Executive Summary

Yemen’s civil war is a multifaceted conflict rooted in historical, political, economic, and regional divides. The conflict involves multiple internal actors (Houthis, the internationally recognized government, Southern separatists, tribal/local authorities, extremist groups) and external powers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, etc.), each with overlapping and sometimes contradictory goals. The humanitarian toll is massive: displacement, famine risk, collapse of infrastructure, public health crises. There is no simple military solution. Political arrangements, inclusive governance, economic reconstruction, local reconciliation, and regional diplomacy are all needed. This paper outlines the sources of Yemen’s divisions, analyzes the obstacles to peace, and proposes possible solutions that might lead to sustainable peace and stability.

1. Historical and Structural Foundations of the Divides

To understand Yemen’s war, one needs to recognize several longstanding divides:

North vs South Prior to unification in 1990, Yemen had two separate states: the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). They had distinct political, economic, and ideological systems. Even after unification, many in the South felt marginalized: in governance, resources, identity, and infrastructure. There is a strong separatist sentiment (or at least regional autonomy demand) in the South, embodied by the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Tribal, sectarian, and regional identities Yemen is deeply tribal, particularly in rural and highland areas. Tribal authority and loyalties often run parallel to, and sometimes in competition with, state authority. Sectarian identity also plays a role—Houthis are Zaidi (a branch within Shia Islam), mostly from the north (Saada region and surroundings). Although Yemen has historically been more mixed and less strictly sectarian than many conflicts elsewhere, sectarian identity has become more politicized. Economic underdevelopment, state weakness, and inequality Even before the war, Yemen was one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with weak institutions and governance, especially outside key cities and coasts. Basic public services (water, electricity, health) were underprovided, infrastructure was poor, and there was uneven access to resources. Political exclusion and cycles of corruption Centralized power, elite capture, often weak accountability. Sidelined factions, including those from the South, had grievances about representation. Regional and international geopolitics Yemen’s location makes it strategically important (for Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, access to Arabian Sea, etc.). Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have become heavily involved. The Houthis are seen (rightly or wrongly) by some as allies of Iran; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested militarily, politically, and economically in various parts of Yemen.

2. How Those Divides Play Out—and the Key Actors

Here are the main actors, the alliances, and the fault lines:

Actor

Territory / Influence

Goals and Motivations

Dividing Fault Lines / Conflicts with Others

Houthis (Ansar Allah)

Most of north Yemen (Sanaa, Saada, etc.), parts of west; control many state institutions in their territory.

Maintain political power; resist marginalization; defend against external intervention; in some narratives desire recognition and a major role in national governance.

Conflict with the internationally recognized government; tension with Saudi-led coalition; clashes with local tribes; ideological, sectarian, and political differences.

Internationally Recognized Government

Mostly in the south and parts of east and some west coastal areas; often based in exile or in Aden.

Restore state authority; regain control over territory; ensure international legitimacy; secure foreign support.

Divided internally (among politicians, factions, security forces); weak capacity in many regions; dependence on external support; often conflict with Southern separatists.

Southern Transitional Council (STC) & Separatist Movements

Southern governorates, Aden, some coastal regions.

Many in STC want autonomy or even secession; resent marginalization from northern-dominated governments; want local control over resources, governance.

Conflict with the government (even if the government is “southern” in parts); tension over “who governs” in the south; sometimes conflict with local tribes or local authorities.

Tribal Authorities and Local Power Structures

Across rural Yemen: various tribes, sheiks, local councils.

Protect local interests; maintain autonomy; sometimes play both sides; want local services and stability.

Their interests sometimes conflict with both Houthis and the government; might oppose centralization; sometimes exploited by outside actors.

External States / International Actors

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Oman, US, UN, etc.

Security concerns (border security, Red Sea control, preventing hostile actors); seeking influence; countering rivals; humanitarian obligations; international norms.

Proxy conflicts (especially Saudi/Emirati vs. Iran); differing priorities; inconsistent policies; external pressure sometimes misaligned with local realities.

Non-state armed groups / extremist groups (AQAP, ISIS, etc.)

Pockets in south, east, rural areas.

Exploit weak governance; seek control; ideological aims; benefit from chaos.

Opposed by most other actors; their presence complicates peace negotiations; create humanitarian threats.

3. Key Dynamics Complicating Peace

Apart from the actors and the divides, there are particular dynamics that make resolving the conflict difficult:

Fragmentation of authority: There is no single government or opposing force that controls all territory. Control is patchy; local authorities fill vacuums. Economic collapse / funding deficits: Yemen’s economy is fractured. In many areas, civil services are unpaid; inflation, food insecurity, health crises rampant. External aid is huge but often constrained. Humanitarian catastrophe: Civilians face famine or near-famine, disease (cholera, etc.), displacement, infrastructural collapse. This amplifies grievances and creates urgent needs that complicate long-term planning. Weaponization and external supply: The Houthis have acquired increasingly advanced weaponry; cross-border strikes and naval/drones complicate regional security. External actors supply weapons, intelligence, support. Legitimacy and trust deficits: Years of broken ceasefires and stalled negotiations have sapped trust on all sides; local populations often distrust both the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. Southern separatism and fears of “balkanization”: The secessionist currents in the South, along with limited control by the central government there, make national cohesion challenging. Some analysts believe Yemen is at risk of de facto partition.  Interference of regional rivalries: Even where local actors may want peace, external powers often have incentives (or perceived incentives) to continue competition—partly for regional prestige, partly for security, partly ideological.

4. Past Efforts and Why They Have Largely Failed

National Dialogue Conference (2013-14): Attempted to set up a federal system to balance regional autonomy. It resulted in a proposal to divide Yemen into six federal regions. However, many saw the federal plan as unfair: for example, the South would have had only two regions vs. four in the north, among other contentions.  UN-mediated ceasefires and peace plans: Multiple efforts (stockholm agreement, Riyadh agreement, etc.) have tried to negotiate ceasefires, share power, reopen ports and airports. But violations, lack of implementation, lack of enforcement, lack of trust undermine them. Military efforts: Saudi-led coalition, Emirati involvement, etc., has had mixed success. Some territory changed hands, but cost has been high in civilian lives and infrastructure damage, making post-conflict recovery more difficult. International aid and reconstruction programs: These have mitigated some suffering, but often cannot keep up with the scale of destruction; questions of corruption, access, and effectiveness remain.

5. Possible Solutions: What Peace Might Look Like

Any durable peace will have to grapple with the deep divides and take a multi-layered approach. Here are some possible components of solutions; each has challenges, but in combination they may make peace possible.

A. Political and Institutional Arrangements

Inclusive, negotiated political settlement Recognize Houthis as part of Yemen’s political landscape; any settlement that marginalizes them is likely to fail. Include southern separatists (or at least southern representatives) so that their concerns over local autonomy, control of resources, governance are addressed. Tribal and local actors should be part of the negotiations and post-agreement governance; local legitimacy matters. Power-sharing or federal / confederal models A federal system might allow for local/regional autonomy, better resource distribution, and reduce the sense of marginalization. However, federal boundaries, revenue sharing, governance competencies all must be carefully negotiated.  Alternatively, a confederal model (strong central government for foreign affairs, currency, national security; local governments with autonomy in local affairs) might help. Transitional governance Until a permanent settlement is in place, some kind of interim or transitional authority that is seen as legitimate, inclusive, transparent. Possibly international or regional guarantors to monitor transitional implementation. Accountability, justice, reconciliation To build trust, there will need to be mechanisms of transitional justice: for abuses, human rights violations, war crimes. Reconciliation efforts: local truth-commissions, community dialogues, repair of social and sectarian rifts.

B. Ceasefires, Security, and Demilitarization

Robust ceasefires and monitoring: Agreements backed by international bodies (UN, etc.), with mechanisms to monitor compliance and consequences for violations. Disarmament / demobilization / reintegration (DDR) programs for fighters who choose to lay down arms. Security sector reform: Rebuilding or modernizing police, military, state security in ways that are neutral, respectful of human rights, and under accountable command. Demining and dealing with remnants of war: Clearing land mines, explosive remnants to allow safe return of displaced people, revival of farming, transport. (Projects like Masam are examples.) 

C. Economic Stabilization and Reconstruction

Restoring basic services: water, electricity, health, sanitation. Stabilizing the currency, controlling inflation. Reviving agriculture, fisheries, industry; ensuring people have livelihoods. Reconstruction of critical infrastructure (roads, ports, airports). Transparent economic governance: reduce corruption, manage oil and gas (if any) revenues in equitable, accountable ways.

D. Humanitarian Relief and Social Needs

Ensure aid flows to all areas, including Houthi‐controlled territories. Remove blockages (e.g. border/regional, bureaucratic). Address public health emergencies: disease control, clean water, cholera outbreaks, malnutrition. Support displaced people to return home where possible; ensure protection of rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Reconstruct schools, provide education; psychosocial supports, especially for children traumatized by conflict.

E. Regional Diplomacy and External Actors

External actors (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Oman, etc.) need to be part of peace negotiations, and their security concerns must be addressed. Confidence-building among these external powers (e.g. limiting cross-border attacks, reducing foreign military footprints, ensuring non-interference) will be critical. International guarantees for peace agreements can help: perhaps guarantor states, UN oversight, or regional bodies.

F. Phased Approach

Given how fractured things are, a sequential, phased approach is likely more feasible:

Immediate steps: ceasefire, easing of humanitarian crisis, opening humanitarian corridors, restoring services. Transitional phase: negotiation over political settlement, establishment of transitional authorities, DDR, security sector reform. Long-term development: rebuilding infrastructure, economic development, reconciliation, elections (if feasible), building institutions.

6. Obstacles and Risks to Peace

While the solutions above offer a roadmap, there are several formidable obstacles:

Spoilers: Parties that fear loss of power or privileges (military elites, local strongmen, external sponsors) may sabotage agreements. Lack of trust: Decades of betrayals, broken ceasefires make parties wary of concessions. Competing visions of Yemen’s identity: Whether Yemen is a single state vs. federated vs. partitioned; role of religion; role of northern vs southern vs tribal governance. External conflicting interests: Regional power plays (e.g. Saudi vs Iran), and foreign state support for different actors can feed conflict. Economic constraints: Huge costs of reconstruction; dependence on foreign funding; risk of corruption and elite capture; risk of economic collapse under peace as under war. Humanitarian urgency: The urgent needs of people (food, water, health) might force or push policies that are expedient but not sustainable. Security vacuum and extremist threats: AQAP, ISIS-affiliated or other militant groups could exploit gaps in governance.

7. Case Studies & Lessons Learned

The Stockholm Agreement (2018), which temporarily reduced violence in Hudaydah port, showed that core infrastructure (ports, airports) are critical leverage points in both humanitarian terms and political bargaining. The Riyadh Agreement (2019) sought to reconcile the internationally recognized government and the STC, including power sharing in Aden. Partial implementation but many delays and contestation. Local mediation (by tribes, local sheikhs) has often succeeded in smaller ceasefires or localized truces, showing that peace must be locally grounded. 

8. Policy Recommendations

For parties seeking to promote peace, here are policy options:

For Yemeni actors (Houthis, government, STC): • Engage in negotiations in good faith and include wide representation. • Be willing to compromise on autonomy, revenue sharing, governance responsibilities. • Commit to transparency and rebuilding legitimacy with citizens. For international mediators and donor community: • Ensure that aid delivery is impartial, reaches all areas, including Houthi regions. • Condition support on governance reforms and adherence to international law. • Provide incentives for compliance with peace agreements. • Be realistic about timelines; invest in long-term institution building, not just short-term fixes. For regional powers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, etc.): • Support peace efforts rather than proxies or spoilers. • Limit cross-border interventions that destabilize further. • Possibly serve as guarantors for peace deals. For civil society and local communities: • Engage in reconciliation processes. • Support local economic and social development. • Amplify voices of ordinary Yemenis in peace dialogues.

9. Possible Scenarios for Peace and Their Viability

Here are several scenarios, with their pros/cons of viability:

Scenario

Description

Strengths

Risks / Weaknesses

Comprehensive National Settlement

One negotiated deal among Houthis, government, STC, tribal actors with federal or power-sharing arrangements.

Potentially durable; could bring large scale peace; restores state coherence.

Hard to negotiate; many spoilers; would require deep compromises; external actors must cooperate.

De facto Partition or Two-State Solution

Recognize that different parts of Yemen are controlled by different entities; formalize separation (e.g. South autonomous or independent, North under Houthis or with federal oversight).

Could reduce conflict between North & South; reduce friction over governance.

May be resisted by many; economic and social linkages complicated; minority rights issues; might entrench partitions that fuel future conflict. Some argue this is the only realistic path. 

Federalism with Strong Local Autonomies

Central government handles foreign affairs, macro-economics; regional governments have control over many local matters.

Could satisfy multiple identity/region concerns; maintain national integrity.

Requires strong institutions; agreement on boundaries and revenue sharing; risks of weak center; risk of local elites capturing power.

Staged Peace: Ceasefire → Transitional Government → Elections

Gradual process, building trust and institutions before final political decisions.

Allows confidence building; better for implementation; reduces immediate risks.

Risk that interim phases become permanent; risk of war relapse; needs strong monitoring and enforcement.

10. Recommendations for an Agenda Going Forward

To move towards peace, the following might be adopted in an agenda:

Negotiate and enforce a nationwide ceasefire covering both internal and cross-border hostilities. With credible international monitoring. Open up humanitarian access, unblock ports and airports, ensure aid reaches all. Establish a widely-inclusive national dialogue with representation from north, south, tribes, women, youth, marginalized groups. Design political and governance reforms, including consideration of federalism, autonomy, resource sharing. Security sector reform and DDR to reshape armed forces into a unified,-accountable security apparatus. Economic stabilization plan with macroeconomic support (currency, inflation, public finances), infrastructure reconstruction, livelihoods programs. Justice, accountability, transitional justice mechanisms to address grievances. Regional diplomacy: secure buy-in from neighboring states; link Yemeni peace with broader regional normalization (e.g. Saudi-Iran ties etc.).

11. Conclusion

Yemen’s civil war is not simply a military conflict but a result of decades of marginalization, weak institutions, regional divisions, external involvement, and overlapping identity, economic, and political cleavages. Achieving sustainable peace will require confronting those realities rather than ignoring them. There is no quick fix; peace will be incremental, fragile, and require sustained internal and external commitment.

If done well, however, Yemen can emerge as a more inclusive, stable state—able to deliver services, represent its diversity, and restore dignity for its people. But failure to act risks continued humanitarian catastrophe, regional instability, and fracturing of Yemen into zones of influence or even outright partition.

If you like, I can prepare a more focused version of this—for example, looking at southern separatism, or the role of outside powers more deeply, or modeling scenarios.