Ecclesiology: Remembering the Fellowship’s Origins

Abstract. The general theory holds that a body’s stored founding fixes its verdict on reform before any reform is named. This paper applies the theory to the case nearest at hand and least available for disinterested handling: the fellowship, which stores its origins as a deposit and adjudicates its doctrinal disputes by appeal to that storage. The appeal to the faith which was once delivered unto the saints is the strongest available form of the first disposition, and precisely for that reason it is the form most exposed to the gilding described in Paper 1, §1.2. The paper reads the appeal in both directions—as honest recovery of a genuinely known past, and as the smoothing of a founding always more contested than the memory allows—takes the Armstrong doctrinal tradition and the fellowship history known from within as its worked case, and arrives at the question the whole cluster exists to answer: when is return faithful recovery, and when is it nostalgia wearing the dress of fidelity? The paper closes by tying the case to Cluster I. The fellowship that keeps the appointed times already possesses the machinery for furnishing its founding honestly. Whether it uses that machinery is a separate question, and it is the question that decides everything else.


2.1 — The Case Set Out

Of the four institutions treated in this cluster, the fellowship is the one for which the furnished founding does the most work and receives the least inspection. A university may reorganize its curriculum without asking what its founders intended; a legislature may pass a statute without settling what the framers meant, and will often prefer not to settle it. But a fellowship cannot dispute a doctrine or a practice without disputing its origins, because the origins are held to be the location of the truth in question. The doctrine is not merely held by the body. It is held to have been received by the body, and the reception is an event with a date, a place, and a set of persons attached to it. To ask whether a doctrine is true is therefore, within the fellowship’s own grammar, to ask whether it was there at the beginning.

This is not a defect in the grammar. It is what makes a fellowship a fellowship rather than a debating society, and Scripture requires it. The command to remember is not a suggestion that memory is a useful auxiliary to obedience. Remember all the way which the LORD thy God led thee these forty years in the wilderness (Deut. 8:2); Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations (Deut. 32:7); thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt (Deut. 5:15). Cluster I established that the zakar imperative is not a call to recollect but a call to store—to build the past into the body’s ongoing practice so that it stands available and operative in the present. The commanded memory is a furnished memory. That is the whole point of the appointed times: they are the furniture.

But it follows, and this is the uncomfortable inference this paper is written to draw, that a fellowship is not exempt from the mechanism of Paper 1 merely because its founding is commanded rather than chosen. A commanded memory is still a stored memory, and storage is selection. The zakar imperative tells a body that it must remember. It does not, by itself, tell the body that what it has remembered is what happened.

Here the two dispositions of Paper 1 arrive in ecclesial dress, and they arrive with names already attached. The founding held as revered origin is what the fellowship calls the deposit, and the disposition toward it is what the fellowship calls fidelity. The founding held as one stage among others is what the fellowship calls development, and the disposition toward it is what the fellowship calls, when it is being candid, maturity, and when it is not being candid, growth in understanding. Every doctrinal controversy in the fellowship’s history has been conducted as a dispute between parties who differed on some point of teaching. Almost none of them were. They were disputes between parties who differed on how the founding was stored, and the point of teaching was where the difference surfaced.

That is the claim. The remainder of the paper is an attempt to make it stick against the case in which the reader has the most invested.

2.2 — The Faith Once Delivered, Read Two Ways

Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, it was needful for me to write unto you, and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered unto the saints (Jude 3).

No sentence in the New Testament is more useful to the first disposition, and none is more frequently deployed without examination. Consider what it asserts. There is a faith, singular and identifiable. It was delivered, which is to say handed over from one party to another, so that the receiving party did not construct it. It was delivered once—ἅπαξ, once for all, not once upon a time—so that the delivery is complete and not ongoing. It was delivered unto the saints, a body, so that it exists as a possession held in common and not as a private illumination. And the saints are charged to contend earnestly for it, ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι, a word of struggle, which presupposes that the faith is the sort of thing that can be lost, diluted, or taken away.

