What does Iran want? When twice within the course of a week a nation manages to provoke difficulties on two fronts, it is fair to wonder what sort of conditions are leading a nation’s leaders to engage in what others may easily view as reckless provocation. First, earlier this week, Iran openly admitted to firing rockets at the Kurdish-administered area of Erbil, in northern Iraq. Although Americans wondered if they were the targets, it became clear that the attacks were aimed at an Israeli base, though it is not clear how serious the damage was, or how it was that Israel was able to build a spy base in Kurdistan and what kind of relationship Israel might be said to have with the Kurds in general, who are a permanent if often low-level threat to the territorial integrity of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Ian’s open willingness to admit attacking Israeli interests, in light of the false accusations that Israel is engaged in a genocidal conflict in its efforts to combat Iran’s proxy Hamas in the Gaza Strip that have been regularly reported around the world, would seem to justify Israel’s efforts, especially given the fact that one of Iran’s other proxies, the Houthi of Yemen, have also been engaged in attacks in at the base of the Red Sea. 

As if this was not enough, though, immediately after that there were strikes between Iran and Pakistan that seem to revolve around the troubled Baluchi areas divided between the two nations (along with Afghanistan, which has a Baluchi-dominated south that is less populated than the larger Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi territories). With missiles being fired by both nations into another, there is serious concern about whether the ongoing Baluchi efforts to achieve greater autonomy from both Iran and Pakistan and their moving freely across borders to cause trouble to both nations will lead to a war between the two nations. India, for its part, has already expressed its support for Iran, possibly because of their view that an enemy of Pakistan is to be supported in the hope that it will keep Pakistan distracted from Kashmir and efforts to rival India. China, meanwhile, has so far had an unsuccessful time acting as a mediator between Iran and Pakistan, which makes sense as both Iran and Pakistan are nations which could be of use to China in their efforts at increasing their soft power around the world, and a war between them or even a period of intense diplomatic trouble could jeopardize their common aims to develop the ports that China is seeking to build in the area to increase its own presence in the Indian Ocean.

When a nation shows itself willing to provoke crises on multiple fronts, it is fair to wonder what sort of national interests are at stake that would lead a nation to act in a way that could lead to coalition-building efforts against it. The example of Ethiopia here is instructive. Ethiopia has expressed a willingness to provoke confrontations with almost all of its neighbors simultaneously. In particular, Ethiopia’s search for controlling its own power and increasing its electricity for development has led it to a combative relationship with Sudan and Egypt concerning the flow of the Blue Nile. Similarly, its desire for a port and access to the sea has led to bellicose diplomacy with Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, including a promise to recognize Somaliland’s independence in exchange for long-term port rights and development of the transportation between Somaliland and the core regions of Ethiopia, which has promoted a diplomatic crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the case of Ethiopia, though, its willingness to provoke or at least to accept a state of multiple crises has obvious areas of national self-interest, as massive hydroelectric dams and access to the sea are issues of national interest that are easy enough to understand as being worth the acceptance of a crisis.

And here Iran’s interests are not so clear. It is unclear what Iran wants with regards to Israel. Iran, in recent years, has increased its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and with Houthi clients in Yemen, its influence in the area is only expanding at the moment. Yet it must want something if it is willing to justify Israel’s intense war efforts against their proxy Hamas by attacking what could be considered as a base against Iran’s nuclear program. Similarly, it is unclear what Iran would want or fear from Pakistan. Both Iran and Pakistan have mutual problems with the Baluchi that could presumably be dealt with via bilateral diplomacy to encourage common efforts against Baluchi nationalists who seek to work both sides of the border to preserve some sort of buffer for themselves against both states. While Pakistan is a nuclear power and Iran is not (yet), it is widely thought that Iran is not far at all from the place where it would be able to demonstrate, if it so wanted, its own status as a nuclear state. If Iran is a pretty isolated nation in terms of its diplomacy, being a nuclear power would at least potentially add a great deal of caution to any nation that would attempt to dominate it or completely disregard it. Still, it is mysterious that Iran is willing to provoke hostility so easily with its neighbors, and to accept responsibility for missile attacks both to the east and west simultaneously. What Iran wants, what its interests are, and why it appears so willing to engage in conflict is not clear. Perhaps it will be more clear in the near future, if such crises are not easily calmed and settled.