Executive Summary
Over the past several years, separate conflicts in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Ethiopia have increasingly come to be organized around a single regional rivalry. On one side stands a loose coalition built around Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, which presents itself as a defender of existing states and borders. On the other stands a network centered on the United Arab Emirates and Israel, with Ethiopia as its main continental partner, which works mostly through ports, investment, recognition, and non-state or sub-state partners. Neither grouping is a formal alliance, and members on both sides hedge. Even so, the competition between them now shapes which side in a local war receives drones, money, and diplomatic cover. This paper describes the character and membership of each bloc, examines the hot spots where they compete, and identifies the mechanisms by which their rivalry converts local crises into regional wars.
I. The Nature of the Blocs
Analysts broadly agree on the outline of the division, though they describe it in different terms. The American Enterprise Institute describes the Red Sea region as split between an Emirati-backed, Israeli-supported axis of revisionist state and non-state actors, set against a coalition of status quo African states aligned with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The Institute for Economics and Peace, in its 2026 Global Peace Index supplement, identifies the emerging UAE–Israel–Ethiopia axis, set against a Saudi–Egypt–Türkiye reaction, as the clearest candidate for linking the conflict systems of the Horn of Africa and the Greater Middle East.
The most useful way to understand the two blocs is by how they operate rather than by their membership. The Saudi–Egyptian–Turkish grouping favors central governments, internationally recognized borders, and the unity of existing states. One Horn analyst summarized the shared interest of Riyadh and Cairo as a desire to have controllable neighbors. The UAE-centered network, by contrast, has been characterized as an “axis of secessionists” that supports non-state and separatist actors across the Middle East, southern Arabia, and the Horn, a strategy that gives Abu Dhabi strategic depth but often sets it against central governments and against Saudi Arabia.
The difference in method matters as much as the difference in goals. The first bloc works mainly through recognized governments, formal summits, and multilateral statements. The second works through port concessions, airfields, private logistics firms, and partners whose legal status is contested. Because the second method creates facts on the ground that diplomacy must then address, one commentator described the UAE–Ethiopia–Israel grouping as following a doctrine of recognition by deed that prioritizes functional control over diplomatic consensus.
II. The Sovereigntist Bloc: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey
Core states. Saudi Arabia supplies money and diplomatic weight, Egypt supplies military proximity and a direct stake in both the Nile and the Suez Canal, and Turkey supplies drones, training, and a long-standing military presence in Somalia. Egypt’s motives are the most concrete. Cairo sees the expanding Israel–UAE footprint as a strategic risk to two core interests: the freedom and security of the Suez Canal, and its leverage over Nile Basin politics. Saudi Arabia’s motive sharpened after its confrontation with the UAE in Yemen, and Saudi officials have openly accused the UAE of backing separatist actors and of interventions that undermine central authorities in Yemen and beyond.
Associated states and partners. Around this core sit several states that depend on it or share its interests. In Sudan, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have partnered with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the internationally recognized government, as well as with the Federal Government of Somalia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have built ties with Djibouti and with Eritrea in order to contain Ethiopia and the UAE–Israel partnership across the region. Pakistan also appears as a supplier at the edge of the bloc, since the Somali government is expanding its partnerships with key Saudi allies, including Pakistan.
An awkward fellow traveler. Iran stands outside both blocs but has interests that run alongside the first. It is known to have developed relations with Asmara, and it renewed diplomatic ties with Sudan in October 2023, aligning Tehran with the SAF. This overlap is a matter of convenience rather than shared purpose, and it gives the rival network an argument that its opponents are compromised by Iranian association.
Institutions. The bloc has begun to formalize itself at sea. In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks at which 14 countries, including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia, established the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, from which the UAE and Ethiopia are excluded. Earlier, at a June summit in Cairo, Egypt and Eritrea declared that littoral states bear primary and exclusive responsibility for Red Sea security, a doctrine that by definition excludes a landlocked Ethiopia.
III. The Networked Bloc: The UAE, Israel, and Ethiopia
Core states. The UAE provides capital, logistics, and military supply; Israel provides diplomatic recognition, intelligence, and security technology; Ethiopia provides a large population, a large army, and an appetite for sea access. The Atlantic Council has called this combination the “Berbera Axis”: UAE capital, Ethiopian appetite for maritime access, and Israeli diplomatic cover, all converging on a single deep-water port. Israel’s entry is recent. Its involvement in the Horn has origins in events after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, and it reflects the significant rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Ethiopia’s hedging. Ethiopia is the least committed of the three. The UAE has supplied finance, infrastructure investment and political backing that helped stabilize Ethiopia during periods of internal strain, yet Ethiopia keeps working links with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in order to balance Gulf rivalries. Its membership in the bloc is therefore partly a product of its neighbors’ hostility. Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan have treated it as an adversary, which pushes Addis Ababa toward the only partners offering it an outlet to the sea.
Associated partners. The network’s distinctive feature is the number of sub-state and non-state partners attached to it. In Somalia, these are Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland; in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces; in Libya, Khalifa Haftar’s eastern forces; and, until January 2026, Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council. Chad served as an early transit state for Emirati supply to the RSF. Each of these partners is either unrecognized, autonomous, or in rebellion against a recognized government, which explains why the network’s growth is so threatening to the sovereigntist bloc.
Instruments. Ports are the network’s main assets. DP World holds a 30-year concession at Berbera, and the UAE built and operates a large deep-water port and military base there. Puntland hosts an Emirati military base at Bosaso. Recognition is the second instrument: Israel recognized Somaliland in December 2025, the first state to do so since Somaliland declared independence in 1991, and the UAE is widely seen as having quietly supported the move.
IV. The Hot Spots
Sudan
Sudan is the most developed theater of the rivalry and the clearest case of a proxy war. Saudi Arabia backs the SAF while the UAE backs the RSF, with Gulf states supplying drones and advanced weapons to opposite sides. The country is now effectively divided: the army holds Khartoum, Port Sudan and the center-east, while the RSF holds Darfur after capturing El Fasher in October 2025 and is besieging El Obeid. Egypt is the SAF’s most committed backer, driven by deep military ties, anxiety about growing UAE influence, and fear of refugee flows and spillover. The war shows no sign of ending. On October 7, 2026, al-Burhan promised to seize every inch of RSF-held territory and rejected negotiations.
Libya and the Tri-Border Area
Libya functions as the RSF’s rear base. Supply lines originating in the UAE run through bases controlled by Haftar’s forces, entering by sea at Benghazi and by cargo flights to interior airfields including an old airbase southeast of Kufra. One assessment counted nearly 600 Emirati flights reaching Kufra in 2025, with weapons forwarded to RSF strongholds in El Fasher and Nyala. This theater exposes a contradiction within the sovereigntist bloc. Egypt is a key ally of the SAF but also supports Haftar, the same commander whose territory feeds the RSF. Cairo has responded with quiet pressure; in January 2026 Kufra airport was shut for a month, likely due to Egyptian and Saudi pressure on the Haftar family over Emirati use of the field.
Yemen
Yemen is where the rivalry broke into open confrontation between the bloc leaders themselves. In late December 2025, Riyadh took decisive military action against Emirati influence, backing forces to retake Hadramawt and Al-Mahra and launching airstrikes against STC and UAE positions and equipment. The Saudi-backed Yemeni leadership announced on December 30 that the UAE must withdraw from all of Yemen within 24 hours, and the UAE complied. The STC announced its dissolution after its leader fled by boat to Somalia and was flown on to Abu Dhabi. The episode demonstrated that the two blocs’ leaders are prepared to use force against each other’s partners directly, not only through intermediaries.
Somalia and Somaliland
Yemen and Somalia are linked through this escape. Somalia’s January 2026 cancellation of all agreements with the UAE came days after reports that al-Zubaidi traveled to the UAE via Berbera on January 8. The cancellation exposed the fragmentation of the Somali state, since Jubbaland, Puntland, and Somaliland issued separate statements invalidating it and reaffirming their right to make agreements on their own. The UAE was providing salaries for at least 3,400 soldiers at the start of 2026, which means that a rupture between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi has direct consequences for security forces fighting al-Shabaab and Islamic State affiliates. Turkey’s role here is central; it opposed the Israel–UAE–Somaliland trajectory and found common cause with Egypt on Somali unity.
Ethiopia and Eritrea
The Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation is now the most acute point of contact between the blocs. As of mid-2026, the Institute for Economics and Peace had already judged the Ethiopia–Eritrea axis to be the most acute war risk in the region. The danger was realized in the autumn: in late September, with quiet backing from Eritrea, the TPLF launched large-scale offensives against the Ethiopian army. Addis Ababa’s framing places the war squarely within the bloc rivalry, since Ethiopia’s army chief accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting the rebels, a charge all three deny. A second interstate front is also forming, with rising risk of conflict between the Saudi-backed SAF and Ethiopia, an ally of the Emirates.
The Red Sea Itself
The maritime space ties all of these theaters together. The Iran war added an Arabian-shore layer: in July 2026, Yemen’s four-year ceasefire showed signs of breaking down as the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government resumed fighting. Ports and airfields on the African shore serve both commercial and military purposes. Berbera, for example, is seen as a useful launchpad for Israel to target the Houthis or for the UAE to supply allies in Africa, which makes it a potential target in any wider war.
V. How the Rivalry Turns Crises into Regional Wars
Several mechanisms recur across these theaters. Together they explain why local disputes that might once have stayed contained now tend to spread.
Patronage removes the pressure to settle. Civil wars usually end when one or both sides run out of money and weapons. External sponsorship prevents that point from arriving. In Sudan, external backing from the UAE for the RSF and from Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the army removes the financial pressure that usually forces combatants to negotiate. The same logic now applies in Ethiopia, where insurgents who might otherwise have been exhausted can look to Asmara, and possibly to Cairo and Khartoum, for support.
Logistics nodes become targets and borders become fronts. Because the networked bloc supplies its partners through specific ports and airfields, those facilities acquire military significance and draw neighboring states into the fight. The RSF’s 2025 capture of the Sudan–Libya–Egypt tri-border area, following a joint offensive with Haftar’s forces, opened a new front and a new supply route at Egypt’s doorstep. A supply corridor that crosses three countries turns a civil war into a problem for all three.
Issue linkage merges separate disputes into one contest. Each bloc tends to treat its rival’s moves in different theaters as parts of one campaign. Addis Ababa now portrays Egypt as a strategic spoiler and links the Nile dam dispute directly to Red Sea politics. Riyadh reads events in Yemen, Somaliland, and Sudan as a single southward extension of UAE–Israeli influence. Once disputes are linked in this way, a concession in one theater looks like a defeat in all of them, which makes compromise harder everywhere.
Opportunistic reversals multiply the number of armed parties. The bloc rivalry rewards switching sides. Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia against the TPLF in 2020 to 2022 and now stands accused of backing the same movement. Sudan’s RSF once fought in Yemen on behalf of both Gulf powers and is now the UAE’s client against a Saudi-backed army. Each reversal creates new grievances and new armed actors whose loyalty is available to the highest bidder.
Precedents for secession travel across borders. The sovereigntist bloc’s deepest fear is not any single port deal but the example it sets. Much of the African and Arab world opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, fearing it would encourage other secessionist movements. The examples of the STC in Yemen, the RSF’s parallel Tasis government in Sudan, and armed regional movements in Ethiopia all appear to the status quo powers as variations on one threat. They respond accordingly, with force where they can apply it.
Mediators become parties. As the blocs harden, the institutions that once mediated lose credibility. The African Union is headquartered in Addis Ababa, which exposes it to accusations of federal Ethiopian influence and limits its usefulness as a neutral broker. Gulf states, once the region’s financiers of peace deals, are now sponsors of opposing sides. With few neutral parties left, local crises lack an exit ramp.
VI. Limits and Fault Lines Within the Blocs
The blocs should not be mistaken for disciplined alliances. Three limitations stand out.
First, cross-cutting ties persist. Egypt’s support for Haftar while opposing the RSF is the clearest example, and Ethiopia’s continued courtship of Riyadh and Doha shows that the networked bloc’s continental anchor is not fully committed.
Second, outside shocks can suspend the rivalry. After the United States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, 2026, Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE temporarily thawed the escalating tensions between them, as GCC members rallied together. That thaw proved limited; one assessment observed that Saudi–UAE competition was only temporarily on hold, making stronger GCC security cooperation a distant prospect. The Iran war also exposed a difference in posture, with the UAE supporting the US–Israeli position while Saudi Arabia maintained strategic ambiguity.
Third, outside distraction can make local wars worse rather than better. One analysis noted that Gulf interventions in the Horn were possible largely because the Gulf states were at peace with one another and with Iran, and that Sudan’s war may last longer now that their attention is elsewhere. The same analysis expected Turkey and Egypt to remain active in the Horn regardless. A reduction in Gulf involvement may therefore shift the balance toward the bloc whose non-Gulf members have the most direct stakes.
VII. Indicators to Watch
Several developments in the coming months would signal whether the rivalry is moving toward open regional war. These include any Egyptian or Sudanese military deployment toward the Ethiopian border or the GERD; confirmed Eritrean–Ethiopian combat beyond Tigray, particularly near Assab or along the Afar corridor; renewed traffic through Kufra, Bosaso, or Chadian airfields after periods of pressure; formal recognition of Somaliland by any additional state; Houthi or Iranian strikes on Emirati or Israeli facilities on the African shore; and the RSF’s fate at El Obeid, which would determine whether Sudan’s de facto partition becomes permanent.
Conclusion
The rivalry between the Saudi–Egyptian–Turkish coalition and the UAE–Israel–Ethiopia network is less a clash of two alliances than a contest between two ideas of regional order. One holds that existing states and borders should be preserved, even weak or abusive ones; the other holds that ports, partners, and control on the ground matter more than formal recognition. Each local war in the region now offers both blocs a chance to advance their idea at the other’s expense, and so each local war tends to draw in outside weapons, outside money, and eventually outside armies. Sudan shows what happens when this logic runs unchecked for several years. Yemen shows that the bloc leaders will strike each other’s partners directly. Ethiopia and Eritrea show how quickly a civil war can become an interstate one when both blocs see it as part of their larger contest. The decisive question for the region is whether any actor can remain neutral enough to mediate, or whether the rivalry will be settled only by the exhaustion of the states caught between the two blocs.