Every term in that sentence licenses the rhetoric of return. If the faith was delivered once and complete, then the measure of any later teaching is its identity with what was delivered. Departure is not evolution; departure is loss. And loss is not misfortune; loss is what the earnest contending was supposed to prevent, which means that loss is failure, and failure of this kind has a name.

I want to be very clear about what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that Jude is wrong, or that the verse has been misread, or that the first disposition is thereby exposed as an error. Jude 3 is Scripture, and it says what it says, and the fellowship that has organized itself around contending for a delivered faith has organized itself around an apostolic command. The critical instrument that the first disposition supplies—a standard fixed before the present arrived, available to any member who can read, and immune to capture by whoever currently holds the offices—is a real instrument and a gift. Paper 1, §1.2 said this and meant it. A body without it is a body whose powerful are its measure.

The difficulty is elsewhere, and it is this. Jude 3 asserts that the faith was delivered once. It does not assert that the fellowship’s memory of the delivery is accurate. These are different propositions, and the first does not entail the second. The apostolic deposit may be complete, unchanging, and fully sufficient, and the account of that deposit which a given body has stored may nevertheless be a furnishing—selected, arranged, smoothed, and maintained in the shape the body’s present requires.

So the appeal admits two readings, and from inside the appeal they are indistinguishable.

Read one: honest recovery. The faith was delivered. It was subsequently obscured. A body has, by diligence and grace, recovered a genuinely known past, and its appeal to that past is an appeal to something that actually stands there, independent of the appealing. On this reading the rhetoric of return is not rhetoric at all. It is description. The critic who says we have departed is reporting a fact about a distance that exists whether or not anyone measures it.

Read two: the gilding. The faith was delivered. The delivery, however, occurred among persons who understood it partially, disputed its implications immediately, and transmitted it through hands that were themselves in conflict. Even in the apostolic period the fellowship’s own record shows contention: the Jerusalem council convened because the matter was not settled (Acts 15:1–7); Paul withstood Peter to the face (Gal. 2:11); the churches of Asia and the churches of Achaia did not receive identical instruction because they had not raised identical questions. A body which stores this founding as a settled and univocal deposit has not lied. It has furnished. It has resolved the ambiguities in the direction its present appeal requires, and it has done so without noticing, because—as Paper 1, §1.4 argued—the furnishing presents to the furnisher not as a premise but as a perception.

On the second reading, the appeal to the faith once delivered is still an appeal to a real deposit, and it is also an appeal to a memory of that deposit which has been smoothed. The two are not in competition. That is exactly what makes the case hard. The declinist error in ecclesiology is not the error of appealing to a founding that does not exist. It is the error of appealing to a founding that exists, through a memory of it that has been quietly improved.

And here Ecclesiastes 7:10 lands where it was aimed. Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better than these? for thou dost not enquire wisely concerning this. The Preacher does not forbid the comparison. He forbids the question asked in a form that has already answered itself. The man who asks why have we departed from the founding has not established that the founding was where he has placed it. He has furnished a founding at that location and is now demanding an account of the distance. His question is unanswerable because it is not a question. It is a verdict looking for a cause.

2.3 — The Inside View

A theory of this kind is worthless if it is only ever applied to other people’s foundings. So take the fellowship history known from within, and take the doctrinal tradition associated with Herbert W. Armstrong, and ask the question of them.[^1]

The tradition’s self-account, as it was taught and as it was received, ran approximately as follows. The apostolic faith was delivered once. It was suppressed within a generation or two—the record of the suppression being read out of the New Testament’s own warnings about false brethren and another gospel (2 Cor. 11:4; Gal. 1:6–7).[^2] It survived in remnant form through the centuries, largely unseen. It was recovered in the twentieth century, through study of the Scriptures against the traditions of men, and the marks of the recovery were the marks the New Testament had specified: the seventh-day Sabbath, the annual holy days appointed in Leviticus 23, the rejection of festivals of pagan derivation, the observance of the clean-meat statutes, and a body of teaching on prophecy and on the purpose of human life.[^3]

Notice the shape. This is Paper 1’s first disposition in its purest available form: a revered origin, a fall, a hidden remnant, a recovery, and a present body charged with contending for what has been recovered. It supplies the fellowship with a standing critical instrument of enormous power. It also supplies the fellowship with the strongest possible incentive to remember the recovery as more settled than it was.

