Real Work, Phantom Work, and the Prestige Paradox: A Typology of Occupational Value

Executive Summary

Some jobs come with vague titles and diffuse duties, and their output is hard to trace to production or profit. Many of them still carry high status. Other jobs sit directly on the path by which money is earned, recognized, and paid out, and are often treated as the bottom of their occupational ladder. This white paper reviews what has been written on the “real job / fake job” distinction, from Adam Smith’s productive and unproductive labor through David Graeber’s “bullshit jobs” thesis and the empirical work that has tested it. Existing typologies are useful but incomplete: most measure either the incumbent’s own feeling of uselessness or an outside observer’s moral judgment, and neither measures how a job is causally connected to an organization’s value chain. The paper therefore proposes a composite typology built on four tests: traceability, absence, legibility, and direction of value. It then explains the prestige paradox through seven mechanisms. A final section sets the question within a biblical frame, where the inversion of worldly prestige is both diagnosed and judged.

The paper uses one recurring case: the commissions analyst. In carrier-based sales industries such as insurance, this role takes carrier statements, reconciles them, books recognized revenue, and produces the figures from which agents’ compensation is paid. It is usually ranked as the lowest analyst position. It is also among the clearest examples of an unmistakably real job.


1. Introduction: The Problem of Invisible Necessity and Visible Superfluity

Every complex organization contains two kinds of positions. In the first, the work is necessary even though nobody sees it. In the second, the work is highly visible even though it may not be necessary. The commissions analyst belongs to the first group. If carrier statements are not pulled and reconciled, revenue is not recognized and agents are not paid, and the failure shows up within one pay cycle in the form of angry phone calls. The second group includes roles that are often described in admiring terms: “strategic alignment,” “transformation leadership,” “brand evangelism,” “stakeholder engagement,” and “innovation enablement.” Their failures may never show up at all, because no one can say exactly what they were supposed to produce.

The puzzle has two parts. The first is classificatory: is there a principled way to tell real work from fake work without falling back on resentment or anti-intellectualism? The second is sociological: why does prestige so often flow away from the visible necessity of a job and toward its visible superfluity? Economists, sociologists, organizational theorists, and moral philosophers have all addressed these questions. Their answers have not yet been combined into a usable typology.


2. Intellectual Lineage

2.1 Classical political economy: productive and unproductive labor

The earliest systematic distinction is Adam Smith’s. In Book II, Chapter 3 of The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith separated productive labor, which “fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity,” from unproductive labor, whose services “perish in the very instant of their performance.”[1] His unproductive category included menial servants and also sovereigns, officers of justice, soldiers, churchmen, lawyers, physicians, and men of letters. Smith did not call these roles worthless. His point was that they did not add to the stock of reproducible capital. The distinction was economic, not moral, but it set a pattern that has lasted: some of the most honored occupations of his day fell on the unproductive side of the line.

Karl Marx later redefined productive labor in Theories of Surplus Value as labor that produces surplus value for capital. On that definition, the same physical task could be productive in one institutional setting and unproductive in another.[2] This point matters for any modern typology. Whether a job is “real” depends partly on its institutional position and not only on the task itself.

2.2 Veblen and the leisure class

Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) supplied the key insight about prestige. In Veblen’s account, honor attaches to visible exemption from productive labor. “Industrial” employments, which deal directly with material things, carried a taint of servility. “Exploit” employments, such as war, government, sport, and priestly observance, carried honor because they showed the performer’s distance from necessity.[3] Veblen was writing about a hereditary leisure class. His mechanism carries over easily to the salaried professional world, where a job’s distance from the shop floor, the ledger, or the customer complaint line still works as a status marker.

2.3 Parkinson’s Law and bureaucratic self-generation

C. Northcote Parkinson’s 1955 essay in The Economist proposed that “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.” He also observed that officials prefer to multiply subordinates rather than rivals.[4] Parkinson used British Admiralty data to show administrative staff growing while the number of ships and sailors fell. The essay was written as satire, but it captured a mechanism that later scholars took seriously: managerial positions can generate further managerial positions without any connection to output.

2.4 Economics of rent-seeking, allocation of talent, and guard labor

Twentieth-century economics added more precise tools:

  • Rent-seeking. Gordon Tullock (1967) and Anne Krueger (1974) showed that resources spent competing for transfers of existing wealth, such as licenses, quotas, and regulatory favors, are socially wasted even when they are privately profitable.[5]
  • Productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship. William Baumol (1990) argued that the supply of entrepreneurial talent is roughly constant across societies. What varies is whether institutional incentives direct it toward production, rent-seeking, or outright destruction.[6]
  • Allocation of talent. Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1991) found that countries with a larger share of engineering graduates grew faster, while countries with a larger share of law graduates grew more slowly. Their explanation was that talent drawn into redistribution is talent drawn away from production.[7]
  • Guard labor. Samuel Bowles and Arjun Jayadev (2006) estimated that a large share of the U.S. labor force does “guard labor”: supervision, security, enforcement, and monitoring. This work exists because of conflict and mistrust rather than production, and it grows with inequality.[8]
  • Social externalities of occupations. Benjamin Lockwood, Charles Nathanson, and E. Glen Weyl (2017) built on surveys of the literature to estimate the externalities of high-earning professions. They found positive externalities for research and teaching and negative externalities for parts of finance, law, and management consulting.[9]

2.5 Graeber and the “bullshit jobs” thesis

David Graeber’s 2013 essay in Strike! magazine, and the 2018 book Bullshit Jobs: A Theory that grew out of it, brought the question to a popular audience.[10] Graeber defined a bullshit job as “a form of paid employment that is so completely pointless, unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its existence, even though, as part of the conditions of employment, the employee feels obliged to pretend that this is not the case.” His definition is subjective: the test is the incumbent’s own judgment. He proposed five types:

Graeber’s typeFunctionExample
FlunkiesExist to make a superior look or feel importantReceptionists at firms that receive no visitors; assistants to executives with nothing to assist
GoonsExist because competitors employ them; work is adversarial and zero-sumCorporate lobbyists, telemarketers, some corporate lawyers, PR specialists
Duct tapersRepair faults that should not existStaff who manually re-enter data between systems that should integrate
Box tickersLet an organization claim it is doing something it is not doingCompliance reporters whose reports are never read; internal surveys with no follow-through
TaskmastersAssign work to others who do not need supervision, or create new bullshit jobsMiddle managers whose role is supervision of the self-directing

Graeber separated these from “shit jobs,” meaning work that is plainly useful but poorly paid, physically unpleasant, or socially despised, such as cleaning, care work, and logistics. The prestige paradox is the inverse relationship between the two categories. Graeber called this pattern “moral envy.” In his account, people resent those whose work is plainly meaningful, and this resentment helps suppress the pay of nurses, teachers, and sanitation workers.[11]


3. Empirical Tests and Critiques of the Existing Typology

Graeber relied largely on YouGov polling and on testimonials he solicited from readers. Later empirical work has qualified his claims considerably.

Dur and van Lent (2019) analyzed International Social Survey Programme data covering 37 countries. They found that about 8 percent of workers regarded their jobs as socially useless. That figure is far below the 37 to 40 percent suggested by the polls Graeber cited. Self-reported uselessness was more common in some finance, sales, and marketing roles than in public-service occupations, and it was strongly associated with poor management.[12]

Soffia, Wood, and Burchell (2022) used European Working Conditions Survey data and found that roughly 4.8 percent of UK workers considered their jobs useless. These responses were spread across occupations rather than concentrated in the managerial and professional jobs Graeber had singled out. Some occupations he considered essential, such as refuse collection and cleaning, reported uselessness at noticeable rates. The authors concluded that the feeling of uselessness was better explained by alienation, meaning poor management, lack of autonomy, and toxic workplace culture, than by any objective futility in the job.[13]

Walo (2023) used German panel data and partly reconciled the two positions. He found that perceived uselessness was associated both with features of the job itself and with alienating management practices, and that it predicted lower wellbeing.[14]

Alvesson and Spicer (2012, 2016) approached the subject from another direction. They described “functional stupidity,” an organizationally enforced suspension of critical reflection, which allows symbolic work such as branding, strategy statements, leadership development, and rebranding initiatives to persist because nobody is permitted to ask what it accomplishes.[15]

These critiques have three implications for typology:

  1. Subjective self-report is an unreliable measure. A person doing necessary work under abusive management may call the job pointless. A person doing pointless work in a pleasant environment may feel fulfilled.
  2. The job has to be distinguished from its incumbent. A real position can be performed in a fake way. A fake position may be held by someone who quietly takes on real informal work.
  3. Coordination is not automatically fake. Ronald Coase (1937) explained the existence of the firm by the costs of market transactions. Alfred Chandler (1977) documented how the “visible hand” of salaried management made the modern industrial enterprise possible.[16] Much coordinating work is real, but it is illegible, which means its value is hard to see even when it exists. A typology that treats every abstract title as fake turns into anti-intellectual populism.

4. A Composite Typology: Four Tests and Eight Categories

Given these limits, this paper proposes a typology that does not depend on how incumbents feel or how observers judge. It applies four structural tests.

4.1 The four tests

Test 1: Traceability. Can a line be drawn from the job’s output to a product delivered, a dollar recognized, a risk prevented, or an obligation fulfilled? The commissions analyst passes clearly. Carrier statement to deposit reconciliation to accounting file to recognized revenue to agent compensation is a documented chain, and each link has its own artifact: the statement, the deposit record, the upload file, the SQL insert.

Test 2: Absence. If the position disappeared tomorrow, what would break, and how fast? Rutger Bregman’s comparison of the 1968 New York sanitation strike with the 1970 Irish bank strike makes the point well. The city became intolerable within days. Ireland’s economy adapted for about six months by using checks as informal currency.[17] A job whose absence is felt within one cycle is real. A job whose absence is felt only after a reorganization review is suspect.

Test 3: Legibility. Can the quality of the work be judged by someone other than the person doing it? Legible work can fail visibly: a commissions file either balances to the deposit or it does not. Illegible work cannot easily fail visibly, and that protects its incumbents.

Test 4: Direction of value. Does the job create value, transfer it between parties, guard it against threats, or display it as a signal? This test draws on the Smith, Baumol, Krueger, and Bowlesโ€“Jayadev line of analysis.

4.2 Eight categories

Combining the four tests gives a more detailed map than Graeber’s five-part scheme:

CategoryTraceabilityAbsence effectLegibilityDirectionExamples
1. ProductionDirectImmediateHighCreationMachinists, farmers, programmers shipping features, cooks
2. Conduit / VerificationDirectImmediate (one cycle)HighEnables creation to be realizedCommissions analysts, accounts payable clerks, payroll processors, claims adjusters, reconciliation staff
3. MaintenanceIndirect but clearDelayed but certainHighPreservationJanitors, IT systems administrators, mechanics, records custodians
4. CoordinationIndirectDelayed, diffuseLowEnables creationCompetent project managers, dispatchers, schedulers, effective middle managers
5. GuardCounterfactualDelayed, probabilisticMediumProtectionAuditors, security staff, compliance officers whose findings are acted upon
6. Zero-sum TransferDirect, but to a rival’s lossRival also stands downMediumTransferGraeber’s “goons”: competitive lobbying, adversarial litigation, much advertising
7. Remedial (“Duct Tape”)Direct, but to a self-inflicted faultImmediate, but only because of the faultHighCorrection of dysfunctionManual re-keying between non-integrated systems; workarounds for broken processes
8. Decorative / SignalingNone demonstrableNone, or delayed indefinitelyVery lowDisplayFlunkies, box tickers, taskmasters, many “visionary” and “evangelist” titles

Several features of this scheme should be noted.

  • Category 2, Conduit/Verification, is the most overlooked category in the literature. Graeber’s “shit jobs” include obvious physical labor, but he does not treat the administrative-financial conduit role as a separate class. These jobs are white-collar, so they lack the dignity that tradition grants manual labor. They are rule-bound, so they lack the mystique of “knowledge work.” In Smith’s terms, they are the jobs that turn revenue earned into revenue realized. A sale that is never reconciled, booked, and paid out has not been completed in any sense that matters to the firm or to the agent.
  • Categories 6 and 7 are real in an organizational sense but questionable in a social sense. A litigator is necessary to a client because the opposing side also has litigators. A duct taper is necessary because the systems are broken. The absence test gives different answers depending on whether the unit of analysis is the firm or the society.
  • Category 4 is where most of the dispute lies. Coordination roles fail the legibility test, and this lets genuine coordinators and decorative title-holders resemble each other from the outside. The two are usually told apart by asking what decisions the role makes and what happens when those decisions are wrong.
  • Many real positions contain a mixture of categories. The commissions analyst’s role is mostly Category 2 work with some Category 7 work mixed in, for example when manual macros make up for carrier file formats that will not integrate cleanly.

5. The Prestige Paradox: Seven Mechanisms

Davis and Moore’s functionalist theory of stratification (1945) argued that society attaches the greatest rewards to the positions of greatest functional importance that also require scarce talent.[18] If that theory held without qualification, the prestige paradox would not exist. Melvin Tumin’s critique (1953) pointed out that functional importance is extremely hard to measure, and that people already holding rewarded positions shape the definition of “importance” to their own advantage.[19] The following seven mechanisms explain why prestige so often runs opposite to function.

5.1 Distance from necessity (the Veblenian mechanism)

Prestige accrues to visible distance from material consequence. A job that handles money at the level of the deposit, the statement, and the reconciliation is close to the “industrial” side in Veblen’s terms, even though no physical labor is involved. A job that speaks about money only in strategic abstractions is closer to “exploit.” Workers in Category 2 handle the actual material of the business, and in Veblen’s scheme that kind of handling has always carried a mark of lower status.

5.2 The stigma of dirty work

Everett Hughes’s concept of “dirty work” (1951, 1962) and its later development by Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) and by Kreiner, Ashforth, and Sluss (2006) identify three kinds of taint: physical, social, and moral.[20] Conduit work carries a fourth, quieter kind that might be called procedural taint. The work is defined by rules, deadlines, and correctness rather than by judgment and vision. Because it can be written down as procedure, it is assumed to be easy, and because it is assumed to be easy, it is ranked low. This assumption ignores the skill involved in exception-handling, which is where most of the real difficulty in reconciliation lies.

5.3 The legibility trap

Legible work can be measured, measured work can be judged, and judged work can be found wanting. Illegible work escapes this chain. This is the most damaging feature of the paradox. Real jobs are more exposed to accountability than fake jobs, so their holders bear more risk of visible failure for less reward. The decorative-role holder faces almost no risk of visible failure, and is therefore free to show confidence, optimism, and “strategic thinking.” These are the very traits that organizational cultures reward with promotion. Robert Jackall’s Moral Mazes (1988) documented how corporate managers learn to distance themselves from outcomes, so that blame lands on those closest to execution while credit flows toward those furthest from it.[21]

5.4 Proximity to power

Graeber’s “flunky” category points to a more general rule: status passes along chains of proximity. A role that reports to an executive takes on part of that executive’s prestige whatever it produces. A role that reports into accounting operations takes on the lower prestige of a back-office function, even though the executive’s compensation report may depend on its output.

5.5 Credential signaling

Michael Spence’s signaling model (1973) shows that credentials can command a wage premium because they signal traits employers value, even when the credential itself adds nothing to productivity.[22] High-status vague roles often require elite credentials. Their prestige then reflects the scarcity of the signal rather than the value of the output. Conduit roles tend to require demonstrated accuracy rather than pedigree, so they gain nothing from this effect.

5.6 Positional competition

Robert Frank and Philip Cook’s The Winner-Take-All Society (1995) describes markets in which rewards depend on relative rather than absolute performance.[23] Many high-prestige vague jobs are positional: their value lies in outranking rivals, not in producing anything. Positional goods attract excess investment, which raises their apparent value and attracts still more talent. This is a social cost Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny would recognize.

5.7 Moral envy and the meaning premium

Graeber’s own explanation is that work which is plainly meaningful is treated as its own reward. Teachers, nurses, and care workers are told in effect that the satisfaction of serving should make up for low pay.[24] The other side of the same logic is that people in pointless jobs are owed compensation for their pointlessness. Whether or not Graeber’s psychology is correct, the pattern he describes is widely recognized. It also extends to conduit work. Because the necessity of the work is obvious, the work is taken for granted, and what is taken for granted is seldom rewarded.


6. The Case of the Commissions Analyst

The commissions analyst shows the whole problem in one role.

  • Traceability: complete. Each step, from statement retrieval through deposit matching, accounting file construction, carrier upload, macro execution, and SQL insertion, leaves an auditable artifact, and the chain ends in two financial facts: recognized revenue and agent pay.
  • Absence: felt immediately. If the role stopped, the next pay period would show it, and the effects would spread to agents’ household finances, to the agency’s revenue statements, and possibly to its standing with carriers and regulators.
  • Legibility: very high. The work either balances or it does not.
  • Direction of value: realization. The analyst does not create the sale, but without the analyst the sale is never converted into recognized revenue and paid compensation.

Its standing as “the bottom of analyst jobs” follows directly from the mechanisms above. The work is procedural (5.2), legible (5.3), far from executive proximity (5.4), unconnected to elite credentialing (5.5), and so obviously necessary that it is taken for granted (5.7). The analyst ladder itself shows the paradox: prestige rises with each step away from the ledger and toward the presentation. The lowest analyst handles the actual money, while the highest analyst is the most removed from it.

This does not make higher analytical roles fake. Forecasting, strategic financial analysis, and data science can be fully real Category 4 or even Category 1 work. The point is narrower. Prestige within the analyst family tracks abstraction, not necessity, and abstraction and necessity are separate dimensions.


7. A Biblical Frame: Busybodies, Feeble Members, and the Servant Who Is Greatest

Scripture addresses both halves of the problem, the classification of work and the inversion of honor, and it does so directly.

7.1 Scripture’s own category of fake work

In 2 Thessalonians 3:11, Paul writes: “For we hear that there are some which walk among you disorderly, working not at all, but are busybodies.” The Greek contains a wordplay: mฤ“den ergazomenous alla periergazomenous, “not working, but working-around.” The periergazomenos is busy in a way that circles the work without doing it. This is an ancient and precise description of fake work: activity that has the outward form of labor without its substance. Paul’s remedy (verse 12) is that such persons “with quietness โ€ฆ work, and eat their own bread,” and the preceding verse states the governing principle: “if any would not work, neither should he eat” (3:10).

Proverbs makes a parallel distinction: “In all labour there is profit: but the talk of the lips tendeth only to penury” (Proverbs 14:23). The contrast between labor and “talk of the lips” fits the modern divide between production-and-conduit work and decorative or signaling work remarkably well.

7.2 The honor owed to necessary but lowly members

Paul’s body metaphor in 1 Corinthians 12 directly overturns the prestige paradox. “Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary: And those members of the body, which we think to be less honourable, upon these we bestow more abundant honour” (12:22โ€“23). The passage concedes that some members seem lower and that people think them less honorable. It then commands that honor be distributed in reverse, to correct for that misperception. In biblical terms, the prestige paradox is not a neutral sociological fact. It is a failure to give honor where honor is due (Romans 13:7).

7.3 Faithfulness in what is least

Jesus Christ taught that “he that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much” (Luke 16:10), and the context of that saying is the handling of money. When disputes over rank arose among His disciples, He reversed the standard of greatness: “he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth serve” (Luke 22:26). He acted this out by washing the disciples’ feet (John 13:12โ€“17), which was the work of the lowest household servant. In the economy of the Kingdom, honor attaches to service actually performed rather than to titles held.

7.4 Diligence and its reward

Proverbs 22:29 gives a counter-promise to the worldly paradox: “Seest thou a man diligent in his business? he shall stand before kings; he shall not stand before mean men.” Elsewhere, labor is commanded so that the worker “may have to give to him that needeth” (Ephesians 4:28) and may “walk honestly toward them that are without” (1 Thessalonians 4:11โ€“12). Real work, in this frame, is defined by its ability to sustain the worker, supply the needs of others, and stand up to scrutiny. These are the same criteria that the traceability, absence, and legibility tests try to make operational.


8. Implications

For organizations. A periodic traceability audit would require each position to state, in concrete terms, the chain linking its output to production, recognized revenue, risk reduction, or a fulfilled obligation. Positions that cannot state such a chain are not automatically superfluous, since Category 4 coordination is real but illegible. They should, however, carry the burden of explaining themselves. Organizations should also identify their Category 2 conduit roles explicitly and treat them as critical points of failure, with corresponding investment in documentation, cross-training, and compensation.

For compensation design. Graeber’s moral-envy thesis and the Lockwoodโ€“Nathansonโ€“Weyl externality estimates both suggest that market pay systematically underprices real work with large positive spillovers. An internal corrective is to price roles partly by the cost of their absence rather than only by labor-market comparables.

For workers in real but low-prestige roles. The typology gives a vocabulary for describing the value of a role in terms that hold up under scrutiny: traceability, immediacy of absence, legibility, and realization of revenue. It also shows that the mismatch between prestige and necessity is structural and predictable. It does not reflect on the competence or worth of the people doing conduit work.

For research. The empirical literature has relied almost entirely on self-report. A research program built on objective measures, such as absence events, dependency mapping in process-mining data, and audit-trail analysis, could test whether the eight categories proposed here correspond to measurable differences in organizational resilience.


9. Conclusion

The distinction between real and fake jobs is old. It goes back at least to Smith’s productive and unproductive labor and, in Scripture, to Paul’s contrast between those who work and those who merely “work around.” The modern literature has given the distinction new attention and new data. It has also shown that measuring the incumbent’s feelings measures alienation more than futility. A better typology looks at structure: whether a job’s output can be traced, whether its absence would be felt, whether its quality can be judged, and whether it creates, transfers, guards, or merely displays value.

On those tests, the commissions analyst is plainly real work, of the Conduit/Verification type that turns sales into recognized revenue and agents’ pay. Its low standing is not an anomaly. It is the predictable result of seven well-documented mechanisms that send prestige toward abstraction, proximity to power, and illegibility, and away from the ledger. Scripture calls this inversion a failure to give honor where it is owed, and it sets out the correction: the member that seems feeble is necessary, and the one who serves is the greatest.


Notes

  1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Book II, ch. 3. Smith’s list of unproductive laborers explicitly includes “the sovereign โ€ฆ with all the officers both of justice and war,” as well as “churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds.”
  2. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, vol. 1, especially the chapters on Smith and on productive and unproductive labor. On Marx’s account, a singer employed by a theater entrepreneur is a productive laborer, while the same singer performing for her own account is not.
  3. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), ch. 1, on the distinction between “exploit” and “drudgery.”
  4. C. Northcote Parkinson, “Parkinson’s Law,” The Economist, 19 November 1955.
  5. Gordon Tullock (1967); Anne O. Krueger (1974). Krueger’s paper introduced the term “rent-seeking.”
  6. William J. Baumol (1990).
  7. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1991).
  8. Samuel Bowles and Arjun Jayadev (2006). Their category includes supervisors, police, private security, prison guards, and military personnel, along with the unemployed and imprisoned populations whose existence the guard-labor apparatus presupposes.
  9. Benjamin B. Lockwood, Charles G. Nathanson, and E. Glen Weyl (2017). The authors stress that their externality estimates are highly uncertain. The direction of their findings is more robust than the magnitudes.
  10. David Graeber, “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant,” Strike! (August 2013); Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (2018). The definition quoted is from ch. 1 of the book.
  11. Graeber (2018), ch. 6, on “moral envy” and the inverse relation between social value and remuneration.
  12. Robert Dur and Max van Lent (2019).
  13. Magdalena Soffia, Alex J. Wood, and Brendan Burchell (2022).
  14. Simon Walo (2023).
  15. Mats Alvesson and Andrรฉ Spicer (2012); The Stupidity Paradox (2016).
  16. Ronald H. Coase (1937); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand (1977).
  17. Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists (2017), in the chapter on why it does not pay to be a banker. The Irish bank closure began in May 1970 and lasted roughly six months.
  18. Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1945).
  19. Melvin M. Tumin (1953).
  20. Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work (1958), and “Good People and Dirty Work” (1962); Blake E. Ashforth and Glen E. Kreiner (1999); Glen E. Kreiner, Blake E. Ashforth, and David M. Sluss (2006). “Procedural taint” is a term proposed in this paper and does not appear in the dirty-work literature.
  21. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (1988), especially the chapters on “looking up and looking around” and on the management of blame.
  22. Michael Spence (1973).
  23. Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook (1995).
  24. Graeber (2018), ch. 6. See also Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft (2009), and Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (1972), on the moral standing of hands-on and procedural work.
  25. Scripture quotations are from the King James Version. The Greek wordplay in 2 Thessalonians 3:11 (ergazomenous / periergazomenous) is noted in the standard lexica, e.g., Bauerโ€“Dankerโ€“Arndtโ€“Gingrich, s.v. periergazomai.

References

Alvesson, Mats, and Andrรฉ Spicer. 2012. “A Stupidity-Based Theory of Organizations.” Journal of Management Studies 49 (7): 1194โ€“1220.

Alvesson, Mats, and Andrรฉ Spicer. 2016. The Stupidity Paradox: The Power and Pitfalls of Functional Stupidity at Work. London: Profile Books.

Ashforth, Blake E., and Glen E. Kreiner. 1999. “‘How Can You Do It?’: Dirty Work and the Challenge of Constructing a Positive Identity.” Academy of Management Review 24 (3): 413โ€“434.

Baumol, William J. 1990. “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive.” Journal of Political Economy 98 (5): 893โ€“921.

Bowles, Samuel, and Arjun Jayadev. 2006. “Guard Labor.” Journal of Development Economics 79 (2): 328โ€“348.

Bregman, Rutger. 2017. Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build the Ideal World. New York: Little, Brown.

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (16): 386โ€“405.

Crawford, Matthew B. 2009. Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work. New York: Penguin Press.

Davis, Kingsley, and Wilbert E. Moore. 1945. “Some Principles of Stratification.” American Sociological Review 10 (2): 242โ€“249.

Dur, Robert, and Max van Lent. 2019. “Socially Useless Jobs.” Industrial Relations 58 (1): 3โ€“16.

Frank, Robert H., and Philip J. Cook. 1995. The Winner-Take-All Society. New York: Free Press.

Graeber, David. 2013. “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant.” Strike! Magazine, August 2013.

Graeber, David. 2018. Bullshit Jobs: A Theory. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hamel, Gary, and Michele Zanini. 2020. Humanocracy: Creating Organizations as Amazing as the People Inside Them. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

Hughes, Everett C. 1958. Men and Their Work. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Hughes, Everett C. 1962. “Good People and Dirty Work.” Social Problems 10 (1): 3โ€“11.

Jackall, Robert. 1988. Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kreiner, Glen E., Blake E. Ashforth, and David M. Sluss. 2006. “Identity Dynamics in Occupational Dirty Work: Integrating Social Identity and System Justification Perspectives.” Organization Science 17 (5): 619โ€“636.

Krueger, Anne O. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64 (3): 291โ€“303.

Lockwood, Benjamin B., Charles G. Nathanson, and E. Glen Weyl. 2017. “Taxation and the Allocation of Talent.” Journal of Political Economy 125 (5): 1635โ€“1682.

Marx, Karl. 1963 [1905โ€“1910]. Theories of Surplus Value, Part I. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1991. “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2): 503โ€“530.

Parkinson, C. Northcote. 1955. “Parkinson’s Law.” The Economist, 19 November 1955.

Sennett, Richard, and Jonathan Cobb. 1972. The Hidden Injuries of Class. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.

Soffia, Magdalena, Alex J. Wood, and Brendan Burchell. 2022. “Alienation Is Not ‘Bullshit’: An Empirical Critique of Graeber’s Theory of BS Jobs.” Work, Employment and Society 36 (5): 816โ€“840.

Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355โ€“374.

Treiman, Donald J. 1977. Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic Press.

Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 5 (3): 224โ€“232.

Tumin, Melvin M. 1953. “Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis.” American Sociological Review 18 (4): 387โ€“394.

Veblen, Thorstein. 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. New York: Macmillan.

Walo, Simon. 2023. “‘Bullshit’ After All? Why People Consider Their Jobs Socially Useless.” Work, Employment and Society 37 (5): 1123โ€“1146.

The Holy Bible, King James Version.


Unknown's avatar

About nathanalbright

I'm a person with diverse interests who loves to read. If you want to know something about me, just ask.
This entry was posted in Musings and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply