Executive Summary

“What do you bring to the table?” is a request for consideration in the contractual sense: it asks what a prospective party offers in exchange for admission. The question is legitimate where a bargain is in view. It does harm when applied to relationships that are not bargains, and it becomes dishonest when the questioner exempts himself or herself from it.

This paper names that dishonesty the asymmetric audit: judging others by their contribution while demanding to be accepted without reciprocity. Scripture condemns this double standard as a false balance. This paper makes five claims:

1. Exchange is a real and legitimate feature of human life, and Scripture protects it.
2. Biblical covenant differs from contract because entry may be unearned and because its object is the person rather than the performance.
3. Biblical covenant still carries terms, obligations, witnesses, and consequences, so it gives no support to a claim of being “enough” without any duty to anyone.
4. Contract doctrine offers useful diagnostic categories for personal and institutional relationships, while also marking where legal categories stop.
5. Institutions commonly commit the same false balance by claiming covenant loyalty while reserving contractual exit.

The biblical standard for the table can be stated simply: no one comes empty-handed by choice, no one is measured beyond ability, and no one is cast out for having nothing to give.

1. The Problem: The Asymmetric Audit

Many people learn early that their place depends on their usefulness. A child becomes the family’s dependable one, an employee is retained for output, a congregant becomes known by a list of duties, and a friend is called mainly when something needs fixing. Over a lifetime, such a person may conclude that belonging is always conditional because it has always been so in practice.

For this person, a particular encounter is bewildering. Someone asks what the contributor brings, assesses the answer coolly, and finds it wanting. The same evaluator then insists that his or her own presence is sufficient and that any expectation of reciprocity is an insult. Two standards operate in one person: an audit outward and an exemption inward.

Scripture has a precise category for this conduct: “Diverse weights and diverse measures, they are both alike, an abomination to the LORD” (Proverbs 20:10; see also Deuteronomy 25:13–16). The offense in a false balance lies in keeping two sets of weights, one for buying and one for selling. Jesus Christ applied the same principle to judgment of persons: “with the measure you use, it will be measured back to you” (Matthew 7:2).

The double standard is culturally stable because two vocabularies are available at once. The first is the market vocabulary of value, return, networking, and investment in people. The second is the therapeutic vocabulary of acceptance and worthiness. Carl Rogers described unconditional positive regard as a condition of therapeutic change, a stance that belongs to a bounded professional relationship.[2] When transferred to ordinary life, it can become a claim on everyone. Robert Bellah and his colleagues described the expressive individualism in which the self becomes its own measure, and Carl Trueman has traced the longer intellectual history of that self.[3]

Anthony Giddens supplied the corresponding account of intimacy. His “pure relationship” continues only as long as each party finds it satisfying enough to remain.[4] Eva Illouz has shown how thoroughly economic and emotional languages have merged in modern life.[5] The result is a person who can speak as a portfolio manager about others and as a therapy client about the self, without noticing the shift.

2. What Exchange Accounts Explain, and What They Miss

Social exchange theory describes much of what happens in ordinary relationships. George Homans treated social behavior as exchange, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley showed that people assess a relationship against available alternatives, and Peter Blau traced how exchange generates obligation and power.[6] Caryl Rusbult’s investment model explains commitment through satisfaction, investments, and the quality of alternatives.[7] Equity research adds that distress arises from being over-benefited as well as under-benefited.[8] These findings describe recognizable behavior and should not be dismissed.

The same literature also shows that exchange does not govern every relationship. Margaret Clark and Judson Mills distinguished exchange relationships, in which benefits create debts, from communal relationships, in which benefits respond to need. In their experiments, prompt repayment could reduce attraction where a communal relationship was desired.[9] Alan Fiske identified market pricing as only one of four basic models of social relation, and Fiske and Philip Tetlock showed the moral outrage produced when market logic is applied to a sphere that excludes it.[10] Alvin Gouldner observed that even the norm of reciprocity does not apply with full force to children, the aged, and the disabled.[11]

Aristotle had noticed the central difficulty long before. Complaints arise chiefly in friendships of utility, he wrote, and such friendships come in a legal form on fixed terms and a moral form in which something is given as to a friend while a return is still expected. Trouble comes when people enter on one understanding and leave on the other.[12] That is an accurate description of many personal disappointments.