And the recovery was not settled. This is a matter of the fellowship’s own record, and the record is not obscure to anyone who was there or who has read the periodicals as they were issued rather than as they are remembered. Teachings were revised. Positions taught with the full weight of the recovered deposit behind them were later altered, sometimes reversed, sometimes reversed again. The question of divorce and remarriage; the question of medical treatment; the question of the reckoning of Pentecost; the question of makeup; the question of the boundaries within which the Passover was to be observed—each of these was, at some point, held and taught as part of the recovered faith, and each was at some point revised.[^4] The revisions were real. The prior teaching was real. Both were presented, in their moment, as the faith once delivered.

I am not scoring these revisions. Some of them were corrections, and a body that cannot correct itself is a body that has confused its own furnishing with the deposit. The point is what the memory did with them. Within a decade, and often within less, a revision that had been experienced by the membership as an upheaval was stored as a clarification. Within a generation the prior teaching had disappeared from the account altogether—not concealed, simply not furnished. Ask a member of the second generation what the fellowship had always taught on any of these questions, and he will answer, honestly and in good conscience, with the current position, and he will be surprised to learn that anyone ever taught otherwise. He has not been deceived. He has inherited a furnished room and has never had occasion to look behind the wallpaper.

Then came 1986 and what followed. The doctrinal reversals undertaken by the parent body after Armstrong’s death—on the Sabbath and holy days, on the clean-meat statutes, on the nature of God, and on much else—were presented by the reversing party as growth in understanding and received by the departing parties as apostasy.[^5] The schism was total and it was fast. Multiple bodies formed, each claiming to hold the deposit, each claiming that the others had either abandoned it or frozen it at the wrong moment.[^6]

Now attend to the structure of that quarrel, because it is the whole thesis of this cluster displayed in a single decade.

The reversing party held the founding as one stage among others. Armstrong had grown in understanding; the fellowship must continue to grow; the teachings of the 1950s were the teachings of the 1950s; to freeze them was to make a man’s understanding into a rule and to prefer the founder to the Scriptures he had studied. This is the rhetoric of advance in ecclesial dress, and every one of its moves is the move Paper 1, §1.3 predicted. It cited the founder’s own revisions as precedent for reversing him—which is to say, it read the founding as a stage precisely by pointing at the founding’s own instability.

The departing parties held the founding as a revered origin. What was delivered was delivered; what was recovered was recovered; the revisions had been refinements within the deposit, not alterations of it; and the reversals now proposed went to the deposit itself. This is the rhetoric of return, and every one of its moves is the move Paper 1, §1.2 predicted. It was obliged to treat the founding’s instability as minor irregularity within a settled origin—which is what §1.4 said a furnishing does with inconvenient evidence.

Both parties possessed the same documents. Both parties had lived through the same decades. Neither was lying. Each found the other’s arguments not merely mistaken but unserious, and each was baffled by the other’s imperviousness to considerations that seemed decisive. This is the exact signature of a dispute in which the premises are not held in common and neither party knows that the premises are premises. What was on the table was not the Sabbath. The Sabbath was where the difference surfaced. What was on the table was the stored founding, and it had been settled years before anyone convened a meeting.

I say this as one who holds that the reversals were wrong and that the appointed times are commanded still. Nothing in the analysis softens that. But I will not pretend that the party I judge to have been right arrived at its rightness by a route that this cluster’s theory exempts. It did not. It read the founding as a revered origin, and that reading disposed it toward the correct verdict on that occasion. Disposition is not demonstration. A furnishing that yields the right answer once will yield the wrong answer the next time the question changes shape, because a furnishing does not know anything. It only inclines.

