Program Structure, Fleet, Network, and Projected Per-Removal Economics
Prepared July 2026 — based on publicly available reporting and federal procurement documents
A note on program status
Because DHS has not released routes or a per-removal cost model, the corresponding sections here are analytical projections built from the existing ICE Air charter network and published cost figures, and are labeled as such rather than presented as official DHS numbers.
Executive summary
DHS is moving to replace its decades-old model of chartering deportation flights from private airlines with a fleet of government-owned aircraft flown by a contracted operator. The department has begun searching for a company to operate planes that would carry out deportation flights, respond to emergencies, and transport senior officials. The stated rationale is cost savings and insulation from public pressure; the previous marquee charter partner, Avelo, ended its involvement amid criticism from immigration and human-rights groups and some lawmakers who argued it was profiting from the abuse of migrants.
The unusual feature is the ownership/operation split: the government buys and owns the planes, but a private contractor flies and maintains them. Industry observers have questioned where the efficiencies come from when contractors still operate the flights, and note that charter capacity is easier to scale up or down than an owned fleet. The underlying policy driver is the administration’s stated goal of one million removals per year — a figure critics call unrealistic given that first-year removals ran closer to 400,000.
Background: the current charter model
For decades ICE has run removals through chartered aircraft rather than owned planes. ICE Air Operations is based in Mesa, Arizona, with locations in San Antonio and Brownsville, Texas; Alexandria, Louisiana; and Miami, Florida. CSI Aviation holds the prime contract for these ICE charter flights, subcontracting the actual operation. Recent flying carriers have included GlobalX, Eastern Air Express, Omni Air International, World Atlantic, and (until early 2026) Avelo.
The shift to ownership is being funded by a large appropriation. The administration earmarked $464.5 million for DHS earlier this year to purchase aircraft for mass deportations. Separately, DHS agreed to buy six Boeing 737-700s for about $140 million, purchased from Avelo, which then exited deportation flying. Note that the program survived a leadership change: after Kristi Noem was replaced by Secretary Markwayne Mullin in March, Mullin conducted an agency-wide contract review, and DHS now says it plans to integrate the planes into deportation efforts using contractors to operate them.
Fleet
The proposed fleet is nine aircraft, in two tiers:
Mass-transport tier — Boeing 737-700. Seven planes capable of transporting large groups of passengers. The 737-700 was chosen for its practicality carrying up to 149 passengers in an all-economy configuration, with a range of up to about 3,800 miles, and because it is one of the smallest members of the 737 NG family. (Reporting is slightly inconsistent on the count — six aircraft already acquired versus a target of seven — because acquisition is ongoing.)
Executive/long-range tier — Gulfstream G650ER (military designation C-37B). Two aircraft, described as C-37B or equivalent Gulfstream G650ER jets. The G650ER is an ultra-long-range jet cruising around 590 mph with a range up to about 6,700 miles. These are the aircraft intended for global airlift, high-risk removals to distant countries, and transport of senior officials — the dual-use element that has drawn scrutiny, since the earlier Gulfstreams acquired under Noem, at a reported $200 million, were largely used to fly her around the country rather than for removals.
DHS reserves the right to expand the fleet later in the contract.
Network and routes (projected)
DHS has not published a route map, and has deliberately left basing open: the eventual operator may use one main base, several main bases, or a hub-and-spoke system with forward operating locations, and may be required to support missions in remote, primitive, or austere environments inside and outside the continental U.S.
What the new fleet would most plausibly inherit is the existing ICE Air removal network. Based on tracked flight data, common removal destinations include Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Mexico City, Port-au-Prince, Santo Domingo, and Bogotá, across Latin America, the Caribbean, and occasionally Africa and Asia. Volume is concentrated heavily in Central America: in a representative recent month, destinations were led by Guatemala and Honduras, followed by El Salvador and Nicaragua.
The fleet’s two tiers map onto two route profiles:
The 737 fleet would handle the high-frequency short-haul core — the Central American and Caribbean runs well within its ~3,800-mile range from southern U.S. staging points. This is the bulk of removal volume.
The G650ER pair would handle the long-haul, low-frequency, high-complexity missions the 737s cannot reach nonstop. These already exist in the charter system: removals have reached Ghana (a September flight staged through a fuel stop in Saint Croix), and a first removal to Iran occurred via a “layover transfer” through Qatar. ICE describes such special high-risk charter missions as repatriations to Europe, Asia, and Africa for individuals who cannot be removed via commercial airlines.
The mission set is broader than removals alone: deportation flights, voluntary repatriations, high-risk charter operations, crisis-response deployment, medical evacuations, and transport of senior DHS leaders.
Projected per-“customer” economics
This is the section where caution matters most: DHS has not disclosed a projected per-removal cost for the owned fleet. What follows builds an estimate from published figures.
Baseline — what a removal costs today. ICE’s own stated average to arrest, detain, and deport one person is at least $17,121. Independent estimates run much higher: the Penn Wharton Budget Model cited studies ranging from $30,591 to $109,880 per deportation, averaging about $70,236, with detention duration the largest variable. The air-transport portion is only one slice of that total — detention is the dominant cost driver.
Isolating the flight cost. A daily scheduled charter runs about $8,577 per flight hour; a special high-risk charter runs between $6,929 and $26,795 per flight hour, covering aircraft, fuel, flight crew, security, an onboard medical professional, and aviation/overflight fees. Per-person flight cost then depends almost entirely on load factor and distance:
On a full 737 short-haul run to Central America (roughly 3–5 flight hours, ~130 passengers), the flight-hour cost spread across a full plane yields a low-hundreds-of-dollars-per-person figure. A real-world anchor: a set of 50 Panama flights was estimated at about $1,350 per person.
On sparsely loaded or long-haul high-risk missions, per-person cost rises sharply. One estimate, using roughly $25,000 per hour, put an average deportation trip at $100,000 to $200,000 — that figure reflects long, lightly loaded, or multi-leg missions, not a full short-haul 737.
Will owning the fleet lower this? That is the contested claim. DHS insists the airline will save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, but industry observers question where the efficiencies come from when contractors still operate the flights, and note that charter margins on these flights are not large. Two structural cost pressures cut against savings:
First, the broker-and-subcontractor layering that inflates current charter pricing does not automatically disappear under a contracted operator. A source with knowledge of the matter identified the current model — one company brokering and subcontracting to multiple charter airlines, each adding profit and overhead — as a major cost driver.
Second, there are transition costs. Aviation veterans note that operators would need regulatory authorization to fly the department’s 737s (which can take months) and would need to hire and train pilots on the type. A blunter industry assessment: “They bought the aircraft before they figured out how to operate them and/or what the cost to operate them would be.”
A reasonable projected range, then: the air-transport per-person cost on the owned fleet is likely to land in the hundreds of dollars per person on full short-haul runs and several thousand to tens of thousands on long-haul or lightly loaded missions — broadly comparable to today’s charter economics, with net savings dependent on high, sustained utilization the department has not yet demonstrated it can generate.
Key considerations and risks
Utilization is the whole ballgame. Owned aircraft cost money whether they fly or sit. Charters flex with demand; an owned fleet does not. By using charter operators, capacity is easy to adjust over time to reflect demand, which is much harder once planes are purchased. If removal volume falls short of the one-million-per-year target — and it has run far below it — the fixed fleet cost is spread over fewer people, raising per-person cost.
The dual-use question. Folding senior-official transport into a deportation fleet invites the same criticism the earlier Gulfstream purchase drew. It also complicates clean per-removal accounting, since not every flight hour serves a removal.
Execution risk. Multiple aviation sources described the plan as one they thought would “never work,” and a former ICE official likened it to “building the plane while they’re flying it.” The proverb one industry veteran offered captures the skeptic case: the fastest way to become a millionaire is to be a billionaire who starts an airline.
Contract timeline. DHS estimates a contract beginning in summer 2027 and continuing through 2032 — a five-year commitment locking in fleet costs regardless of how removal volumes actually track.
Conclusion
The DHS owned-fleet plan is a real, funded, and advancing procurement — nine aircraft, a contractor-operated model, a mid-2027 target, and a network that would inherit the existing Central America–Caribbean core plus occasional long-haul high-risk missions. What it is not, yet, is a launched airline with published routes and a disclosed per-person price. The fleet and appropriations are documented; the routes and per-removal costs remain projections. On the central promise — that ownership saves money — the evidence available today is genuinely mixed: the savings case rests on high sustained utilization and elimination of broker layering, neither of which is yet demonstrated, and knowledgeable industry voices are openly skeptical.
This paper reflects reporting and procurement documents available as of mid-July 2026. Because the program is at the market-research stage, fleet counts, timelines, and especially any cost figures should be expected to shift as a formal solicitation and contract award proceed.