The Contributor’s Own Danger

The contributor’s grievance is often just, but the contributor’s position has dangers of its own. Self-worth staked on performance is inherently unstable, as research on contingent self-worth has shown.[13] Contribution can also become a means of control. Blau observed that unreciprocated benefits produce subordination, and Marcel Mauss showed how gifts bind recipients.[14] Proverbs states the economic form of the principle: “the borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7).

Two figures in the Gospels speak for the contributor. Martha protests that she has been left to serve alone (Luke 10:40). The elder brother protests that he has served for many years and never received a young goat (Luke 15:29). His complaint reveals that he has understood his sonship as employment, the same error his brother made when he planned to return as a hired servant (Luke 15:19). The father’s answer rejects the ledger for both sons: “Son, you are always with me, and all that I have is yours” (Luke 15:31).

Peter’s refusal to have his feet washed shows a further difficulty. Jesus Christ answered, “If I do not wash you, you have no part with Me” (John 13:8). A person who will only give, and will never receive, has kept control of the terms of the relationship. Persons formed by a lifetime of conditional acceptance may find receiving harder than serving.

3. Covenant: Unearned Entry, Obligated Continuance

Gordon Hugenberger defines covenant as an elected, as opposed to natural, relationship of obligation established under divine sanction.[15] Frank Moore Cross described covenant as the means by which kinship obligations are extended to those who are not kin by birth.[15] Scripture presents marriage in these terms: “she is your companion and your wife by covenant,” with the LORD as witness (Malachi 2:14; see also Proverbs 2:17).

Entry Is Not Earned

God’s covenants repeatedly refuse the logic of prior contribution. “The LORD did not set His love on you nor choose you because you were more in number than any other people . . . but because the LORD loves you” (Deuteronomy 7:7–8). Israel is warned against supposing that its righteousness secured the land (Deuteronomy 9:4–6). Ezekiel depicts Israel as an abandoned infant whom God sustained and later took in covenant (Ezekiel 16:4–8). In Genesis 15, God alone passes between the divided animals, taking upon Himself the form of the oath later described in Jeremiah 34:18.

Paul draws the distinction with commercial precision: “Now to him who works, the wages are not counted as grace but as debt” (Romans 4:4). God is no one’s debtor (Romans 11:35), and Christ died for people while they were still sinners (Romans 5:8).

Continuance Has Terms

Unearned entry does not mean an unobligated relationship. At Sinai, the offer is conditional: “if you will indeed obey My voice and keep My covenant” (Exodus 19:5). The people assent (Exodus 19:8; 24:3–8), blessings and curses are stated (Deuteronomy 28), witnesses are invoked (Deuteronomy 30:19), the text is deposited (Deuteronomy 31:26), and public reading is scheduled (Deuteronomy 31:10–13). George Mendenhall and Meredith Kline connected these features with ancient treaty forms, and Moshe Weinfeld distinguished obligatory treaty from promissory grant.[16]

Abraham, the great example of faith, also obeyed God’s voice and kept His commandments, statutes, and laws (Genesis 26:5). The covenant can be broken (Jeremiah 31:32), and Scripture even records a certificate of divorce issued to faithless Israel (Jeremiah 3:8). The New Covenant retains God’s law by writing it on the heart (Jeremiah 31:33; Hebrews 8:10). Its promises are better (Hebrews 8:6), but its demand on the believer has not disappeared. Paul holds both truths together: “If we deny Him, He also will deny us. If we are faithless, He remains faithful” (2 Timothy 2:12–13).

John Barclay’s reading of grace in Paul supplies a useful distinction: God’s gift is unconditioned, because it does not depend on the recipient’s prior worth, but it is not unconditional, because it is meant to produce a transformed life.[18] The parable of the wedding feast illustrates this. Guests are gathered from the highways, both bad and good, yet a man without a wedding garment is cast out (Matthew 22:9–13).

The claim to be “enough as I am” therefore contains a half-truth. No one must earn entry into God’s favor, but no one may treat that entry as release from obligation.

Hesed and the Test of “For Nothing”

The Hebrew word hesed, often rendered “kindness” or “lovingkindness,” names loyal love shown within a relationship, frequently where the party in need cannot compel it.[17] Satan’s challenge in Job goes to the center of the matter: “Does Job fear God for nothing?” (Job 1:9). The accusation is that all devotion is secretly contractual. The book of Job tests whether a relationship can survive the loss of every visible benefit.

The same adverb, hinnam, appears in Laban’s question to Jacob: “Because you are my relative, should you therefore serve me for nothing?” (Genesis 29:15). The word thus marks both the highest test of faithful love and the opening of a labor negotiation.

Three Case Studies

Ruth. Naomi makes the formal case that she brings nothing to the table: she has no more sons to offer (Ruth 1:11–13). Ruth binds herself anyway by oath (Ruth 1:16–17). Her loyalty is noticed and honored (Ruth 2:11–12; 3:10). Chapter 4 then sets a legal transaction at the city gate with witnesses, where the nearer kinsman calculates the cost and declines “lest I ruin my own inheritance” (Ruth 4:6). His decision is lawful, and the narrative leaves him unnamed.

Mephibosheth. David seeks someone of Saul’s house to whom he may show hesed for Jonathan’s sake, fulfilling an earlier covenant (1 Samuel 20:14–17; 2 Samuel 9:1). Mephibosheth is lame, politically dangerous, and calls himself a dead dog (2 Samuel 9:8). He is given a permanent place at the king’s table (2 Samuel 9:7, 13). The same passage records that Ziba and his household must work the land to supply food (2 Samuel 9:10). A table where someone is received without contributing is still a table someone else has supplied.

Joshua 9. Israel’s oath to Gibeon was obtained by deception, a circumstance that would ordinarily make a contract voidable.[20] Israel nevertheless held to it (Joshua 9:19), and its later violation brought judgment generations afterward (2 Samuel 21:1–2). The righteous person “swears to his own hurt and does not change” (Psalm 15:4).

4. Covenant and Contract in Relation

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks summarized the contrast by describing contract as a transaction grounded in interest and covenant as a relationship grounded in loyalty and shared belonging.[19] The contrast is valuable, provided that contract is not treated as the villain.

Scripture protects contract. Wages must be paid promptly (Deuteronomy 24:14–15), and withheld wages cry out to God (James 5:4). Abraham declined Ephron’s offer of a gift and paid full price before witnesses (Genesis 23:11–18). Jeremiah’s land purchase was signed, sealed, and witnessed (Jeremiah 32:10–12). Paul used the language of accounts freely with those he loved (Philippians 4:15–17; Philemon 18–19). The parable of the vineyard contains both principles: “Did you not agree with me for a denarius?” protects the bargain, and “Is it not lawful for me to do what I wish with my own things?” protects generosity beyond it (Matthew 20:13, 15).

Contract can be a mercy. Laban’s household shows why. He invokes kinship to obtain labor, changes Jacob’s wages ten times (Genesis 31:7), and in the view of his own daughters has sold them and consumed their price (Genesis 31:14–15). Family language without enforceable terms left Jacob exposed. Conversely, the law of the bondservant shows a term arrangement closing with generosity, since the departing servant may not leave empty-handed (Deuteronomy 15:13). It also provides for a servant who chooses permanent attachment out of love (Deuteronomy 15:16–17).

Dimension	Contract	Covenant
Object	Specified performance	The person and the relationship, along with specified duties
Entry	Bargained-for exchange	Election and solemn undertaking; may be wholly unearned
Measure	The stated terms	The stated terms plus hesed
Duration	Fixed term or completed performance	Lasting, often lifelong or generational
When a party cannot perform	May be excused or discharged (Restatement § 261)	Inability calls for help (Leviticus 25:35)
Response to breach	Damages or discharge	Reproof, patience, and a call to return; dissolution for grave breach
Witness and enforcer	Parties and courts	God and, commonly, the community

Covenant therefore contains contractual form and exceeds it. Every covenant has terms, but the parties owe each other more than the terms can specify. A contract ends in a settled account, whereas love remains a debt that is never finally discharged: “Owe no one anything except to love one another” (Romans 13:8).

The Biblical Rule of the Table

The clearest biblical answer to the paper’s title question appears in the commanded festivals. Worshippers “shall not appear before the LORD empty-handed,” yet “every man shall give as he is able” (Deuteronomy 16:16–17). At the same feast, the Levite, stranger, fatherless, and widow are to be included in the rejoicing (Deuteronomy 16:14). The tithe of the third year also feeds those without inheritance or means (Deuteronomy 14:28–29).

The New Testament maintains this structure:

• Contribution is indexed to capacity. A gift “is accepted according to what one has, and not according to what he does not have” (2 Corinthians 8:12). The widow’s two mites exceeded the gifts of the wealthy (Mark 12:41–44).
• Refusal differs from inability. “If anyone will not work, neither shall he eat” (2 Thessalonians 3:10) addresses those who will not work. It offers no warrant for excluding those who cannot.
• Hospitality should reach those who cannot repay. Jesus Christ told His host to invite the poor and maimed because “they cannot repay you; for you shall be repaid at the resurrection of the just” (Luke 14:12–14).
• Status may not rule the table. Paul rebuked the Corinthians for meals that would “shame those who have nothing” (1 Corinthians 11:22). James condemned partiality toward the wealthy visitor (James 2:1–9).

Proverbs observes without approval that wealth attracts friends and poverty drives them away (Proverbs 19:4, 6–7). Scripture recognizes the market in persons as a fact and refuses to accept it as a standard.

5. Contract Doctrine Applied to Relationships Between Persons

Contract law cannot define love, but its concepts expose common confusions. The following discussion summarizes general, mainly American, doctrine and is offered as analysis and not as legal advice.[1]

Consideration and its adequacy. A contract requires a bargained-for exchange (Restatement § 71), and consideration may consist of something given up, as Hamer v. Sidway held of a nephew’s forbearance from drinking and smoking. Courts generally do not require equivalence between the values exchanged (Restatement § 79). The social audit is thus often harsher than a court. The law asks whether a bargain was made, whereas the social evaluator asks whether a person is worth having.

Mutual assent and unspoken terms. Contract formation depends on outward manifestations of assent (Restatement § 18; Lucy v. Zehmer). Much relational bitterness arises from a contract known to only one party: “I did all this, and expected that in return.” An unstated expectation is not a term. Parties who have real needs should state them, and should recognize that a request can be declined.

Past consideration and the volunteer. In Mills v. Wyman, a father’s promise to pay for care already given to his adult son was held unenforceable despite its moral force. Restatement § 86 allows only limited exceptions. “After all I have done for you” is usually the language of past consideration. A gift cannot later be converted into an invoice. Paul’s commendation of Philippian generosity shows that gratitude remains a duty of the recipient (Philippians 4:14–18), but the giver cannot convert that duty into a bill.

Illusory promises. A promise that leaves performance entirely to the promisor’s option binds no one (Restatement § 77). Statements such as “I will always be there, so long as it feels right” belong in this category. Giddens’s pure relationship is, in legal terms, a series of illusory promises terminable at will.

Reliance. In Kirksey v. Kirksey, a widow moved at her brother-in-law’s invitation and was later turned out, and the promise was held to be gratuitous, although the opinion’s author thought it morally binding. Ricketts v. Scothorn and Restatement § 90 later reflected the principle that a promise inducing foreseeable reliance may be enforced to avoid injustice. Morally, people who invite others to reorganize their lives around a promised relationship incur obligations through that reliance. Jacob’s bargaining vow at Bethel (Genesis 28:20–22) and Ruth’s unconditional one show the range of what people may promise, but each promise, once relied upon, carries weight.

Domestic relations and preexisting duty. Atkin, L.J., wrote in Balfour v. Balfour that “each house is a domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run.”[21] In Borelli v. Brusseau, a California court refused to enforce a husband’s promise of property in exchange for his wife’s personal nursing care, reasoning that spousal care was already owed (see also Restatement § 73). Although the result was harsh in that case, its reasoning preserves a significant boundary: what is already owed by status cannot be sold as a new performance. Maynard v. Hill likewise described marriage as more than a mere contract.[22] Parental duty rests on status as well, and no child must qualify for care by usefulness. Scholars such as Elizabeth and Robert Scott have analyzed marriage as a relational contract, which illuminates its long-term reciprocity but cannot fully capture its covenantal object.[23]

Good faith. Every contract carries a duty of good faith in performance and enforcement (Restatement § 205). Literal compliance that defeats the purpose of the relationship is a breach of that duty. The Pharisees’ corban practice, which used a religious dedication to evade the support of parents, is a biblical example (Mark 7:9–13).

Breach, substantial performance, and repudiation. Not every shortfall discharges the other party. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, a builder’s use of pipe from the wrong manufacturer did not justify treating the contract as defeated, and Restatement § 241 lists the factors bearing on whether a failure is material. Long relationships need the same discernment. A person’s weakness, illness, or a poor season differs from repudiation (Restatement § 250), by which a party makes clear that the promise will not be kept. Scripture likewise distinguishes ordinary failure, which calls for forbearance and forgiveness (Colossians 3:13; Matthew 18:21–22), from grave breach (Matthew 19:9; 1 Corinthians 7:15).

Remedies and the limits of enforcement. Courts will not specifically enforce a promise of personal service (Restatement § 367). Damages can address loss, but no decree can compel affection. Song of Solomon states the same limit from the other side: “If a man would give for love all the wealth of his house, it would be utterly despised” (Song of Solomon 8:7). Love can be neither bought nor court-ordered.

The parable of the unforgiving servant (Matthew 18:23–35) applies all of this to the asymmetric audit. A servant released from an unpayable debt seizes a fellow servant over a small one. He asks to be treated by mercy and treats others by contract. His master then holds him to the standard he chose.

6. People and Institutions

Institutions cannot love as persons do, but they make promises, hold power, and can be faithful or faithless. Scripture accordingly holds them to account. David made a covenant with Israel’s elders (2 Samuel 5:3), Samuel recorded the behavior of royalty in a book (1 Samuel 10:25), and Jehoiada established a covenant involving the LORD, the king, and the people (2 Kings 11:17). Rehoboam’s refusal to lighten the burden prompted Israel’s cry, “What share have we in David?” (1 Kings 12:4, 16). Daniel Elazar has explored this covenantal political tradition at length.[24]

Employment. American employment defaults to at-will status in most settings, a doctrine given memorable form in Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, which allowed dismissal even for a cause “morally wrong.” Yet courts have sometimes treated handbooks and assurances as binding, as in Toussaint and Woolley. Employees also carry what Denise Rousseau calls psychological contracts: their beliefs about reciprocal obligations, often transactional or relational in character.[25] Research finds that perceived violation of these contracts is common.[26] George Akerlof described employment as partial gift exchange, in which both parties commonly give more than the minimum.[27] Stewart Macaulay found that even business people often relied on relationships rather than strict contract rights.[28] Ian Macneil built a broader theory of relational contract from such realities.[29]

The institutional false balance. An organization commits the asymmetric audit when it speaks of family, calling, and loyalty while demanding unpaid extra labor, then reverts to at-will language and severance formulas when the person’s usefulness declines. Religious bodies are especially exposed to this temptation because covenant language is natural to them. The worker remains entitled to wages (1 Timothy 5:18), and a form of words cannot convert underpayment into a privilege. Paul could waive his right to support precisely because the right existed (1 Corinthians 9:7–15).

Adhesion and unequal drafting. Institutions usually draft the terms and individuals sign them. The doctrines of unconscionability and standardized agreements address some abuses (Restatement §§ 208, 211; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.). A membership or employment covenant written by one side and unilaterally amendable by that side bears the name of covenant without its mutuality.

Fiduciary duty. The law’s closest approach to covenant is fiduciary obligation, which binds those entrusted with another’s interests to loyalty beyond ordinary market conduct.[30] Cardozo’s phrase in Meinhard v. Salmon remains the classic statement: “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Ezekiel’s charge against shepherds is a fiduciary indictment: “Woe to the shepherds of Israel who feed themselves!” (Ezekiel 34:2). The appointment of seven men to address the neglect of widows (Acts 6:1–6) models the opposite response: a complaint is heard, responsibility is assigned, and the institution changes its practice.

Religious membership. Watson v. Jones described members as giving implied consent to the government of the body they join.[31] Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville recognized a limit: a member’s withdrawal affected the body’s authority to continue disciplinary action against her. Believers are instructed to resolve disputes within the congregation and even to consider accepting wrong (1 Corinthians 6:1–7), yet Paul invoked his legal rights when authorities acted unlawfully (Acts 16:37; 22:25; 25:11). The biblical pattern neither idolizes litigation nor forbids every recourse to lawful protection.

7. Diagnostic Questions and Recommendations

Five questions can identify the character of a given relationship:

1. What kind of relationship is this? Is it a bargain, a gift, a covenant, a status relationship, or an institutional membership?
2. Have the terms been stated? Would both parties describe the obligations in the same way?
3. Are the weights identical? Does each party apply to himself or herself the standard applied to the other?
4. Is the shortfall inability or refusal? Has the person’s capacity been honestly assessed?
5. What would remain if contribution ended? Would illness, age, or job loss end the relationship?

For persons accustomed to being valued for contribution:

• Distinguish gifts from loans before giving, and stop billing for what was freely given.
• State needs plainly, recognizing that hints do not create obligations.
• Accept a wage relationship as a wage relationship, without expecting it to supply belonging.
• Practice receiving, since refusal to receive can preserve a position of control.
• Do not mistake being used for being in covenant. “Each one shall bear his own load” stands beside “Bear one another’s burdens” (Galatians 6:2, 5). A one-sided arrangement that has never involved mutual promise may be lawfully reduced or ended.

For persons who ask, “What do you bring to the table?”:

• Answer the question first, by the same measure.
• Ask it only where a bargain is actually being considered.
• Replace the demand for equivalent value with an inquiry into willingness and capacity.

For persons who claim to be enough as they are:

• Distinguish human worth, which comes from being made in God’s image (Genesis 1:27; James 3:9), from the duties of a relationship, which no such worth cancels.
• Recognize that claims upon others’ patience create obligations to exercise patience in turn.

For institutions:

• Use covenant language only where the institution binds itself as well.
• Put reciprocal commitments in writing, and define how they may be changed.
• Pay fully for labor, and do not reclassify underpayment as devotion.
• Provide fair processes for complaint, discipline, and exit.
• Decide in advance how the institution will treat those whose usefulness ends through age, illness, or disability.

8. Conclusion

The person who has been valued all of life for contribution is right to object to the false balance, and Scripture supports the objection. The same Scripture also refuses to let the contributor make the ledger ultimate. A servant, having done everything commanded, is still told to say, “We are unprofitable servants” (Luke 17:10). The same Lord promises that the master will gird himself and serve those found watching (Luke 12:37).

At the last Passover of His earthly ministry, Jesus Christ asked who is greater, the one who sits at the table or the one who serves, and then said, “Yet I am among you as the One who serves” (Luke 22:27). The only One who could rightly audit every guest supplied the table at the cost of His own life and then called His people to faithful obedience. The biblical answer to “What do you bring to the table?” begins with the admission that no one supplied it for himself. Those admitted on such terms are obligated to bring what they can, to welcome those who can bring nothing, and to use one set of weights for all.

Notes

[1] Scripture quotations follow the New King James Version. Legal references summarize general doctrine, are drawn chiefly from American and English sources, and vary by jurisdiction. Section references to the Restatement are to American Law Institute (1981).

[2] Rogers (1957).

[3] Bellah et al. (1985); Trueman (2020).

[4] Giddens (1992, p. 58).

[5] Illouz (2007).

[6] Homans (1958); Thibaut and Kelley (1959); Blau (1964).

[7] Rusbult (1980). Stanley and Markman (1992) add a useful distinction between dedication and constraint commitment.

[8] Walster et al. (1973).

[9] Clark and Mills (1979).

[10] Fiske (1992); Fiske and Tetlock (1997).

[11] Gouldner (1960, p. 178). Sahlins (1972) distinguishes generalized, balanced, and negative reciprocity, a useful parallel to the gift, contract, and exploitation categories in this paper.

[12] Aristotle (2009), Nicomachean Ethics VIII.13, 1162b.

[13] Crocker and Wolfe (2001).

[14] Blau (1964); Mauss (1990). Augustine’s distinction between things to be used and things to be enjoyed (1997, Book I) offers a historically influential way of naming the error of treating persons merely as instruments, though the present argument rests on the biblical text.

[15] Hugenberger (1994); Cross (1998).

[16] Mendenhall (1954); Kline (1963); Weinfeld (1970). These works are used here for their observations about covenant form. This paper does not adopt any critical assumptions about the composition or authority of the biblical text that appear in this literature.

[17] Glueck (1967); Sakenfeld (1978).

[18] Barclay (2015). The terminology of “unconditioned” and “unconditional” is Barclay’s; its application to the claim of being “enough” is this paper’s.

[19] Sacks (2007).

[20] American Law Institute (1981), § 164, addresses misrepresentation that makes a contract voidable.

[21] Balfour v. Balfour (1919, p. 579).

[22] Maynard v. Hill (1888, pp. 210–211). By contrast, Marvin v. Marvin (1976) allowed contract-based claims between unmarried partners, showing contract supplying a framework where marriage had not been undertaken.

[23] Scott and Scott (1998).

[24] Elazar (1995).

[25] Rousseau (1989, 1995).

[26] Robinson and Rousseau (1994); Morrison and Robinson (1997).

[27] Akerlof (1982).

[28] Macaulay (1963).

[29] Macneil (1980).

[30] Frankel (2011).

[31] Watson v. Jones (1871, p. 729).

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