And this is why the second corrective is needed alongside the first. The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be (Eccl. 1:9). The reversing party’s strongest card was the claim that the fellowship faced questions the founding could not have contemplated—new scholarship, new circumstances, a new generation. Ecclesiastes will not grant it. The questions were old. They had been asked in Jerusalem and answered in council. The claim of unprecedentedness is what the rhetoric of advance requires and what the Preacher denies, and the denial does more work against the reversals than any amount of contending did.

2.4 — The Discriminating Question

We have arrived at the question, and it should now be stated in the form in which the rest of the cluster will carry it:

When is return to a founding the faithful recovery of a genuinely known past, and when is it nostalgia wearing the dress of fidelity?

This is the question the cluster exists to answer. It is not a rhetorical question and it does not answer itself in either direction. Three things about it need saying before Paper 3 can proceed.

First, the question cannot be answered by sincerity. The man who is gilding is not aware that he is gilding. He experiences his furnished founding as a memory of what happened, which is what a furnished founding is for. Sincerity is therefore not evidence, and the fellowship’s confidence that its own appeal is honest recovery is worth precisely as much as the reversing party’s confidence that its own reversal was growth in understanding. Both were sincere. One of them was wrong. Sincerity did not sort them and cannot.

Second, the question cannot be answered by outcome. It is tempting to say that recovery is the return that produces good fruit and nostalgia the return that does not. But the fruit arrives after the verdict, and the verdict is what determined which fruit would be counted. A body disposed toward return will read the fruits of its return as vindication and the fruits of its non-return as judgment, and it will do this without dishonesty. §1.4 named this: new evidence is metabolized by the existing furnishing. Outcomes are evidence. They are metabolized like the rest.

Third, the question cannot be answered by refusing to return. This is the error the reversing party made, and it is worth naming as an error rather than merely as the opposite disposition. Confronted with the discovery that the founding was more contested than the memory allowed, the reversing party concluded that the founding could not therefore bind. That inference does not follow. The discovery that a memory has been smoothed is a discovery about the memory. It is not a discovery about the deposit. A founding may be genuinely normative and badly remembered at the same time, and in the ordinary case it is. To move from our memory of the founding is furnished to the founding does not bind is to commit the progressive error in its most seductive form, because the move is made in the name of honesty about the past.

What is needed, then, is an instrument: something that operates on the memory rather than on the sincerity, the outcomes, or the disposition. The hinge paper builds it, and it will be built from four probes, which I name here so that Papers 3 through 5 may exercise them without stopping to explain them.[^7]

The first is authority versus evidence: whether the founding is held because the founding can be shown, or because someone with standing has said so and the showing has never been attempted. The second is distance: whether the body is able to say, of its own founding, things the founding would not have wanted said—whether the account contains anything the account did not want to contain. The third is the feedback of expected futures: whether the stored founding is doing work for an expected future, in Koselleck’s sense, such that the past goes on saying what the horizon requires it to say. The fourth is real failures versus laundered: whether the body’s account of its own founding includes failures that cost something to admit, or only failures that flatter the admitting.

Run these against the fellowship. The results are mixed, which is what one should expect of an honest instrument and what one should be suspicious of when the instrument returns a clean verdict on the body wielding it.

2.5 — Where the Floor Meets the Theory

There is a reason the ecclesial case comes first among the four, and it is not only that it is nearest at hand.

Cluster I established that the zakar imperative is a command to store and that the appointed times are the appointed storage. Consider what the appointed times actually do, structurally, to the memory of a body that keeps them. Passover stores a deliverance the body did not accomplish. Unleavened Bread stores a body’s own corruption as the thing being removed and stores the removal as not yet complete—seven days, not one. The wave sheaf stores a firstfruits, which is to say a beginning that is explicitly not the harvest and explicitly not the standard by which the harvest will be measured. Trumpets stores an interruption. Atonement stores a national guilt requiring annual acknowledgment, which is to say it stores a failure the body cannot retire. Tabernacles stores forty years in booths—not the entry into the land, not the founding of the nation, but the wandering, kept annually, by a people who had every incentive to store the arrival instead.[^8]

Read the list again against the four probes. The appointed times are, structurally, an anti-gilding apparatus. They store failures that cost something to admit. They store the founding as incomplete by construction, since a firstfruits is not a harvest and a booth is not a house. They resist the feedback of expected futures, because the future they point toward is one the body has no part in producing and therefore cannot make the past serve. They put evidence before authority, because the command is to rehearse the events, and rehearsed events retain the power to say things the rehearser did not want said. Thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman. The appointed times will not permit a fellowship to remember itself as having always been free.

This is the meeting point. The theological floor of Cluster I and the institutional theory of Cluster II converge here, and the convergence has a sharp edge. The fellowship that keeps the appointed times already possesses, in its own commanded practice, the machinery for furnishing its founding honestly. It has been handed an annual instrument for storing a contested and unflattering past. It does not need to build what the hinge paper builds. It needs to use what it has.

And it does not use it. The fellowship that keeps Atonement can go a generation without admitting a doctrinal failure that cost it anything. The fellowship that stores forty years in booths can store its own founding as a clean recovery and its own revisions as clarifications. The fellowship that rehearses a bondage it did not choose can remember its origins as freedom it always had. The machinery is commanded, it is kept, and it is not permitted to do the work it exists to do—because it has been turned outward, applied to the failures of Israel and the failures of the world and the failures of the parent body, and never to the storage of the keeping body’s own founding.

That is the ecclesial case, and it is the case that indicts the party writing it. A body which keeps the appointed times and gilds its own founding is not merely furnishing badly. It is furnishing badly with the anti-gilding apparatus in its hands, which is a different and worse thing, since the apparatus provides the assurance that no gilding could be occurring.

The three cases that follow—the university, the constitution, the governing body of college sport—will show the same mechanism in institutions that possess no such apparatus and are therefore, in a certain sense, less culpable for its absence. The fellowship’s disadvantage is that it cannot plead absence. The command was given. Remember the days of old.


Notes

[^1]: Throughout this section I write as one inside the tradition described, not as an observer of it, and the reader is entitled to weigh the account accordingly. Two liabilities attach to the inside view and both cut. The insider knows what the periodicals said before they said something else, and knows it in the way one knows things one lived through rather than the way one knows things one has read. He also has an interest in the outcome, and the interest is not small. Paper 1, §1.4 argued that a furnished founding presents to the furnisher as perception rather than as premise; there is no reason to suppose the present author exempt. What follows is offered as testimony subject to correction from the documentary record, not as a verdict handed down from outside the dispute.

[^2]: The suppression narrative in this tradition was not primarily historical-critical in its method. It proceeded chiefly by reading the New Testament’s own warnings as descriptions of a defection already under way, and then locating the visible outcome of that defection in the ecclesiastical settlements of the following centuries. Whether that reading can be sustained on the documentary evidence is a question this paper does not adjudicate. What matters for the argument is the shape the narrative gives to the storage: a complete deposit, an early fall, a hidden preservation, and a recovery. That shape is the first disposition of Paper 1, §1.1, and it would perform the same office regardless of whether the historical claims embedded in it hold.

[^3]: The doctrinal marks are set out across Armstrong’s published works. See Armstrong (1976) on the annual festivals and their standing over against festivals of other derivation; Armstrong (1985) for the mature synthesis of the tradition’s account of the purpose of human life; and Armstrong (1980) for the prophetic material. I cite these as the tradition’s own primary statements, not as authorities for their contents. A reader who wishes to test §2.3 should not test it against these books, which are the furnished account, but against the periodical literature issued contemporaneously with the revisions—which is where the revisions can still be seen occurring.

[^4]: I list these from memory of the tradition’s internal literature and from the recollection of persons who lived through the changes, and I list them as examples of a pattern rather than as a documented chronology. I have not reconstructed dates, sequence, or the precise formulations at each stage, and I decline to invent them. If this paper is to be published, §2.3 requires an apparatus built from the periodical literature as issued—the semimonthly and monthly church publications, the ministerial bulletins, and the doctrinal papers circulated internally—and I do not have those in hand. Supply them and the section can be made to carry citations. Until then the claim stands at the level at which the tradition’s own members can verify it from their own recollection, which is a lower standard than scholarship requires and a higher one than the furnished account currently meets.

[^5]: The parent body’s account of its own reversals is given in Tkach (1997), and the reader should note what kind of document that is: it is a furnished founding produced by the reversing party, and it furnishes the founding as one stage among others in exactly the manner of Paper 1, §1.3. It is invaluable evidence and it is not neutral testimony. The prior teaching against which the reversals were made is stated in Armstrong (1985) and elsewhere. Barrett (2013) supplies an outside reconstruction of the schism and its aftermath; the sociological framing there is not the framing of this paper, but the chronology is more careful than anything either party to the dispute has produced about itself.

[^6]: The multiplication of successor bodies is itself a datum for the theory and deserves a paper it will not get here. Each successor body was obliged to specify the moment at which the deposit had been correctly held, and the successors did not agree on the moment. This is precisely what one expects when a founding stored as revered origin turns out, under pressure, to have been unstable: the disposition toward return survives intact, but the return has multiple possible destinations, and the choice among them cannot be made by the disposition that generated the return. Cf. Barrett (2013). The phenomenon is a species of what the suite elsewhere calls acoustic-shadow work—the reconstruction of a founding from the pattern of what later bodies could and could not hear.

[^7]: These are the four levers. They are stated here in provisional form and built into a usable test in the hinge paper, §H.2. I resist the temptation to run them out fully against the fellowship in this paper, because the running-out is the hinge paper’s business and because a probe exercised on the case dearest to the prober, in advance of the probe’s construction, is a probe likely to be built to a shape that yields the answer already wanted. The order of operations matters: build the instrument on the cases where nothing is at stake for the builder, then bring it home.

[^8]: Lev. 23:4–44; Deut. 16:1–17; Lev. 23:43 for the express rationale of the booths. The point being pressed is structural rather than exegetical: I am asking what these observances store, and what a body which stores those things annually is thereby prevented from forgetting. Yerushalmi (1982) makes the broader case that ritual rehearsal, rather than historiography, is the primary mode of Israelite memory, and the argument of this section is a narrower application of that observation to the problem of institutional self-flattery.


References

Armstrong, H. W. (1976). Pagan holidays—or God’s holy days—which? Worldwide Church of God.

Armstrong, H. W. (1980). The United States and Britain in prophecy. Worldwide Church of God.

Armstrong, H. W. (1985). Mystery of the ages. Dodd, Mead.

Barrett, D. V. (2013). The fragmentation of a sect: Schism in the Worldwide Church of God. Oxford University Press.

Butterfield, H. (1931). The Whig interpretation of history. G. Bell and Sons.

Douglas, M. (1986). How institutions think. Syracuse University Press.

Halbwachs, M. (1992). On collective memory (L. A. Coser, Ed. & Trans.). University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1925)

Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (1983). The invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press.

King James Bible. (1987). Thomas Nelson. (Original work published 1611)

Koselleck, R. (2004). Futures past: On the semantics of historical time (K. Tribe, Trans.). Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1979)

Shils, E. (1981). Tradition. University of Chicago Press.

Tkach, J., Jr. (1997). Transformed by truth. Multnomah Books.

Yerushalmi, Y. H. (1982). Zakhor: Jewish history and Jewish memory. University of Washington Press.


Unknown's avatar

About nathanalbright

I'm a person with diverse interests who loves to read. If you want to know something about me, just ask.
This entry was posted in Bible, Christianity, Church of God, History, Musings and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply