at which the consequences of commons failure are most catastrophic and least reversible. The analysis of the four-stage failure sequence at this scale draws on an extensive empirical literature and does not require the same degree of analytical reconstruction that the preceding sections have provided for smaller-scale commons; what the scale-invariance thesis contributes at the macro scale is not primarily new empirical content but the integration of macro-scale commons failure into the common analytical framework that the preceding sections have developed.

The Pacific fisheries provide one of the most thoroughly documented cases of the four-stage failure sequence at the macro scale. Stage One—private appropriation—in Pacific fisheries governance has taken two characteristic forms. The first is the progressive expansion of individual fishing effort beyond the sustainable yield limits established by fisheries governance institutions: the individual vessel that fishes beyond its licensed quota, that fishes in areas or seasons where governance rules restrict access, or that employs gear that captures non-target species whose bycatch constitutes an uncompensated externalization of ecological cost onto the shared fishery. The second form is the governance appropriation characteristic of Stage One: the concentration of influence over fisheries governance institutions in the hands of the largest and most capitalintensive fishing operations, whose interests in maximizing extraction consistently conflict with the governance requirements of sustainable fisheries management.

Pálsson and Helgason’s (1995) analysis of Icelandic fisheries governance documented the Stage One governance appropriation with particular precision: the introduction of individual transferable quotas—a governance mechanism designed to align private interest with sustainable harvest by creating property rights in fish—produced the progressive concentration of quota ownership in the hands of large fishing corporations, which then exercised governance authority over the fisheries governance system through their control of the quota-based institutional framework. The governance appropriation was structural rather than informal: the design of the quota system itself generated the concentration of governance authority that constituted Stage One appropriation, by creating a market for quota that larger and more capitalized operations were better positioned to exploit than smaller, community-based fishing operations.

Stage Two—externalized maintenance—in Pacific fisheries governance takes the form of the systematic externalization of fisheries restoration costs onto the public sector and the broader commons community: the costs of habitat restoration, stock assessment, enforcement, and the social support for fishing communities displaced by overfishing are borne by public institutions and taxpayers rather than by the fishing operations whose extraction has produced the need for restoration. Mansfield’s (2004) analysis of neoliberal fisheries governance documented this externalization pattern in detail: the privatization of fishing rights through quota systems externalized the social costs of fisheries management while privatizing the economic benefits of access to the fishery, producing a governance arrangement in which the fishing industry bore an increasingly small share of the costs of fisheries governance while receiving an increasingly large share of its benefits.

Stage Three—moralization of contributors—in macro-scale fisheries governance is directed primarily at the small-scale and artisanal fishing communities whose governance practices are most compatible with sustainable fisheries management and whose displacement by industrial fishing is most damaging to the long-term health of the fishery. These communities, whose fishing practices are adapted to local ecological conditions and whose governance of local fishing grounds has sustained productive fisheries for generations, are represented in the Stage Three moralization as traditional, inefficient, and insufficiently capitalized to participate in the modern governance of a fishery that requires scientific management and market-oriented institutions. Berkes’s (1999) analysis of the governance knowledge embedded in traditional fishing communities directly contests this moralization: Berkes documented the ecological sophistication of traditional fisheries governance practices and the ways in which their displacement by industrial fishing—justified by the Stage Three moralization of traditional practitioners as technologically inadequate—systematically degraded the ecological knowledge base on which sustainable fisheries governance depends.

The California groundwater commons provides a case of the four-stage failure sequence in which the structural dynamics are visible with particular clarity because groundwater governance has historically been less formally institutionalized than surface water governance, making the failure sequence less obscured by formal governance complexity. Hanak et al.’s (2011) analysis of California groundwater governance documented the progressive appropriation of groundwater resources by agricultural and urban users whose extraction consistently exceeded sustainable yield levels, the externalization of aquifer depletion costs onto communities dependent on groundwater for domestic supply, the moralization of those communities’ governance claims as parochial or uninformed, and the narrative justification of agricultural groundwater appropriation as the economically and technically rational use of a resource that traditional governance had managed inadequately.

The atmospheric commons—the shared capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gas emissions without catastrophic climate disruption—represents the macro-scale commons failure of greatest contemporary significance, and one where the four-stage failure sequence is visible at the civilizational scale. Stage One appropriation is the appropriation by high-emission economies and industries of a disproportionate share of the atmosphere’s carbon absorption capacity—an appropriation that is not governed by any institutional framework capable of enforcing the boundary discipline that sustainable commons governance would require. Stage Two externalization is the externalization of the costs of this appropriation onto those least responsible for it: the low-emission developing countries and future generations who bear a disproportionate share of the consequences of climate disruption while contributing a disproportionately small share of the emissions that produce it. Stage Three moralization in climate governance is directed at the advocates for binding emissions constraints—the governance contributors who invest in the maintenance of the atmospheric commons by advocating for the institutional mechanisms that would constrain appropriation—who are represented as economically naïve, ideologically motivated, or insufficiently attentive to the legitimate development interests of high-emission economies. And Stage Four narrative justification represents the failure to constrain emissions as the rational adaptation to the governance challenges of a truly global commons that cannot be effectively governed through binding constraints, naturalizing the continuation of appropriation as the realistic alternative to utopian governance frameworks that responsible actors cannot be expected to accept.


VIII. Methodological Implications: Vignettes as Primary Data

The scale-invariance thesis has significant methodological implications for commons governance research that the paper must address explicitly. The most significant is the claim that micro-scale vignettes—the office refrigerator, the shared living room, the departmental commons—should be treated as primary analytic data rather than as illustrative metaphor. This claim is counterintuitive within the conventional methodological hierarchies of social science, in which large-scale quantitative analysis of natural resource systems is typically treated as the evidential gold standard while micro-scale qualitative observation is treated as preliminary or supplementary.

The case for treating micro-scale vignettes as primary data rests on several arguments. The first is the argument from observational accessibility. Macro-scale commons governance systems are observed primarily through data that are themselves products of governance processes—fishery catch statistics, groundwater level measurements, satellite imagery of land cover change—that are several steps removed from the formative and relational dynamics that the formation-based account identifies as the primary causes of commons failure. The micro-scale vignette is observable directly: the governance dynamics of the office kitchen, the residential commons, and the departmental budget can be observed in real time by participants in those governance systems, without the mediation of governance data collection processes that are themselves subject to the political dynamics of the governance systems they are designed to monitor.

The second argument is from causal proximity. The formation failure that the suite’s formation-based account identifies as the proximate cause of commons failure is most directly observable at the micro scale, where the relationship between the psychological dynamics of individual actors and the governance outcomes of the commons system is least mediated by institutional complexity. At the macro scale, the relationship between formation failure and governance outcomes is mediated by multiple layers of institutional structure, political process, and organizational behavior that make causal attribution difficult. At the micro scale, the relationship is often directly observable: the actor whose constraint intolerance drives governance appropriation in the shared household or office is the same actor whose behavior degrades the shared resource, and the causal connection between formation failure and commons failure is available for direct inspection.

The third argument is from theoretical generativity. Micro-scale commons observation generates theoretical hypotheses about the dynamics of commons failure with a concreteness and specificity that macro-scale analysis cannot readily achieve. The four-stage failure sequence was inductively developed from observation of micro-scale commons dynamics and then verified across scales; this inductive direction—from micro-scale observation to theoretical generalization—is methodologically productive in ways that the deductive application of macro-scale theory to micro-scale cases is not. The theoretical contributions of ethnographic and participant-observational methods in commons research—the work of scholars including Netting (1981), Berkes (1999), and Dove and Carpenter (2008)—derive from precisely this methodological advantage: the direct observation of governance dynamics in specific, bounded settings generates theoretical insights that survey-based or institutional-analysis-based methods cannot readily produce.

Yin’s (2014) analysis of case study methodology is relevant to the methodological defense of micro-scale vignettes as primary data. Yin argued that case studies are the appropriate research method for governance research questions that require understanding of the mechanism through which outcomes are produced rather than merely the correlation between variables and outcomes, and that the case study’s analytic generalizability—its capacity to illuminate a theoretical pattern through the dense description of a specific case—is a form of scientific generalization that is distinct from but no less rigorous than the statistical generalizability of large-sample quantitative research. The micro-scale vignettes of this paper are employed in precisely the case study mode that Yin describes: as dense descriptions of specific governance situations that illuminate the mechanism of the four-stage failure sequence with a clarity and specificity that the necessarily more abstract analysis of large-scale commons governance cannot provide.

Small’s (2009) analysis of ethnographic generalization in urban sociology provides a further methodological resource. Small argued against the requirement that ethnographic research justify its generalizations through the representativeness of its cases, proposing instead that ethnographic generalization proceeds through analytic categories that illuminate structural patterns rather than through representative sampling that permits statistical inference about population distributions. The scale-invariance thesis is precisely the kind of analytic category that Small describes: it is not a claim about the frequency distribution of commons failure patterns across the population of commons governance situations, but a claim about the structural mechanism that generates commons failure wherever the conditions for it are present—a mechanism that micro-scale observation illuminates with a precision that large-scale quantitative analysis cannot achieve.


IX. Practical Implications: What Scale-Invariance Means for Governance Intervention

The scale-invariance thesis has practical implications for governance intervention that are significant and that distinguish the formation-based approach from conventional governance design approaches. Several of these implications deserve explicit statement.

The most important practical implication is that governance intervention at any scale must attend to the formation-based dynamics that the four-stage failure sequence reflects, rather than treating those dynamics as the background against which structural incentive design operates. The governance practitioner who designs a fisheries management system without attending to the formation failure dynamics of Stage One appropriation is designing a system that will be vulnerable to the same governance capture that has characterized fisheries governance failures across multiple management regimes: the concentration of governance authority in the hands of the most powerful extractors, who then redesign the management system’s governance structures to serve their appropriative interests rather than the commons’ sustainability requirements. The formation-based approach to fisheries governance intervention would attend not only to the design of catch limits, quota systems, and monitoring mechanisms but to the governance conditions that produce the boundary discipline, externality awareness, and role containment that sustainable fisheries governance requires in its participants.

The second practical implication is that governance intervention at different scales is mutually relevant and should be mutually informed. If the four-stage failure sequence is structurally identical across scales, then the governance lessons learned from intervention at one scale should be applicable—with appropriate contextual adjustment—to intervention at other scales. The governance practitioner who has developed expertise in household commons governance has developed expertise in the formation-based dynamics that operate identically in organizational, neighborhood, municipal, and natural resource commons—expertise that the disciplinary organization of governance practice typically prevents from being transferred across scales.

The third practical implication concerns the timing of intervention. The four-stage failure sequence has a temporal structure that implies an intervention point hierarchy: intervention at Stage One—the private appropriation stage—is most effective and least costly; intervention at Stage Two is effective but requires the correction of an externalization pattern that has already become established; intervention at Stage Three requires the simultaneous correction of appropriation, externalized maintenance, and the moralization narrative that has developed to legitimate them; and intervention at Stage Four—after the narrative justification of enclosure has been consolidated—is most difficult and least likely to succeed without fundamental governance restructuring that the narrative has already delegitimated.

The practical implication of this hierarchy is that governance systems should be designed to detect Stage One appropriation before it progresses to Stage Two, and to respond to Stage One appropriation with the kind of governance engagement that the formation-based account implies: not merely structural sanctions that address the behavioral surface of appropriation, but the formation-oriented governance processes that develop the boundary discipline and externality awareness whose absence drives Stage One appropriation. The earlier in the failure sequence that formation-oriented governance intervention occurs, the less costly and more effective it is likely to be—a principle that applies identically across all the scales at which the sequence operates.


X. Conclusion: The Pattern That Connects

The argument of this paper has been sustained across multiple scales and multiple analytical frameworks, and its central claim can now be stated with the precision that the preceding analysis has made possible. Commons failure is a scale-invariant phenomenon: the four-stage sequence of private appropriation, externalized maintenance, moralization of contributors, and narrative justification of enclosure recurs with structural fidelity across household, organizational, neighborhood, municipal, and natural resource commons, because it is driven by a common underlying mechanism—formation failure producing the sovereignty fantasy—that operates regardless of the scale of the commons at which it appears.

This claim is not a metaphor. It is not the assertion that the office refrigerator is like a fishery in some interesting and rhetorically productive way. It is the assertion that the person who appropriates the office refrigerator space and the corporation that appropriates the Pacific fishery are exhibiting the same formation failure, producing the same four-stage failure sequence, and requiring the same formation-based governance response—at different scales, with consequences proportional to their scale, but structurally identical in their mechanism and their logic.

The methodological implication of this claim is that micro-scale vignettes are primary analytic data whose investigation provides genuine access to the mechanism of commons failure rather than merely illustrative analogy whose rhetorical function is to make large-scale commons failure vivid and accessible to general audiences. The formation-based dynamics of commons failure are most directly observable at the micro scale, where the relationship between psychological mechanism and governance outcome is least mediated by institutional complexity; the theoretical insights generated by micro-scale observation are transferable to larger-scale commons analysis precisely because the underlying mechanism is scale-invariant.

The practical implication is that governance intervention at any scale must attend to the formation-based dynamics that the failure sequence reflects, must intervene as early in the sequence as possible, and must draw on the governance lessons available at all scales rather than treating the governance challenges of different scales as structurally distinct problems requiring separate analytical frameworks and separate governance expertise.

And the theoretical implication—the one that connects this paper most directly to the suite of which it is a part—is that the formation of governance competence in individual actors is the foundational investment on which commons governance at every scale depends. The fishery and the refrigerator are governed by the same competencies or fail for the same lack of them. The civilization that cannot form its members in the capacities for shared constraint will enclose its fisheries by the same logic and through the same sequence as the household that cannot form its members in the capacities for shared domestic life will enclose its refrigerator space.

Formation failure is not a small-scale problem that occasionally has large-scale consequences. It is the pattern that connects commons failure across every scale at which human beings attempt to share what they cannot individually own, and to govern what they cannot individually control. That pattern begins in the smallest spaces of shared life, and its logic, uninterrupted, reaches to the atmosphere itself.


Notes

Note 1. The concept of scale-invariance as deployed in this paper is borrowed from the physical and mathematical sciences—from fractal geometry, complex systems theory, and statistical mechanics—in ways that require acknowledgment of both the analogical nature of the borrowing and its limitations. In the physical sciences, scale-invariance refers to the mathematical property of self-similarity: a pattern that is literally identical at different scales of measurement, such that the same equation describes the pattern at all scales. The social scientific claim of this paper is weaker and more analogical: the four-stage failure sequence is structurally similar rather than mathematically identical across scales, and the similarity reflects common underlying dynamics rather than mathematical self-similarity in the strict sense. The term scale-invariance is used because it captures the structural quality of the claim—that the pattern is not merely superficially similar across scales but reflects a common mechanism—in a way that more qualified language would obscure. Readers from the physical sciences should treat the term as a social scientific appropriation rather than as a claim to mathematical precision.

Note 2. The analysis of the household commons in Section IV deliberately focuses on shared household spaces rather than on the family as a governance unit. The family raises governance questions—intergenerational resource transfer, the authority of parents over children, the governance of intimate relationships—that are distinct from the commons governance questions that this paper analyzes, and conflating the family as a social institution with the household as a commons environment would introduce analytical complications that the paper’s scope does not require. The household commons analysis is an analysis of the governance of shared physical and material resources in residential settings—refrigerators, common rooms, shared maintenance—rather than an analysis of family governance in the broader sense.

Note 3. Hochschild’s (1989) analysis of the second shift and DeVault’s (1991) analysis of feeding the family are cited as empirical evidence for the four-stage failure sequence in household commons without prejudging the complex normative and theoretical questions about gender, labor, and household governance that those works also address. The paper’s use of these sources is analytical rather than normative: they are cited as evidence that the four-stage failure sequence is empirically present in household commons governance, not as complete accounts of the gendered dynamics of domestic labor or as endorsements of any particular normative conclusion about the appropriate organization of household governance. The gender dimension of household commons failure is an important substantive area that deserves more extended treatment than this paper provides within its specific analytical scope.

Note 4. The analysis of homeowners associations in Section VI draws primarily on the American institutional context in which McKenzie’s (1994) foundational study was conducted. The homeowners association as a governance institution is not universal across cultural and national contexts, and the specific failure dynamics documented in the American literature may not transfer directly to the governance of residential commons in other institutional contexts. The scale-invariance thesis does not require that the specific institutional forms of commons failure be identical across cultural contexts—only that the four-stage structural sequence be present, expressed through whatever institutional forms the specific cultural and national context provides. The analysis of homeowners associations is offered as a documented case of the failure sequence at the meso-institutional scale in one institutional context, not as a claim about the universal form of residential commons governance.

Note 5. The treatment of the atmospheric commons in Section VII is necessarily compressed given the complexity of the governance literature on climate change. The four-stage analysis offered in that section is a structural schematization rather than a comprehensive account of climate governance failure, and readers seeking a more complete treatment should consult the extensive literature on global commons governance including Dietz et al. (2003), Ostrom et al. (1999), and the broader scholarly literature on international climate negotiations. The scale-invariance thesis’s contribution to climate governance analysis is not empirical—it adds nothing to the already extensive empirical documentation of climate commons failure—but analytical: it situates climate governance failure within the same structural framework as commons failure at all other scales, and thereby makes available the formation-based diagnostic tools that the suite’s broader argument develops.

Note 6. The concept of analytic generalizability employed in Section VIII in defense of micro-scale vignettes as primary data is one of several competing accounts of how social scientific research can make valid general claims from specific observations. Mitchell’s (1983) earlier account of logical inference in case study research, Flyvbjerg’s (2006) defense of phronetic social science against the positivist model of generalization, and Ragin’s (1987) comparative case analysis method all offer theoretical resources for the defense of case-based research that the paper does not fully develop. The methodological claim of Section VIII is offered as a starting point for a more extended methodological reflection that the scope of the present paper does not permit.

Note 7. The four-stage failure sequence described in Section III is presented as a sequential model in which Stage One precedes Stage Two, Stage Two precedes Stage Three, and so on. In practice, the stages are not always strictly sequential: Stage Three moralization can precede rather than follow Stage One appropriation (as Paper 4 of this series documents in its analysis of pre-emptive moralization), and Stage Four narrative justification can be deployed simultaneously with Stage One appropriation rather than after the preceding stages have been completed. The sequential model is a theoretical idealization that captures the logical dependencies among the stages—the way in which each stage creates the conditions for the next—rather than a strict temporal claim about their empirical ordering. Governance analysts applying the model to specific situations should treat it as a diagnostic framework that identifies the structural relationships among the stages rather than as a predictive timeline.

Note 8. Bateson’s (1972) concept of the pattern that connects, referenced in Section II, is drawn from his collected essays Steps to an Ecology of Mind and his later work Mind and Nature (Bateson, 1979). Bateson’s use of the concept was primarily biological and epistemological—he was arguing for a view of mind and nature as organized by recursive patterns that connect phenomena across levels of biological and social organization—but its application to the social scientific analysis of commons failure at different scales is consistent with the spirit of his project, which was to identify the meta-patterns that connect phenomena that disciplinary specialization tends to treat as separate and unrelated. The paper’s invocation of Bateson’s concept is interpretive rather than strictly derived from his specific arguments, and readers should treat it as a theoretical resonance rather than as a direct application of Bateson’s framework.


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Moralization as Enclosure Technology: How Domination Acquires Legitimacy


Abstract

The conventional sequence in commons discourse runs from empirical observation to moral judgment to policy prescription: commons fail, the failure is attributed to the irresponsibility of contributors, and enclosure or privatization is proposed as the rational corrective. This paper inverts that sequence and contests its empirical basis, arguing that moralization—the systematic attribution of commons failure to the character defects, irresponsibility, or incompetence of participants in shared governance—is not a response to commons failure but the primary mechanism through which enclosure acquires legitimacy before, during, and after the fact. Drawing on rhetorical analysis, the sociology of moral discourse, critical discourse analysis, and the political sociology of knowledge, the paper identifies a recurring grammar of enclosure justification organized around four primary rhetorical moves: the appeal to disorder, the moralization of contributors, the efficiency claim for private ownership, and the naturalization of enclosure as inevitable progress. It demonstrates that this grammar functions not to describe the reality of commons governance but to foreclose the alternatives that an accurate description would make visible, and that its deployment systematically precedes rather than follows the commons failures it purports to explain. The paper then develops a set of diagnostic instruments for detecting moralization in policy and institutional discourse—instruments designed to enable governance analysts and practitioners to distinguish between genuine governance diagnosis and the rhetorical production of consent for enclosure. It concludes that when the language of responsibility and disorder appears in commons discourse, the analyst’s first question should not be whether the claims are accurate but whose interests the moral framing serves, what alternatives it forecloses, and what governance conditions it obscures.

Keywords: moralization, enclosure, rhetorical grammar, commons failure, legitimation, critical discourse analysis, political economy, governance, ideology, responsibility discourse


I. Introduction: The Inversion Thesis

Every intellectual tradition has its canonical narrative of failure—the story it tells about why things go wrong, who is responsible, and what should be done in response. For commons governance theory, that canonical narrative has been remarkably stable across the five decades since Hardin’s (1968) formulation: things go wrong in the commons because people do not take responsibility for the shared resource, individual self-interest overrides collective obligation, and the irresponsibility of contributors makes shared governance unstable. The policy prescriptions that follow from this narrative—privatization, coercive state management, the conversion of common property into individual private property—acquire their authority from the moral diagnosis that precedes them. If the problem is irresponsibility, then governance structures that make individuals responsible for specific parcels of the shared resource are the rational response.

This paper’s central claim is that this narrative is not a description of commons failure but a technology of enclosure: a rhetorical and analytical framework whose function is not to explain why commons governance fails but to produce the conditions under which enclosure appears legitimate, necessary, and rational. The moralization of commons failure—the systematic attribution of governance failure to the character defects, irresponsibility, and incompetence of commons participants—is not the consequence of careful observation of how commons actually fail; it is the mechanism through which the interests served by enclosure are represented as the interests of good governance, and through which the alternatives to enclosure are made to appear naive, inefficient, or morally confused.

This is the paper’s inversion thesis: moralization is not a response to commons failure; it is the rhetorical precondition of enclosure. It functions not to describe what has happened but to authorize what is about to happen, to legitimate what is currently happening, and to retrospectively justify what has already happened. The temporal relationship between moralization and enclosure is the reverse of what the canonical narrative assumes: moralization precedes enclosure, enables it, and follows it as its vindication—not because the moral claims are accurate but because they are effective.

The evidence for this inversion is both historical and analytical. Historically, as Paper 1 of this series documented in detail, the English commons did not fail and then require enclosure; they were enclosed, and the moral narrative of irresponsible commoners and disordered commons was constructed to justify an enclosure that was driven by the interests of agricultural capital rather than by the governance failures it retrospectively claimed to address. Analytically, the rhetorical grammar of enclosure justification exhibits a formal consistency across historical periods, cultural contexts, and resource types that cannot be explained by reference to the variable empirical conditions of commons governance—conditions that vary enormously across the cases where the grammar appears. What does not vary is the grammar itself: the appeal to disorder, the moralization of contributors, the efficiency claim, and the naturalization of enclosure as progress. This consistency reveals a rhetorical technology whose function is independent of the empirical conditions it ostensibly describes.

The paper proceeds through eight sections. Section II develops the concept of rhetorical grammar as an analytical tool for the study of moralization in policy discourse. Sections III through VI analyze the four primary moves of the enclosure grammar in detail: the disorder premise, the responsibility moralization, the efficiency claim, and the naturalization move. Section VII examines the temporal claim of the inversion thesis—that moralization precedes rather than follows commons failure—and presents the evidence for it. Section VIII develops the diagnostic instruments that the paper’s analysis implies. Section IX concludes with a statement of the paper’s implications for commons governance theory and the broader political economy of shared life.


II. Rhetorical Grammar as an Analytical Category

The concept of rhetorical grammar, as this paper employs it, refers to a structured system of argumentative moves whose elements are regularly combined in characteristic ways to produce recognizable effects on an audience—in this case, the effect of representing enclosure as the rational and morally appropriate response to commons failure. The concept draws on rhetorical analysis in the classical tradition, on the sociology of moral discourse developed by sociologists including Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), and on critical discourse analysis in the tradition of Fairclough (1992) and van Dijk (1993).

A rhetorical grammar is distinguished from a collection of individual arguments by its structural character: the elements of the grammar are not deployed independently but in combination, with each element performing a specific function in the overall argumentative structure and deriving part of its persuasive force from its relationship to the other elements. The disorder premise establishes the problem; the responsibility moralization identifies its cause and locates it in the character of participants rather than in structural conditions; the efficiency claim identifies the solution and represents it as technically rather than politically motivated; and the naturalization move completes the structure by representing the enclosure that the preceding elements have argued for as the inevitable direction of progress rather than as a specific political choice that could have been made differently. Each element is analytically separable but practically interdependent: the disorder premise requires the responsibility moralization to establish causation, the efficiency claim requires both to establish the superiority of private management, and the naturalization move requires all three to represent enclosure as the conclusion toward which rational analysis inevitably tends.

The concept of rhetorical grammar is related to but distinct from several adjacent analytical concepts. It is related to ideology in the Althusserian sense—the system of representations through which individuals are positioned as subjects within particular social formations—but is more specific and more actionable: a rhetorical grammar can be identified, analyzed, and contested through the examination of specific argumentative patterns in specific texts and discursive contexts, where ideology in the Althusserian sense tends toward a level of abstraction that makes empirical analysis difficult. It is related to framing in the sociological sense of Goffman (1974) and Entman (1993)—the selection and salience of interpretive frameworks that organize experience and guide judgment—but is more analytically structured: the concept of grammar implies a systematic relationship among elements that the concept of framing does not require. And it is related to narrative in the sense of Hayden White (1987) and Paul Ricoeur (1984)—the emplotment of events within a story that gives them meaning and coherence—but is more rhetorical and less temporal: the enclosure grammar does not primarily tell a story but makes an argument, and its force is analytical and normative rather than narrative and identificatory.

Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) sociology of justification provides the most directly applicable theoretical framework. Their analysis of the repertoires of justification—the orders of worth—that actors deploy when they are required to justify their actions or to contest the justifications of others, identifies several such repertoires, each of which organizes evaluation according to a different principle: the civic order (collective good), the market order (price), the industrial order (efficiency), the domestic order (tradition and loyalty), the inspired order (creativity and grace), and the fame order (renown). The enclosure grammar, as this paper analyzes it, draws primarily on the industrial and market orders—representing enclosure as efficient and price-rationally optimal—while deploying the civic order rhetorically to moralize commons participants and represent enclosure as the restoration of the collective good that irresponsible commoners have undermined.

This deployment of the civic order against commons participants while the market and industrial orders are deployed in favor of enclosure is a characteristic feature of the enclosure grammar that the sociology of justification helps illuminate: the grammar does not simply advocate for one order of worth against another but deploys multiple orders in a specific rhetorical sequence that makes its argument appear to transcend the particular interests it serves. The moral condemnation of irresponsible commoners draws on the civic order; the advocacy for privatization draws on the market and industrial orders; and the combination produces the appearance of a comprehensive analysis that is simultaneously morally serious and technically rigorous. It is this combination that gives the enclosure grammar its persuasive force and that makes its analysis as a unified rhetorical system, rather than as a collection of independent claims, analytically necessary.


III. The Disorder Premise: Commons as Inherently Unruly

The first and foundational move of the enclosure grammar is the disorder premise: the representation of the commons—shared space, shared resources, shared governance—as inherently disorderly, messy, contentious, and difficult to manage. This premise is the necessary starting point of the grammar because it establishes the problem that the subsequent moves will address. If shared governance were experienced as orderly, productive, and well-managed, the subsequent claims that its failures reflect participant irresponsibility and that privatization would restore order would have no purchase. The disorder premise prepares the argumentative ground by establishing that the commons is the kind of thing that tends toward disorder—that its disordered condition is a natural expression of what it is rather than the consequence of specific and alterable conditions.

The disorder premise is rarely argued for explicitly; it is typically presupposed. It appears in the casual observation that shared spaces are messy, that collective decisions are slow and contentious, that shared resources are poorly maintained, and that the commons lacks the crisp accountability that private ownership provides. These observations are not always false—shared governance is often slower and more contentious than individual decision-making, and shared spaces are often less consistently maintained than private ones—but they are systematically selected and interpreted in ways that make their negative features appear essential rather than contingent, and their positive features are systematically invisible within the grammar’s interpretive framework.

Torfing et al. (2012), in their analysis of collaborative governance, and Ansell and Gash (2008), in their examination of collaborative governance regimes, documented the conditions under which shared governance produces superior outcomes to either private management or hierarchical state management—conditions that include resource complexity that exceeds any single actor’s management capacity, interdependencies between resource users that make coordinated management necessary, and knowledge distribution across the user community that centralized management cannot access. These conditions are common precisely in the kinds of resource systems—forests, fisheries, water systems, atmospheric commons—where the disorder premise is most frequently deployed to justify privatization or state centralization. The disorder premise systematically misrepresents the governance situation by representing the messiness of coordination under these conditions as evidence of commons incapacity rather than as evidence of the complexity that makes commons governance necessary.

The concept of irreducible complexity—the characteristic of governance problems that cannot be solved by simplification without losing what is most important about them—is directly relevant here. Rittel and Webber’s (1973) analysis of wicked problems—problems whose complexity, interdependency, and contestedness make them resistant to the linear analysis and solution that technical approaches to governance assume—applies precisely to the governance situations where the disorder premise is most frequently invoked. The messiness of shared governance is often not evidence of governance failure; it is the appropriate expression of genuine complexity that no governance form can eliminate without losing the complexity-sensitive responsiveness that makes governance adequate to the problem it addresses.

Edelman’s (1977) analysis of political spectacle is relevant to the disorder premise’s rhetorical function. Edelman argued that political language does not primarily describe political reality but constitutes it—that the representation of political situations as disordered, threatening, or requiring expert management is itself a political act that serves specific interests by creating the demand for the interventions that those interests advocate. The disorder premise in the enclosure grammar is precisely such a constitutive political act: by representing the commons as inherently disordered, it creates the perceived need for the order that enclosure promises to provide, and it makes the messiness of shared governance appear as a problem requiring solution rather than as a feature of legitimate complexity requiring navigation.

The disorder premise also performs a specific epistemic function: it establishes the evaluative standard against which shared governance will be measured. By invoking the image of private property’s clean accountability—a single owner who is clearly responsible, clearly incentivized, and clearly capable of making decisions without the contentious deliberation that shared governance requires—the disorder premise establishes private ownership as the implicit norm against which shared governance is judged deficient. This normative move is rarely made explicit; the comparison between the messiness of shared governance and the clean accountability of private ownership is typically presented as an observation rather than a comparison, because making the comparison explicit would require justifying why private ownership’s specific form of accountability—concentrated, exclusive, and oriented toward the owner’s private interest—should be the standard against which shared governance is evaluated rather than one governance form among others, each with its characteristic strengths and limitations.

The disorder premise is particularly effective when combined with aesthetic and affective dimensions that the explicitly argumentative presentation of the enclosure grammar tends to suppress. The shared space that is described as messy is not merely analytically deficient; it is viscerally unappealing—cluttered, unkempt, lacking in the visual order that private property’s boundary markers, maintenance standards, and aesthetic coherence provide. This aesthetic dimension of the disorder premise activates affective responses that are more immediate and less subject to rational scrutiny than the argumentative content of the premise, and it connects the governance critique of the commons to embodied experiences of disorder and cleanliness that carry substantial psychological and cultural weight. Lamont and Molnár (2002) documented the cultural significance of symbolic boundaries—the lines that distinguish the clean from the dirty, the orderly from the disorderly—and their role in legitimating social hierarchies and exclusions; the aesthetic dimension of the disorder premise mobilizes this cultural significance in the service of the enclosure argument.


IV. The Moralization of Contributors: Responsibility as a Weapon

The second move of the enclosure grammar—the moralization of contributors—is the most analytically important and the most difficult to contest, because it deploys the most powerful resource available in any argumentative system: moral language. When the failure of commons governance is attributed not to structural conditions or formative deficits but to the irresponsibility, laziness, selfishness, or incompetence of commons participants, the enclosure argument acquires a moral urgency that structural or economic arguments alone cannot generate. It also acquires a specific argumentative asymmetry: those who contest the enclosure argument must either defend the character of the participants who have been moralized—a defensive posture that concedes the moral framing—or contest the moral framing itself, which is rhetorically difficult precisely because the moral language has been deployed to represent the interests of enclosure as the interests of good governance.

The moralization of contributors takes several characteristic forms that are worth distinguishing analytically even though they frequently appear in combination.

The first form is the irresponsibility attribution: the claim that commons participants do not take adequate responsibility for the shared resource, that they exploit it without contributing to its maintenance, and that this free-riding is the proximate cause of commons degradation. This attribution is not always empirically false—free-riding does occur in some commons governance situations—but it is characteristically deployed without the kind of empirical investigation that would distinguish cases where free-riding is a significant governance problem from cases where it is not, and without attention to the structural and formative conditions that produce free-riding where it occurs. The irresponsibility attribution treats free-riding as a character trait—something that irresponsible people do—rather than as a response to specific governance conditions that the analysis of those conditions could address.

The second form is the competence imputation: the claim that commons participants lack the technical knowledge, managerial capacity, or governance sophistication to manage shared resources effectively, and that this incompetence makes professional management, state oversight, or private ownership necessary to prevent the degradation that amateur governance would produce. This form of moralization is less explicitly moral in its language than the irresponsibility attribution—it speaks of capacity rather than character—but it performs the same argumentative function: it locates the failure of commons governance in the attributes of participants rather than in the structural and formative conditions of the governance system, and it represents the displacement of participant governance by external management as a technical rather than a political intervention.

Chambers’s (1983, 1997) extensive documentation of rural people’s knowledge—the detailed, locally specific, and ecologically sophisticated knowledge of commons users in diverse cultural and resource contexts—provides the most systematic empirical refutation of the competence imputation. Chambers demonstrated that commons users frequently possess knowledge of local resource conditions, seasonal variation, and management requirements that external managers—state agencies, NGOs, private management firms—do not and cannot acquire without extended engagement with the local community. The competence imputation misrepresents this knowledge asymmetry as a capacity deficit: what is in fact a distributional asymmetry—knowledge held by local commons users that external managers lack—is represented as a directional asymmetry, in which external managers are more competent than local users. This misrepresentation serves the interests of the external managers and privatizing interests that the enclosure grammar advocates for, but it is empirically inverted: on the dimensions of knowledge most relevant to sustainable commons management, local users are typically more competent than the managers who are proposed to replace them.

The third form of contributor moralization is the ingratitude narrative: the representation of commons participants as ungrateful beneficiaries of shared resources who contribute less than their share to the collective goods they consume. This form is most visible in contemporary welfare state politics—where welfare recipients are systematically represented as ungrateful dependents who consume common social resources without adequate reciprocal contribution—but it appears in commons governance contexts as well, where the participants who use shared resources without formal participation in governance processes are represented as free-riders whose behavior disqualifies them from the moral standing that would make their interests relevant to governance decisions. The ingratitude narrative performs the double function of moralizing specific participants and delegitimating their standing as claimants in the governance system: the ungrateful, irresponsible, or incompetent contributor has forfeited the standing that legitimate participation would have provided, and the enclosure that removes his access is therefore not an injustice but a restoration of the proper relationship between contribution and entitlement.

Scott’s (1998) analysis of the legibility imperative—the drive of modern states to make complex social and environmental systems legible to centralized management by simplifying them in ways that destroy what made them work—provides an important complement to the moralization analysis. Scott demonstrated that the attribution of incompetence to indigenous and local resource management systems frequently reflected not the actual incompetence of those systems but their illegibility to the centralized management frameworks through which external authorities evaluated them. What appeared as disorder or irresponsibility to the outside observer was often a complex, locally adapted management system whose sophistication was invisible to standardized evaluation frameworks—a point that directly parallels the analysis of the disorder premise in Section III. The moralization of contributors and the disorder premise operate together as a system of legibility distortion: what cannot be made legible to centralized management frameworks is represented as disorderly and irresponsible, and this misrepresentation provides the moral justification for the simplification that makes legibility possible at the cost of the system’s actual governance capacity.

Bourdieu’s (1991) analysis of symbolic power—the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world, to make particular representations of reality appear natural, universal, and self-evident—provides the deepest theoretical account of why the moralization of contributors is so rhetorically effective and so difficult to contest. Bourdieu argued that symbolic power operates through misrecognition: the interested representations of the world that it produces are not recognized as interested but as accurate, not as political but as technical, not as the expressions of specific social positions and interests but as the neutral descriptions that any careful observer would produce. The moralization of commons contributors is a paradigm case of symbolic power operating through misrecognition: the moral language of irresponsibility and incompetence appears to describe the attributes of specific persons—attributes that anyone could observe—when it is in fact imposing a specific interpretive framework whose function is to legitimate the interests of those who benefit from enclosure.


V. The Efficiency Claim: Private Ownership as Technical Solution

The third move of the enclosure grammar—the efficiency claim—performs a crucial rhetorical function: it converts the political argument for enclosure into a technical argument, representing the displacement of shared governance by private ownership not as a choice among governance alternatives, each with its characteristic advantages and limitations, but as the conclusion toward which any technically rigorous analysis of governance efficiency must tend. The efficiency claim is the grammar’s most consequential move because it is the most difficult to contest: while moral claims can be contested on moral grounds, and disorder premises can be contested by pointing to functioning commons, the efficiency claim operates in a domain—technical economic analysis—where contestation requires fluency in a technical language that many governance participants and policy audiences do not possess, and where the appearance of technical authority is itself a rhetorical resource that the enclosure argument deploys against its critics.

The efficiency claim has several characteristic forms. The most basic is the incentive argument: private ownership creates the incentive for sustainable management because the owner internalizes both the costs and benefits of resource use, while shared governance externalizes costs and produces the tragedy that Hardin described. This argument is the economic translation of the irresponsibility attribution: private ownership makes people responsible by making them self-interested, and self-interest under private ownership produces efficiency. The argument is not without substance—the internalization of externalities is a genuine governance problem, and property rights can contribute to its solution in some contexts—but it is deployed in the enclosure grammar without the qualifications that would make it empirically accurate: without attention to the conditions under which private ownership actually internalizes rather than externalizes costs, to the conditions under which self-interest in private ownership produces sustainable management rather than maximally rapid extraction, or to the conditions under which commons governance successfully internalizes externalities through non-property mechanisms.

Heller’s (1998) analysis of the tragedy of the anticommons—the situation in which the excessive fragmentation of property rights into too many private hands produces underuse and governance failure rather than efficient management—demonstrates that private ownership does not inherently solve the problems that the efficiency claim attributes to it, and can produce its own characteristic form of governance failure that the commons governance framework handles more effectively. Heller’s analysis received less attention than Hardin’s despite its comparable rigor, a discrepancy that itself reflects the ideological asymmetry that the enclosure grammar produces: arguments for the governance advantages of private ownership are more readily received and more widely disseminated than arguments for its governance limitations, because the institutional and political economy of academic and policy discourse is not neutral between them.

The productivity argument is a second characteristic form of the efficiency claim: private ownership produces greater output per unit of resource input than shared governance because private owners have stronger incentives to invest in resource improvement and stronger incentives to prevent resource degradation. This argument has historical applications—the enclosure of English common fields was frequently justified by contemporary commentators and later by economic historians on grounds of agricultural productivity improvement—that have been substantially contested by the historical scholarship. Allen’s (1992) careful analysis of the productivity effects of English agricultural enclosure demonstrated that the productivity gains attributed to enclosure were modest, unevenly distributed, and often achievable through alternative governance mechanisms that the enclosure framework excluded. More fundamentally, Clark (1998) demonstrated that the common field system was more productive than contemporary enclosure advocates and many later economic historians assumed—that the productivity comparison was framed in ways that systematically disadvantaged the commons by measuring outputs that private cultivation optimized while ignoring outputs that commons governance provided: the subsistence security, risk distribution, and ecological resilience that the commons offered to its participants and that private enclosure destroyed.

The transaction cost argument is the third characteristic form: private ownership reduces the transaction costs of resource governance—the costs of negotiation, coordination, monitoring, and enforcement—by concentrating governance authority in a single owner whose decisions do not require the agreement of multiple participants. This argument draws on the institutional economics of Coase (1960) and Williamson (1985) in ways that those authors did not specifically intend and that their frameworks do not consistently support. The transaction cost framework is a tool for analyzing the comparative efficiency of different governance forms under specified conditions; it does not support the general conclusion that private ownership is more efficient than shared governance, because the comparative transaction costs of different governance forms depend on the specific conditions—number of parties, frequency of interaction, complexity of the resource system, availability of information—that vary across governance situations in ways that sometimes favor shared governance and sometimes favor private ownership.

The efficiency claim performs its most important rhetorical function not through any of these specific arguments but through the meta-claim that efficiency is the appropriate criterion for evaluating governance alternatives—that governance forms should be chosen on the basis of their efficiency in producing specified outputs rather than on the basis of the distribution of their benefits, the range of values they serve, the relational and formative conditions they create, or the governance legitimacy they provide to participants. This meta-claim is not a technical conclusion; it is a political choice about what governance is for—a choice that systematically advantages the interests of those whose primary stake in commons governance is productive output over those whose stakes include the subsistence security, relational community, cultural continuity, and democratic participation that commons governance has historically provided. By representing this political choice as a technical conclusion, the efficiency claim converts what is a contestable value judgment into an apparent terminus of rational analysis that those who disagree with it appear to be rejecting in favor of sentimentality or ideology.


VI. The Naturalization Move: Enclosure as Inevitable Progress

The fourth move of the enclosure grammar—the naturalization of enclosure as the inevitable direction of development, modernization, and progress—performs the function of foreclosing alternatives by representing enclosure not as a political choice that could have been made differently but as the expression of forces—market development, technological progress, institutional evolution—that are too powerful and too rational to be effectively resisted. The naturalization move converts enclosure from a contingent outcome of specific political and economic choices into a natural process whose inevitability is itself evidence of its rationality: that which survives is fit, and that which is fit is efficient, and that which is efficient is right.

The Darwinian resonances of this move are not accidental. The application of evolutionary language to institutional change—the representation of private property as more evolved than common property, of market governance as more advanced than community governance, of commercial agriculture as more developed than subsistence farming—is a characteristic feature of modernization discourse that has provided intellectual cover for enclosure processes across multiple continents and centuries. The language of evolution and development is particularly effective as a naturalization device because it places the enclosure process in a temporal framework that makes it appear as a direction rather than a choice: what is evolving cannot be stopped without opposing progress itself, and those who oppose it appear to be defending backwardness against the inevitable march of rationality.

Ferguson’s (1994) analysis of the development apparatus—the network of institutions, discourses, and practices through which development interventions in the global South are designed, implemented, and evaluated—demonstrated that development discourse systematically represents the complex, historically specific conditions of governance in the societies it addresses as deficiencies relative to a developmental norm that is implicitly identified with the governance forms of the industrialized North. The naturalization move in the enclosure grammar is the micro-level expression of this macro-level development discourse: just as development discourse represents the governance forms of the global South as premodern deficiencies awaiting the development that will bring them into modernity, the enclosure grammar represents commons governance as a premodern governance form awaiting the development—privatization, market integration, professional management—that will bring it into the present.

Polanyi’s (1944) analysis of the great transformation provides the most historically comprehensive account of the naturalization of market enclosure. Polanyi demonstrated that the self-regulating market—the institutional form that the naturalization move represents as the inevitable destination of economic development—was not a natural outgrowth of economic progress but a deliberately constructed political project that required the sustained effort of states, legislatures, and intellectual advocates to establish and maintain against the resistance of the communities it disrupted. The naturalization of market enclosure was itself a project: the representation of a politically constructed outcome as a natural process was necessary precisely because the political construction was so extensive and so disruptive that its representation as natural required continuous effort. As Polanyi put it, laissez-faire was planned—and the naturalization move is the rhetorical dimension of that planning.

North’s (1990) institutional economics provides an interesting case of naturalization within an analytical framework that is not primarily rhetorical. North’s account of institutional evolution—the representation of institutional change as a path-dependent process in which efficient institutions progressively displace inefficient ones—is not designed as a legitimating framework for enclosure, but it performs that function in contexts where it is applied without the qualifications that North himself insists on. The representation of institutional change as an efficiency-selecting evolutionary process naturalizes whatever institutional form has emerged as the one that the process has validated, and this naturalization is available for deployment in the enclosure grammar as evidence that the displacement of commons governance by private property is the expression of an evolutionary dynamic rather than a political choice.

Cronon’s (1991) environmental history of the American West provides an illuminating case study of the naturalization move in operation. Cronon documented the way in which the transformation of the American West from indigenous commons governance to private property and market integration was narrated—by settlers, boosters, politicians, and eventually historians—as the story of nature being brought under productive management: wilderness converted to cultivated land, savage commons converted to civilized private property, waste converted to wealth. This narrative naturalized enclosure by representing it as the conversion of nothing into something—as the creation of value where value had not previously existed—and thereby made invisible the commons governance systems that had sustained indigenous communities in the converted territories for thousands of years. The naturalization move operated precisely through this invisibilization: what could not be seen within the evaluative framework of the settler colonial discourse was represented as not there, and what was represented as not there could be enclosed without injustice because there was nothing to enclose.


VII. Moralization as Pre-emptive: The Temporal Argument

The temporal claim of the inversion thesis—that moralization precedes rather than follows commons failure—is the paper’s most empirically testable claim, and it requires the most careful argumentation. The claim is not that moralization always precedes commons failure in every case; commons can and do fail, and moral analysis of the conditions of that failure is both appropriate and necessary. The claim is that when the enclosure grammar is operative—when moralization is functioning as an enclosure technology rather than as a genuine governance diagnosis—the moral characterization of commons participants and commons governance precedes the failures it is deployed to explain, because its function is not to explain those failures but to authorize the enclosure that is already intended.

The historical evidence from the English enclosure movement is the most thoroughly documented case for this temporal claim. Thompson (1991) and Neeson (1993) both documented the way in which the moral characterization of English commoners as idle, dissolute, and resistant to productive employment preceded and enabled the parliamentary enclosure acts rather than following from the observed failure of common field governance. The contemporary literature of improvement—the agricultural writings of Arthur Young, William Marshall, and their contemporaries—represented commoners as forming bad habits, living in indolence, and resisting the incentives to productive labor that private employment would have provided, at a time when the common field system was, by most measures, functioning adequately as a governance system and providing the subsistence security of its participants. The moral characterization was not a response to observed governance failure; it was the discursive preparation for an enclosure that served the interests of agricultural improvement and capital accumulation, and that required the moral delegitimation of commoners to appear as something other than the seizure of their resources that it in fact was.

Neeson’s (1993) analysis is particularly detailed on this point. She documented the way in which parliamentary enclosure commissioners were frequently appointed from among the improving landlords who stood to benefit from enclosure—a structural conflict of interest that the moral language of improvement and responsibility obscured by representing enclosure as governance reform rather than as the redistribution of resources from commoners to landlords. The moralization of commoners—their representation as ungrateful, irresponsible, and resistant to the improvements that would benefit them—was the rhetorical mechanism through which this redistribution was represented as governance correction: the commoners were receiving what their irresponsibility had earned, and the landlords were receiving what their responsible management deserved.

Contemporary resource governance provides multiple cases that exhibit the same temporal structure. The privatization of water systems in developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s—a process extensively documented by Goldman (2005) and Bakker (2010)—was preceded in most cases by representations of public water management as corrupt, inefficient, and irresponsible that were produced by the international financial institutions and consulting firms that stood to benefit from privatization, rather than by independent governance assessments that found public management to be failing. The moralization of public management preceded the privatization that it was deployed to justify, and the governance failures that it attributed to public management were in most cases either exaggerated, misattributed, or the consequence of the underfunding that the same financial institutions had imposed as conditions of structural adjustment loans—underfunding that had itself produced the conditions the moralization described.

Fairclough’s (1992) concept of synthetic personalization—the rhetorical technique through which institutional communications address their audiences as individuals with specific moral attributes rather than as members of social categories with structural positions—is relevant to the pre-emptive character of moralization in contemporary governance discourse. The language of responsibility, independence, and active citizenship that characterizes contemporary welfare state reform, housing policy, and environmental governance consistently addresses its audiences as moral agents whose choices are the primary determinants of governance outcomes—a framing that pre-emptively moralizes participants before any governance failure has occurred, by establishing individual moral agency as the framework within which governance outcomes will be evaluated and governance failure will be assigned. The pre-emptive moralization of the irresponsible welfare recipient, the irresponsible homeowner, and the irresponsible environmental consumer establishes the interpretive framework within which future governance failures will be attributed to character rather than to structure, and within which enclosure—in the forms of welfare retrenchment, housing market deregulation, and the privatization of environmental commons—will appear as the rational response to the moral failures that the pre-emptive moralization has already identified.

Harvey’s (2005) analysis of neoliberalism as a political project—the organized effort to restore the conditions of capital accumulation and the power of economic elites through the institutional restructuring of economies, states, and social relations—provides the broadest analytical framework for understanding pre-emptive moralization as a political technology. Harvey argued that neoliberal policy was not primarily driven by its own theoretical commitments—the actually existing evidence for the efficiency advantages of market governance was too thin to account for the policy program’s adoption—but by its utility for the restoration of class power that the mid-century social settlement had constrained. The pre-emptive moralization of welfare recipients, public sector workers, commons users, and other beneficiaries of social-democratic governance provided the legitimating discourse for a policy program whose actual driver was the redistribution of resources and power from the poor and working class to capital, and whose adoption required the discursive construction of a governance crisis that the available evidence did not straightforwardly support.


VIII. Diagnostic Instruments: Detecting Moralization in Governance Discourse

The analysis of the enclosure grammar and its components developed in the preceding sections is not merely theoretical; it has practical implications for governance analysts, practitioners, and participants who encounter the grammar in policy discourse, institutional communication, and the everyday talk of governance situations. This section develops a set of diagnostic instruments—questions, criteria, and analytical procedures—designed to enable the detection of moralization when it is functioning as an enclosure technology rather than as a genuine governance diagnosis.

The instruments are organized around three diagnostic questions, each of which addresses a different dimension of the moralization phenomenon and each of which can be applied to any governance discourse in which the language of responsibility, disorder, and efficiency appears.

Diagnostic Question 1: Whose interests does the moral framing serve?

The first diagnostic question is the most fundamental: when the language of responsibility, disorder, or efficiency appears in commons discourse, who benefits from the framing, and who would benefit from alternative framings that the moral language forecloses?

This question is not a counsel of suspicion toward all moral language in governance discourse; it is a methodological directive to pursue the analysis of interests that the moral language does not perform. Moral language does not automatically serve the interests of those who deploy it or automatically harm the interests of those it targets—there are genuine cases where the attribution of irresponsibility to commons participants is accurate, where the disorder of shared governance reflects genuine governance failure, and where private management would produce better outcomes for a broader range of stakeholders than the commons governance it displaces. The diagnostic question does not assume that these cases do not exist; it requires that the interests at stake be examined before the moral claims are accepted as accurate descriptions of governance reality.

The examination of interests requires attention to several specific factors. Who is making the moral claims, and what institutional position do they occupy relative to the enclosure that the claims support? What would they gain from enclosure and what would they lose from the maintenance of commons governance? Who is being moralized, and what is their relationship to the resources at stake? What alternative governance frameworks would the moral claims make difficult to advocate for, and what interests would those alternatives serve? The answers to these questions do not determine the accuracy of the moral claims—accurate moral claims can serve particular interests, and inaccurate moral claims can be made in good faith by actors without material stake in their outcome—but they establish the context within which the accuracy of the claims can be evaluated without naively accepting the framing that the grammar provides.

Lukes’s (1974) three-dimensional theory of power—which distinguishes between the exercise of power through decision-making (first dimension), through agenda-setting that determines what questions are decided (second dimension), and through the shaping of preferences and perceptions that determines what alternatives are imaginable (third dimension)—provides the theoretical framework within which this diagnostic question is most productively pursued. Moralization in the enclosure grammar operates primarily at the third dimension of power: it shapes the perceptual and evaluative framework within which commons governance is assessed, making enclosure appear as the rational conclusion of any competent analysis and making the alternatives to enclosure appear as the expressions of irrationality, sentimentality, or special pleading. Detecting this third-dimensional power exercise requires attending not only to the claims that governance discourse makes but to the claims it makes impossible—the alternatives it forecloses by establishing the evaluative framework within which governance is assessed.

Diagnostic Question 2: Does the moral framing precede or follow the conditions it describes?

The second diagnostic question addresses the temporal structure of moralization: does the moral characterization of commons participants and commons governance appear before or after the governance failures it purports to explain? If moralization precedes commons failure, the temporal analysis supports the inversion thesis—the moralization is functioning as a technology of enclosure rather than as a response to observed governance failure. If moralization follows commons failure, the temporal analysis is consistent with genuine governance diagnosis—though it does not exclude the possibility that the diagnosis is nonetheless distorted by the interests it serves.

The temporal diagnostic is most productively applied through the examination of the institutional and discursive context within which moralization appears. Who produced the moral characterization, when, and in relation to what governance process? Was the moral characterization produced by actors with a stake in enclosure before governance failure was observable, or by actors without such a stake after careful observation of governance conditions? Was it produced in the context of a governance reform process that had already determined enclosure as its destination, or in the context of a genuine diagnostic inquiry whose outcome was genuinely uncertain?

The identification of pre-emptive moralization is complicated by the fact that governance discourse rarely announces its temporal relationship to the conditions it describes. The improving landlord who characterized commoners as idle and dissolute did not preface his characterization with the acknowledgment that it preceded any observed change in commoner behavior; the international financial institution consultant who characterized public water management as corrupt and inefficient did not note that her assessment preceded the independent governance review that might have confirmed or contested it. The temporal analysis requires reconstruction from institutional and historical context rather than from the explicit claims of the discourse itself.

Diagnostic Question 3: What governance alternatives does the moral framing foreclose?

The third diagnostic question is the most practically consequential: what governance alternatives does the moral framing make difficult or impossible to advocate for, and what would governance analysis look like if those alternatives were available for consideration?

Moralization in the enclosure grammar forecloses alternatives not by explicitly prohibiting their discussion but by establishing the evaluative framework within which governance alternatives are assessed in ways that systematically disadvantage commons governance. The representation of commons governance as inherently disordered forecloses the alternative of reformed commons governance—the governance of shared resources through improved institutional design—by establishing disorder as an essential feature of shared governance rather than as a contingent feature of specific governance designs. The moralization of commons contributors forecloses the alternative of formation-based governance intervention—the development of the competencies that shared governance requires through appropriate institutional and social design—by representing the inadequacy of commons participants as a character attribute rather than as a formative deficit. And the efficiency claim forecloses the alternative of governance criteria other than efficiency—the assessment of governance forms by the range of values they serve, the relational and formative conditions they create, and the democratic legitimacy they provide—by establishing efficiency as the only criterion that technical analysis can recognize.

The diagnostic procedure for this question involves counterfactual analysis: what would governance policy look like if the disorder premise were replaced by an accurate characterization of commons governance as variable in quality depending on specifiable institutional conditions? If the moralization of contributors were replaced by a formation-based account of governance incapacity as the product of specifiable developmental and institutional conditions? If the efficiency claim were replaced by a pluralist account of governance values that included relational, formative, and democratic dimensions alongside productive efficiency? The answers to these counterfactual questions reveal what the enclosure grammar forecloses—the governance alternatives that an accurate and comprehensive analysis of commons governance conditions would make available—and thereby identify the ideological work that the grammar performs.

Consolidated Detection Criteria

The three diagnostic questions can be consolidated into a set of detection criteria for moralization in governance discourse. The presence of three or more of the following features in a governance discourse suggests that moralization is functioning as an enclosure technology rather than as a genuine governance diagnosis:

The moral characterization of commons participants or commons governance is produced by actors with a material stake in enclosure. The characterization precedes rather than follows observable governance failure. The characterization employs global attributions—irresponsibility, incompetence, disorder—that apply to the governance form as such rather than to specific, remediable features of specific governance situations. The characterization forecloses formation-based and institutional reform alternatives by representing governance incapacity as essential rather than contingent. The characterization deploys efficiency as the exclusive governance criterion while representing other governance values as naïve or impractical. The characterization presents enclosure as the inevitable destination of rational governance analysis rather than as one governance alternative among others. And the characterization is resistant to empirical refutation—governance evidence that contradicts the moral claims is dismissed as exceptional, ideologically motivated, or irrelevant to the essential truth of the characterization.

These criteria do not constitute a definitive test; the presence of several of them is suggestive rather than conclusive, and their application requires contextual judgment that no algorithmic procedure can substitute for. But they provide a systematic starting point for the kind of discourse analysis that the detection of moralization as an enclosure technology requires.


IX. The Moralization of the Moralization Critique

Before proceeding to the conclusion, the paper must address a reflexive difficulty that the analysis of moralization generates: the possibility that the critique of moralization as an enclosure technology is itself a form of moralization—an attribution of bad faith, strategic deception, or ideological motivation to the actors who deploy the enclosure grammar. This possibility is not merely abstract; the charge that critics of privatization and enclosure are engaged in ideological special pleading—defending the inefficiency of commons governance for sentimental or political reasons—is a standard feature of the enclosure grammar’s defensive repertoire, and the critique of moralization must be able to respond to it without either accepting its terms or reproducing its logic.

The response has two components. The first is methodological: the analysis of moralization as an enclosure technology does not require the attribution of conscious bad faith to the actors who deploy the enclosure grammar. The grammar can be deployed sincerely by actors who genuinely believe that commons governance is disordered, that commons participants are irresponsible, and that private ownership is the efficient and rational corrective. Sincere deployment of the grammar does not make it accurate; the accuracy of the grammar’s claims is an empirical question independent of the sincerity of those who advance them. The analysis of whose interests the grammar serves, whether it precedes or follows the conditions it describes, and what alternatives it forecloses is not an attribution of bad faith; it is a structural analysis of the grammar’s function that is independent of any assessment of the motives of individual actors.

The second component is substantive: the critique of moralization as an enclosure technology is not itself moral in the same sense that the enclosure grammar is moral. The enclosure grammar moralizes—it attributes governance failure to the character defects, irresponsibility, and incompetence of commons participants. The critique of the enclosure grammar does not respond by attributing character defects to enclosers; it analyzes the rhetorical structure and ideological function of the grammar without claiming that those who deploy it are personally dishonest, malicious, or morally deficient. The distinction between structural analysis and moral attribution is precisely the distinction between formation failure and character failure that Paper 2 of this series developed: the analysis of the enclosure grammar as a structural phenomenon does not require and should not produce a moral indictment of the individual actors who deploy it.

This reflexive self-awareness is not merely a rhetorical courtesy; it is the analytical integrity that distinguishes genuine governance diagnosis from the moralizing that the paper analyzes. The critique of moralization that itself moralizes—that responds to the enclosure grammar by attributing bad faith, greed, or moral failure to enclosers—has reproduced the logic it set out to contest, and has thereby provided the enclosure grammar’s advocates with the target they need to deflect the structural critique onto the motives of the critics. The analysis of moralization as an enclosure technology must be conducted with the same methodological discipline that the paper demands of governance discourse generally: attending to structural function, institutional context, and the interests served by specific framings, without defaulting to the character attributions that moralization always finds more satisfying than the structural analysis it forecloses.


X. Conclusion: The First Question

The argument of this paper has developed a systematic account of moralization as an enclosure technology—a structured rhetorical grammar whose function is not to describe commons governance accurately but to produce the conditions under which enclosure appears legitimate, necessary, and rational. The grammar’s four primary moves—the disorder premise, the moralization of contributors, the efficiency claim, and the naturalization of enclosure as progress—work together as a structured argumentative system that systematically forecloses the alternatives to enclosure while representing enclosure as the conclusion of any competent governance analysis. The grammar’s temporal structure—its tendency to precede rather than follow the commons failures it purports to explain—reveals its function as a technology of authorization rather than a tool of description.

The diagnostic instruments developed in Section VIII provide the practical tools for detecting the enclosure grammar in policy and institutional discourse: the questions of whose interests the moral framing serves, whether it precedes or follows the conditions it describes, and what governance alternatives it forecloses provide the analytical entry points for governance discourse analysis that the detection of moralization requires.

The paper’s concluding claim is the one stated in the abstract and in the paper’s framing: when the language of responsibility and disorder appears in commons discourse, the analyst’s first question should not be whether the claims are accurate but whose interests the moral framing serves and what alternatives it closes off. This is not a counsel of permanent skepticism toward moral language in governance discourse—accurate moral claims have an important place in governance analysis, and the paper does not deny that commons can fail, that participants can be irresponsible, or that governance reform is sometimes necessary. It is a counsel of analytical order: the accuracy of moral claims in governance discourse should be investigated, not assumed, and that investigation requires attending to the structural function of those claims before accepting their descriptive content at face value.

The commons governance literature has largely accepted the descriptive content of the enclosure grammar at face value—has treated the disorder premise, the moralization of contributors, and the efficiency claim as descriptions of governance reality rather than as the components of a rhetorical system whose function is to authorize enclosure rather than to explain governance failure. This acceptance has produced a governance analysis that is systematically unable to see what is happening when the enclosure grammar is operative—that treats the pre-emptive moralization of commons participants as evidence of genuine governance failure, the efficiency claim as a technical finding rather than a political choice, and the naturalization of enclosure as an observation about the direction of history rather than as an ideological construction designed to make resistance appear futile.

The recovery of analytical clarity about moralization as an enclosure technology is not a peripheral refinement of commons governance theory; it is a prerequisite for governance analysis that can accurately describe the conditions of commons failure and commons success, identify the genuine governance interventions that the formation-based account this suite proposes, and resist the rhetorical foreclosure of those alternatives that the enclosure grammar is designed to produce. Commons governance theory that cannot detect moralization when it is operating will consistently misdiagnose commons failure—will treat the political outcomes of enclosure as the natural consequences of commons inadequacy, will treat the formative and institutional failures that produce genuine governance incapacity as the character failures that the grammar attributes to irresponsible participants, and will treat the political choices that produce enclosure as the technical conclusions that any rational analysis must reach. The recovery of analytical clarity is the recovery of governance theory’s capacity to see clearly what is happening in commons governance situations—to distinguish genuine diagnosis from rhetorical authorization, accurate description from ideological production, and the first question of structural analysis from the premature moral conclusion that the enclosure grammar is designed to deliver before the first question can be asked.


Notes

Note 1. The concept of rhetorical grammar employed in this paper is related to but distinct from the concept of discourse in the Foucauldian tradition. Foucault’s (1972) analysis of discourse as a system of statements that produces the objects it purports to describe, operating through epistemic rules that determine what can be said, thought, and known within a given historical period, is relevant to the analysis of moralization as an enclosure technology but operates at a level of abstraction that makes empirical analysis of specific texts and discursive contexts difficult. The concept of rhetorical grammar is more specific and more tractable: it refers to a structured system of argumentative moves that can be identified, analyzed, and traced in specific texts and governance discourses, and whose function can be assessed through the diagnostic procedures developed in Section VIII. The relationship between the two concepts is one of level of analysis rather than theoretical incompatibility.

Note 2. The analysis of the disorder premise in Section III should be distinguished from the claim that shared governance is never disorderly or that commons governance failures never reflect genuine governance problems. The point is not that commons governance is uniformly successful or that its difficulties are always artifacts of misrepresentation; it is that the disorder premise in the enclosure grammar represents disorder as essential to commons governance—as a feature of what shared governance is—rather than as the contingent result of specific and alterable governance conditions. The distinction between essential and contingent disorder is the analytically important one: essential disorder cannot be addressed by governance reform and therefore implies that enclosure is the only solution, while contingent disorder can be addressed by governance reform and therefore makes enclosure one option among several rather than the necessary destination of rational governance analysis.

Note 3. Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) sociology of justification, on which Section II draws, is primarily a sociology of moral discourse in interpersonal and organizational contexts. Its application to the analysis of political and governance discourse requires some extension of the framework’s original scope, and readers familiar with the source literature should note that the application in this paper is interpretive rather than strictly derived. The extension is justified by the structural parallels between the justification repertoires that Boltanski and Thévenot identified in interpersonal disputes and the argumentative structures of the enclosure grammar—parallels that suggest that the grammar is drawing on the same cultural repertoires of justification that Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework describes, even if in a political rather than an interpersonal context.

Note 4. The analysis of Scott’s (1998) legibility imperative in Section IV is particularly relevant to contemporary digital governance, where the legibility requirement takes the form of data standardization, algorithmic classification, and the reduction of complex social behaviors to quantifiable metrics that centralized platforms can process and monetize. The moralization of users who resist this legibility—who refuse to provide personal data, who use privacy tools, who engage in behaviors that resist algorithmic classification—follows the same pattern as the moralization of commons contributors in the enclosure grammar: the illegibility of their behavior to the platform’s management framework is represented as irresponsibility, opacity, or resistance to the terms of a bargain that the platform claims to offer in good faith. The digital enclosure of attention, data, and communicative commons is enabled by a moralization grammar whose structure is identical to the one this paper analyzes in relation to physical and natural resource commons.

Note 5. Harvey’s (2005) analysis of neoliberalism as a political project is one of several competing accounts of neoliberalism’s character and origins. Readers should note that Harvey’s emphasis on class power restoration as the primary driver of neoliberal policy is contested by scholars who emphasize the role of ideas (Blyth, 2002), institutional path dependence (Streeck, 2014), or the specific political coalitions that produced neoliberal policy in different national contexts (Crouch, 2011). The paper does not depend on Harvey’s specific account of neoliberalism’s origins; it draws on his analysis of the discursive function of pre-emptive moralization in governance reform as an analytical framework for understanding the temporal structure of moralization that the inversion thesis claims. Readers who find Harvey’s political economy analysis contentious can engage the temporal argument of Section VII independently of the neoliberalism analysis that provides its contemporary illustration.

Note 6. The diagnostic instruments developed in Section VIII are offered as analytical starting points rather than as definitive algorithms for the detection of moralization. Their application requires contextual judgment—attention to the specific institutional context, the specific actors and interests involved, the specific historical conditions of the governance situation—that cannot be reduced to the application of formal criteria. The instruments are designed to structure this judgment rather than to replace it, and governance analysts who apply them should treat the detection criteria as questions to be investigated rather than as findings to be confirmed. The most common failure mode in the application of these instruments is the premature conclusion that moralization is operating—the attribution of enclosure-enabling rhetorical function to moral language that is actually performing genuine governance diagnosis—and the diagnostic procedure should include explicit attention to the evidence that would disconfirm the moralization hypothesis as well as to the evidence that would confirm it.

Note 7. The paper’s analysis of the naturalization move in Section VI is implicitly indebted to Barthes’s (1972) concept of myth as the conversion of history into nature—the rhetorical process through which historically contingent social arrangements are represented as natural, inevitable, and self-evident features of reality that only ideology or sentiment would contest. Barthes’s semiotic analysis of myth provides a theoretical framework that is complementary to the rhetorical grammar analysis of this paper: where the rhetorical grammar analysis attends to the argumentative structure through which naturalization is produced, Barthes’s analysis attends to the semiotic mechanism through which the historical is converted into the natural. The two analyses illuminate different dimensions of the same phenomenon and are more complementary than competing as frameworks for the analysis of naturalization in governance discourse.

Note 8. The relationship between the moralization analysis of this paper and the prophetic material examined in Paper 6 of this series deserves explicit acknowledgment. The Hebrew prophets’ analysis of the rhetorical strategies through which enclosure acquires legitimacy—the way in which the accumulation of nachalah is moralized as good management and the resistance of dispossessed commoners is moralized as ingratitude—anticipates the structure of the enclosure grammar that this paper analyzes with remarkable precision. Amos’s analysis of the judicial corruption through which enclosure was legitimated, Isaiah’s identification of the self-justifying narrative of the accumulator, and Micah’s account of the planning and execution of enclosure as a deliberate governance strategy all exhibit the analytical structure that this paper develops through the sociology of moral discourse and critical discourse analysis. The convergence between prophetic and sociological analysis at this point suggests that the enclosure grammar is not a specifically modern phenomenon but a recurring feature of the governance of shared resources wherever accumulative interests seek legitimacy through the moralization of those whose entitlements they are appropriating.

Note 9. Readers interested in the application of this paper’s analysis to contemporary environmental governance will find Prudham (2004) and McCarthy and Prudham (2004) valuable extensions. Their analyses of the way in which neoliberal environmental governance deploys the language of market efficiency, individual responsibility, and participatory governance to legitimate the enclosure of environmental commons demonstrate the enclosure grammar in operation in a specific governance domain with a precision that this paper’s more general analysis does not provide. The literature on payment for ecosystem services—the conversion of ecological functions into market commodities whose provision is compensated through financial transactions—is a particularly rich site for the analysis of the efficiency claim and naturalization move in contemporary environmental governance discourse.


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Constraint Intolerance and the Psychology of Enclosure: Toward a Formation-Based Account


Abstract

Standard accounts of commons failure attribute enclosure behavior to greed, short-sightedness, or structural incentives that reward individual extraction at collective expense. This paper proposes an alternative and complementary explanatory variable that the standard accounts cannot see from within their own frameworks: the psychological incapacity for shared constraint. Drawing on object relations theory, developmental psychology, research on narcissistic injury and sovereignty fantasy, and the clinical literature on self-regulation under stress, the paper argues that enclosure behavior is better understood as a psychological defense activated by the experience of constrained shared life than as a rational strategy of resource maximization. When individuals lack the formative capacity to tolerate the internal experience of constraint, limitation, and shared governance, they respond not primarily by seeking more resources but by seeking more control over space—externalizing internal disorder through the domination of shared environments in ways that convert the experience of constraint into the experience of sovereignty. The paper develops a detailed account of the mechanism through which this externalization occurs, examines the specific ways in which governance feedback is experienced as humiliation rather than information by actors with particular formative histories, and proposes the distinction between formation failure and character failure as the conceptual key to a governance response that addresses the psychological substrate of enclosure rather than merely its behavioral surface. It concludes that enclosure is not primarily an economic strategy but a psychological defense, and that governance interventions designed on the assumption that it is the former while ignoring that it is the latter will systematically fail at precisely the moments when they are most needed.

Keywords: enclosure, constraint intolerance, sovereignty fantasy, psychological defense, object relations, narcissistic injury, formation failure, commons governance, externalization


I. Introduction: The Inadequacy of the Greed Hypothesis

The most common explanation of commons failure in both popular and policy discourse is the simplest one: people take too much because they want too much, and the structures of shared governance cannot reliably overcome the gravitational pull of individual self-interest. This explanation—call it the greed hypothesis—has the virtues of parsimony and intuitive plausibility. It corresponds to a recognizable feature of human experience: people do pursue their own interests, sometimes at the expense of others, and shared resources do suffer when that pursuit is unrestrained.

The greed hypothesis is not false. But it is radically incomplete in a way that has serious consequences for governance theory and practice. Its incompleteness lies not in what it asserts but in what it excludes: the psychological dimension of enclosure behavior—the specific motivational, cognitive, and emotional processes through which individuals come to appropriate shared space and resources in ways that exceed their legitimate entitlement and that cannot be adequately explained by reference to resource maximization alone.

Consider three observations that the greed hypothesis cannot explain. First, the observation documented extensively in the behavioral economics literature that people frequently forgo personal gain in order to punish perceived unfairness, maintain perceived equality, or uphold shared norms—even in anonymous, one-shot experimental contexts where there is no reputational or strategic incentive to do so (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2001). If greed were the reliable default, these findings would be anomalies; they are, in fact, robust regularities that require a more complex account of human motivation than the greed hypothesis provides.

Second, the observation that enclosure behavior in real commons governance situations frequently targets control rather than resources—that actors who engage in enclosure often seek to dominate governance processes, monopolize decision-making authority, and appropriate the symbolic markers of sovereignty over shared space in ways that do not obviously serve their material interests and sometimes actively conflict with them. The herdsman who insists on managing the commons even after his herding has ceased, the committee member who expands his role until he has effectively become the committee, the department head who captures organizational processes that fall well outside her department’s mandate—these actors are not maximizing resources; they are maximizing control, and the distinction is analytically important.

Third, the observation that enclosure behavior frequently intensifies in response to governance feedback—that actors who are informed of the consequences of their resource use for the shared system, or who are confronted with the claims of other users, often respond by escalating rather than moderating their appropriation. This observation is directly contrary to what the greed hypothesis, supplemented by informational and monitoring interventions, would predict: if the problem is that self-interested actors lack information about consequences, providing that information should moderate their behavior. In many cases it does not—and the cases where it does not are precisely those where the psychological account proposed in this paper has the most explanatory work to do.

The paper proposes that these observations can be explained—and that commons governance theory can be significantly advanced—by the addition of a variable that rational choice theory and structural institutionalism both lack: the psychological dimension of shared constraint, including the specific ways in which the experience of constrained shared life activates defensive responses in actors with particular formative histories, and the specific mechanisms through which those defensive responses produce the enclosure behaviors that governance theory attributes to greed or structural incentive.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops the concept of constraint as a formative and developmental category, establishing the theoretical basis for understanding constraint tolerance as a formed competency rather than a natural attribute. Section III constructs the theoretical framework of the sovereignty fantasy and identifies its behavioral markers in governance contexts. Section IV examines identity fragility as the specific psychological condition that makes shared space threatening rather than merely inconvenient. Section V analyzes the mechanism of externalization through which internal disorder is converted into spatial and governance domination. Section VI addresses the specific dynamics through which governance feedback is experienced as humiliation by actors whose self-regulatory capacity depends on the maintenance of an expansive sense of control. Section VII develops the distinction between formation failure and character failure that is central to the paper’s practical implications. Section VIII concludes with a statement of what the psychological account contributes to commons governance theory and what governance responses it implies.


II. Constraint as a Developmental and Formative Category

The concept of constraint, as deployed in the commons governance literature, is almost exclusively structural: constraint refers to limitations on individual behavior imposed by institutional rules, monitoring systems, sanction mechanisms, or property rights assignments. This structural understanding of constraint is analytically necessary but psychologically insufficient. It treats constraint as an external condition that governance systems impose on actors whose interior responses to that imposition are uniform and predictable—actors who experience the cost of constraint as a straightforward reduction in their ability to pursue their preferences, and who therefore respond to constraint in proportion to its structural strength.

The developmental and clinical psychology literatures offer a very different picture. In these traditions, constraint is first of all an internal experience—a phenomenological reality that is encountered before it is analyzed, that is felt before it is reasoned about, and that activates motivational and emotional responses that precede and substantially shape the reasoning processes through which actors subsequently represent their situation to themselves and others. The internal experience of constraint is not uniform across persons; it varies substantially depending on the developmental history through which individuals have learned—or failed to learn—to tolerate and navigate the inevitable limitations of shared life.

Developmental psychology has documented with considerable precision the trajectory through which constraint tolerance is normally acquired. The infant experiences constraint as absolute frustration—the gap between desire and satisfaction is not yet mediated by any understanding of why the gap exists, any confidence that it will be closed, or any capacity for the self-regulation that could manage the affective experience of deprivation. The normal developmental trajectory involves the progressive development of precisely these mediating capacities: the cognitive ability to understand why constraint exists, the relational trust that provides confidence in the eventual satisfaction of needs, and the self-regulatory capacity to tolerate the gap between desire and satisfaction without catastrophizing it or demanding its immediate resolution (Winnicott, 1965; Bowlby, 1988; Ainsworth et al., 1978).

This developmental trajectory is substantially shaped by the relational environment within which it unfolds. Winnicott’s (1965) concept of the holding environment—the relational context provided by good-enough parenting that allows the infant to develop the capacity for independent functioning without experiencing the withdrawal of support as abandonment—identifies the primary social condition for the development of constraint tolerance. The holding environment does not eliminate constraint; it provides the relational security within which constraint can be experienced, processed, and integrated rather than defended against. The child who grows up in an adequate holding environment develops what Winnicott termed the capacity to be alone in the presence of another: the ability to function independently, to tolerate frustration, and to accept limitation, because the relational security that grounds this functioning is sufficiently internalized to remain available even when the other is not physically present.

The failure of the holding environment—in the forms of neglect, unpredictable caregiving, intrusion, or the chronic failure to respond adequately to the child’s needs—disrupts this developmental trajectory in ways that have lasting consequences for the individual’s capacity to tolerate constraint in adult life. Kohut (1977) described this disruption in terms of the failure of selfobject functions: the caregiving relationships that normally provide the child with the mirroring, idealization, and twinship experiences that build a stable and coherent sense of self. When these functions are chronically unavailable or inadequate, the self that develops is fragile—dependent on external sources of validation and control for the maintenance of coherence that a securely developed self would maintain from internal resources.

This developmental account of the origins of constraint intolerance is not a claim that all enclosure behavior can be traced to childhood trauma or developmental failure in a simple etiological sense. The relationship between developmental history and adult governance behavior is mediated by many factors—social context, institutional environment, cultural norms, and the specific pressures of particular governance situations—and the developmental literature does not support simple causal claims about the relationship between specific childhood experiences and specific adult behaviors. What it does support is the claim that the capacity for constraint tolerance is a developmental achievement rather than a natural given, that this achievement varies substantially across individuals and populations, that its variation is substantially shaped by developmental experience and social context, and that its absence produces specific patterns of response to the experience of constrained shared life that the governance literature has not adequately theorized.

The concept of formation, as developed in the prolegomenon to this suite and in Paper 5 on stewardship as competence, provides the theoretical framework within which this developmental account is most usefully situated. Formation is the process through which stable dispositional orientations are developed through practice in appropriate social contexts—and constraint tolerance is precisely such a stable dispositional orientation: a formed competency rather than a natural endowment, developed through the repeated experience of navigating constraint within relational contexts that provide adequate support for that navigation, and susceptible to both cultivation and atrophy depending on the social and institutional conditions within which it is embedded.

The implication for commons governance is significant. If constraint tolerance is a formed competency rather than a natural given, then governance interventions that assume its uniform presence across participants—that design monitoring systems, sanction mechanisms, and conflict resolution processes on the assumption that participants can tolerate the experience of constrained shared life without defensive response—are interventions that will fail precisely where participants lack the formative history that constraint tolerance requires. Understanding the psychology of constraint intolerance is therefore not supplementary to governance design; it is a prerequisite for governance design that can function in the real conditions of human variability rather than in the idealized conditions of uniform rational agency.


III. The Sovereignty Fantasy: Theoretical Construction and Behavioral Markers

The concept of the sovereignty fantasy, as this paper develops it, refers to a specific motivational and cognitive pattern that emerges in actors with inadequate constraint tolerance when they encounter the conditions of shared governance: the progressive redefinition of shared space as personal territory, the experience of shared governance as an intrusion on legitimate personal authority, and the behavioral drive to convert shared governance into personal control. The sovereignty fantasy is not a deliberate strategy; it is a psychological defense—a way of reorganizing the experience of constrained shared life that converts the intolerable feeling of limitation into the more manageable feeling of contested sovereignty.

The concept draws on several related theoretical traditions. Fromm’s (1941) analysis of the authoritarian character—the personality organization that seeks to escape the anxiety of freedom by surrendering to a higher power or dominating those perceived as weaker—identifies a related but distinct pattern: the flight from freedom into domination that is driven by the anxiety of self-determination rather than by the incapacity for shared constraint. Kernberg’s (1975) object relations account of narcissistic personality organization provides a closer theoretical analogue: the grandiose self that defends against underlying feelings of inadequacy and worthlessness by maintaining an inflated sense of entitlement and superiority, and that responds to perceived threats to this grandiosity with rage, contempt, or the devaluation of others. Kohut’s (1977) competing account of narcissistic injury and the fragmented self provides a further theoretical resource: the self that has not received adequate mirroring and idealization in development and that therefore remains dependent on external validation for the coherence that would otherwise be internally maintained.

The sovereignty fantasy, as this paper constructs it, draws on all three traditions while being fully reducible to none. It is distinguished from the authoritarian character by its orientation toward personal sovereignty rather than submission to authority: the actor in the grip of the sovereignty fantasy does not seek a higher power to submit to but seeks to become the higher power in the local governance context. It is related to but not identical with narcissistic personality organization: not every actor who exhibits the sovereignty fantasy meets clinical criteria for narcissistic disorder, and the fantasy can be activated situationally in actors who do not exhibit it chronically. And it is grounded in the Kohutian account of the fragmented self without being limited to it: the sovereignty fantasy is one specific response to the experience of selfobject failure, among others, and is activated specifically by the conditions of shared governance rather than by the broader range of conditions that activate narcissistic injury in Kohut’s account.

The sovereignty fantasy has several characteristic behavioral markers in governance contexts that distinguish it from the simple greed that the rational choice account assumes.

The first marker is the displacement of resource interest by control interest. The actor in the grip of the sovereignty fantasy is not primarily interested in taking more of the shared resource; he is interested in controlling access to it, governing its distribution, and defining the terms under which others may use it. The commons herdsman driven by greed adds more animals to the pasture; the commons participant driven by the sovereignty fantasy seeks to become the person who decides how many animals each herdsman may add. This distinction is not merely behavioral; it reflects a fundamentally different motivational structure that requires a fundamentally different governance response.

The second marker is escalating response to constraint. Where the greedily motivated actor moderates his behavior when constraint is adequately enforced—when the cost of extraction is raised sufficiently to make restraint individually rational—the sovereignty-fantasy-motivated actor escalates in response to constraint, experiencing the imposition of governance limits not as a rational signal to modify behavior but as an assault on a self-understanding that depends on the maintenance of unrestricted authority over shared space. This escalating response is what explains the otherwise puzzling observation that governance feedback sometimes intensifies enclosure behavior rather than moderating it: the feedback is not received as information but as humiliation, and the response to humiliation in actors with fragile self-structures is not moderation but counterattack.

The third marker is the moralization of other participants. The actor in the grip of the sovereignty fantasy does not merely take more than his share; he constructs a narrative in which his appropriation is legitimate and the claims of other participants are illegitimate. Other participants are represented as irresponsible, incompetent, or insufficiently invested in the shared resource to deserve governance authority—as people who need to be managed rather than as co-participants with legitimate standing in shared governance. This moralization serves a dual function: it provides narrative justification for the actor’s appropriation of governance authority, and it manages the anxiety that the presence of other legitimate participants generates in a self that cannot tolerate the constrained and negotiated character of shared authority.

The fourth marker is the identification of governance process with personal attack. The actor in the grip of the sovereignty fantasy experiences governance processes—monitoring, sanctioning, conflict resolution, participatory rule modification—not as neutral institutional mechanisms but as vehicles for targeting him specifically. Monitoring feels like surveillance; sanctioning feels like persecution; conflict resolution feels like forced submission; participatory rule modification feels like the dilution of authority that should be his alone. This misidentification of governance process with personal attack is a reliable indicator that the sovereignty fantasy is operative, because it reflects the actor’s inability to maintain the distinction between himself and the governance system—a distinction that depends on precisely the self-differentiation and constraint tolerance that his formative history has not produced.

These four behavioral markers—displacement of resource by control interest, escalation in response to constraint, moralization of other participants, and identification of governance process with personal attack—form a recognizable behavioral cluster that governance practitioners encounter regularly but rarely analyze systematically. The theoretical framework of the sovereignty fantasy provides the analytical tools for that systematic analysis, and the formation account provides the developmental and social substrate that explains why some actors are vulnerable to this fantasy while others are not.


IV. Identity Fragility and the Perception of Shared Space as Threat

The sovereignty fantasy does not operate in isolation. It is activated by a specific perceptual condition: the experience of shared space—space that is governed by rules that apply to everyone, that constrains everyone’s behavior including one’s own, and that requires ongoing negotiation with the legitimate claims of others—as a threat to identity rather than as a resource for community. This perceptual condition is what this paper terms identity fragility: the vulnerability of a self-structure that cannot tolerate the experience of being one among many legitimate claimants in a shared governance system without experiencing that condition as a fundamental challenge to its coherence and worth.

Identity fragility, in the sense employed here, does not refer to clinical pathology in the diagnostic sense, though it can shade into it. It refers to a specific vulnerability in the self’s relationship to its own boundaries and authority—a vulnerability that is produced by inadequate formation in the developmental conditions through which a stable and differentiated sense of self is normally established. The relevant dimension of self-structure is what Erikson (1963) termed ego identity: the experienced sense of continuity and sameness that allows a person to function consistently across different social contexts and under conditions of stress and uncertainty without requiring continuous external validation or the elimination of competing claims in order to maintain a sense of coherent selfhood.

A person with adequate ego identity can participate in shared governance as one participant among others without experiencing that participation as a diminishment of self. The legitimate claims of other participants are not experienced as threats to one’s own claim; the governance rules that constrain everyone’s behavior are not experienced as personal impositions; and the negotiated, imperfect, and sometimes frustrating character of shared governance is experienced as an inherent feature of any system that takes multiple legitimate claims seriously rather than as evidence that the system is working against one specifically.

A person with identity fragility cannot reliably maintain this equanimity. For such a person, the shared governance situation presents a constellation of experiences that are disproportionately threatening: the presence of other participants whose claims are as legitimate as one’s own implies that one’s own claim is not uniquely privileged; the governance rules that constrain one’s behavior imply that one does not have the authority to determine one’s own relationship to the shared resource; the feedback processes that inform one of the consequences of one’s behavior imply that one’s judgment is subject to external evaluation; and the conflict resolution processes that engage one in negotiation with others imply that one’s preferences do not automatically prevail. Each of these experiences, individually manageable by a person with adequate identity security, is experienced by a person with identity fragility as a specific threat to the self’s coherence and worth.

Benjamin’s (1988) analysis of the dynamics of domination and recognition in interpersonal relationships provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding this vulnerability. Benjamin argued that the fundamental human need for recognition—for the acknowledgment of one’s subjectivity by another whose subjectivity one in turn acknowledges—creates a characteristic tension in relationships between the desire to be recognized and the desire to maintain control. The person who can tolerate this tension—who can remain in relationship with another whose subjectivity constrains one’s own—has achieved what Benjamin terms intersubjectivity: the capacity to recognize and be recognized by another who remains genuinely other. The person who cannot tolerate this tension defensively eliminates it by reducing the other to an object—denying the other’s subjectivity in order to eliminate the constraint that subjectivity imposes.

In commons governance terms, this dynamic produces a characteristic pattern: the actor with identity fragility, unable to tolerate the experience of sharing governance authority with other participants whose subjectivity is as real as his own, defensively reduces those participants to objects—to people who lack the competence, the investment, or the legitimate standing to claim co-governance authority. The moralization of other participants that was identified in the previous section as a behavioral marker of the sovereignty fantasy is, in Benjamin’s framework, the conversion of co-participants from subjects to objects: the narrative move that eliminates the constraint of others’ subjectivity by denying that subjectivity itself.

Ferenczi’s (1933) account of the identification with the aggressor provides a further dimension of the identity fragility analysis. Ferenczi described a defensive strategy in which the person who has been unable to integrate experiences of powerlessness and subjugation identifies with the source of that subjugation—adopts the perspective and authority of the aggressor rather than remaining in the vulnerable position of the subjugated—as a way of converting an intolerable experience of helplessness into a more manageable experience of power. Applied to commons governance, this dynamic suggests that actors who have formative histories characterized by experiences of constrained powerlessness—who have been governed without adequate participation, subjected to rules without adequate voice, or denied legitimate authority in contexts where authority was important to them—may respond to shared governance situations by seeking to occupy the position of the authority that constrained them rather than by participating as one among equals. The sovereignty fantasy, on this account, is the governance expression of identification with the aggressor: the conversion of the experience of being governed into the drive to govern, driven by the intolerable memory of powerlessness rather than by the straightforward desire for resources.

Menzies-Lyth’s (1960) organizational application of Kleinian object relations theory provides a third relevant framework. Menzies-Lyth analyzed the way in which social institutions develop structural arrangements that function as defenses against the anxieties that the institution’s primary task activates in its members. Applied to commons governance, this analysis suggests that enclosure behaviors—the appropriation of governance authority, the moralization of other participants, the resistance to monitoring and feedback—may function not only as expressions of individual psychological defense but as institutionally structured defenses that become embedded in the governance system’s social arrangements over time. The sovereignty fantasy is not only an individual psychological phenomenon; it is capable of becoming an institutional pattern, in which the governance system’s structural arrangements systematically protect the appropriations of dominant actors by providing them with institutionalized rationales that convert personal sovereignty assertion into organizational policy.


V. Externalizing Internal Disorder: The Mechanism of Enclosure

The concept of externalization, borrowed from the clinical psychology literature, refers to the process by which internal psychological states—anxiety, disorder, conflict, inadequacy—are attributed to, projected onto, or displaced into the external environment rather than being processed internally. Externalization is a normal and sometimes adaptive psychological process; the experience of being overwhelmed by internal states that one cannot process alone is a universal human experience, and the communication of internal distress to others who can help manage it is a fundamentally social and relational capacity. What makes externalization pathological—or, in governance terms, destructive—is when it takes the specific form of externalizing internal disorder into the governance of shared space: converting the experience of internal constraint, disorder, and inadequacy into the domination and reorganization of shared environments.

The mechanism of this specific form of externalization operates through what Klein (1946) termed projective identification: the psychological process in which intolerable aspects of the self are projected onto another person or environment, and then the self relates to that person or environment as if it actually contained those projected aspects. In governance terms, the actor who cannot tolerate the experience of internal disorder—the anxiety of inadequacy, the experience of constraint, the sense of being insufficient to the demands of a complex shared governance situation—projects that disorder onto the shared governance system and onto other participants, and then relates to the system and participants as if they, rather than the actor, were the source of the disorder.

The behavioral consequence of this mechanism is characteristic and recognizable. The actor who has externalized internal disorder into the shared governance system does not experience himself as the source of governance difficulty; he experiences himself as the person who is attempting to bring order to a disordered system. The monitoring systems that other participants experience as accountability mechanisms he experiences as evidence of the irresponsibility of those being monitored. The conflict resolution processes that other participants experience as constructive engagement with governance difficulty he experiences as evidence of the inability of other participants to manage themselves without his intervention. And the governance rules that apply to everyone, including himself, he experiences as poorly designed constraints that someone with genuine competence—himself—would not need and should not be subject to.

This perceptual reorganization is not deliberate dishonesty; it is the genuine phenomenological experience of the actor whose externalization has reorganized the governance landscape in terms of his own psychological defense. He is not pretending to experience the shared governance system as disordered; he genuinely experiences it that way, because the disorder that he cannot tolerate internally has been relocated, through projective identification, into the system and into the other participants. And the governance interventions that are appropriate responses to the disorder he has introduced—the monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution processes that commons governance theory identifies as design principles for successful commons—are experienced by him as confirmations of the disorder he has projected rather than as responses to his own contributions to that disorder.

This mechanism explains several governance phenomena that the standard frameworks have difficulty accounting for. It explains why governance feedback—accurate information about the consequences of an actor’s resource use—sometimes produces escalation rather than moderation: the actor who has externalized his disorder does not receive feedback as information about his own behavior; he receives it as confirmation that the system is disordered in the ways he has projected. It explains why enclosure behavior is frequently accompanied by elaborate self-justifying narratives: these narratives are not strategic cover stories but genuine accounts of how the situation appears to an actor whose externalization has reorganized his perception of the governance landscape. And it explains why the removal of one enclosing actor from a governance system does not reliably eliminate enclosure dynamics: if the governance system’s structural arrangements have been shaped by institutionalized projective identification—if the system’s organization reflects the defensive needs of dominant actors rather than the governance requirements of the shared resource—the enclosure dynamics will be reproduced by new actors who occupy the structurally arranged positions that the system has created.

Bion’s (1961) analysis of basic assumption functioning in groups provides a complementary account of the collective dimension of this mechanism. Bion identified three recurring patterns of group behavior—dependency, fight-flight, and pairing—that emerge when a group is unable to maintain the work-oriented functioning that its task requires and instead organizes itself around shared unconscious assumptions that provide defense against the anxieties the task activates. In governance terms, the collective expression of the externalization mechanism produces characteristic group-level patterns: the governance group that cannot tolerate the anxiety of shared responsibility organizes itself around the dependency on a dominant actor who promises to take control and restore order; the governance group that cannot tolerate the anxiety of conflict organizes itself around the identification of an external threat that justifies fight or flight rather than the engagement with internal governance difficulty that the situation requires; and the governance group that cannot tolerate the anxiety of genuine collaboration organizes itself around the fantasy of a future governance solution that will resolve all difficulty without requiring the present engagement with constraint and imperfection.

These collective patterns are recognizable in commons governance situations that have been analyzed in terms of structural incentives alone—the group that surrenders governance authority to a single dominant actor who then appropriates shared resources, the governance group that responds to internal difficulty by identifying an external enemy responsible for commons failure, the governance group that defers engagement with governance difficulty by anticipating a future reform that will render present constraint unnecessary. The externalization mechanism and its collective expressions are not alternatives to the structural incentive analysis; they are the psychological substrate that shapes how structural incentives are experienced and responded to, and that determines whether governance responses to structural problems succeed or produce the escalation that unaddressed psychological defense typically generates.


VI. Why Feedback Feels Like Humiliation: The Governance of Shame

Among the most practically important consequences of the psychological dynamics analyzed in the preceding sections is the specific way in which governance feedback is received by actors whose constraint tolerance is inadequate and whose self-structure is insufficiently differentiated to maintain the distinction between information about behavior and judgment of identity. In these actors, governance feedback—the monitoring information, the sanction signal, the conflict resolution process that identifies their behavior as governance-problematic—is not received as information about the consequences of specific actions; it is received as a judgment about the adequacy of the self. The emotional experience activated is not the manageable discomfort of learning that one has been mistaken; it is the searing, reorganizing experience that Lewis (1971) termed shame: the global negative evaluation of the self as defective, inferior, and unworthy.

The distinction between guilt and shame is analytically important for governance theory, though it has not been developed in that context. Tangney and Dearing (2002) documented the behavioral consequences of this distinction with precision: guilt—the negative evaluation of a specific behavior—is associated with the motivation to repair the behavior, to apologize, and to change. Shame—the negative evaluation of the self—is associated with the motivation to hide, to deny, to attack others who are perceived as the source of the shaming experience, or to withdraw entirely from the situation in which the shaming occurred. The governance implications are direct: actors who receive governance feedback as guilt experience—as information that a specific behavior has had negative consequences for the shared resource or for other users—are motivated to modify the behavior. Actors who receive governance feedback as shame experience—as a global judgment on their adequacy and worth—are motivated to attack the feedback, deny its validity, escalate the very behavior that generated it, or withdraw from the governance system entirely.

The conditions under which governance feedback activates shame rather than guilt are substantially the conditions that the preceding sections have analyzed as identity fragility and inadequate constraint tolerance. When the self-structure is insufficiently differentiated—when behavioral adequacy and personal worth are not effectively distinguished from each other—any negative evaluation of behavior is experienced as a negative evaluation of self, and the motivational consequence is defense rather than learning. The governance system that issues monitoring information, applies graduated sanctions, or engages in conflict resolution is experienced by such an actor not as a system performing its proper governance function but as a system issuing a global condemnation of his adequacy as a person.

Scheff’s (1988) analysis of shame and the social bond provides a further dimension of this dynamic. Scheff argued that shame—the experience of being negatively evaluated by significant others—is the primary social emotion: the emotion whose presence or absence most fundamentally determines the quality of the social bond and the individual’s capacity to participate in social life. Unacknowledged shame—shame that is experienced but not recognized as such, and therefore not engaged and processed—produces what Scheff termed shame-rage spirals: the escalating sequences of shame activation, rage response, further social rupture, and further shame activation that characterize the most destructive interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. The governance expression of the shame-rage spiral is recognizable: the actor who receives governance feedback as shame responds with rage—expressed as escalating extraction, aggressive moralization of other participants, or direct attack on the governance process—which produces further governance response, which is experienced as further shaming, which produces further rage, in a sequence that the governance system’s normal mechanisms are poorly equipped to interrupt.

The practical implications of this analysis are significant. Governance systems designed on the assumption that participants receive monitoring information as data and sanction signals as rational incentives are designed for actors whose self-structure is adequately differentiated to maintain the distinction between behavioral feedback and personal judgment. When a significant proportion of governance participants cannot maintain this distinction—when governance feedback reliably activates shame rather than guilt in a substantial subset of the user community—the governance mechanisms that the institutional design literature recommends may produce the opposite of their intended effects: escalating rather than moderating the behaviors they are designed to address, because those behaviors are expressions of defensive response to shame rather than of strategic resource maximization.

This does not mean that monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution should be abandoned; it means that their design must take account of the psychological dynamics through which they are experienced by participants whose formative history has not produced adequate differentiation between behavioral feedback and personal judgment. Governance systems that provide monitoring feedback in ways that support the distinction between behavior and person—that communicate consequences clearly while explicitly separating the evaluation of specific behaviors from the evaluation of the actors who engage in them—are more likely to produce the learning responses that governance designers intend. Governance systems that employ sanctioning in ways that engage the graduated escalation principle Ostrom identified—beginning with the mildest sanction that can communicate the governance message and escalating only when milder sanctions prove inadequate—are more likely to avoid activating the shame responses that produce escalation rather than compliance. And governance systems that employ conflict resolution processes designed to maintain the dignity and legitimate standing of all participants—to engage with the behavioral content of governance conflicts without issuing global judgments on the persons involved—are more likely to support the constructive engagement with governance difficulty that sustained commons governance requires.


VII. Formation Failure and Character Failure: A Critical Distinction

The analysis of constraint intolerance, the sovereignty fantasy, identity fragility, and the externalization of internal disorder through enclosure behavior is vulnerable to a misreading that the paper must explicitly address: the misreading that treats this psychological account as a form of character indictment—as a claim that enclosers are bad people, psychologically defective, or morally culpable in ways that require therapeutic rather than governance responses.

This misreading is not only theoretically incorrect; it is practically dangerous. A governance framework that identifies enclosure behavior as evidence of character defect produces exactly the kind of moralization that Paper 4 of this series analyzes as an instrument of enclosure itself: the attribution of governance failure to the moral inadequacy of specific persons rather than to the formative and institutional conditions that have produced the governance-relevant capacities or incapacities of those persons. Character indictment of enclosers provides neither an explanation of enclosure behavior nor a practically useful framework for addressing it; it provides only the satisfaction of a verdict that, like all moral verdicts on complex behavioral phenomena, generates more heat than light.

The distinction between formation failure and character failure is the conceptual tool that the paper’s analysis requires and that governance theory has lacked. Formation failure refers to the failure of the developmental, relational, and institutional processes through which the capacities for shared governance are normally developed—the failure to provide the holding environment that develops constraint tolerance, the failure to provide the social practices that form externality awareness, the failure to provide the governance institutions that build role containment and tolerance of imperfect coordination. Character failure refers to a different kind of assessment: the moral judgment that a person has failed to exercise the agency available to him in the direction of right action—that he has chosen badly when better choices were available.

The distinction matters because it determines the appropriate governance response. If enclosure behavior is the expression of character failure—of deliberate choice to appropriate shared resources against the actor’s better moral knowledge—then the appropriate governance response is moral: sanction, exhortation, and the expectation of better choices in the future. If enclosure behavior is the expression of formation failure—of the absence of capacities for shared governance that the actor’s developmental and social history has not produced—then the appropriate governance response is formative: the design of governance environments that develop these capacities, the creation of relational contexts that provide the holding environment that formation requires, and the institutional support for the practices through which constraint tolerance, externality awareness, and boundary discipline are cultivated over time.

In practice, most enclosure behavior is the expression of both formation failure and character failure in varying proportions that are difficult to disentangle from the outside and that may not be fully knowable from the inside. A person whose formative history has produced inadequate constraint tolerance nevertheless retains moral agency: the constraints of one’s formative history do not eliminate the capacity for choice but they substantially shape the range of choices that feel available, the cognitive and emotional resources that are accessible for making those choices, and the interpretive frameworks within which the choices are understood. Governance responses that address only the character failure dimension—that issue moral demands for better choices without attending to the formative conditions that shape the range and quality of choices available—will predictably fail, because they demand from actors capacities that their formative history has not equipped them to reliably exercise.

Governance responses that address only the formation failure dimension—that design formative environments without maintaining any expectation of moral agency—will predictably produce a different failure: the removal of the accountability that shared governance requires, and the implicit message that actors with inadequate constraint tolerance are not responsible for their behavior in ways that would make accountability meaningful. The appropriate governance response to the reality of both formation failure and character failure is neither pure sanction nor pure therapeutic intervention but a governance framework that maintains accountability—that makes clear that enclosure behavior has consequences for the governance system and for other participants—while attending simultaneously to the formative conditions that would develop, over time, the capacities for shared governance that accountability assumes.

This two-dimensional governance response is more complex and more demanding than either the purely structural approach of the rational choice tradition or the purely therapeutic approach that a misreading of the psychological account might suggest. It requires governance practitioners to attend simultaneously to the institutional design of accountability mechanisms and to the formative design of the social practices and relational contexts within which governance participants develop their governance capacities. It requires the ability to maintain accountability without moralizing—to communicate that specific behaviors have specific consequences without issuing global judgments on the persons who engage in them. And it requires the tolerance of complexity and ambiguity in the assessment of governance participants that the formation account demands: the recognition that the same person can be simultaneously a moral agent whose choices matter and a product of formative conditions whose consequences he did not choose and cannot easily overcome.

This tolerance of complexity is itself a governance competency—a form of the tolerance of imperfect coordination that Paper 5 identifies as the most demanding of the four governance competencies that commons governance requires. The governance practitioner who can maintain this complexity—who can hold both the accountability and the formative account of enclosure behavior without collapsing into either pure sanction or pure exculpation—is a practitioner who has developed, in relation to governance participants, something analogous to what Winnicott required of the good-enough parent: the capacity to maintain appropriate expectations while providing the holding environment that development requires.


VIII. Implications for Governance Theory and Practice

The psychological account of enclosure behavior developed in this paper has implications for governance theory and practice that extend beyond the specific analysis of the sovereignty fantasy, identity fragility, and the externalization mechanism. Several of the most significant implications deserve explicit statement.

The problem of governance capture by formation failure. The institutional design literature has analyzed governance capture—the appropriation of governance institutions by the interests of powerful actors—primarily in terms of structural incentives and power asymmetries. The psychological account adds a dimension that structural analysis cannot see: the way in which governance institutions can be progressively reorganized by the defensive needs of actors whose formation failure produces the sovereignty fantasy in response to shared governance conditions. The actor in the grip of the sovereignty fantasy does not merely extract more than his share of the resource; he reorganizes the governance system’s social arrangements to accommodate his defensive needs—creating monitoring systems that function as instruments of his surveillance, sanction mechanisms that function as instruments of his authority, and conflict resolution processes that function as arenas for his dominance. This psychologically driven governance capture produces institutional pathology that is more durable and more resistant to structural intervention than capture driven by straightforward material interest, because the defensive needs it serves are more fundamental to the actor’s psychological functioning than material interest.

The timing problem in governance intervention. The standard governance design literature focuses primarily on the design of governance institutions at inception: the specification of design principles that characterize successful governance systems from their beginning. The psychological account suggests that the most critical governance moments are not at inception but under stress: the moments when governance systems face resource scarcity, internal conflict, external threat, or the perception of non-reciprocity that activates the shame-rage spiral in actors with inadequate constraint tolerance. These are the moments when the sovereignty fantasy is most likely to be activated, when externalization of internal disorder is most likely to be displaced into governance domination, and when the governance system’s resilience depends most heavily on the constraint tolerance, boundary discipline, and tolerance of imperfect coordination of its participants. Governance design that attends only to the structural conditions of inception without attending to the psychological conditions of stress will produce governance systems that function adequately under favorable conditions and collapse under the conditions that test governance resilience most severely.

The limits of monitoring and transparency. The design principle of effective monitoring—making the state of the shared resource and the behavior of users visible to governance participants—is empirically well-supported as a characteristic of successful governance systems. The psychological account identifies a limit of this principle that structural analysis alone cannot see: that monitoring and transparency activate shame rather than guilt in actors with inadequate self-differentiation, and that this activation produces escalation rather than compliance. The implication is not that monitoring should be abandoned but that its design must attend to the psychological dynamics of how monitoring information is received, and that governance systems that employ monitoring without attention to these dynamics are systems that will produce the escalation responses that unaddressed shame reliably generates in governance contexts.

The formative function of governance participation. If the psychological capacities required for shared governance are formed through practice in appropriate social contexts, then governance institutions are not merely the arena in which formed capacities are exercised; they are among the most powerful formative environments available for the development of those capacities. The design of governance institutions therefore has formative consequences that are distinct from—and in some cases more important than—their structural incentive consequences. Governance systems that provide genuine participatory engagement, that require actors to attend to the resource state and to the claims of other users, that engage actors in the construction and modification of governance rules, and that provide the conflict resolution processes within which governance disagreement can be engaged rather than avoided, are governance systems that form their participants in the competencies that shared governance requires. The formative function of governance participation is not supplementary to governance design; it is one of the most important functions that governance design serves.


IX. Conclusion: Enclosure as Defense

The argument of this paper can be stated with the precision that its length and complexity are designed to support. Enclosure behavior—the progressive appropriation of shared resources, governance authority, and spatial control that commons governance theory has analyzed primarily in terms of structural incentives and character defect—is better understood as a psychological defense: a way of reorganizing the experience of constrained shared life that converts the intolerable internal experience of limitation into the more manageable, if still anxious, experience of contested sovereignty.

This understanding does not eliminate the structural and character dimensions of enclosure analysis; it provides the psychological substrate within which those dimensions operate. The structural analysis of commons failure identifies the incentive conditions under which enclosure behavior is reinforced; the character analysis identifies the moral agency through which actors remain responsible for the consequences of their choices; and the psychological analysis identifies the formative conditions under which the capacities for shared governance are developed or withheld, the defensive dynamics through which their absence produces enclosure, and the governance responses that address those dynamics rather than merely the behavioral surface that they produce.

The central practical implication of this paper is not therapeutic: it is not that governance systems should provide psychological treatment for enclosers rather than structural accountability for enclosure. It is diagnostic: that governance interventions designed on the assumption that enclosure is purely a rational strategy of resource maximization will systematically fail to address the cases where enclosure is primarily a psychological defense, and that the failure of those interventions will be most visible at precisely the moments—under stress, resource scarcity, and perceived non-reciprocity—when governance resilience is most needed. Diagnosis is prior to intervention: the governance practitioner who can identify the sovereignty fantasy, the externalization mechanism, and the shame-rage spiral in the governance situations she faces is a practitioner who can design interventions that address the actual dynamics of those situations rather than the idealized dynamics of rational choice theory.

Commons are made, as the prolegomenon to this suite argues, through the work of formation. The psychological account of enclosure developed in this paper specifies what that work must address: not merely the structural design of incentive systems and monitoring mechanisms, but the developmental and social conditions through which human beings acquire the constraint tolerance, externality awareness, and boundary discipline that make shared governance possible—and the governance consequences of their failure to do so. Formation failure is the proximate cause of commons collapse that the structural analysis identifies as its target but cannot, from its own resources, explain. The explanation requires the psychological account that this paper has attempted to provide.


Notes

Note 1. The concept of the sovereignty fantasy as developed in this paper is a theoretical construction derived from convergent themes in the clinical, developmental, and social psychology literatures rather than a term in established use in any single tradition. Its closest analogues in the existing literature are Fromm’s (1941) authoritarianism, Kernberg’s (1975) narcissistic personality organization, and Kohut’s (1977) account of the grandiose self. The paper’s construction differs from each of these in specific ways noted in Section III, and readers familiar with any of the three traditions should resist the temptation to identify the sovereignty fantasy with the specific clinical or theoretical concept from which they are reading. The sovereignty fantasy is a governance-specific theoretical construction designed to capture a recognizable behavioral pattern that each of the source traditions illuminates partially without capturing fully.

Note 2. The distinction between guilt and shame developed in Section VI draws primarily on the work of Lewis (1971), who introduced the distinction in a clinical context, and Tangney and Dearing (2002), whose empirical research documented its behavioral consequences. The governance application of this distinction is the paper’s own development and does not appear in either source, though the behavioral implications that Tangney and Dearing documented—guilt associated with repair motivation, shame associated with attack, denial, or withdrawal—translate directly into governance contexts with a fidelity that suggests the distinction is capturing something real about the phenomenology of governance feedback reception. Scheff’s (1988) work on shame and the social bond, and particularly his analysis of shame-rage spirals, provides the most developed account of the collective and relational dynamics of unacknowledged shame and is the most directly applicable to the governance situations this paper analyzes.

Note 3. Bion’s (1961) analysis of basic assumption functioning, discussed in Section V, is drawn from his experience as a group therapist rather than from organizational or governance research. The application of his framework to commons governance situations requires the kind of analogical reasoning that is always potentially treacherous in interdisciplinary work. The specific claim being made is not that commons governance groups are therapeutic groups but that the basic assumption patterns Bion identified—dependency, fight-flight, and pairing—are expressions of the same underlying dynamic that produces enclosure behavior in individual actors: the defensive reorganization of the governance situation around the management of anxiety rather than the performance of the governance task. Whether this claim is defensible in the specific governance contexts to which it is applied is an empirical question that the paper does not resolve, and readers should engage it as a theoretically productive hypothesis rather than an established finding.

Note 4. The Kleinian framework of projective identification, used in Section V to analyze the mechanism of externalization, is among the most contested concepts in psychoanalytic theory. Klein (1946) introduced the concept to describe an intrapsychic process; subsequent theorists—particularly Bion (1962) and Ogden (1979, 1982)—developed it into an account of an interpersonal and intersubjective process in which the projection involves an actual (rather than merely imagined) impact on the person or environment onto whom projection occurs. The paper employs the concept in the interpersonal and organizational sense developed by Bion and Ogden, applying it to the governance context in which the shared governance system and its participants become the recipients of projected internal disorder. This application is interpretive rather than strictly derived from the source literature, and readers trained in the Kleinian tradition may have legitimate reservations about the scope of the concept’s application that the paper cannot fully address within its compass.

Note 5. The formation failure versus character failure distinction developed in Section VII is the paper’s most significant practical contribution, and it is also the most vulnerable to misappropriation. The risk is that the formation failure account will be used to eliminate rather than contextualize moral accountability—that actors who engage in enclosure will invoke their formative history as a complete exculpation of their governance behavior. The paper explicitly rejects this use. Formation failure contextualizes moral accountability without eliminating it: a person whose developmental history has produced inadequate constraint tolerance nevertheless retains moral agency, and the governance system is right to maintain accountability for the behavioral consequences of the choices that agency makes. What formation failure analysis adds is the recognition that accountability interventions alone—without attention to the formative conditions that would develop the capacities for better choices—will reliably underperform, and that the governance design implications of this recognition require attention to formative conditions as well as to accountability mechanisms.

Note 6. The relationship between the psychological account of enclosure developed in this paper and the neurobiological literature on self-regulation, threat response, and social cognition deserves acknowledgment. Research on the amygdala’s role in threat detection and the prefrontal cortex’s role in self-regulation (LeDoux, 1996; Sapolsky, 2017), on oxytocin and the social brain (Zak, 2012), and on the default mode network and social cognition (Lieberman, 2013) provides biological substrate for several of the psychological dynamics analyzed in this paper—particularly the analysis of constraint as activating threat responses that interfere with the self-regulatory and social-cognitive capacities that shared governance requires. The paper has not incorporated this literature for reasons of scope and focus, but the neurobiological dimension of constraint intolerance and externalization is a direction that subsequent research in this area should explore.

Note 7. The paper’s analysis of the collective dimension of enclosure dynamics—the institutionalization of projective identification through organizational structures that protect the appropriations of dominant actors—has direct relevance to the political economy of enclosure at the civilizational scale addressed in Paper 6 of this series. The biblical prophets’ identification of the corruption of judicial and commercial institutions by the interests of the economically powerful—Amos’s indictment of the bribed gate, Isaiah’s analysis of the structural conditions of accumulation—can be read as exactly the kind of institutional projective identification that this paper analyzes at the organizational level: the conversion of shared governance institutions into vehicles for the defensive needs of dominant actors rather than for the governance functions they were designed to serve. The convergence between the psychological and the theological analyses at this point is not coincidental; both are tracking the same underlying dynamic at different scales and through different analytical frameworks.

Note 8. Readers working in conflict resolution and restorative justice contexts will find resonances between the paper’s analysis of shame-governance dynamics and the extensive literature on shame in restorative justice processes, particularly the work of Braithwaite (1989) on reintegrative shaming. Braithwaite’s distinction between stigmatizing shame—which excludes the offender from the community and produces the defensive responses analyzed in Section VI—and reintegrative shame—which addresses the behavior while maintaining the offender’s membership in the community—is directly relevant to the governance context and provides a partially worked out framework for the kind of accountability processes that the paper’s analysis implies. The application of restorative justice frameworks to commons governance is an underdeveloped direction that the present analysis suggests could be productive.


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Commons Are Made, Not Given: Formation as the Missing Variable in Political Economy


Abstract

The governance of shared resources has been theorized, debated, and legislated for decades without arriving at a satisfactory account of why some communities sustain commons governance over extended periods while others fail within a single generation. The dominant explanatory frameworks—rational choice theory, structural institutionalism, social capital theory, and behavioral economics—each capture real features of the governance landscape while leaving a critical variable unaddressed: the formative conditions that produce, or fail to produce, the specific human capacities that shared governance requires. This paper argues that formation—the process by which human beings develop stable dispositions for externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—is the missing variable in political economy’s account of commons governance, and that its absence explains both the empirical failures of dominant frameworks and the practical failures of governance interventions derived from them. The paper situates this argument in relation to Hardin’s rational choice model, Ostrom’s institutional design theory, the behavioral economics of social preference, and the theological tradition of stewardship, and maps the terrain that the suite of which it is the prolegomenon will occupy. It concludes that commons are not given by nature, recovered from tradition, or secured by incentive design alone—they are made, through the slow, specific, and institutionally supported work of formation, and that this recognition transforms both the theoretical agenda and the practical orientation of commons governance research.

Keywords: formation, commons governance, political economy, rational choice, institutional design, stewardship, shared constraint, social preference, prolegomenon


I. The Question That the Literature Has Not Answered

Somewhere between the pastoral simplicity of Garrett Hardin’s overstocked pasture and the institutional complexity of Elinor Ostrom’s polycentric governance systems lies a question that neither has fully answered and that the subsequent literature has addressed only partially: why do some communities develop the capacity for sustained commons governance while others do not, even when the structural conditions for governance success appear to be present?

This is not a question about incentive structures, though incentive structures are relevant to it. It is not a question about institutional design, though institutional design is one of its dimensions. It is not a question about culture or social capital in the aggregate sense in which those terms are usually deployed, though the specific practices and relationships that form human capacity are part of what it asks about. It is a question about formation: about the processes through which human beings develop—or fail to develop—the specific capacities that participation in shared governance requires, and about the conditions—developmental, social, institutional, and theological—under which those processes succeed or fail.

The question is both theoretically prior to and practically more urgent than the questions the dominant frameworks ask. Theoretically, it is prior because the institutional conditions that Ostrom identified as characteristic of successful commons governance—clear boundaries, rule-condition matching, participatory modification, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, recognized autonomy, and nesting—presuppose participants who are capable of exercising judgment about boundaries, constructing and modifying rules, monitoring resource conditions and user behavior, calibrating sanctions to violations, engaging in conflict resolution without defaulting to domination, and sustaining cooperative commitment under conditions of imperfect coordination. These are not capacities that any person who arrives at a commons governance situation automatically possesses; they are formed competencies that must be developed in participants before the institutional design principles can be effective. Practically, the question is more urgent because governance interventions designed on the assumption that incentive structures can substitute for participant capacity have consistently underperformed, often producing the motivational crowding-out effects that Bowles (2016) documented: the replacement of intrinsic normative motivation by external incentive structures that assume and thereby produce the self-interested behavior they were designed to constrain.

Formation is the missing variable—missing not because scholars have been inattentive but because the dominant frameworks of political economy are not equipped to see it. Rational choice theory, which has dominated commons analysis since Hardin, treats individual preferences as given and stable, not as formed and variable; it has no concept of the process by which preferences become what they are, and therefore no way to theorize formation as a governance variable. Structural institutionalism, which Ostrom’s work exemplifies at its best, attends to the design of governance structures with admirable precision but treats the motivational and capacitary attributes of governance participants as background conditions rather than as objects of analysis and intervention. Social capital theory gestures toward the relational conditions of governance success but tends toward aggregate concepts—trust, norms, networks—that obscure the specific processes by which individual participants develop the capacities that shared governance requires. Behavioral economics has documented with precision the conditions under which people deviate from narrow self-interest in favor of cooperative, fair, and norm-governed behavior, but has not developed an account of the developmental and social conditions that produce these behavioral dispositions in some people and not others.

The suite of papers of which this prolegomenon is the introduction proposes formation as the theoretical variable that political economy has lacked, and develops its implications across a range of domains—historical, psychological, institutional, rhetorical, and theological—that the dominant frameworks have addressed in isolation from one another. This paper maps the theoretical terrain those papers will occupy, situates the formation concept in relation to the existing frameworks, and establishes the vocabulary on which the subsequent analysis will draw.


II. What the Dominant Frameworks Get Right and What They Miss

Before proposing formation as a missing variable, it is necessary to be precise about what the dominant frameworks have contributed and where their contributions end. This precision matters because the formation account proposed in this suite is not a rejection of the existing frameworks but an extension of them—an attempt to provide the explanatory substrate that each framework gestures toward but cannot theorize within its own terms.

Rational Choice Theory: The Contribution and the Limit

The contribution of rational choice theory to commons governance analysis is real and should not be dismissed in the enthusiasm for its critique. The basic insight that individual actors respond to incentive structures—that the design of governance systems affects the costs and benefits of different behavioral options and therefore affects behavior—is both true and important. Hardin’s model, whatever its empirical failures and ideological liabilities, identified a genuine structural problem: governance systems that allow unlimited individual extraction from shared resources while distributing the costs of extraction across all users create incentive structures that drive toward overextraction. This is not an artifact of the rational choice framework; it is a real governance problem that any adequate framework must address.

The limit of rational choice theory is that it treats the identification of this problem as the complete analysis. Having established that the incentive structure of an unregulated commons drives toward overextraction, the rational choice framework concludes that the solution must be structural: change the incentive structure through privatization, coercive regulation, or institutional design, and the behavior will change accordingly. This conclusion follows from the framework’s premise—that behavior is a function of incentive structure applied to given preferences—but the premise is false in precisely the ways that matter for commons governance. Preferences are not given; they are formed. And the formation of preferences in the direction of externality awareness, boundary discipline, and shared constraint is a governance achievement that incentive structures can support or undermine but cannot produce from their own resources.

Bowles and Gintis (2011) documented this failure extensively in their analysis of the evolution of social preferences, demonstrating that human motivational structure is substantially more complex than rational choice theory assumes—that people routinely exhibit strong reciprocity, inequality aversion, and norm-governed behavior that cannot be derived from narrow self-interest maximization, and that the conditions under which these behavioral dispositions are exhibited or suppressed are social and institutional rather than merely incentive-structural. This documentation is important but incomplete: it establishes that people sometimes behave cooperatively and that the conditions of cooperation are social and institutional, without providing an account of the developmental and formative processes that produce the disposition toward cooperative behavior in some people and not others.

Ostrom’s Institutional Design Theory: The Contribution and the Limit

Ostrom’s contribution is of a different order. Where rational choice theory offered a model of inevitable failure, Ostrom offered an empirically grounded account of institutional conditions under which commons governance succeeds—an account derived from systematic comparison of governance systems across multiple resource types, cultural contexts, and historical periods. The design principles she identified—and the broader research program in institutional analysis and development that she established—represent the most significant advance in commons governance theory of the past half-century, and any adequate successor framework must incorporate rather than ignore them.

The limit of Ostrom’s framework is not a failure of attention or rigor; it is a consequence of the methodological commitments that made her empirical contribution possible. Ostrom’s comparative institutional analysis was designed to identify the structural features that characterize successful governance systems—features that could be observed, compared, and codified as design principles applicable across cases. This methodological commitment required treating governance participants as background constants: the analysis compares institutional structures across cases while holding participant characteristics constant, or treating variation in participant characteristics as subsumed under institutional variables. This methodological choice was appropriate for the analytical goal Ostrom was pursuing; but it means that the formation of governance participants—the processes by which they develop the capacities that the institutional design principles presuppose—falls outside the analysis by construction.

Ostrom was aware of this limitation. Her later work on social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2007, 2009) and her engagement with the behavioral economics literature in her Nobel lecture (Ostrom, 2009) both gesture toward the formative and motivational dimensions of governance that her institutional analysis could not fully address. She acknowledged that the design principles characterize systems that work without fully explaining why some communities develop the capacity to implement and maintain them while others do not. That acknowledgment is the opening through which the formation account proposed in this suite enters.

Social Capital Theory: The Contribution and the Limit

Social capital theory, associated primarily with the work of Putnam (1993, 2000) and Coleman (1988), introduced relational and normative variables into the analysis of governance success in ways that both rational choice theory and structural institutionalism had excluded. The insight that trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement are genuine governance resources—that communities with high social capital govern shared resources more successfully than communities with low social capital—is supported by substantial empirical evidence and represents a real advance over purely structural accounts.

The limit of social capital theory is conceptual rather than empirical. The concept of social capital, as typically deployed, is an aggregate and relatively undifferentiated measure of relational and normative resources. It captures the fact that relational resources matter without analyzing the specific competencies that those resources produce, the specific practices through which those competencies are developed, or the specific conditions under which relational resources produce governance capacity rather than merely social cohesion. Two communities may have similar levels of trust and network density while differing substantially in the governance capacities of their members, because the practices through which their social relationships are constituted form different competencies in their participants. Social capital theory lacks the conceptual vocabulary to make this distinction because it operates at the level of aggregate relational resources rather than at the level of specific formed competencies.

Portes (1998) identified related limitations in his critique of social capital theory, noting its tendency toward circular reasoning—communities with strong institutions have high social capital, and high social capital produces strong institutions—and its inability to explain negative social capital: the formation of strong in-group loyalty and normative cohesion that supports governance failure rather than success by constituting the group against external others rather than in support of shared governance norms. The formation account proposed in this suite addresses both limitations by specifying the content of what needs to be formed and the processes through which formation occurs, rather than treating relational resources as a generic positive variable.

Behavioral Economics: The Contribution and the Limit

The behavioral economics of social preference—associated with the work of Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Henrich et al. (2001), Bowles (2016), and others—has contributed to commons governance analysis by documenting with experimental precision the conditions under which people exhibit cooperative, fair, and norm-governed behavior that deviates from narrow self-interest maximization. The finding that strong reciprocity—the disposition to cooperate with cooperators and to punish defectors, even at personal cost—is both widespread and culturally variable is important for commons governance because it demonstrates that the motivational substrate for shared governance is real and not merely the product of self-interest dressed in cooperative language.

The limit of behavioral economics is developmental: it documents the behavioral dispositions that people exhibit under various conditions without providing an account of the developmental and social processes that produce those dispositions. The cross-cultural variation in social preference that Henrich et al. (2001) documented—substantial differences across cultures in the degree of prosociality, fairness-seeking, and punishment of defectors exhibited in experimental games—is treated as evidence of cultural influence on behavioral disposition without analyzing the specific cultural practices and formative processes that produce the observed variation. This is precisely the gap that the formation account addresses: not the fact that some people and communities exhibit governance-supporting behavioral dispositions more robustly than others, but the processes through which those dispositions are developed and the conditions under which those processes succeed or fail.


III. Formation: A Technical Definition and Theoretical Location

The concept of formation, as this suite employs it, requires precise definition to distinguish it from related but distinct concepts: education, training, socialization, and character development. These distinctions are not merely terminological; they reflect substantive differences in what is being claimed about the processes through which human governance capacity is developed.

Formation, in the technical sense employed here, refers to the process by which human beings develop stable dispositional orientations—stable patterns of perceiving, evaluating, motivating, and acting—that constitute genuine competencies for shared governance rather than merely behavioral compliance with governance rules. Formation differs from education in that it targets stable dispositions rather than information and knowledge, though education may contribute to formation when it is designed to do so. It differs from training in that it produces intrinsic motivation rather than merely skill acquisition, though training may be part of the formative process. It differs from socialization in its specificity: socialization refers to the general process by which individuals acquire the norms and behaviors appropriate to a social group, while formation refers to the development of specific competencies for shared governance that may or may not be produced by socialization in any given community. And it differs from character development in the breadth of its reference: character development typically refers to the formation of moral character in the most general sense, while formation as used here refers specifically to the governance-relevant competencies that commons governance requires.

The theoretical lineage of the concept is primarily Aristotelian. Aristotle’s account of virtue as stable disposition (hexis) developed through habituation (ethismos)—through the repeated performance of virtuous acts under conditions that make the exercise of practical wisdom possible—establishes the basic framework within which formation operates (Aristotle, trans. 1999). Virtues, for Aristotle, are not natural endowments; they are developed through practice in appropriate social contexts. But they are also not merely learned behaviors that could be unlearned as easily as they were acquired; they are stable dispositions that become constitutive of the agent’s character—part of who the person is, not merely part of what the person does under particular incentive conditions.

This Aristotelian framework was developed by MacIntyre (1981) in After Virtue and by MacIntyre (1988) in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? into a sustained argument that the concept of virtue as formed through participation in social practices is the necessary foundation for any adequate account of human action and social life—including, though MacIntyre did not develop this application explicitly, governance of shared resources. The concept of social practice as a cooperative activity with internal goods, standards of excellence, and constitutive rules that form the practitioners in specific virtues is the theoretical vehicle through which formation operates in MacIntyre’s account, and it is directly applicable to commons governance: participation in well-designed governance institutions is a social practice in MacIntyre’s sense, and sustained participation in such institutions forms governance participants in the virtues—the stable dispositional competencies—that the institution requires and expresses.

The developmental psychology literature provides empirical grounding for this theoretical framework without being reducible to it. Research on executive function and self-regulation (Mischel, 2014; Baumeister and Tierney, 2011), on perspective-taking and prosocial motivation (Batson, 1991), on secure attachment and the capacity for constructive engagement under stress (Bowlby, 1988; Ainsworth et al., 1978), and on the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Gilligan, 1982) all converge on a picture of human motivational and cognitive development as substantially shaped by developmental experience and social context—as genuinely formative in the technical sense rather than merely responsive to incentive structures applied to given preferences.

The theological tradition of stewardship, examined at length in the sixth paper of this series, contributes to the formation concept a dimension that the philosophical and psychological traditions do not provide: an account of why the formation of governance competencies is not merely practically useful but theologically required—why the failure of formation is not merely a governance problem but a distortion of the human relationship to creation and to the Creator. This theological dimension is not incidental to the formation account; it is, as the theological paper argues, the source of its deepest rationale and its most fundamental claim about what human beings are and what they are for.


IV. The Four Competencies and Why They Are the Right Ones

The formation account developed in this suite identifies four specific competencies as the governance-relevant outcomes of successful formation: externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination. These four competencies are not arbitrary or exhaustive; they are identified as the governance-relevant competencies by the convergence of three independent lines of evidence: the comparative institutional literature on commons governance success and failure, the developmental psychology literature on self-regulation and prosocial motivation, and the theological tradition of stewardship as accountable governance.

Externality awareness is the competence to perceive—habitually, without special effort—the consequences of one’s resource use for the shared resource system and for other users. It has both cognitive and affective dimensions: the cognitive ability to model consequences across time and across the community of users, and the affective disposition to care about those consequences as morally relevant rather than as irrelevant background conditions for one’s own extractive behavior. The absence of externality awareness is the proximate mechanism of the commons failure that Hardin described: the herdsman who adds the marginal animal does not perceive or does not care about the distributed cost that addition imposes on the shared resource and on other users. The presence of externality awareness is what makes monitoring and feedback systems effective: participants who habitually track the consequences of their behavior for the shared system use the information that monitoring systems provide, while participants who lack externality awareness treat monitoring information as irrelevant to their resource decisions.

Boundary discipline is the competence to distinguish between legitimate claim assertion within a shared governance system and enclosure—the appropriation of control or resources that exceeds one’s legitimate entitlement—and to regulate one’s own behavior in light of that distinction rather than in light of the locally plausible reasoning that drives incremental enclosure. The absence of boundary discipline is the driver of the proto-enclosure behavior that Paper 2 of this series analyzes: the progressive expansion of individual control over shared space through a series of small, individually justifiable steps that cumulatively constitute enclosure. The presence of boundary discipline is what makes the governance category of legitimate entitlement operative: participants who know where their legitimate claim ends and exercise the self-regulatory capacity to stay within that limit maintain the shared governance system, while participants who lack either the knowledge or the self-regulatory capacity progressively erode it.

Role containment is the competence to exercise one’s legitimate function within a shared governance system without expanding that function into domains that belong to other roles, and without treating the authority appropriate to one’s role as a license for broader control over shared space and governance processes. The absence of role containment produces the sovereignty fantasy that Paper 2 identifies as a distinct failure mode from enclosure: the drive to control the governance system rather than merely to appropriate its resources—the committee member who attempts to exercise executive authority, the department manager who monopolizes organizational resources and processes. The presence of role containment is what makes differentiated governance structures—the nested, polycentric governance systems that Ostrom identified as characteristic of successful large-scale commons—functional: participants who can exercise their roles fully and excellently without collapsing the boundaries between their roles and the governance system as a whole enable the system to function as designed.

Tolerance of imperfect coordination is the competence to remain constructively engaged with a shared governance system through the experience of imperfect outcomes—to distinguish between failures that indicate the need for reform and failures that are endemic to the constrained and negotiated character of shared governance, and to maintain cooperative commitment under conditions of uncertainty and perceived non-reciprocity without defaulting to defection, withdrawal, or control-seeking. The absence of this competence is the most common proximate cause of governance system collapse: not the failure of institutional design or the exhaustion of structural incentives, but the withdrawal of participants whose capacity to tolerate imperfect coordination under stress has been exceeded. The presence of this competence is what makes governance system resilience possible: participants who can remain constructively engaged through failure, who experience imperfect coordination as a problem within a valued relationship rather than as evidence that the relationship is not worth maintaining, provide the motivational substrate on which governance reform is possible.

These four competencies are governance-relevant not because they are exhaustive of what governance participants need—they are not—but because they are the specific competencies that the evidence most consistently identifies as the proximate difference between successful and failed commons governance at the level of individual participants. They are what participants who can sustain shared governance over the long term have that participants who cannot do not have. And they are what formation must produce if commons governance is to succeed.


V. Why Formation Is Prior to Institutional Design

The claim that formation is prior to institutional design requires careful statement because it is easily misread as a claim that institutional design is irrelevant to governance success—a claim that the evidence does not support and that this suite does not make. The relationship between formation and institutional design is not one of competition or substitution; it is one of dependence and mutual constitution. Formation is prior to institutional design in the specific sense that the governance capacities presupposed by good institutional design must be present in participants before the design can be effective; but institutional design is simultaneously one of the most powerful formative environments available, shaping the motivational and capacitary attributes of participants in ways that either support or undermine the governance competencies on which the design depends.

The claim of priority is best understood through a simple observation: governance design principles are specifications of what governance structures should look like given that participants have certain capacities—the capacity to monitor resource conditions and report accurately, to calibrate sanctions to violations with judgment rather than merely following rules, to engage in conflict resolution rather than defaulting to escalation, to participate in rule modification with genuine concern for governance effectiveness rather than merely for personal advantage. When participants lack these capacities, governance structures designed on the assumption that they are present do not produce the outcomes the design principles predict; they produce the pathological variants of those outcomes—monitoring systems that become surveillance instruments for dominant actors, sanction systems that become tools for targeted intimidation, conflict resolution mechanisms that become arenas for sovereignty assertion, rule modification processes that become vehicles for capturing governance norms in the interest of powerful participants.

The evidence for this priority is distributed across the governance literature but rarely assembled in its implications. Platteau (2004) documented the failure of decentralization programs in developing countries that transferred formal governance authority to local communities without attending to the formation of the governance capacities those communities needed to exercise that authority effectively—producing, in many cases, governance capture by local elites that was worse than the centralized systems the decentralization was designed to replace. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) demonstrated that the assumption of communities as homogeneous units with shared governance interests—an assumption embedded in much of the commons design literature—obscures the internal power dynamics that determine whether formally participatory governance institutions serve the community as a whole or are captured by the interests of those already powerful within it. Both findings point to the same conclusion: that institutional design without formation produces governance structures that powerful actors capture and redirect toward their own interests.

The converse claim is equally important: institutional design is one of the most powerful formative environments available for the development of governance competencies. The design principles that Ostrom identified are not merely structural features of successful governance systems; they are, as Paper 5 of this series argues in detail, formative practices that develop the competencies they presuppose in participants who engage them over time. Participatory rule modification, when genuine rather than performative, forms participants in the habit of attending to the consequences of governance rules for the resource system and for other users—a habit that is the institutional expression of externality awareness. Graduated sanctions, when fairly calibrated and consistently applied, form participants in the understanding of where legitimate behavior ends and enclosure begins—a cognitive map that supports boundary discipline. Accessible conflict resolution, when used rather than avoided, forms participants in the practice of constructive engagement with governance disagreement—a practice that is the institutional expression of tolerance for imperfect coordination.

This mutual constitution of formation and institutional design—in which institutional design presupposes formative outcomes that it simultaneously produces—is not a vicious circle but a developmental dynamic that has both a direction and a starting point. The direction is toward the mutual reinforcement of formed governance competence and effective institutional design; the starting point is whatever formative resources a community brings to its governance situation. Communities that bring substantial formative resources can implement and maintain more sophisticated institutional designs; communities with minimal formative resources require institutional designs that both function with limited participant capacity and work to develop that capacity through the governance practices they establish.

This developmental dynamic is what the formation-based account of commons governance adds to the institutional design literature: not a competing framework but a developmental dimension that the design literature implicitly assumes without theorizing. The question for governance intervention is not merely which design principles to implement but how to sequence the development of participant capacity and institutional sophistication in ways that produce the mutual reinforcement rather than the mutual destruction of formation and design.


VI. The Ideological Dimension: Why Formation Has Been Invisible

Having established the theoretical case for formation as the missing variable in political economy, the paper turns to a question that the theoretical analysis cannot itself answer: why has formation been invisible to the dominant frameworks, and why does its invisibility persist despite the evidence that points toward it?

The answer is not primarily a matter of scholarly inattention. The invisibility of formation in political economy’s account of commons governance is produced by a set of theoretical and ideological commitments that are prior to any specific empirical question—commitments about human nature, about the proper units of social analysis, and about the relationship between individual and collective life that structure what can be seen within each framework.

The rational choice commitment to given and stable preferences is the most fundamental source of formation’s invisibility in the dominant framework. If preferences are given—if the motivational structure of governance participants is a constant rather than a variable—then the process by which that motivational structure is produced cannot be an explanatory variable. The formation question—why do some people develop governance-supporting motivational orientations while others do not?—is not merely unanswered within the rational choice framework; it is unaskable, because the framework’s foundational premise eliminates the variability that the question requires.

The methodological individualism that characterizes both rational choice theory and much of the institutional economics tradition provides a second source of invisibility. Methodological individualism treats the individual as the irreducible unit of social analysis, explaining social outcomes as the aggregate results of individual actions. This commitment makes it possible to analyze the incentive structures that affect individual behavior and the institutional structures that aggregate individual choices into collective outcomes; it makes it difficult to analyze the social practices and relational contexts through which the individual motivational structure that the analysis takes as given is itself produced. Formation is inherently a social and relational process—it occurs within families, communities, governance institutions, and cultural traditions—and a framework committed to methodological individualism has structural difficulty seeing it.

The ideology of possessive individualism that Macpherson (1978) identified as the foundational assumption of liberal political theory provides the deepest source of formation’s invisibility. If human beings are by nature self-interested proprietors of their own persons and capacities—if self-interest is the natural condition from which governance institutions must work—then the formation of motivational orientations that are not reducible to self-interest is not merely analytically invisible but politically inconvenient. It suggests that the self-interested actor of liberal political theory is not a description of human nature as such but a description of a specific formative outcome—of what human beings become when formed by practices and institutions that treat self-interest as natural and legitimate—and that different formative conditions could produce different motivational outcomes. This suggestion is threatening to a political tradition that derives the legitimacy of its institutional arrangements from the claim that they work with human nature as it is rather than requiring human nature to be different from what it is.

Paper 4 of this series develops the analysis of moralization as a mechanism for making enclosure appear natural and inevitable—for converting a specific institutional and formative failure into an apparent expression of human nature that requires enclosure as its correction. The invisibility of formation in political economy is the theoretical counterpart of this moralization: by treating self-interested behavior as given rather than formed, the dominant frameworks make the governance conditions that produce self-interested behavior appear as descriptions of human nature rather than as explanatory targets requiring understanding and intervention.

The formation-based account proposed in this suite is thus not merely a theoretical correction to the dominant frameworks; it is a political and ideological intervention that makes visible what those frameworks systematically exclude. To say that commons are made rather than given—that the governance capacities required for shared life are formed through specific practices in specific social contexts rather than either naturally present or permanently absent—is to contest the ideological claim that enclosure is the inevitable response to human nature and to insist that the conditions under which human beings develop governance capacity or fail to develop it are themselves objects of political analysis and intervention.


VII. Theological Grounding: Why the Formation Account Needs It

The suite of which this paper is the prolegomenon includes a theological paper that the preceding papers in the series might appear not to require. The historical, psychological, institutional, rhetorical, and developmental analyses of the preceding papers constitute a theoretically coherent account of commons governance failure and its formation-based corrective without needing to invoke theological commitments. Why, then, does the suite include a theological paper at all, and why does the formation account need the theological grounding that paper provides?

The answer operates at two levels: the level of explanatory completeness and the level of normative grounding.

At the level of explanatory completeness, the theological tradition—specifically, the biblical land ethic developed in Leviticus 25, the prophetic material examined in Isaiah, Amos, and Micah, and the stewardship theology of the New Testament parables—provides historical evidence of a governance framework that recognized, analyzed, and responded to commons failure and enclosure dynamics with institutional sophistication that secular political economy has not yet matched. The Jubilee provision is the most striking example: a structural anti-enclosure mechanism that provides for the periodic reversal of accumulation and the restoration of distributed tenure—not as moral exhortation but as enforceable legislation embedded in the institutional fabric of the covenant community. Secular commons theory has not produced an equivalent, and the reasons for its failure to do so are themselves illuminating: the secular frameworks lack the theological grounding—the claim of divine ownership that makes permanent alienation categorically impermissible—that gives the Jubilee provision its unconditional character. A governance provision that can be overridden by economic necessity is not equivalent to a covenant obligation that cannot be, and the difference matters for governance resilience under stress.

At the level of normative grounding, the formation account requires a rationale for why formation in the governance competencies identified in this suite is obligatory rather than merely prudent—why the failure to develop externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination is not merely a governance inefficiency but a moral and theological failure. The secular frameworks can demonstrate that communities with well-formed governance participants govern better than communities without them; they cannot demonstrate that the formation of those participants is morally required rather than merely instrumentally desirable. The biblical tradition can and does make this stronger claim: the formation of human beings in the capacities for accountable stewardship of creation is not merely useful but required—required by the covenant terms under which creation is held in trust, required by the character of the Creator-Owner whose governance of creation defines what legitimate human dominion looks like, and required by the human vocation as image-bearers commissioned to represent that governance faithfully across generations.

This theological claim does not invalidate the secular analysis; it grounds it in a way that the secular analysis cannot ground itself. The secular formation account can say: communities that form their participants in governance competencies sustain commons governance, and the failure to do so produces commons collapse. The theological formation account can add: the formation of governance competence is what human beings were made for, the failure of that formation is a distortion of the human vocation, and the judgment that the prophets announce on enclosure is not an arbitrary sanction but the natural consequence of a fundamental disorder in the human relationship to creation and to the Creator. These are different kinds of claims, operating at different levels of analysis; but they are complementary rather than competing, and the suite that includes both is more complete than a suite that includes only one.


VIII. The Suite and Its Architecture

The papers that follow this prolegomenon develop the formation account across six specific domains, each of which addresses a different dimension of the central argument while remaining independently publishable as a scholarly contribution to the relevant specialized literature.

Paper 1, The Myth of the Inevitable Tragedy, establishes the empirical and historical foundation of the suite by demolishing the inevitability thesis on which Hardin’s model depends and replacing it with the diagnostic question that the formation account requires: not whether commons fail but under what conditions of formation, institutional design, and social accountability they do so. The paper’s analysis of Hardin’s assumptions as political commitments rather than neutral analytical premises, its documentation of historical commons that worked, its account of Ostrom’s design principles as empirical correction, and its identification of the rational actor model’s category error when applied to normed communities together establish the negative case: the dominant framework is inadequate. The formation account developed in subsequent papers provides the positive alternative.

Paper 2, Constraint Intolerance and the Psychology of Enclosure, develops the formation account from the psychological side, analyzing the specific motivational and dispositional conditions that produce enclosure behavior—the sovereignty fantasy, identity fragility, and the externalization of internal disorder through domination of shared space. This paper provides the psychological depth that the institutional analysis cannot supply and that the theological account presupposes: an account of what is happening in the persons who enclose, that goes beyond the description of enclosure as greed or self-interest to identify the specific formative failures—the inadequate development of constraint tolerance, externality awareness, and the capacity for shared identity—that produce enclosure as a psychological necessity rather than a rational choice.

Paper 3, From the Office Refrigerator to the Aquifer, demonstrates the scale-invariance of the formation failure pattern—the recurrence of the same four-stage sequence of commons failure across radically different scales and contexts. The paper’s analytical use of micro-scale vignettes as primary data rather than mere illustration is methodologically significant: it demonstrates that the formation failure that drives commons collapse is visible at scales and in contexts that the standard commons governance literature, focused on natural resource systems, does not examine, and that the visibility of formation failure at these scales provides diagnostic access that large-scale studies cannot.

Paper 4, Moralization as Enclosure Technology, completes the critical analysis of the suite by examining how enclosure acquires and maintains its legitimacy—how the displacement of shared governance by individual accumulation is represented as the correction of commons failure rather than as its cause, and how the rhetoric of responsibility and disorder functions not to describe reality but to foreclose the alternatives that a formation-based account would make visible. This paper is the suite’s most directly critical contribution: it identifies moralization as an instrument of enclosure rather than a response to it, and provides diagnostic tools for detecting this instrument in policy and institutional discourse.

Paper 5, Stewardship as Formed Competence, develops the suite’s constructive argument: a non-utopian account of the specific competencies that successful commons governance requires and the conditions under which those competencies are formed, sustained, and supported by institutional design. The paper’s central distinction between stewardship and asceticism—between the formation of desire in accordance with a stewardship self-understanding and the suppression of desire through acts of will—is the conceptual key to the constructive argument: stewardship is not self-denial but competence, and the cultivation of stewardship is not moral exhortation but formative practice.

Paper 6, Land, Limits, and Judgment, grounds the formation account in the theological tradition that provides its deepest rationale: the biblical land ethic of Leviticus 25, the prophetic indictment of accumulation in Isaiah, Amos, and Micah, and the stewardship theology of the New Testament parables. The paper demonstrates that the biblical tradition constitutes a coherent anti-enclosure framework of greater structural sophistication than secular commons theory has achieved, and argues that its superiority at precisely the points where secular theory is weakest—the grounding of the accountability claim, the diagnosis of institutional capture, the structural ambition of the Jubilee correction, and the theological account of formation—makes it an indispensable interlocutor for commons governance theory rather than a supplementary moral perspective.

The suite as a whole constitutes a sustained argument that commons governance theory has been organized around the wrong explanatory variable—incentive structure rather than formation—and that the reorientation of that theory around formation transforms both its theoretical agenda and its practical implications. Commons are not given by nature; they are not recovered from tradition; they are not secured by incentive design alone. They are made—through the slow, specific, and institutionally supported work of forming human beings in the capacities for shared governance that shared life requires. That work is the most important governance project of any age, and it has been systematically neglected by the frameworks that have dominated political economy’s account of shared life.


IX. Conclusion: What It Means to Say That Commons Are Made

The title of this prolegomenon is intended as a thesis, not a slogan. To say that commons are made rather than given is to make a specific theoretical claim with specific implications, and the conclusion of this paper is the appropriate place to state those implications with precision.

It is a claim against inevitability. Commons are not inevitably fated to fail, as Hardin’s model implies, nor inevitably recoverable through solidarity, as communitarian optimism assumes. Their success or failure is contingent on the formative, institutional, and social conditions under which governance participants develop or fail to develop the competencies that shared governance requires. This contingency is the foundation of the suite’s diagnostic orientation: the question for any commons governance situation is not “will this fail?” but “what formative conditions are present or absent, and what does their presence or absence predict about governance outcomes?”

It is a claim about process. Commons are made through processes—developmental, relational, institutional, and theological—that have specific content, specific conditions of success and failure, and specific relationships to the institutional design principles that the governance literature has documented. Understanding these processes is both a theoretical task and a practical one: theoretical because the processes have not been adequately theorized in the dominant frameworks, and practical because they are the target of the governance interventions that formation-based commons theory recommends.

It is a claim about time. Commons are made slowly. The formation of governance competencies is a developmental achievement that requires sustained practice in appropriate social and institutional contexts—not a quick intervention that produces reliable governance capacity in the short term. The governance interventions implied by the formation account are therefore long-term investments in the conditions of human development rather than short-term adjustments of incentive structures. This implication is uncomfortable for policy frameworks oriented toward measurable outcomes in short time horizons, but it is what the evidence requires.

It is a claim about responsibility. If commons are made rather than given—if their success or failure is the contingent result of formative conditions rather than the inevitable expression of human nature—then the conditions of formation are objects of political and moral responsibility. Communities, institutions, and governance systems bear responsibility for the formative conditions they create or fail to create—for whether they produce governance participants capable of shared life or participants whose incapacity for shared constraint drives the enclosure dynamics that the prophets condemned and that the Jubilee was designed to correct.

And it is, finally, a claim about hope. If commons are made, they can be made better. The tragedy of the commons is not the final word on human nature or on the possibilities of shared life. It is a description of what happens when formation fails—when the conditions for developing governance competency are absent or actively undermined—and a challenge to understand those conditions well enough to produce them deliberately, sustain them institutionally, and ground them in the theological account of human vocation that gives them their deepest rationale.

That is what the papers that follow this prolegomenon are an attempt to do.


Notes

Note 1. The term prolegomenon (from the Greek prolegomena: things said beforehand) is used deliberately to signal that this paper functions as a theoretical orientation for the suite as a whole rather than as an independent contribution to any single specialized literature. Its audience is correspondingly broader than that of the individual papers: while each subsequent paper is addressed primarily to scholars in a specific field—institutional economics, political psychology, organization studies, sociology, political philosophy, or biblical theology—the prolegomenon is addressed to readers who want to understand how those contributions cohere and why the coherence matters. It is, in the tradition of prolegomena in philosophical literature, the paper that makes the other papers intelligible as a unified argument rather than a collection of independent contributions.

Note 2. The claim that formation is the missing variable in political economy should be distinguished from the closely related but distinct claim that culture is the missing variable—a claim associated with scholars including North (1990), Platteau (2000), and Fukuyama (1995). The culture claim holds that the shared beliefs, values, and norms of a community explain governance outcomes that institutional analysis cannot account for. The formation claim is both more specific and more dynamic: it holds that the specific competencies required for shared governance—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—are developed through specific practices and relational contexts that can be identified and supported, rather than being the aggregate expression of cultural heritage that can be described but not directly produced. Formation is the mechanism through which culture becomes governance capacity, and specifying that mechanism is both more analytically tractable and more practically useful than invoking culture as an explanatory variable.

Note 3. The relationship between the formation account proposed in this suite and the capabilities approach of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2011) deserves acknowledgment. The capabilities approach holds that human development should be understood in terms of the actual capabilities that people have to live flourishing human lives—capabilities that depend on both internal attributes of persons and external conditions of social and institutional life. The governance competencies identified in this suite are a subset of capabilities in this sense: formed human powers that are both internal achievements and products of social and institutional conditions. The formation account is more specific than the capabilities approach in its identification of which capabilities matter for commons governance and through which processes they are developed, but it operates within a broadly compatible theoretical framework.

Note 4. The concept of practical wisdom (phronesis) in Aristotle’s ethics is relevant to the formation account in ways that the papers of this suite do not fully develop. Phronesis is the meta-virtue that governs the exercise of all specific virtues: the capacity to perceive what a situation requires and to respond appropriately—to exercise the right virtue, in the right measure, at the right time, toward the right person. For commons governance, practical wisdom is the capacity to navigate the specific and variable situations that governance presents—to know when constraint is required and when flexibility is appropriate, when to assert legitimate claim and when to defer, when to invoke sanctions and when to engage in conflict resolution—in ways that serve the long-term health of the shared governance system. The formation of practical wisdom is both the deepest goal of the formative processes that the suite describes and the most difficult to specify in terms of determinate content, because it is precisely the capacity to respond well to situations that cannot be fully anticipated.

Note 5. The relationship between the formation account and the literature on organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990) is worth noting for readers working in organizational and management contexts. The organizational learning literature identifies the capacity to detect and correct errors in organizational functioning—including the deeper-level errors in the assumptions and frameworks that govern organizational behavior—as the central challenge of organizational development. The formation of governance competencies, as analyzed in this suite, is a related but distinct challenge: not merely the development of organizational learning capacity in the abstract, but the development of specific dispositional orientations toward shared governance that make organizational learning in the governance domain possible. The two literatures are complementary rather than overlapping, and their integration represents a productive direction for subsequent research.

Note 6. The gendered dimensions of commons governance and commons failure have received increasing attention in the literature since Agarwal’s (1994) foundational work on gender and forest governance in South Asia. The formation account proposed in this suite is not gender-neutral in its implications: the socialization and formative practices that produce the governance competencies of externality awareness, boundary discipline, and role containment differ substantially by gender in most societies, and the differential formation of men and women in these competencies has predictable consequences for commons governance outcomes. These dimensions deserve more extended treatment than the suite provides, and the development of a gender-sensitive formation account for commons governance is an important direction for subsequent research.

Note 7. The digital commons represent a governance domain in which the formation-based analysis of this suite is both particularly urgent and particularly difficult to apply. The scale, anonymity, and rapid change characteristic of digital commons—platforms, open-source software, knowledge commons, and internet governance—make the relational and developmental conditions for formation difficult to establish and maintain, while the governance failures of digital commons—platform capture, knowledge enclosure, and the exploitation of open-source commons by proprietary actors—exhibit precisely the patterns of unaccountable extraction and sovereignty fantasy that the suite analyzes. Hess and Ostrom’s (2007) foundational work on knowledge commons and Benkler’s (2006) analysis of networked commons governance are the most important entry points to this literature, and the application of formation-based analysis to digital commons governance is a significant direction for subsequent research.

Note 8. Readers familiar with Polanyi’s (1944) The Great Transformation will recognize affinities between the formation account proposed in this suite and Polanyi’s analysis of the disembedding of markets from social relationships as the central dynamic of modernity’s disruption of sustainable community life. Polanyi’s argument—that the attempt to organize economic life entirely through self-regulating markets destroys the social relationships and normative frameworks on which both economic and community life depend—is a large-scale version of the same analysis that the formation account applies to commons governance specifically. The connection is not coincidental: the formation of governance competence requires the embedding of economic activity in social relationships and normative frameworks precisely of the kind that market disembedding destroys. Polanyi’s historical analysis is the background against which the suite’s formation-based account should be read, and the relationship between the two deserves more extended development than the present papers provide.


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Land, Limits, and Judgment: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Enclosure


Abstract

The biblical tradition contains a coherent, structurally integrated, and theologically rigorous land ethic that stands in direct and irreconcilable contradiction to the logic of enclosure. This paper develops that ethic from its foundations in the Torah’s account of land tenure, through the Jubilee legislation of Leviticus 25, to the prophetic indictment of accumulation in Isaiah, Amos, and Micah, arguing that the biblical critique of enclosure is not peripheral or incidental to the tradition but structural to its understanding of creation, covenant, and justice. The paper undertakes a lexical and theological analysis of the three key categories—dominion, stewardship, and ownership—and demonstrates that the modern ideology of unrestricted private ownership is not only unsupported by the biblical tradition but actively contradicted by it. The Jubilee provision is examined not as utopian legislation or cultic curiosity but as a structural mechanism for the periodic correction of enclosure dynamics that secular commons theory has approached but not surpassed in coherence or scope. The prophetic material is read as the application of this structural framework to specific historical instances of accumulation and enclosure, constituting not merely moral exhortation but covenant indictment. The paper concludes that the biblical tradition identifies enclosure not as inefficiency or injustice in an ordinary sense but as covenant violation—a fundamental distortion of the human relationship to creation that calls down the judgment of the Creator—and that this identification carries implications for how contemporary enclosure is understood and addressed that secular commons theory cannot generate from its own resources.

Keywords: land theology, Jubilee, Leviticus 25, enclosure, dominion, stewardship, prophetic critique, covenant, Torah, commons


I. Introduction: Scripture as a Source for Commons Theory

The claim of this paper is neither modest nor familiar within the mainstream literature on commons governance. It is that the biblical tradition offers not merely a supplementary moral perspective on the enclosure of shared resources but a theoretically coherent, empirically grounded, and institutionally specific account of why enclosure happens, why it is a fundamental disorder rather than merely an inefficiency, and what structural provision is required for its correction—an account that engages the best of secular commons theory without being reducible to it and that exceeds it at precisely the points where secular theory is weakest.

This claim requires some preliminary clarification about method. The paper engages the biblical text as a primary source for social and institutional theory—not because the text is being forced into a social scientific framework for which it was not designed, but because the biblical tradition itself addresses, with sustained and systematic attention, precisely the questions that commons governance theory asks: who may use shared resources, on what terms, with what accountability, and with what consequences when those terms are violated. The Torah legislates on these questions in specific and enforceable terms; the prophetic tradition applies that legislation diagnostically to specific historical situations; and the wisdom literature reflects on the underlying understanding of creation and human relationship to it that the legislation and prophecy both presuppose.

The paper treats the biblical text in accordance with what might be termed a biblicist hermeneutic: reading the text as a coherent and authoritative witness to the character and purposes of the Creator, attending carefully to the literary and historical context of specific passages while reading them within the canonical whole, and resisting both the reductionism that treats the text as merely a historical artifact and the privatization that treats it as relevant only to individual piety rather than to the ordering of shared social and institutional life. This hermeneutic is not an imposition on the text; it is, as the paper will demonstrate, demanded by the text itself, which addresses the ordering of land tenure, resource use, and shared governance as matters of the first theological importance.

The paper proceeds through six principal movements. Section II examines the foundational claim of the Torah regarding land: that the land belongs to YHWH and that all human tenure is therefore stewardship rather than ownership in the modern sense. Section III analyzes the Jubilee legislation of Leviticus 25 as a structural anti-enclosure mechanism—the most sophisticated institutional response to commons failure in the ancient world and one that secular commons theory has not yet equaled. Section IV examines the prophetic indictment of enclosure in Isaiah, Amos, and Micah as the application of the Jubilee framework to specific historical instances of accumulation, reading the prophetic material as covenant jurisprudence rather than merely moral exhortation. Section V undertakes the lexical and theological analysis of dominion, stewardship, and ownership that the paper’s constructive argument requires. Section VI addresses the judgment on accumulation and its civilizational implications. Section VII applies the biblical framework diagnostically to contemporary enclosure dynamics and assesses what the biblical tradition contributes to commons theory that secular frameworks cannot provide from their own resources.


II. Land in Torah: Use Without Ultimate Ownership

The foundational claim of the biblical tradition regarding land is stated with lapidary precision in Leviticus 25:23: “The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine. For you are strangers and sojourners with me.” This single verse contains the entire theological architecture of the biblical land ethic, and every subsequent development—in Torah, prophecy, wisdom, and the later tradition—is an elaboration of what it establishes.

The claim has three interlocking components. First, a prohibition: land shall not be sold in perpetuity. Second, a rationale: the land belongs to YHWH. Third, a definition of the human condition before that ownership: the Israelites are gerim and toshavim—strangers and sojourners, resident aliens—even in the land that has been given to them. The syntax of the verse makes explicit that these three components are not independent claims but a single integrated argument: the prohibition follows from the rationale, and the rationale establishes the human condition that defines what legitimate tenure looks like.

The implications of this foundational claim are far-reaching and have been insufficiently appreciated in the commons governance literature that has occasionally drawn on biblical materials. The claim is not that private use of land is forbidden or that common ownership in the modern sense is mandated; it is that ultimate ownership—the kind of ownership that includes the right to alienate permanently, to exclude absolutely, and to use without accountability—belongs to YHWH alone, and that all human relationship to land is therefore constitutively relational and accountable rather than sovereign and absolute.

This theological claim is embedded in a legal and institutional framework that makes it operative rather than merely declaratory. The Torah’s land legislation—the provisions governing inheritance (Numbers 27:1–11; 36:1–12), the prohibition of permanent alienation (Leviticus 25:23–28), the redemption provisions (Leviticus 25:25–34), the Jubilee (Leviticus 25:8–55), and the sabbatical year for the land (Leviticus 25:1–7; Exodus 23:10–11)—constitutes an integrated system of land governance designed to prevent the progressive concentration of land in the hands of a few and the reduction of the many to landlessness and dependency.

Wright (1990) identified the distinctive structure of this system as a triangular relationship between YHWH, Israel, and the land, in which YHWH’s ultimate ownership defines the terms on which Israel holds the land, and Israel’s covenant faithfulness is expressed concretely in the maintenance of those terms across generations. This is not merely a religious overlay on what would otherwise be a secular property system; it is a different ontology of land tenure—a different account of what land is, what human beings are in relation to it, and what legitimate use looks like—from which the specific legal provisions of the Torah follow as natural consequences.

The sabbatical year provision is particularly instructive as a concrete expression of this ontology. Every seventh year, the land is to lie fallow: it is not to be plowed, sown, pruned, or harvested in the usual way. What grows of itself is available to the poor, the sojourner, and the wild animals—but the landowner’s claim to exclusive use is suspended for the year (Leviticus 25:1–7; Exodus 23:10–11). This provision is not merely an agricultural practice, though it has agronomic wisdom; it is a structural reminder, built into the annual rhythm of agricultural life, that the land’s productivity is a gift held in trust rather than a product of sovereign ownership. The landowner who cannot harvest the seventh year’s produce is being formed—through the practice of the sabbatical year, year after year, generation after generation—in the fundamental truth that YHWH’s ownership is not theoretical but operative.

The sociological implications of this system are equally significant. Brueggemann (2002) argued that the biblical vision of land is inseparable from a vision of social solidarity: land is the material condition of community life, and the maintenance of distributed land tenure across generations is the material precondition of a society in which all members have the resources necessary for dignified participation in shared life. The progressive concentration of land in the hands of a few is therefore not merely an economic problem or an equity problem; it is a social catastrophe that destroys the material foundation of community and, by the logic of the covenant, calls down the judgment that covenant violation always calls down.

The concept of nachalah—inheritance, ancestral portion, patrimony—is the vehicle through which this theological and sociological vision is given legal form. Each Israelite family’s ancestral portion of land is not a commodity to be traded but a nachalah: a divinely allocated share of the covenant people’s territory that is meant to remain within the family across generations as the material basis of their participation in the life of the covenant community (Num. 27:1–11; 36:7–9). The prohibition on permanent alienation is the legal expression of this concept: because the land is YHWH’s gift to the family as a nachalah, it cannot be permanently disposed of by any individual member of the family, whose tenure is stewardship of what belongs ultimately to YHWH and representatively to the family across generations.

This framework has a direct relationship to the commons governance analysis developed in the preceding papers of this series. The biblical account of land tenure is not a commons system in the technical sense of common pool resource governance, but it instantiates the same fundamental distinction that Paper 1 of this series identified as foundational: the distinction between shared use—use governed by accountability to a community, to rules, and ultimately to the Owner—and unaccountable extraction. The biblical landowner is not an absolute proprietor; he is an accountable steward whose use of his allocation is governed by the covenant terms under which it was given. And the covenant terms prohibit precisely the behaviors that commons governance theory identifies as the drivers of commons failure: unlimited extraction, externalization of costs onto others, and the progressive appropriation of others’ legitimate entitlements.


III. Jubilee as Structural Anti-Enclosure Legislation

If the sabbatical year provision is the annual embodiment of the biblical land ontology, the Jubilee of Leviticus 25 is its civilizational expression: the provision through which the progressive accumulation of land and the progressive reduction of families to landlessness and debt slavery are not merely moralized but structurally reversed, every fifty years, by the return of land to its ancestral holders, the cancellation of debt, and the liberation of those who have sold themselves into debt-bondage.

The Jubilee legislation of Leviticus 25:8–55 is among the most complex and carefully crafted legal texts in the Torah, and its complexity has been the occasion for significant scholarly debate about its historical implementation, its legislative intent, and its theological significance. This paper does not enter all of those debates; what matters for the present argument is the structural logic of the Jubilee provision and what that logic reveals about the biblical tradition’s understanding of enclosure and its correction.

The basic provision is stated clearly: after seven sabbatical cycles of seven years—forty-nine years—the fiftieth year is hallowed as the Jubilee. In the Jubilee year, the deror is proclaimed throughout the land: the release, the liberty (Leviticus 25:10). This release has three specific institutional expressions. Land that has been sold reverts to its ancestral holder—the nachalah returns to the family to which it was originally allocated (25:13, 25–28). Israelites who have sold themselves or their family members into debt servitude are released from that servitude and return with their families (25:39–55). And the economic transactions of the intervening years are recalibrated accordingly: the price of land is to be calculated not as an absolute sale but as a lease of a specified number of harvests until the Jubilee (25:14–17), so that the market value of land is structurally indexed to the remaining years of the Jubilee cycle rather than treated as a permanent alienation.

The structural logic of this provision is, as Ross (1988) noted, fundamentally anti-accumulative: it is designed to interrupt the dynamics by which economic distress leads to progressive land loss, debt accumulation, and eventual enslavement within a single family across a generation, and to ensure that the catastrophic outcomes of those dynamics cannot be consolidated across generations. The Jubilee does not prevent economic distress; it prevents distress from becoming permanent structural dispossession. It is not a utopian provision that assumes the absence of economic inequality; it is a structural mechanism that assumes the presence of economic inequality and provides for its periodic correction.

This structural logic is directly relevant to the commons governance analysis of this series. The Jubilee is not a commons governance system in the technical sense, but it addresses the same fundamental problem that commons theory addresses under the concept of enclosure: the progressive appropriation of shared or allocated resources by powerful actors at the expense of those less able to defend their legitimate entitlements. The Jubilee provision recognizes that market transactions, under conditions of economic asymmetry, will systematically produce the concentration of resources in the hands of the economically powerful and the reduction of the economically vulnerable to dependency—and it provides a structural correction that does not depend on the virtue of the powerful, the efficiency of the market, or the intervention of the state in its ordinary regulatory mode.

Several features of the Jubilee provision deserve particular attention in relation to the suite’s broader argument.

The Jubilee as a theological rather than merely social provision. The Jubilee is not presented in the text as a pragmatic social policy; it is presented as the expression of a theological reality: YHWH’s ownership of the land and YHWH’s redemptive relationship with Israel. The deror proclaimed in the Jubilee year is YHWH’s proclamation; the hallowing of the year is YHWH’s sanctification; and the provision’s ultimate rationale is stated in verse 55: “For it is to me that the people of Israel are servants. They are my servants whom I brought out of the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.” The liberation of the Jubilee is grounded in the prior liberation of the Exodus: the Israelite who sells himself into debt servitude cannot be permanently enslaved because YHWH has already purchased him by redemption from Egypt. This theological grounding is not incidental to the provision’s structural logic; it is what gives that logic its unconditional character. The Jubilee is not a contingent social policy that may be overridden by economic or political necessity; it is a covenant obligation that expresses the character of YHWH as Redeemer and Owner.

The Jubilee as a formation instrument. The provision that land transactions be priced according to the remaining years until Jubilee is not merely a financial regulation; it is a formative instrument that restructures the framework within which economic decisions are made. By requiring that every land transaction be understood as a leasehold arrangement rather than a permanent sale, the Torah shapes the perception and motivation of economic actors: the land is never truly yours to sell, and the price you pay is always indexed to the time remaining until it reverts. This is formation through institutional design—the reshaping of the conceptual and motivational framework within which individual economic decisions are made, in ways that make the enclosure of ancestral holdings structurally more difficult and the return of those holdings structurally guaranteed.

The Jubilee as evidence against the inevitability thesis. From the perspective of Paper 1’s argument, the Jubilee provision is significant as ancient evidence that the problem of progressive enclosure was recognized, analyzed, and addressed with structural sophistication by a pre-modern society. Hardin’s inevitability thesis depends on the assumption that no governance mechanism can effectively prevent the dynamics of accumulation from producing enclosure; the Jubilee demonstrates that this assumption reflects not the natural law of shared governance but the failure of imagination about what governance mechanisms are possible. The Jubilee is not perfect and its historical implementation is debated; but as a structural concept, it represents a more sophisticated response to the enclosure problem than anything in the contemporary secular policy literature.

The sabbatical debt release. The Jubilee is accompanied in the Torah’s legislation by the sabbatical year debt release of Deuteronomy 15:1–11, which provides for the cancellation of debts owed by fellow Israelites every seven years—a provision that directly addresses the debt dynamics through which land loss typically begins. Moses’s instruction in Deuteronomy 15:7–11 is remarkable for its explicit acknowledgment of the psychological resistance that debt cancellation generates in creditors: “Be careful lest there be an unworthy thought in your heart and you say, ‘The seventh year, the year of release is near,’ and your eye look grudgingly on your poor brother, and you give him nothing” (Deuteronomy 15:9, ESV). The text recognizes that the sovereignty fantasy—the reluctance to relinquish claims over those economically dependent on you—is a real and powerful motivation that the provision must directly address. And it addresses it not by appealing to self-interest or structural incentive but by grounding the obligation of generosity in the covenantal character of the relationship between YHWH and Israel: “You shall give to him freely, and your heart shall not be grudging when you give to him, because for this the LORD your God will bless you in all your work and in all that you undertake” (Deuteronomy 15:10, ESV).


IV. The Prophetic Indictment: Covenant Jurisprudence Against Enclosure

The prophetic literature of the Hebrew Bible constitutes the application of the Torah’s land ethic to the specific historical realities of the monarchic period in Israel and Judah—a period in which the commercialization of agriculture, the growth of royal estates, and the development of merchant capital were systematically producing precisely the dynamics of accumulation and dispossession that the Torah’s land legislation was designed to prevent. The prophetic indictment of these dynamics is not primarily moral exhortation in the ordinary sense; it is covenant jurisprudence—the application of the standards of the covenant to specific violations, the identification of those violations as covenant breaches, and the announcement of the judgments that covenant breach calls down.

Isaiah 5:8 and the Woe Oracle Against Enclosure

The first of the seven woe oracles in Isaiah 5 is directed explicitly at those engaged in the progressive acquisition of land:

“Woe to those who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst of the land.” (Isaiah 5:8, ESV)

The specificity of the indictment is striking. The accusation is not general greed or exploitation but the particular practice of land accumulation: the progressive addition of field to field, house to house, until the accumulator stands alone—the sole possessor of what was meant to sustain a community of families. This is not a description of catastrophic seizure but of incremental enclosure: the slow, transaction-by-transaction process by which ancestral holdings are consolidated into the hands of the powerful through the economic vulnerability of their neighbors.

The judgment announced in verses 9–10 is of corresponding precision:

“The LORD of hosts has sworn in my hearing: ‘Surely many houses shall be desolate, large and beautiful houses, without inhabitant. For ten acres of vineyard shall yield but one bath, and a homer of seed shall yield but an ephah.'”

The judgment is not external catastrophe but the internal collapse of the accumulative enterprise itself: the large and beautiful houses that are the fruit of enclosure stand empty; the consolidated vineyards and fields produce at a fraction of their capacity. The prophetic tradition does not merely threaten punishment for enclosure; it announces the inherent self-destruction of the accumulative logic. Enclosure, by eliminating the distributed community of stewards whose relationship to the land constituted its productive health, destroys the very thing it sought to appropriate.

Brueggemann (1978) identified this oracle as central to Isaiah’s understanding of the covenant community’s failure: the prophetic indictment is not addressed to exceptional wrongdoers but to a social and economic pattern that had become normative in Judah—a pattern in which the Torah’s land ethic had been displaced by a logic of accumulation that the monarchy and merchant class had imported from the surrounding cultures and institutionalized in the economic life of the covenant people.

Amos: Enclosure and the Destruction of the Poor

The book of Amos, addressed to the northern kingdom of Israel during the reign of Jeroboam II—a period of economic prosperity that had produced dramatic inequality alongside its wealth—contains the most sustained and specific prophetic indictment of enclosure and its social consequences in the Hebrew Bible. Amos’s oracles against Israel in chapters 2 through 8 constitute a systematic covenant lawsuit in which the specific practices through which the powerful have appropriated the resources and rights of the poor are identified, indicted, and condemned.

Amos 2:6–8 identifies the specific mechanisms of dispossession with precision that suggests firsthand familiarity with the economic practices being condemned:

“Because they sell the righteous for silver, and the needy for a pair of sandals—those who trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth and turn aside the way of the afflicted; a man and his father go in to the same girl, so that my holy name is profaned; they lay themselves down beside every altar on garments taken in pledge, and in the house of their God they drink the wine of those who have been fined.”

The accumulation of specific charges here is forensic rather than merely rhetorical: debt bondage that reduces families to the equivalent of a pair of sandals, the appropriation of pledged garments that the Torah required to be returned before nightfall (Exodus 22:26–27), the use of judicial processes (fines) as a mechanism for resource extraction. These are not crimes of passion or individual excess; they are systematic practices through which the economic and legal institutions of the society have been captured by accumulative interests and redirected toward the dispossession of the poor.

Amos 5:11–12 makes the structural character of the indictment explicit:

“Because you trample on the poor and you exact taxes of grain from him, you have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not drink their wine. For I know how many are your transgressions and how great are your sins—you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate.”

The reference to the gate—the site of judicial proceedings in ancient Israelite cities—indicates that what Amos is indicting is not merely private economic behavior but the corruption of the public institutions that the Torah established to protect the poor from exactly the dynamics of dispossession being described. The elders who adjudicate cases at the city gate have been corrupted by bribes into instruments of enclosure rather than guardians of covenant justice. The structural dimension of the indictment could not be clearer: the problem is not individual wickedness but institutional capture—the redirection of covenant institutions from their proper function of protecting the vulnerable toward the consolidation of power and resources in the hands of the already powerful.

Amos 8:4–6 returns to the specific mechanisms of economic enclosure with the most detailed description in the prophetic literature:

“Hear this, you who trample on the needy and bring the poor of the land to an end, saying, ‘When will the new moon be over, that we may sell grain? And the Sabbath, that we may offer wheat for sale, that we may make the ephah small and the shekel great and deal deceitfully with false balances, that we may buy the poor for silver and the needy for a pair of sandals and sell the chaff of the wheat?'”

The picture here is of merchant capital operating precisely at the intersection of the Sabbath and market economy: the religious observances that were meant to interrupt the logic of accumulation and provide relief for the poor are experienced by the merchants as frustrating obstacles to commercial activity. The Sabbath, which in the Torah’s framework is both the marker of YHWH’s sovereignty over time and the weekly provision for the rest of servants and strangers (Exodus 20:8–11; Deuteronomy 5:12–15), has become for these merchants merely a day when trade is temporarily suspended. The formative purpose of the Sabbath—to form people in the practice of relinquishing control over time and economic activity, and to constitute a community in which all members have rest—has been lost entirely. What remains is compliance without formation: the merchants observe the Sabbath as a legal constraint while plotting how to maximize extraction the moment the constraint is lifted.

Micah 2: The Anatomy of Enclosure

Micah 2:1–5 provides the most analytically precise description of the enclosure process in the prophetic literature:

“Woe to those who devise wickedness and work evil on their beds! When the morning dawns, they carry it out, because it is in the power of their hand. They covet fields and seize them, and houses, and take them away; they oppress a man and his house, a man and his inheritance. Therefore thus says the LORD: behold, against this family I am devising disaster, from which you cannot remove your necks, and you shall not walk haughtily, for it will be a time of disaster. In that day they shall take up a taunt song against you and moan bitterly, and say, ‘We are utterly ruined; he changes the portion of my people; how he removes it from me! To an apostate he allots our fields.’ Therefore you will have none to cast the line by lot in the assembly of the LORD.”

This oracle deserves careful attention because it describes not merely the fact of enclosure but its psychology and its mechanism with a precision that resonates with the formation-based analysis of Paper 2 in this series. The enclosers devote the night to planning (devise wickedness… on their beds) and the morning to execution (when the morning dawns, they carry it out). The driver is desire (they covet), but what is coveted is not merely resources—it is the nachalah, the ancestral inheritance of others (their inheritance, their portion). This is not merely greed for goods; it is the specific desire to appropriate the divinely allocated share of another family in the covenant community—to remove them from their place in the land that constitutes their membership in the people of YHWH.

The judgment announced is correspondingly specific: those who have deprived others of their ancestral portion will themselves lose their place in the land. The final line of the oracle—“you will have none to cast the line by lot in the assembly of the LORD”—refers to the allocation of land by lot, the mechanism by which the original distribution of the land was accomplished in Joshua. Those who have destroyed others’ ancestral portions will have no share in the restored distribution: they will be excluded from the very community of which the land allocation is the material expression.

Mays (1976) identified this as the most radical element of the prophetic indictment: enclosure is not merely a violation of the rights of individual victims but an assault on the covenant community as a whole, because it destroys the material precondition of distributed community membership that the Torah’s land legislation was designed to maintain. The prophets do not moralize enclosure as a personal sin; they indict it as a covenant crime whose consequences are civilizational.


V. Dominion, Stewardship, and Ownership: A Lexical and Theological Analysis

The argument of the preceding sections has proceeded on the assumption that the biblical tradition maintains a clear and coherent distinction between legitimate human authority over creation and the kind of absolute proprietorial control that the modern ideology of private ownership implies. This section undertakes the lexical and theological analysis required to establish that distinction with precision, examining the three key categories—dominion, stewardship, and ownership—in their biblical context.

Dominion: Radah and Kavash

The foundation text for the concept of dominion is Genesis 1:26–28:

“Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.’ So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them. And God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the earth.'” (ESV)

The two key terms are radah (rendered “have dominion”) and kavash (rendered “subdue”). The history of interpretation of these terms is complex and contested; both Lynn White’s (1967) influential indictment of the Genesis mandate as the root of ecological destruction and the various responses to that indictment have generated a substantial secondary literature. What matters for the present paper is the lexical and contextual meaning of the terms within the text itself.

Radah in its other biblical occurrences refers to governance or oversight: the oversight of workers (1 Kings 5:16), the rule of a king over a territory (Psalm 110:2), the shepherding of a flock (Ezekiel 34:4). It does not connote unlimited exploitation; in the royal and shepherding contexts, it implies accountable governance on behalf of another. The king who exercises radah over his people is answerable for the quality of his governance; the shepherd who exercises radah over the flock is answerable for its welfare. The commission to exercise radah over creation is given to human beings as image-bearers of YHWH—as representatives of the Creator whose character and purposes define what legitimate radah looks like. The mandate to exercise dominion is therefore not a license for unaccountable exploitation but a commission to represent the Creator’s governance of creation—governance that, in the biblical account, is characterized by wisdom, care, and the maintenance of the creation’s integrity and fruitfulness.

Kavash is stronger in its connotations—it can imply forceful subjugation—but its meaning in context is shaped by the same framework of representative stewardship. The commission to subdue the earth is given to human beings who are themselves under the authority of the Creator; the subduing is in the service of the Creator’s purposes for creation, not in the service of unlimited human appropriation. Middleton (2005) argued that the image of God (imago Dei) in Genesis 1 is a royal-functional image: human beings are commissioned to exercise governance over creation as the Creator’s royal representatives, and the character of that governance is defined by the character of the one they represent. This reading understands the dominion mandate not as license but as vocation: a calling to particular forms of care, cultivation, and governance that serve the Creator’s purposes for creation.

The fall narrative of Genesis 3 is relevant here because it describes precisely the corruption of dominion into domination: the human attempt to grasp sovereign independence from the Creator—to be like God, knowing good and evil (Genesis 3:5)—results not in the enhanced dominion that the serpent promised but in the distortion of the human relationship to creation, to labor, and to one another that the curse describes. The toil and frustration of cultivation (3:17–19), the distortion of the male-female relationship (3:16), and the expulsion from the garden (3:22–24) are not arbitrary punishments; they are the structural consequences of the attempt to exercise dominion without accountability to the Creator—to convert stewardship into sovereignty.

Stewardship: Oikonomia and the Parables

The concept of stewardship receives its fullest expression in the New Testament in the Greek term oikonomia and its cognates—the management of a household or estate on behalf of an owner who may be absent but who will return to require an accounting. The parables of the steward in the synoptic gospels—the unjust steward (Luke 16:1–13), the talents (Matthew 25:14–30), the pounds (Luke 19:11–27), the faithful and unfaithful servants (Matthew 24:45–51; Luke 12:42–48)—constitute an extended exploration of what stewardship means, what distinguishes faithful from unfaithful stewardship, and what accountability to the returning owner involves.

Several features of the parabolic material are particularly significant for the paper’s argument. First, the steward’s authority is real but derivative: the steward exercises genuine governance over the master’s household or estate, making real decisions with real consequences—but the authority is entrusted, not owned, and it is accountable rather than sovereign. Second, the evaluation of stewardship is always prospective: the question is not what the steward has preserved but what he has done with what was entrusted—whether the entrustment has been productive, whether the master’s interests have been served, whether the household has flourished under the steward’s management. Third, the return of the master is not a threat to be evaded but the proper context within which stewardship is to be understood: the faithful steward manages as if the master will return, because the master will return, and because the quality of stewardship is defined by what it will look like at the moment of accounting.

This framework has direct implications for how human tenure of land and resources is to be understood. Human beings are stewards of creation on behalf of its Owner; the Owner will return for an accounting; and the quality of stewardship will be evaluated not by what has been preserved in the abstract but by what the creation has produced under human governance—whether it has flourished, whether its fruitfulness has been maintained and extended, whether those who depend on it have been sustained or exploited.

Ownership: What the Biblical Tradition Does Not Support**

Having established what dominion and stewardship mean within the biblical framework, it is possible to specify with precision what the biblical tradition does not support: the modern ideology of private ownership as unrestricted, absolute, and alienable control over land and resources.

The modern concept of property as analyzed by Macpherson (1978) and Schlatter (1951) is a historically specific construction with identifiable roots in early modern European legal and political thought—particularly in the Lockean tradition of natural rights theory, which grounds property rights in labor and treats them as pre-political and therefore as constraints on rather than products of political authority. This concept of property as natural right, absolute within its sphere, and limited only by the equal rights of others has no biblical basis. The biblical tradition does not recognize absolute property rights in land; it recognizes only conditional, accountable, and delegated tenure—tenure that is subject to the prior claim of the Creator-Owner and governed by the covenant terms under which it was granted.

The confusion between the biblical concept of stewardship and the modern concept of property rights has had serious consequences for both theology and politics. Theologically, it has produced a tradition of reading the dominion mandate as a license for extraction rather than a commission for accountable governance—a tradition that White (1967) rightly criticized, even if his attribution of ecological destruction to Christianity per se was too sweeping. Politically, it has allowed the modern ideology of property rights to claim biblical support that the biblical tradition does not provide—to represent enclosure and accumulation as expressions of legitimate dominion when they are, in biblical terms, precisely the violations of covenant stewardship that the Torah prohibits and the prophets indict.

The distinction that matters is between authority and sovereignty. The biblical tradition grants human beings real authority over creation—the authority of governance, cultivation, and care—while denying them the sovereignty that the modern ownership ideology claims—the authority of unlimited appropriation, permanent alienation, and extraction without accountability. Authority is always representative and accountable; sovereignty claims independence that the creation mandate does not grant and that the covenant framework explicitly forecloses.


VI. The Judgment on Accumulation: Civilizational Implications

The prophetic material examined in Section IV identifies enclosure not merely as covenant violation at the individual level but as civilizational catastrophe: the accumulation of land and the reduction of the many to landlessness and dependency is the material expression of a fundamental social disorder that, if uncorrected, produces the collapse of the covenant community and, by extension, the collapse of the civilization that community sustains.

This civilizational claim requires some elaboration. The prophets do not condemn enclosure merely because it harms its immediate victims—though it does. They condemn it because it destroys the social structure that the covenant community is meant to embody and from which its witness to the nations is derived. Israel’s calling, in the prophetic understanding, is to be a community ordered in accordance with YHWH’s character and purposes—a community in which the poor are protected, the vulnerable are sustained, and the land is managed in accordance with the Creator’s intentions for it. When that community abandons its covenant vocation and adopts instead the accumulative logic of the surrounding nations, it not only harms its members but forfeits its reason for existence.

Isaiah 5:8’s observation that the accumulator ends by dwelling alone—“until there is no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst of the land”—is not merely a description of economic monopoly. It is a theological judgment on what accumulation achieves: not the wealth and power it promises but isolation, the destruction of the very community that gives life its human meaning and that constitutes the accumulator’s own humanity. The encloser who devours the nachalah of his neighbors does not thereby become more fully human; he becomes less so, because the relational and communal fabric of covenant life—the life for which human beings were made—is what he has destroyed.

This judgment has civilizational dimensions that the prophetic literature articulates through the theme of exile. The loss of the land—the ultimate judgment announced in the prophets for the covenant people’s failure—is not merely the loss of territory; it is the unraveling of the entire fabric of covenant life that the land provision was designed to sustain. When the people who have been given land as the material basis of covenant community respond by concentrating that land in the hands of a few and reducing the many to landlessness, they have already, in effect, enacted the exile before it occurs politically: the social structure of distributed covenant community has been destroyed by enclosure before any foreign army arrives to complete its destruction.

Brueggemann (1977) characterized this dynamic as the prophets’ central social diagnosis: the prophetic movement arises precisely at the points where the alternative consciousness of the Torah—the vision of a community ordered by covenant justice rather than by accumulative power—is being systematically displaced by the royal consciousness of accumulation, monopoly, and imperial self-aggrandizement. The prophetic indictment of enclosure is therefore not a response to particular injustices within an otherwise sound social order; it is a diagnosis of the collapse of the social order itself, and the announcement of the judgment that that collapse has made inevitable.

The civilizational implications are not limited to ancient Israel. The prophetic framework identifies a structural pattern—the progressive displacement of covenant stewardship by accumulative enclosure, the reduction of the many to dependency, and the social collapse that follows—that is not limited to any particular historical context but is inherent in the dynamics of accumulation wherever they are left uncorrected. Isaiah, Amos, and Micah are not antiquarians; they are analysts of a structural dynamic that has repeated itself, with variations, across every civilization that has abandoned the distributed stewardship ethic for the logic of enclosure.

The implications of this analysis for contemporary commons governance are explored in the following section, but the theological point deserves to be made first on its own terms: the judgment on accumulation in the prophetic tradition is not a contingent sanction that YHWH might choose to impose or withhold depending on circumstances. It is the natural consequence of the distortion of the human relationship to creation—a consequence that is built into the structure of that relationship by its Creator, and that unfolds with the kind of necessity that covenant theology identifies as the inevitable outworking of faithlessness. Enclosure is not merely inefficient or unjust; it is, in the biblical framework, the expression of a fundamental disorder in the human relationship to creation, to community, and to the Creator—a disorder whose consequences are as certain as the character of the One whose purposes for creation it violates.


VII. Applying the Biblical Framework: Contemporary Enclosure and What Scripture Contributes

The biblical framework developed in the preceding sections provides diagnostic resources for contemporary enclosure that are both continuous with and distinct from what secular commons theory offers. This section applies the framework to contemporary enclosure dynamics and identifies what the biblical tradition contributes to commons theory that secular frameworks cannot generate from their own resources.

The Privatization of Common Goods

The most direct contemporary expression of the dynamics that the biblical tradition condemns is the progressive privatization of what have historically functioned as common goods: water, land, seeds, knowledge, and the atmospheric commons. Each of these privatization movements exhibits the structural pattern that the prophets identified: the progressive appropriation by economically and politically powerful actors of resources that the community has historically shared, the reduction of those who formerly had access to dependency on the appropriators, and the moralization of the process as efficiency, development, or progress.

The privatization of water—the conversion of what Leviticus 25’s framework would recognize as a shared resource held under divine provision into a commodity traded on markets and owned by corporations—exhibits the Micah 2 pattern with particular clarity: powerful actors (those who devise wickedness and work evil on their beds, because it is in the power of their hand) systematically appropriate access to an essential resource, pricing out those who cannot pay and reducing them to dependency on those who control access. The prophetic framework identifies this not merely as unfair but as a covenant violation—an assertion of sovereignty over what belongs to the Creator and was meant to sustain the community.

The enclosure of the seed commons—the patenting of plant varieties and the legal prohibition of seed-saving by farmers who have cultivated these varieties for generations—is perhaps the most direct contemporary analogue to the nachalah enclosure that Micah condemns. The ancestral genetic heritage of agricultural communities, developed over generations through the accumulated labor and knowledge of farmers across the world, is being appropriated by corporations that assert proprietary ownership over what was previously a shared inheritance of the agricultural community. The prophetic indictment of those who covet fields and seize them, and houses, and take them away; they oppress a man and his house, a man and his inheritance requires very little translation to apply to this phenomenon.

What the Biblical Framework Contributes Beyond Secular Theory

The preceding papers in this series have developed an account of commons governance that draws substantially on the secular traditions of institutional economics, virtue ethics, developmental psychology, and political theory. The biblical framework does not replace these contributions; it extends and grounds them in ways that secular theory cannot achieve from its own resources. Several contributions are particularly significant.

The ontological grounding of the accountability claim. Secular commons theory can demonstrate that accountability relationships produce better governance outcomes than unaccountable extraction; it can show that distributed stewardship is more sustainable than enclosure; it can identify the institutional conditions under which commons governance succeeds. What it cannot do is ground the claim that accountability is obligatory rather than merely prudent—that the failure of accountability is not merely inefficient but wrong in a sense that carries genuine normative weight. The biblical framework grounds this claim in the character of the Creator-Owner: accountability is not merely instrumentally useful but structutally required by the nature of human tenure as stewardship. The encloser is not merely making a poor governance choice; he is violating a covenant obligation to the Owner of what he has appropriated.

The prophetic diagnosis of institutional capture. The prophetic literature’s analysis of how covenant institutions—judicial processes, market regulations, religious observances—are captured by accumulative interests and redirected toward the consolidation of power at the expense of the vulnerable provides a diagnostic resource that secular commons theory has only partially developed. Amos’s identification of the corruption of the gate—the judicial institution that should have protected the poor from accumulative dispossession—as a central mechanism of enclosure anticipates the contemporary analysis of regulatory capture and institutional corruption with a precision that the secular literature has not surpassed.

The structural scope of the Jubilee. The Jubilee provision addresses the enclosure problem at a level of structural ambition that contemporary secular policy has not approached: it does not merely regulate the rate of accumulation or provide safety nets for those who have been dispossessed; it provides for the periodic structural reversal of accumulation, returning distributed tenure to the baseline that covenant justice requires. This is not a policy that can be directly transplanted into contemporary institutional contexts, but as a structural concept it raises the standard against which contemporary commons governance must be evaluated: not merely whether the rate of enclosure has been slowed but whether the structural dynamics of accumulation have been genuinely corrected.

The formation of the encloser. The biblical framework is distinctive in its attention to the formation of the encloser as well as to the governance structures that constrain enclosure from outside. The Torah’s sabbatical and Jubilee provisions are not merely external constraints on accumulative behavior; they are formative instruments designed to shape the perception, motivation, and self-understanding of economic actors in ways that make the sovereignty fantasy structurally difficult to sustain. The sabbatical year that requires the landowner to relinquish the produce of the seventh year, the Jubilee that requires the return of acquired land, the debt release that requires the forgiveness of loans, the prohibition on harvesting the corners of fields (Leviticus 19:9–10) that requires the landlord to leave something for the poor and the stranger—these are all formative practices, repeated year after year and generation after generation, designed to form the Israelite landlord in the habit of relinquishment that covenant stewardship requires and that the sovereignty fantasy resists.

This formative dimension is the biblical tradition’s most distinctive contribution to the formation-based account of commons governance that this suite develops. The secular formation analysis of Paper 5 identified the four competencies that shared governance requires and the institutional conditions that support their formation; the biblical tradition provides the theological account of why formation in precisely these competencies—externality awareness, boundary discipline, role containment, and tolerance of imperfect coordination—is not merely practically useful but theologically required. The steward who governs creation faithfully is the human being who most fully realizes the imago Dei as the Torah and the prophets understand it; the encloser who asserts sovereignty over what belongs to the Creator is the human being who has most fully distorted that image in the direction of the false sovereignty that the serpent promised and the fall produced.


VIII. Conclusion: Beyond Secular Theory

This paper has argued that the biblical tradition offers a coherent, structurally integrated, and theologically grounded critique of enclosure that extends from the foundational claim of Leviticus 25:23—“the land is mine”—through the structural mechanism of the Jubilee, through the prophetic application of the covenant land ethic to specific historical instances of accumulation, to an account of the judgment on enclosure that is both individual and civilizational. The paper has also argued that this framework contributes to commons theory resources that secular traditions cannot generate from their own premises: an ontological grounding for the accountability claim, a diagnostic analysis of institutional capture, a structural standard for the correction of enclosure that exceeds contemporary secular policy ambition, and a theological account of formation that gives the practical competencies identified in the preceding paper their deepest rationale.

The concluding claim of the series, stated from the perspective of the biblical tradition, can be put simply: the tragedy of the commons is a theological category before it is a governance category. It is the result of the attempt by human beings to exercise sovereignty over what belongs to the Creator—to convert stewardship into ownership, accountability into autonomy, and the nachalah of their neighbors into the extension of their own domain. The prophets did not moralize this attempt; they indicted it as covenant breach and announced its consequences as covenant judgment. And the Jubilee did not merely moralize its correction; it legislated it structurally, embedding the periodic reversal of enclosure into the institutional fabric of the covenant community’s life.

Secular commons theory has made substantial progress in understanding the governance conditions under which commons succeed and fail. It has not, and by its own terms cannot, address the deepest question that the biblical tradition raises: not how to design governance systems that work despite fallen human nature, but how human beings might be formed into the kind of stewards that the Creator commissioned in the beginning and the covenant requires—stewards who govern creation faithfully, care for their neighbors’ nachalah as well as their own, and hold the boundary between legitimate authority and illegitimate sovereignty with the discipline that comes not from external constraint but from the formation of a character shaped by the knowledge of who the Land ultimately belongs to.

That formation is the subject of the Jubilee, the concern of the prophets, and the deepest practical challenge of commons governance in any age.


Notes

Note 1. The rendering of Leviticus 25:23 throughout this paper follows the ESV; the Hebrew is unambiguous on the key terms. Lo timakher litsmitut—”it shall not be sold in perpetuity”—uses the niphal of makar with the adverb litsmitut (permanently, definitively). The force of the prohibition is absolute alienation of the kind that removes the land permanently from the family’s claim; leasehold arrangements and redemption transactions are explicitly permitted by the surrounding legislation (25:25–34). The theological rationale—ki li ha-arets (“for the land is mine”)—uses the simple first-person possessive with the covenant name, establishing YHWH’s ownership as the direct ground of the prohibition.

Note 2. The debate over the historical implementation of the Jubilee is extensive and cannot be resolved here. Scholars including North (1954), Westbrook (1971), Gnuse (1985), and Wright (1990) have argued for various positions ranging from the view that the Jubilee was never practiced to the view that it functioned as a regulatory framework even if its full provisions were never comprehensively enforced. For the purposes of this paper, the question of historical implementation is secondary to the question of structural logic: the Jubilee provision articulates a coherent and sophisticated response to enclosure dynamics that is theologically grounded and institutionally specific, regardless of the degree to which it was implemented in any given period. The prophetic indictment of enclosure in contexts where the Jubilee was presumably available suggests that its non-implementation was itself a covenant failure, which is a distinct claim from the claim that it was never enacted.

Note 3. Lynn White’s (1967) influential essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” argued that the Genesis dominion mandate was the principal ideological source of the exploitative relationship to nature that produced the ecological crisis of the twentieth century. This argument has been extensively criticized and has generated a substantial theological and historical literature in response. The most effective responses—including those of Santmire (1985), Middleton (2005), and Bauckham (2011)—demonstrate that White’s reading depends on a serious misreading of the Genesis text and of the broader biblical tradition, which does not support the unlimited exploitation he attributed to the dominion mandate. The present paper’s analysis of dominion as accountable governance rather than unlimited extraction is consistent with these responses and provides the conceptual framework within which they should be understood.

Note 4. The concept of nachalah deserves more extensive treatment than this paper can provide. In addition to Wright’s (1990) account, von Rad’s (1966) analysis of the theological significance of the land in the Old Testament is essential background, as is Brueggemann’s (2002) extended development of the land theme across the entire canon. The nachalah concept is important for the present argument because it establishes that the Torah’s land provisions are not merely redistributive mechanisms but expressions of a theology of belonging: each family’s ancestral portion is their place in the covenant community, and the loss of that portion is therefore not merely an economic loss but a loss of communal membership and covenantal standing.

Note 5. The relationship between the sabbatical year debt release of Deuteronomy 15 and the Jubilee of Leviticus 25 involves complex source-critical and redaction-critical questions that this paper does not address. What matters for the present argument is the structural coherence of the two provisions as expressions of the same underlying theology of land and debt: both provisions are designed to interrupt the dynamics of progressive accumulation and dispossession by providing structural mechanisms for their periodic reversal, and both ground these mechanisms in the character of YHWH as Redeemer. The Deuteronomy 15 text’s explicit acknowledgment of the psychological resistance that debt cancellation generates—the grudging eye that looks toward the approaching year of release—is particularly significant for the formation analysis of this series, as it demonstrates that the Torah’s authors were not naive about the motivational obstacles to covenant compliance and built formative provisions into the legislation accordingly.

Note 6. The prophetic books examined in this paper—Isaiah, Amos, and Micah—all address the eighth century BCE context of the northern and southern kingdoms during a period of economic expansion that had produced dramatic social stratification. The historical context is significant because it demonstrates that the prophetic indictment of enclosure was not directed at exceptional or marginal behavior but at practices that had become systematically normative in the covenant community—practices that the economic growth of the period had made profitable and that the legal and judicial institutions of the society had been corrupted to protect. The structural character of the prophetic indictment, directed at social and economic patterns rather than at individual wrongdoers, is a model for the diagnostic approach that this series advocates.

Note 7. The New Testament parables of stewardship receive only brief treatment in this paper because their primary contribution—the elaboration of the oikonomia framework and its eschatological grounding in the expectation of the returning master—extends the Torah’s foundational theology rather than revising it. A full treatment of the New Testament stewardship material would include Luke 12:42–48, which explicitly correlates the degree of accountability with the degree of knowledge (to whom much was given, much will be required), and the parable of the talents in Matthew 25, which evaluates stewardship not by what has been preserved but by what has been produced. Both passages reinforce the argument of this paper that the biblical concept of stewardship is not ascetic (preserving by withholding use) but productive (cultivating what has been entrusted for the purposes of the Owner).

Note 8. The application of the biblical framework to contemporary enclosure dynamics in Section VII necessarily involves a degree of analogical reasoning that requires acknowledgment. The biblical provisions addressed specific historical contexts in ancient Israel, and their direct application to contemporary institutional situations requires attention to both the continuities and the discontinuities between those contexts. The structural logic of the provisions—the theology of accountable stewardship, the prohibition of permanent alienation, the structural reversal of accumulation—translates across contexts because it is grounded in claims about the character of the Creator and the nature of the human relationship to creation that are not limited to any particular historical situation. The specific institutional provisions—the Jubilee, the sabbatical year, the corner-of-the-field provision—require analogical rather than direct application, but the structural logic they express has direct contemporary relevance.

Note 9. Readers interested in the broader development of a biblical theology of creation care and environmental stewardship will find Bauckham (2011) and Bouma-Prediger (2010) useful, though neither engages the commons governance literature directly. The intersection between biblical land theology and contemporary commons theory represents a substantially underdeveloped area of interdisciplinary research, and the present suite of papers is an attempt to begin bridging that gap from the theological side. The invitation is open for commons governance scholars to engage the biblical tradition as a serious theoretical interlocutor rather than a historical curiosity.


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The Myth of the Inevitable Tragedy: Historical Commons and the Limits of Hardin’s Model


Abstract

Garrett Hardin’s 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the Commons” has exercised extraordinary influence over four decades of policy discourse, legitimating enclosure, privatization, and state management as the only rational responses to shared resource governance. This paper contests that influence on historical, empirical, and theoretical grounds. Drawing on the institutional economics of Elinor Ostrom, the agrarian history of English and European commons, and comparative case studies from Swiss alpine communities and Japanese fishing villages, the paper demonstrates that commons did not generically fail—they failed under specifiable conditions that Hardin’s model either ignores or assumes by definition. The paper introduces a foundational distinction between shared use and unaccountable extraction, argues that the rational actor framework constitutes a category error when applied to normed communities, and proposes a diagnostic reframing: the question is not whether commons fail, but under what formative, institutional, and social conditions they do so, and why. The paper concludes that the persistence of Hardin’s model in policy discourse reflects its ideological utility to enclosure interests more than its explanatory power, and that a formation-based account of commons governance offers both greater empirical accuracy and greater practical utility.

Keywords: tragedy of the commons, Hardin, Ostrom, common pool resources, enclosure, institutional governance, formation, shared use


I. Introduction: A Parable Masquerading as a Model

In the autumn of 1968, Garrett Hardin published a twelve-page essay in Science that would reshape policy discourse on shared resources for the remainder of the twentieth century and well into the twenty-first. The essay’s central image was vivid and apparently simple: a pasture open to all, on which each herdsman adds cattle until the commons collapses under overgrazing. Since each herdsman receives the full benefit of each animal added but shares the cost of degradation with all users, the rational course for each individual is to add more cattle. The collective result is ruin. “Freedom in a commons,” Hardin concluded, “brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).

The essay’s influence was immediate and lasting. It was cited in support of privatization programs across the developing world, used to justify enclosure of fishing grounds, water rights, and grazing land, and embedded in the curriculum of ecology, economics, political science, and public policy programs at institutions across the globe. Its central claim achieved the status of a social scientific law: given shared resources and self-interested actors, tragedy is inevitable.

It is that claim—the claim of inevitability—that this paper contests.

The argument against Hardin’s model is now several decades old and, in the relevant specialist literature, largely settled. Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990) demonstrated empirically what critics had suspected theoretically: functional, self-governing commons are not anomalies or accidents but recurring achievements of human community under conditions that Hardin’s model excludes by assumption. Yet the model persists in policy discourse, textbook treatments, and popular argument with a tenacity that its explanatory failures cannot account for. This persistence requires explanation, and that explanation is itself part of what a serious account of commons governance must provide.

This paper proceeds in five stages. Section II examines Hardin’s assumptions as political and ideological commitments rather than neutral analytical premises. Section III presents the historical and comparative evidence of functional commons—English, Swiss, and Japanese cases—that Hardin’s model cannot accommodate. Section IV analyzes Ostrom’s design principles as an empirical correction to Hardin and identifies what they reveal about the conditions under which commons succeed. Section V addresses the category error at the heart of rational actor modeling when applied to normed communities. Section VI proposes the paper’s central reframing: not whether commons fail, but under what conditions of formation, accountability, and governance they do so. A brief conclusion addresses the implications for the suite of work of which this paper is a part.


II. Hardin’s Assumptions as Political Commitments

Any serious engagement with Hardin’s model must begin not with its conclusions but with its premises, because it is at the level of premises that the model’s most consequential failures are located. Hardin does not merely describe commons governance; he assumes a particular account of human nature, a particular conception of rationality, and a particular understanding of what counts as a community—and each of these assumptions does substantial analytical work that is rarely made explicit in the model’s deployment.

The assumption of isolated, unrelated actors. Hardin’s herdsmen are strangers. They share a pasture but not a history, not a set of norms, not a network of relationships and reputational accountability. Each makes decisions in isolation, without communication or the possibility of binding agreement. This assumption is not a description of any actual commons that has existed in human history; it is a theoretical stipulation that eliminates the very social fabric within which commons governance actually operates. As Ostrom observed, Hardin’s commons is “a situation that no one would have created voluntarily,” and the herdsmen described are “not those who have historically relied on the commons, but atomistic individuals conceived along the lines of standard economic theory” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 8).

The historical commons of England, Switzerland, Japan, Spain, and elsewhere were not populated by strangers. They were governed by established communities with long institutional memories, recursive relationships, reputational stakes, and complex normative structures developed over generations. The assumption of isolated actors does not simplify Hardin’s model—it eliminates the explanatory domain in which commons governance actually occurs.

The assumption of fixed and undifferentiated access. Hardin’s pasture is “open to all”—a specific institutional arrangement in which access is neither regulated nor differentiated by membership, use history, or need. This is not a description of the commons as a general institution; it is a description of one particular and typically dysfunctional form of resource access that scholars of common property have termed open-access regimes (Bromley, 1992). The critical distinction—one that Hardin collapses throughout—is between open access (no governance, no exclusion, no rules) and common property (governance by a defined community according to rules that regulate access and use). Common property is not open access. The conflation of the two is not a minor theoretical imprecision; it is the load-bearing error of Hardin’s entire argument.

Feeny et al. (1990) identified this conflation as fundamental to the essay’s empirical failures, noting that Hardin “blurred the distinction between open-access and common property” in a way that made the tragedy appear inevitable in cases where governance, had it been considered, would have prevented it. The distinction matters because it redirects the analytical question from “what happens when resources are shared?” to “what happens when shared resources are ungoverned?”—and those are very different questions with very different answers.

The assumption of infinite extractive incentive. Hardin assumes that each herdsman’s rational calculation runs in only one direction: add more cattle. No herdsman in his model values the commons for reasons other than extraction, no herdsman has internalized norms that limit his claims, and no herdsman faces social consequences for behavior that degrades shared resources. Again, this is not a description of commons users as they have actually existed—it is an idealized construction borrowed from neoclassical economics that removes the normative, relational, and social dimensions of resource use by definition.

These three assumptions—isolated actors, undifferentiated access, and infinite extractive incentive—do not describe a commons. They describe the absence of a commons. The “tragedy” that Hardin models is not the tragedy of shared governance; it is the predictable outcome of ungoverned open access among actors with no social relationship, no normative commitments, and no reputational accountability. That this outcome has been widely accepted as a natural law of commons governance reveals more about the ideological climate in which the model was received than about the phenomenon it purports to describe.

The ideological utility of Hardin’s model for enclosure interests is not incidental. Hardin himself drew explicitly policy-relevant conclusions: commons must be either privatized or subjected to coercive state management (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247). These two options—private property and state control—conveniently exhaust the alternatives available within the framework of liberal political economy, and they eliminate from consideration the very form of governance—community self-management—that historical evidence shows to have been most durable and adaptive. The model does not merely describe commons failure; it forecloses inquiry into commons success.

Macpherson (1978) traced the ideological genealogy of assumptions very like Hardin’s to the possessive individualism that has characterized Anglo-American political thought since Hobbes and Locke—the assumption that individuals are by nature self-interested proprietors of their own persons and capacities, and that social relations are fundamentally instrumental. This is not a neutral analytical premise; it is a substantive claim about human nature that has been contested from multiple directions—anthropological, historical, theological, and psychological—and that fails to account for the enormous range of cooperative and norm-governed behavior that human communities have exhibited across time and culture. That it functions as an unexamined premise in one of the most widely cited social scientific essays of the twentieth century should give pause.


III. The Historical Evidence: Commons That Worked

The most direct refutation of Hardin’s inevitability claim is empirical: across multiple continents, cultures, and centuries, commons-based resource governance systems not only existed but persisted—in some cases for centuries—managing resources sustainably without either privatization or state coercion. These are not marginal cases; they are well-documented, extensively studied examples of institutional achievement that the dominant model cannot explain.

English Common Fields and Manorial Commons

The English open field system, which governed agricultural production across much of rural England from the early medieval period through the eighteenth century, represents one of the most thoroughly documented cases of commons-based governance in the historical record. Under this system, arable land was organized into large open fields divided into strips allocated to individual households, while commons—pasture, waste, woodland, and fen—were managed collectively according to customary rules that regulated access, use, and maintenance (Neeson, 1993).

The commons were not, as Hardin’s model would predict, sites of inevitable overgrazing and degradation. They were governed by manorial courts, village by-laws, and customary institutions that established who could use the commons, how much each user could take, and what responsibilities each commoner bore for maintenance. Rights of common were defined and differentiated—rights of pasturage, estovers (wood), turbary (peat), and piscary (fishing) were distinct legal entitlements attached to specific tenancies rather than general permissions available to anyone (Thompson, 1991). The commons were not open to all; they were governed by membership in a community of right-holders whose entitlements were specified, recorded, and enforceable.

Neeson’s (1993) detailed study of English commoners in the period 1700–1820 demonstrates that the commons represented not a failing governance system ripe for correction but a functioning subsistence economy that enclosure destroyed. Parliamentary enclosure of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not rescue a collapsed commons from inevitable tragedy; it terminated a working system in the interest of agricultural capital. The poverty and displacement that followed enclosure were not natural consequences of commons mismanagement—they were direct results of the legislative seizure of common rights that had sustained rural households for generations. Thompson (1991) characterized this transformation as one of the defining acts of class legislation in English history: the legal abolition of customary rights in the name of improvement and efficiency.

This history is directly relevant to Hardin’s model because it inverts the causal narrative the model assumes. The English commons did not fail and then require enclosure; they were enclosed, and their failure was the consequence, not the cause, of that enclosure. The model’s ideological function—providing retrospective justification for privatization by representing it as the rational response to inevitable tragedy—is exposed when the historical sequence is accurately reconstructed.

Swiss Alpine Communities

If English commons offer a case of working governance destroyed by external political force, the Swiss alpine communities studied by Robert McC. Netting offer a case of commons governance persisting and adapting over centuries without destruction—a natural experiment of remarkable duration and stability.

Netting’s (1981) ethnographic and historical study of Törbel, a village in the Swiss canton of Valais, documented a system of communal management of alpine pastures, forests, and irrigation systems that had functioned continuously from at least the thirteenth century. The alpine commons of Törbel were governed by a village corporation whose members were defined by residency and property ownership; access rights were proportional to contribution, and complex rules governed seasonal pasture rotation, livestock quotas, forest harvesting, and water distribution.

What Netting found was not a commons straining against the logic of individual self-interest but a community in which the management of shared resources had become constitutive of social identity and relationship. The corporate institutions governing the commons were not external constraints imposed on naturally acquisitive individuals; they were the social forms through which the community reproduced itself across generations. Netting identified five characteristics that distinguished the alpine commons from the Hardinian model: the resources were scarce and valuable; privatization would have been less productive than collective management; the users were a defined and accountable community; rules of use were enforceable; and the costs of collective action were lower than the costs of individual management (Netting, 1981, p. 62).

This last point is particularly significant: the commons persisted not in spite of individual interest but because collective management served individual interest better than private management could. The Hardinian assumption that individual interest always drives toward extraction and enclosure is not merely ideologically motivated—it is empirically incorrect when the full range of individual interests is considered, including the interest in stable access to resources across time, the interest in community membership and reciprocal support, and the interest in a governance system that can be trusted not to be appropriated by powerful actors.

The Törbel case was not exceptional. McKean’s (1992) comparative study of Japanese and Swiss common lands documented similar patterns of long-term successful governance across a substantial range of cases. The Japanese iriaichi (commonly held lands) of the Tokugawa and Meiji periods were managed by village communities under customary rules governing access, rotation, and maintenance that prevented degradation while sustaining production across multiple generations. McKean found that the most important predictor of commons success was not resource type, population size, or technology, but the quality of institutional design: whether the community had developed clear rules, effective monitoring, graduated sanctions, accessible conflict resolution mechanisms, and recognized rights to organize.

Spanish Huertas and Water Commons

The irrigated garden communities of Valencia, Murcia, and Alicante—the huertas—represent a third major case of commons governance whose durability challenges the inevitability thesis. The irrigation systems of the Valencian huerta have been governed by water courts and farmer assemblies, some of continuous operation, managing shared water resources with a degree of efficiency and equity that subsequent state management has struggled to match (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 69–82).

The Tribunal de las Aguas de Valencia, the water court that governs irrigation rights among the eight acequias (canals) of the Valencian huerta, has operated without significant interruption since its establishment in the medieval period—a record of institutional continuity that has no parallel in the privatized or state-managed systems to which Hardin’s model points as the only alternatives to commons failure. The tribunal’s procedures are oral, public, and rapid; its authority is recognized by users who have submitted to it across multiple centuries; and its decisions are enforced by the community rather than by an external state apparatus.

What these cases collectively demonstrate is not that all commons succeed or that commons governance is always superior to alternative arrangements, but that the claim of inevitable failure is empirically false. Commons have succeeded, in diverse cultural and ecological settings, over extended periods of time, under conditions that Hardin’s model predicts would produce only ruin. The question this evidence demands is not “why do commons fail?” but “under what conditions do they succeed, and what distinguishes those conditions from the conditions under which they fail?”


IV. Ostrom’s Design Principles as Empirical Correction

It was Elinor Ostrom who most rigorously formulated the answer to that question. Governing the Commons (1990), for which Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009, is the foundational work in the empirical study of common pool resource governance, and its central contribution is the identification of institutional design principles that characterize commons governance systems that have succeeded over the long term.

Ostrom derived her design principles inductively from a systematic comparative study of commons cases drawn from multiple continents and resource types—irrigation systems, fisheries, forest commons, and grazing lands. The principles are not normative recommendations but empirical regularities: features that long-enduring, self-governing commons systems share and that distinguish them from systems that have failed.

The eight design principles Ostrom identified are: (1) clearly defined boundaries around the commons and the community of users; (2) rules governing resource use that are matched to local conditions; (3) user participation in modifying rules; (4) effective monitoring of both the resource and user behavior; (5) graduated sanctions for rule violations; (6) accessible and low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms; (7) recognition by external authorities of the community’s right to organize; and (8) for larger systems, nested organizational structures that embed local governance within broader institutional frameworks (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 90–102).

Each of these principles is significant not only as a descriptive regularity but as a theoretical intervention in the Hardinian framework. Together, they constitute a detailed empirical rebuttal to Hardin’s core assumptions.

Against the assumption of isolated actors, the first and third principles demonstrate that successful commons governance depends on a defined community whose members participate in the creation and modification of the rules that govern them. Against the assumption of undifferentiated access, the first and second principles establish that sustainable commons are governed by rules—often highly specific and locally adapted rules—that differentiate access by user identity, resource condition, and season. Against the assumption of infinite extractive incentive unconstrained by social accountability, the fourth and fifth principles demonstrate that monitoring and graduated sanctions create exactly the social accountability that Hardin assumes away.

Ostrom’s framework is not merely a correction to Hardin’s model; it is a replacement of one theoretical framework with another. Where Hardin assumes that individual rationality drives inexorably toward extraction and that collective governance must therefore be either coerced or replaced with private property, Ostrom demonstrates that communities can and do develop institutional forms that align individual interest with collective sustainability—not by eliminating self-interest but by embedding it in social relationships and institutional structures that make long-term cooperation individually rational as well as socially productive.

The scope of the empirical base on which Ostrom drew is itself significant. Cox et al. (2010), in a systematic review and reassessment of Ostrom’s design principles, confirmed their applicability across a substantially extended range of cases while identifying areas of nuance and qualification that subsequent research has elaborated. Dietz et al. (2003) extended the framework to address global commons governance, arguing that the design principles applicable at the local level could be generalized, with appropriate modification, to resources at the scale of the atmosphere and the oceans. The research program that Ostrom established has continued to generate empirical findings that consistently contradict the inevitability thesis while producing increasingly refined accounts of the conditions under which commons governance succeeds and fails.

What Ostrom’s work does not fully explain—and what this paper and the suite it introduces will address—is the formative dimension of commons governance: why some communities develop the institutional capacity to govern shared resources while others do not, and what this difference reveals about the psychological and developmental conditions that make shared constraint tolerable rather than threatening. Ostrom provides the institutional description; the formation-based account this suite proposes provides the explanatory substrate.


V. The Category Error of Rational Actor Modeling in Normed Communities

The theoretical core of Hardin’s failure—and the failure of the broader tradition of commons analysis that his essay represents—is a category error: the application of a model designed to describe behavior in anonymous markets to behavior in normed communities where social relationships, reputational accountability, and normative commitments are constitutive features of the actors and their choices.

The rational actor model, as deployed in Hardin’s essay and in much subsequent commons analysis, treats individual preferences as given, stable, and independent of social context. Each actor knows what he wants (more cattle), knows how to get it (add more cattle), and is constrained only by external institutional structure (which, in Hardin’s commons, is absent). Social relationships, shared norms, and reputational stakes are not parameters in this model—they are excluded from it. The model is designed to describe behavior in precisely those conditions where social context is minimal: anonymous markets where actors do not know each other, do not expect future interaction, and cannot rely on normative pressure to enforce cooperation.

Commons communities are, by definition, not anonymous markets. They are normed communities—communities in which actors know each other across time, expect continued interaction, bear reputational stakes in their behavior, share normative frameworks that define legitimate and illegitimate use, and are embedded in social relationships that create both positive obligations and negative sanctions. Applying a model designed for anonymous markets to normed communities is not a simplification; it is a category error that eliminates the explanatory domain in which commons governance actually operates.

This category error has been identified by critics from multiple theoretical traditions. From the anthropological side, Berkes (1989) documented the normative complexity of commons governance in traditional communities and argued that the rational actor framework systematically misrepresents the motivational structure of actors in these communities. From the behavioral economics side, Bowles (2016) demonstrated experimentally that the introduction of external incentive structures—the institutional response that Hardin recommends—can actually crowd out the intrinsic normative motivations that sustain cooperative behavior, producing worse outcomes than governance regimes that respect and cultivate normative motivation. From the philosophical side, MacIntyre (1981) argued that the very concept of rational action employed in neoclassical economics presupposes an impoverished account of human agency that cannot accommodate the role of social practice, narrative identity, and virtue in shaping what actors want and how they pursue it.

The implications for commons analysis are substantial. If actors in normed communities are not well described by the rational actor model—if their preferences are shaped by social relationships and normative commitments rather than given independently of them—then the trajectory of commons governance cannot be derived from individual incentive structures alone. The institutional design principles that Ostrom identifies as characteristics of successful commons governance systems are not merely external constraints on self-interested behavior; they are social practices that shape the motivational structure of participants over time. Commons governance succeeds, when it does, not only because it aligns incentives but because it forms participants in the habits of shared constraint, externality awareness, and norm-governed behavior that make sustained cooperation possible.

This formative dimension—the way in which governance institutions shape the psychological and motivational capacities of participants—is what Hardin’s model cannot see and what the present suite of work proposes to examine. The tragedy of the commons, on this account, is not the inevitable result of human nature; it is the result of a specific kind of formative failure: the failure to develop in individuals and communities the capacities for constrained shared life that commons governance requires.

Shared Use and Unaccountable Extraction: A Foundational Distinction

One further theoretical clarification is required before the paper’s reframing can be stated with precision. The distinction that Hardin collapses—between open access and common property—corresponds to a deeper distinction that this suite will employ throughout: the distinction between shared use and unaccountable extraction.

Shared use is resource use governed by accountability—to a community, to a set of rules, to a monitoring system, to a set of sanctions, and ultimately to a shared understanding of what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate appropriation. Shared use can occur within private property systems (as in easements and common interests in property law), within state management systems (as in licensed extraction), and within community governance systems (as in the commons cases described above). What defines shared use is not the formal ownership structure but the presence of accountability relationships that constrain individual extraction in the interest of collective sustainability.

Unaccountable extraction is resource use without such accountability—use that is governed only by the extractive capacity and interest of the individual actor, with costs externalized to the collective and benefits privatized to the individual. Unaccountable extraction can occur within private property systems (as in the externalization of pollution costs), within state management systems (as in regulatory capture), and within commons regimes that have lost their governance capacity (as in genuinely failed commons). What defines unaccountable extraction is not the formal governance structure but the absence of effective accountability for the costs of individual action.

Hardin’s tragedy is a description of unaccountable extraction, not of commons governance. The policy prescriptions he derives—privatization or state management—do not in themselves address the problem of unaccountable extraction; they merely relocate it within different formal structures where, as the history of privatized and state-managed resources amply demonstrates, it continues. The relevant question is not which formal ownership structure best constrains unaccountable extraction, but which governance conditions—formal, informal, institutional, and formative—produce the accountability that sustainable resource use requires.


VI. Reframing the Question: Conditions, Not Nature

The evidence and analysis assembled in the preceding sections support a comprehensive reframing of the central question in commons governance. Hardin’s question—is commons failure inevitable?—is not merely empirically incorrect in its implied answer; it is theoretically malformed. It treats a variable outcome (commons failure) as if it were a constant, and it locates the explanation for that outcome in an invariant feature of human nature (self-interest) rather than in the variable conditions that determine whether commons governance succeeds or fails.

The reframed question is: under what conditions of formation, institutional design, and social accountability do commons succeed or fail, and what does the pattern of variation reveal about the requirements for sustainable shared governance?

This reframing does several things simultaneously. It treats commons outcomes as genuinely variable and therefore genuinely explainable rather than predetermined. It shifts analytical attention from human nature (invariant, and therefore uninformative about variation) to governance conditions (variable, and therefore explanatory). It opens space for the formation-based analysis that the present suite proposes by identifying the formative dimension of governance conditions—the ways in which institutional design shapes the psychological and motivational capacities of participants—as a distinct and previously underexplored explanatory variable.

The conditions that the evidence identifies as critical to commons success cluster in three domains. Institutional conditions include the design principles that Ostrom identified: boundary clarity, rule-condition matching, participatory rule modification, effective monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution access, and recognized autonomy. Social conditions include the relational density, reputational accountability, and normative coherence of the user community—the features that the rational actor model excludes but that historical evidence consistently identifies as prerequisites of governance success. Formative conditions—the domain that the present suite foregrounds—include the psychological capacities for shared constraint, externality awareness, and norm-governed behavior that successful commons governance requires of its participants and that failed governance systems have not produced in theirs.

The tragedy of the commons, properly understood, is not the result of human nature in its generic form. It is the result of human nature in the specific condition of formative failure: the failure to develop in individuals and communities the capacities for constrained shared life that governance of any kind requires. This is not a counsel of despair—formative failure is not inevitable, and the historical record is full of communities that developed these capacities under conditions of constraint. But it is a counsel of diagnostic precision: the question for commons governance is not how to design institutions that work despite human nature, but how to understand the conditions under which human beings develop the nature that commons governance requires.


VII. Conclusion: What the Model’s Persistence Reveals

This paper has argued that Hardin’s tragedy of the commons is best understood not as a social scientific finding but as an ideological artifact—a model whose premises exclude by assumption the very conditions under which commons governance succeeds, whose conclusions serve the interests of enclosure and privatization, and whose persistence in policy discourse reflects its ideological utility rather than its explanatory power.

The historical evidence of functional commons—English, Swiss, Japanese, and Spanish cases, among many others—demonstrates that commons failure is not inevitable. Ostrom’s design principles provide an empirical account of the institutional conditions under which commons succeed. The analysis of the rational actor model’s category error reveals why Hardin’s framework cannot see what the historical evidence shows. And the foundational distinction between shared use and unaccountable extraction clarifies the actual problem that commons governance must address.

What remains—and what the suite of which this paper is a part will address—is the formative dimension: why some communities develop the institutional and psychological capacities for shared governance while others do not, what happens in individuals and communities when those capacities fail, how failure produces the enclosure dynamics that Hardin described without understanding, and what a constructive account of stewardship as formed competence would look like.

Hardin was not wrong that commons can fail. He was wrong about why they fail, wrong about when they fail, wrong about whether failure is inevitable, and wrong about what the appropriate responses to failure are. Getting these things right is not merely a matter of theoretical accuracy; it has consequences for how communities understand and respond to the shared governance challenges that define much of contemporary life. A model that represents those challenges as the inevitable expression of human nature produces a politics of resignation and enclosure. A model that represents them as the contingent outcome of formative and institutional conditions produces a politics of diagnosis and possibility.

The present series of papers is an argument for the second kind of model and against the first.


Notes

Note 1. The phrase “tragedy of the commons” has a history prior to Hardin’s essay that is rarely acknowledged in policy discussions. William Forster Lloyd’s 1833 lectures on population at Oxford contain the core image of the overstocked common pasture, and Hardin acknowledged Lloyd as a source. The philosophical lineage running from Lloyd through Malthus to Hardin is significant: all three frame collective resource problems as the consequence of natural drives unconstrained by institutional design, and all three have been used to justify policies of exclusion and privatization. The ideological continuity across this tradition is not incidental.

Note 2. Hardin’s essay is frequently cited as if its central claim were a mathematical theorem rather than a rhetorical argument supported by a thought experiment. The thought experiment depends on assumptions—isolated actors, undifferentiated access, infinite extractive incentive—that are stated briefly and treated as obvious rather than argued for. The ease with which these assumptions were accepted in 1968 reflects the dominance of neoclassical economic assumptions in the intellectual climate of that period more than the self-evidence of the assumptions themselves.

Note 3. Ostrom’s Nobel Prize acceptance lecture (Ostrom, 2009) is a useful complement to Governing the Commons as an introduction to her work, presenting the core findings in accessible form while addressing the scope conditions of the design principles and the challenges of scaling from local to global commons governance.

Note 4. The English enclosure movement, while often discussed in economic history as a transition to more efficient agricultural production, is better understood as a political process in which common rights were legally abolished in the interest of agricultural capital. Thompson’s (1991) account of this process is essential reading, as is Linebaugh’s (2008) broader treatment of the Magna Carta and its charter of the forest as a constitutional recognition of common rights that enclosure destroyed.

Note 5. McKean’s (1992) comparative study of Japanese and Swiss common lands is particularly valuable because it documents commons success in two culturally distinct settings that share the institutional features Ostrom identified, suggesting that those features rather than cultural particularity are the relevant explanatory variables.

Note 6. The crowding-out effect identified by Bowles (2016)—the tendency of external incentive structures to undermine intrinsic normative motivations—is one of the most important findings for commons policy, and one of the most consistently ignored. It suggests that the introduction of market mechanisms and monitoring systems into previously norm-governed communities can actually worsen outcomes by replacing the motivational substrate of cooperation with an incentive structure that assumes and thereby produces the self-interested behavior Hardin took as given.

Note 7. The distinction between shared use and unaccountable extraction is this suite’s foundational analytical category and will recur throughout subsequent papers. Its importance lies in redirecting analytical attention from formal ownership structures (private, common, state) to accountability relationships—the actual operative variable in governance success and failure. Private property does not inherently prevent unaccountable extraction (as the externalization of environmental costs by private firms demonstrates); common property does not inherently permit it (as the historical evidence in section III demonstrates). The formal ownership structure is less important than the accountability relationships it creates or fails to create.

Note 8. Readers wishing to engage with the growing literature on the global commons—atmosphere, oceans, biodiversity, and the digital commons—will find Dietz et al. (2003) and Hess and Ostrom (2007) useful entry points. The design principles applicable to local commons require significant modification when applied at global scale, primarily because the conditions of community membership, reputational accountability, and normative coherence that support local governance are difficult to establish across national and cultural boundaries. This scaling challenge is one of the most important practical problems in contemporary commons governance.

Note 9. The theological dimension of commons governance—addressed in Paper 6 of this series—is not merely supplementary to the institutional and formation-based accounts developed in the preceding papers. The biblical tradition’s understanding of land tenure, the Jubilee provision of Leviticus 25, and the prophetic critique of accumulation in Isaiah, Amos, and Micah represent a coherent and rigorous anti-enclosure framework that is in important respects more radical than secular commons theory because it locates the problem of enclosure not merely in governance failure but in a fundamental distortion of the human relationship to creation.


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Structures To Avoid Extraction from Creators


1) Authority grounded in contribution and bounded by charter

What to put in place

  • Role charter for instructors/curators: a written scope of what “instruction” includes (critique, teaching, standards) and what it does not include (ownership claims, unilateral redefinition of intent, credit capture).
  • Authority boundaries: instructors can evaluate work against explicit standards, but cannot appropriate the work, compel unpaid production, or redefine attribution.
  • Rotation + term limits for high-status instructional roles, with performance review tied to learner outcomes.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Exploitation thrives where “I’m guiding” expands into “I own / I decide / I deserve credit.”

2) Explicit value-flow rules: credit, money, rights, and risk

What to put in place

  • Attribution policy (default attribution to creators; instructors credited only for material contribution).
  • IP and licensing defaults: creators retain rights; any institutional license is narrow, revocable, and purpose-bound.
  • Compensation triggers: define when instruction becomes labor (e.g., requested production, revisions beyond a threshold, deliverables used externally).
  • Risk allocation rule: decision-makers absorb the reputational and political risk of decisions; creators are not scapegoats for leadership choices.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • If you don’t specify these, the institution will “solve” ambiguity in favor of status and control.

3) Separation of functions: instruction vs. extraction pathways

What to put in place

  • Clean separation between:
    • teaching/critique (development),
    • production (deliverables),
    • publication/distribution (audience access),
    • and governance (policy/discipline).
  • No single person controls all four.
    If one actor can teach you, approve your output, publish you, and discipline you, you have dependency risk.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Exploitation is easiest when instruction is bundled with gatekeeping.

4) Contractual clarity and exit-friendly design

What to put in place

  • Plain-language agreements for any structured program (not “we’ll see” relationships).
  • Exit without penalty: creators can leave with their work, portfolio, and credit intact.
  • Portability: letters of reference, credentials, and evidence of completion must not be hostage to ongoing service.
  • No “future reward” substitute: forbid promissory recognition in lieu of present terms.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Exploitative systems monetize creators’ sunk costs by raising the price of leaving.

5) Transparent evaluation: standards that are legible and appealable

What to put in place

  • Published standards: criteria for excellence, acceptance, or advancement that are concrete enough to predict outcomes.
  • Evidence-based critique: feedback must reference specific features of the work, not vague “alignment.”
  • Appeals process: a creator can request a second review by an independent reviewer.
  • Audit trails: decision rationales are recorded (briefly) to prevent post hoc rewriting.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Vague standards are a control technology. Legible standards turn instruction into a service, not a domination ritual.

6) Anti-credit-capture architecture

What to put in place

  • Contribution logs (lightweight): who did what, when.
  • Authorship matrix for collaborative works (concept, drafting, research, editing, final approval).
  • Default byline rule: creators first; managers last; instructors only if they wrote or created content.
  • Public correction norm: misattribution must be corrected promptly.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Credit capture is the most common extraction mechanism in “instructional” environments.

7) Mentorship as capacity multiplication, not dependence

What to put in place

  • Mentors measured by mentee independence metrics:
    • Can the creator self-critique better?
    • Can they ship work without permission?
    • Can they find audiences without the mentor?
  • Curriculum that teaches leverage: contracts, licensing, audience building, pricing, negotiation, portfolio strategy.
  • Network sharing: mentors open doors, then step aside.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • If the “teacher” needs the student to remain reliant, the structure is extractive by design.

8) Governance representation: creators have standing

What to put in place

  • Creator representation on boards/committees that set policy affecting creative work.
  • Ombuds function with power to investigate complaints about extraction.
  • Whistleblower protections for credit theft, coercion, retaliation.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Without voice, creators become an input class governed by those who profit from them.

9) Time boundaries and anti-scope-creep norms

What to put in place

  • Defined hours and “no surprise deadlines” norms.
  • Scope caps: limits on revision cycles, meeting load, and unpaid “quick favors.”
  • Consent-based extra work: any additional deliverable requires explicit agreement.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Creative goodwill is otherwise treated as an infinite resource.

10) Distinguish “service to the institution” from “practice for the creator”

This one is subtle but decisive.

What to put in place

  • If a project primarily benefits the institution (branding, fundraising, reputation), it is paid work with rights terms.
  • If a project primarily benefits the creator (practice, portfolio), it can be unpaid only if:
    • the creator controls publication,
    • the creator retains rights,
    • and the institution cannot monetize it without compensation.

Why it prevents exploitation

  • Institutions routinely reframe institutional needs as “opportunities.”

A practical package: the minimum viable safeguards

If you want a compact “starter constitution” for a creative instruction program, these five rules do most of the work:

  1. Creators keep rights by default; institutional use is limited and revocable.
  2. Attribution tracks contribution; instructors credited only for material additions.
  3. Instruction roles cannot also be sole gatekeepers; add independent review/appeal.
  4. Exit is penalty-free; creators leave with portfolio, credit, and references.
  5. Compensation triggers are explicit whenever work benefits the institution externally.

The “tell” that your structure is working

In non-extractive instruction, you see:

  • decreasing dependency over time,
  • increased creator bargaining power,
  • clear attribution,
  • fewer moralized demands,
  • and instructors becoming less central as creators mature.

If instruction produces the opposite—greater dependence, fear of exit, ambiguous credit, “mission” pressure—then “instruction” has become extraction.


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Extraction Without Production: Institutional Mechanisms for Capturing Creative Value Without Contribution

Executive Summary

Many institutions rely disproportionately on the output of creative, technical, or generative individuals while allocating authority, recognition, and reward to actors whose primary function is symbolic, administrative, or political rather than productive. This paper examines the mechanisms by which institutions systematically extract value from creative people for the benefit of high-authority, low-productivity roles, often without explicit coercion and frequently under the guise of legitimacy, mission, or coordination.

The analysis intentionally avoids attributing blame to personalities. Instead, it identifies structural extraction pathways that emerge when institutions decouple authority from contribution and reward control over output rather than output itself. These mechanisms are self-reinforcing, difficult to observe externally, and frequently defended as necessary for “quality,” “alignment,” or “stability.”


1. Core Premise: Authority as a Value-Redirecting Valve

Institutions act as value redirection systems. When authority is grounded in production, value flows toward contributors. When authority is grounded in symbolism, credentialing, or narrative control, value flows toward interpreters and curators—regardless of whether they generate anything themselves.

Extraction occurs when:

  • Creative output is necessary but undervalued, and
  • Authority is recognized without productive verification.

2. Preconditions for Institutional Extraction

Before extraction can occur at scale, several conditions must be present:

  1. Creative Asymmetry
    Output is difficult, time-consuming, or rare, while oversight is comparatively easy.
  2. Legibility Gap
    External observers cannot easily distinguish creators from coordinators.
  3. Status Stickiness
    Titles, roles, or credentials persist independently of performance.
  4. Narrative Monopoly
    Authority controls how work is framed, evaluated, and remembered.
  5. Exit Penalties
    Creators lose access, legitimacy, or continuity if they leave.

These conditions are common in late-stage academic, religious, cultural, nonprofit, and creative-industry institutions.


3. Primary Extraction Mechanisms

Mechanism I: Attribution Capture

Description:
Institutions formalize credit assignment systems that default upward, regardless of contribution.

Operational Forms:

  • Mandatory senior authorship
  • Institutional branding overriding individual attribution
  • Editorial dominance without content generation

Effect:
Creative labor increases institutional prestige while personal reputational capital stagnates.


Mechanism II: Contractual Asymmetry

Description:
Agreements emphasize obligations over rights for creators while leaving authority roles underspecified.

Operational Forms:

  • Vague scope definitions
  • Open-ended “mission alignment” clauses
  • Non-reciprocal confidentiality or non-compete expectations

Effect:
Creative people bear enforceable duties; authority figures retain discretionary freedom.


Mechanism III: Risk Externalization

Description:
Institutions shift operational and reputational risk downward while reserving decision rights upward.

Operational Forms:

  • Creative autonomy without decision authority
  • Blame assignment without control
  • “Independent contractor” framing without independence

Effect:
Failure costs are borne by creators; success benefits authority.


Mechanism IV: Throughput Throttling

Description:
Institutions regulate the pace and visibility of creative output to preserve control rather than optimize results.

Operational Forms:

  • Excessive review cycles
  • Sequential approval requirements
  • Artificial scarcity of publication or release slots

Effect:
Creativity is slowed to ensure authority relevance.


Mechanism V: Epistemic Downgrading

Description:
Creative contributors are denied interpretive authority over their own work.

Operational Forms:

  • Strategic reframing without consultation
  • Dismissal of domain expertise as “technical”
  • Authority-defined meaning superseding creator intent

Effect:
Creators become labor inputs rather than epistemic agents.


Mechanism VI: Moralization of Compliance

Description:
Institutions invoke ethical or mission language to suppress negotiation.

Operational Forms:

  • Framing resistance as selfish or disloyal
  • Equating sacrifice with virtue
  • Treating unpaid or underpaid labor as moral contribution

Effect:
Material extraction is insulated from critique.


Mechanism VII: Dependency Engineering

Description:
Institutions design pathways that prevent creators from accumulating independent legitimacy.

Operational Forms:

  • Withholding credentials or endorsements
  • Controlling access to audiences
  • Promising future recognition in place of present compensation

Effect:
Creative people remain perpetually provisional.


4. Secondary Reinforcement Mechanisms

Once primary extraction is established, institutions reinforce it through:

  • Bureaucratic Inflation – adding non-productive roles to justify oversight
  • Performance Theater – substituting meetings, reviews, and statements for output
  • Credential Escalation – raising formal requirements unrelated to production
  • Narrative Sanitization – rewriting institutional history to obscure contributors

These mechanisms increase extraction efficiency while reducing detectability.


5. Why Creative People Are Especially Vulnerable

Creative individuals often:

  • Value output over credit
  • Prioritize meaning over leverage
  • Underestimate institutional inertia
  • Assume good faith where incentives dominate
  • Delay confrontation to preserve momentum

Institutions exploit these traits not maliciously, but systematically.


6. Long-Term Institutional Consequences

Extraction without production leads to:

  1. Creative Attrition – departure of high-output contributors
  2. Output Hollowing – decline in quality masked by branding
  3. Legitimacy Collapse – authority loses epistemic grounding
  4. Increased Coercion – authority compensates for loss of voluntary contribution
  5. Terminal Brittleness – institutions cannot adapt when conditions change

Late-stage institutions often respond by increasing extraction intensity, accelerating failure.


7. Diagnostic Questions

Institutions and collaborators should ask:

  • Who creates the thing we are proud of?
  • Who decides how it is framed?
  • Who bears cost when it fails?
  • Who gains status when it succeeds?
  • Can contributors leave without reputational injury?

Misalignment across these answers indicates extraction.


8. Structural Alternatives

Non-extractive institutions:

  • Tie authority to demonstrated contribution
  • Make attribution transparent
  • Absorb risk at decision points
  • Design exit-friendly collaboration
  • Treat creative people as epistemic peers

Such institutions are rarer but more resilient.


Conclusion

Institutions do not extract value from creative people because they are evil or corrupt. They do so because authority divorced from production must feed on production to justify itself.

When institutions reward control rather than contribution, extraction becomes rational, normalized, and invisible—until the creators leave and nothing remains but titles managing an absence.

The question is not whether extraction can be eliminated entirely, but whether institutions are willing to re-anchor legitimacy in creation rather than curation. Those that cannot will increasingly find themselves managing symbols instead of substance.


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Generative Curatorship: A Counter-Typology to Extractive Status-Based Management

Executive Summary

Where extractive curation converts productivity into status maintenance, generative curatorship performs the inverse function: it converts status, access, and coordination capacity into increased productive yield, clarity, and legitimacy for contributors.

This paper presents a counter-typology of genuinely generative curatorial roles. Each type is defined not by intentions, temperament, or rhetoric, but by measurable effects on throughput, attribution, epistemic clarity, and institutional resilience.

Generative curatorship is rare not because it is difficult in principle, but because it undermines symbolic monopolies. Its success makes itself partially invisible, which is precisely why it is so often replaced by theatrical substitutes.


1. Defining Generative Curatorship

A curator is generative when their presence:

  1. Increases net output
  2. Improves interpretive coherence
  3. Reduces coordination friction
  4. Amplifies contributor legitimacy
  5. Decreases dependency on themselves

Any curatorial role that fails one or more of these tests should be treated as suspect.


2. The Core Distinction: Power Conversion Direction

Extractive CuratorshipGenerative Curatorship
Productivity → StatusStatus → Productivity
Control → LegitimacyContribution → Legitimacy
Dependency preservedDependency reduced
Credit flows upwardCredit flows accurately
Risk displaced downwardRisk absorbed upward

This directional distinction is more reliable than any moral assessment.


3. Counter-Typology of Generative Curatorship

Type I: Attribution Stewardship

Function:
Ensures that credit tracks contribution accurately and durably.

Behaviors:

  • Proactive clarification of authorship and ownership
  • Willingness to be omitted from bylines when value-add is minimal
  • Public correction of misattribution, even at personal cost

Diagnostic Marker:
If the curator exits, contributors retain recognition rather than losing it.


Type II: Throughput Amplification

Function:
Removes bottlenecks rather than inserting themselves as one.

Behaviors:

  • Accelerates approvals rather than extending review cycles
  • Converts vague goals into actionable constraints
  • Collapses unnecessary layers of permission

Diagnostic Marker:
Output velocity increases after curatorial intervention, not before.


Type III: Epistemic Translation

Function:
Bridges domains without overwriting them.

Behaviors:

  • Preserves contributor intent while making it legible to outsiders
  • Distinguishes between clarification and reinterpretation
  • Defers interpretive authority to domain experts

Diagnostic Marker:
Producers recognize their own work after curation.


Type IV: Risk Absorption

Function:
Uses status to shield producers from institutional fallout.

Behaviors:

  • Accepts responsibility for coordination failures
  • Buffers contributors from political or reputational blowback
  • Intervenes upward, not downward, when conflicts arise

Diagnostic Marker:
Failure costs concentrate at the curatorial level, not the production level.


Type V: Capacity Multiplication

Function:
Makes others more capable, not more dependent.

Behaviors:

  • Shares contacts, context, and institutional knowledge
  • Teaches contributors how to navigate systems independently
  • Designs processes that continue functioning without them

Diagnostic Marker:
The curator becomes progressively less necessary over time.


Type VI: Boundary Enforcement Upward

Function:
Prevents status actors from extracting uncompensated labor.

Behaviors:

  • Pushes back against scope creep
  • Makes costs explicit to decision-makers
  • Refuses symbolic rewards as substitutes for material support

Diagnostic Marker:
Producers experience fewer “emergency” demands and clearer expectations.


4. What Generative Curators Do Not Do

They do not:

  • Invoke moral language to avoid negotiation
  • Claim invisible labor without demonstrable effects
  • Confuse access with insight
  • Treat productivity as a threat to authority
  • Require loyalty beyond professionalism

Their legitimacy does not require emotional allegiance.


5. Why Generative Curatorship Is Structurally Disfavored

5.1 Credit Invisibility

Successful curation often looks like:

“Things just worked.”

Institutions that reward performance theater over outcomes therefore misclassify generative curators as nonessential.


5.2 Status Erosion Fear

Generative curatorship:

  • Distributes competence
  • Reveals redundancy
  • Collapses mystique

This threatens systems organized around symbolic scarcity.


5.3 Exit-Friendly Design

Generative curators design themselves out of indispensability, which is directly counter to most status-preserving incentive structures.


6. Institutional Diagnostics: Spotting the Real Thing

Ask:

  • Does this role measurably reduce friction?
  • Does it leave contributors stronger?
  • Does it survive scrutiny without narrative inflation?
  • Does it scale without centralization?
  • Does it tolerate being replaced?

If yes, the curatorship is likely generative.


7. Implications for High-Productivity Collaborators

For producers evaluating collaborators or managers:

  • Favor those who clarify contracts early
  • Beware those who describe value in metaphors rather than mechanisms
  • Track who absorbs cost when things go wrong
  • Notice whether your independence grows or shrinks over time

Generative curators create conditions for exit without injury.


Conclusion

Generative curatorship is not a personality trait or leadership style. It is a structural posture defined by the direction in which power flows and the durability of the systems it leaves behind.

Where extractive curation feeds on productivity, generative curation feeds productivity itself—until it no longer needs feeding.

Institutions that cannot tolerate this posture will select against it. Institutions that can will quietly outlast those that cannot.


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