Executive summary

The November 2025 fires at the Wang Fuk Court public-housing estate in Tai Po, Hong Kong, are now the territory’s deadliest blaze in roughly seventy years, with officials reporting at least 128 deaths, around 80 injured, and roughly 200 people still unaccounted for as of the latest updates.

This white paper explains:

What happened at Wang Fuk Court. Why the fires caused so many deaths and missing persons. Who is likely to be held responsible, based on current arrests and the legal framework, while recognizing that formal liability will ultimately be decided by the courts and any public inquiry.

1. Background: Wang Fuk Court and Hong Kong’s fire-risk context

1.1 The estate

Wang Fuk Court is a high-rise housing estate in the Tai Po district of Hong Kong’s New Territories, consisting of eight 31-storey towers and almost 2,000 flats, housing roughly 4,600–4,800 residents. It is home to a disproportionately elderly population: more than a third of residents are 65 or older, making evacuation slower and more difficult. At the time of the fire, the estate was undergoing a large-scale renovation, with bamboo scaffolding and protective green mesh wrapping several blocks and foam panels added around window frames.

1.2 Hong Kong’s high-rise fire profile

Hong Kong’s urban fabric—dense high-rises, subdivided flats, and extensive use of bamboo scaffolding during building works—has long posed particular fire-risk challenges. Previous disasters such as the 1996 Garley Building fire and the 2024 blaze at New Lucky House prompted incremental improvements in codes and inspections but also revealed recurring vulnerabilities: combustible materials on façades, blocked escape routes, and deficiencies in alarms and sprinklers.

The Wang Fuk Court disaster sits squarely in this pattern, but at a vastly greater scale.

2. Chronology of the incident

2.1 Outbreak and spread

According to preliminary investigations:

The fire started on scaffolding at a lower level of one of the towers (Wang Cheong House) around mid-afternoon on 26 November 2025. Flames quickly climbed the bamboo scaffolding wrapped in green mesh and ignited highly flammable plastic foam panels that had been installed around windows on each floor, apparently as part of energy-efficiency or waterproofing works. The blaze spread externally across façades and then jumped laterally to adjoining towers, ultimately affecting seven of the eight buildings in the estate.

2.2 Emergency response

The Hong Kong Fire Services Department mobilised more than 1,200 fire and ambulance personnel, battling the fire for over 40 hours before it was brought fully under control. One firefighter died and at least a dozen were injured. Rescuers reported extreme heat, falling debris, and collapsing scaffolding, which slowed entry to upper floors and complicated internal search and rescue.

2.3 Casualty and missing-persons picture

Deaths: at least 128, making it Hong Kong’s deadliest fire in roughly 70–80 years. Injured: about 79–80 people, including firefighters. Missing: roughly 200 residents remain unaccounted for, and around 89 bodies still await formal identification.

Authorities have now called off active searches for survivors, shifting to recovery, identification of remains, and support for displaced residents.

3. Why the fires were so lethal

The scale of death and disappearance at Wang Fuk Court is not the result of a single failure but of interacting physical, technical, social, and governance factors.

3.1 Combustible renovation materials and external “chimney effect”

Several investigations now converge on the renovation system—bamboo scaffolding, green mesh, and foam panels—as the key technical driver of the disaster:

Bamboo scaffolding + mesh as a vertical fuel path Traditional bamboo scaffolding is usually safe when combined with flame-retardant mesh and good fire-watch practices. In this case, police and fire officials believe the scaffolding netting and associated tarps did not meet fire-safety standards, allowing flames to race up the exterior of the building far faster than internal compartmentation was designed to cope with. Highly flammable foam around windows Investigators found plastic foam panels installed around windows on each floor, probably styrofoam or similar, which are both highly combustible and produce toxic smoke. Secretary for Security Chris Tang has said this foam, used to seal windows during works, is believed to have accelerated the fire’s spread across façades and into apartments. Wind and multi-tower propagation Strong winds channeled along the estate helped drive flames along and between blocks, causing simultaneous fires in multiple towers and overwhelming fire-service capacity.

The result was an external firestorm that bypassed many of the safety assumptions built into high-rise interior design (like compartmentation between floors) and turned the cladding/scaffolding envelope itself into the main fuel source—very similar to the pattern seen at London’s Grenfell Tower.

3.2 Failures of fire-safety systems

Evidence is rapidly accumulating that critical fire-safety systems at Wang Fuk Court were not functioning properly:

Residents had complained for over a year about faulty fire alarms, degraded hoses, and concerns over the scaffolding and materials. Multiple residents and media reports say the alarms did not sound in some parts of the estate, forcing people to rely on neighbours shouting or social media messages to learn about the fire. The Labour Department had previously issued notices for safety issues at the renovation site, but problems persisted into late 2025.

When an external fire breaches a building, early warning and functioning internal systems become crucial to survival. The combination of delayed or absent alarms and potentially compromised firefighting infrastructure within the towers significantly increased the fatality rate.

3.3 Vulnerable population: age, mobility, and social factors

The casualty profile reflects a high concentration of residents who were:

Elderly or mobility-impaired: With over a third of residents aged 65+, many could not descend dozens of stair flights quickly, especially amid smoke and poor visibility. Living alone or in small units: Some older residents lived alone and had no one to help them during evacuation. Possibly asleep or resting when the fire escalated, particularly in towers affected later in the chain of spread.

These factors lengthened decision-to-evacuate time, even for those who were aware of the fire, and made it harder for firefighters to reach and assist them in time.

3.4 Information chaos and the missing-persons surge

The unusually high number of missing residents is tied to:

Scale and complexity of the estate With thousands of residents and seven towers affected, authorities faced a large, moving population—some evacuating to official shelters, others staying with relatives, and still others sheltering in malls, churches, or restaurants. Real-time registration gaps The register of flat occupants may not match who was present: visitors, domestic workers, sub-tenants, and family members staying temporarily complicate accounting. Many displaced residents lacked ID documents or phone chargers, delaying formal registration. Slow identification of remains Several bodies are severely burned and require DNA analysis and dental records, slowing the process. Authorities report at least 89 unidentified fatalities at this stage. Parallel citizen-run and official systems Grass-roots groups have set up crowd-sourced web apps and Telegram channels for marking people safe and listing missing persons, while the government runs its own hotlines and registration centres. Until these data sources are reconciled, the number of “missing” remains inflated but uncertain.

The “missing” figure therefore reflects both real potential fatalities and data-management lag; it will almost certainly fall over time as more people are located or remains are identified.

4. Who is likely to be held responsible?

It is too early to say who will ultimately be found legally liable, but we can map the current lines of responsibility and accountability as they are emerging.

4.1 Construction and renovation companies

So far, law-enforcement attention has focused squarely on the firms responsible for the renovation works:

Police have arrested company directors and an engineering consultant from Prestige Construction and Engineering Company, the main contractor, on suspicion of manslaughter due to gross negligence. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has separately arrested at least eight additional individuals, including subcontractors, on suspicion of corruption linked to the renovation contract and material procurement.

Key alleged failings that courts will examine include:

Use of flammable foam panels and mesh that appear not to have met required fire-safety standards. Possible misrepresentation of materials as “flame-retardant.” Failure to respond adequately to prior safety notices and resident complaints about hazards during renovation.

If courts find that the company knowingly used substandard materials or ignored clear risks, senior managers and responsible engineers could face criminal convictions, disqualification from acting as company directors, and substantial civil liability.

4.2 Material suppliers and certifiers

Investigators are also scrutinising:

Suppliers of the foam panels, tarps, and mesh to determine whether products were correctly labelled and certified. Any testing laboratories or certifying bodies that may have issued false or negligent safety certifications.

If evidence shows deliberate falsification of safety documents, these parties could face fraud and corruption charges in addition to civil suits by victims’ families.

4.3 Building management and relevant authorities

Responsibility is unlikely to stop with private contractors:

The estate’s management and owners (public-housing authorities or their agents) may face scrutiny for: Allowing renovation practices that created extreme fire risks. Failing to ensure that alarms, hoses, and sprinkler systems remained functional during works. Inadequate evacuation planning for a heavily elderly population. Government departments in the frame include: The Buildings Department, which oversees structural and fire safety standards. The Fire Services Department, responsible for fire-safety inspections and enforcement. The Labour Department, which had already issued safety notices regarding the renovation works.

While individual civil servants are less likely to face criminal prosecution, systemic failures in inspection, enforcement, and risk communication could be highlighted in a public inquiry or coroner’s court, leading to institutional accountability, disciplinary measures, and policy reforms.

4.4 Political accountability

This disaster has national-level political visibility:

Senior Hong Kong officials and Chinese President Xi Jinping have publicly expressed concern and called for a thorough investigation and support for victims. The scale of the tragedy and prior ignored complaints are fuelling public anger over governance and building-safety enforcement, similar to how Grenfell reshaped political debates in the UK.

Likely political outcomes include:

A formal independent inquiry or commission of investigation to examine not just the immediate causes but also regulatory failures. Potential resignations or reshuffles at the agency or ministerial level if major shortcomings are confirmed. A multi-year programme of city-wide inspections and retrofits of similar estates and renovation projects.

However, the exact political consequences will depend heavily on investigative findings and how transparently the process is conducted.

5. Structural reasons for high casualties and missing persons

Synthesising the above, the high death and missing-persons toll can be traced to four structural clusters:

Design & materials problem Renovation turned building exteriors into continuous combustible surfaces connecting floor to floor and tower to tower. Safety-system and enforcement problem Long-standing maintenance issues and ignored warnings meant that when a major fire did occur, the first line of defence—alarms, hoses, compartment integrity—was compromised. Demographic and social vulnerability A concentration of elderly and low-income residents with limited mobility and resources made rapid, self-organised evacuation extremely difficult. Information and governance problem Inadequate tracking of residents, fragmented communication channels, and lack of integrated missing-persons systems produced a large, persistent “unknown” population, compounding the emotional trauma for families.

6. Policy implications and recommendations

While investigations are ongoing, several policy directions are already apparent.

6.1 Immediate technical reforms

Ban or strictly limit flammable foam and similar materials on façades and around windows in high-rise buildings, whether permanent or temporary. Tighten standards for scaffolding mesh and tarps, requiring independently verified flame-retardant properties. Require fire-safety planning as a precondition for renovation permits, including: Maintaining at least one fully functional escape staircase at all times. Demonstrating that alarm and sprinkler systems will remain operational during works.

6.2 Systematic inspection of high-risk sites

Conduct city-wide inspections of ongoing renovation projects that use bamboo scaffolding and temporary coverings, with the power to halt works immediately where non-compliance is found. Build a public registry of serious safety violations, so residents and the media can monitor whether corrective actions are implemented.

6.3 Protecting vulnerable residents

Develop special evacuation plans for estates with high elderly populations, including: Regular drills tailored to residents with limited mobility. Volunteer “floor wardens” trained to assist neighbours. Ensure redundant communication channels—alarms, loudspeakers, SMS alerts, and community WhatsApp/Telegram groups formally linked to emergency services.

6.4 Missing-persons systems

Create an integrated, privacy-respecting system for rapidly reconciling: Official tenancy and residency records. Data from shelters and hospitals. Citizen-run missing-person lists and “I am safe” check-ins.

This could significantly reduce the psychological toll on families and provide quicker clarity about the true human impact of major disasters.

6.5 Accountability and transparency frameworks

Establish a statutory, time-limited public inquiry with: Full access to documents from contractors, regulators, and certifiers. Public hearings where survivors and families can testify. Publish a binding implementation plan for the inquiry’s recommendations, with milestones and regular public progress reports. Expand the powers and resources of anti-corruption bodies and building-safety inspectors to detect and deter unsafe cost-cutting in public-housing projects.

7. Conclusions

The Wang Fuk Court fires were not a freak accident; they were foreseeable and, to a large extent, preventable.

Why so many deaths and missing? Because combustible renovation systems, non-functioning safety infrastructure, and governance failures collided with a highly vulnerable population living in extremely dense high-rise structures. Who will be held responsible? In the short term, company directors, engineers, and subcontractors from the renovation firm are already under arrest and likely to face manslaughter and corruption charges. Over time, investigations and a probable public inquiry will likely assign broader responsibility to building managers and regulatory agencies whose oversight failed to prevent the tragedy. Politically, the event will test the credibility of Hong Kong’s leadership on public safety, transparency, and care for its most vulnerable residents.

The ultimate test of justice will not only be who is punished, but whether Hong Kong can transform this disaster into enduring improvements in building safety, regulatory integrity, and disaster response—so that no other estate becomes “the next Wang Fuk Court.”