Executive summary

Between June 2022 and August 2023, four flagship Pac-12 members—USC, UCLA, Oregon and Washington—accepted invitations to the Big Ten, with competition beginning in the 2024–25 academic year. All four schools incurred tangible new costs (travel, athlete-welfare spending, governance-imposed payments, and— for Oregon and Washington—reduced media shares) and intangible costs (historic-rivalry strain, alumni backlash, academic scheduling complexity). They moved anyway because Big Ten membership materially increases long-run revenue certainty (via a seven-year media deal worth $7–8+ billion), national exposure across three broadcast windows, College Football Playoff (CFP) access economics, and recruiting/brand advantages, especially as the Pac-12’s next-cycle media options lagged far behind. 

Background and timeline

Jun 30, 2022: USC and UCLA accepted Big Ten invitations for 2024 entry, aligning departure with the end of the Pac-12’s media deal (minimizing exit penalties).  Aug 4, 2023: Oregon and Washington accepted Big Ten invitations for 2024–25; terms contemplated partial revenue shares for multiple years.  The Big Ten’s 2023–2030 media agreements with Fox/CBS/NBC exceed $1B per year; per-school averages are commonly estimated in the $70M range once fully ramped.  By contrast, the Pac-12’s best-available 2023–24 replacement package centered on an Apple streaming proposal reported at $23–25M per school (with subscriber-based upside), well below Big Ten (and even Big 12) baselines. 

Direct and indirect costs by institution

UCLA

UC-mandated “Calimony.” As a condition of endorsing UCLA’s move, the UC Regents required mitigation payments to UC Berkeley of $10M annually for three years (with a revisit after year three), formally approved May 2024.  Athlete-welfare spending. Regents imposed enhanced support—academic, nutrition, mental health, and travel-mitigation (charters)—totaling up to ~$12M/year drawn from new conference revenues. Prior Regents materials also projected ~$10M/year in added costs including $4.5–$5.8M for travel.  Travel/time burdens. Cross-country regular-season trips for multiple sports increase missed class time and operating complexity (aircraft charters, staff). Contemporary reporting underscored substantial travel cost increases at the time of the move. 

USC

Travel and logistics. Similar exposure to coast-to-coast travel (charters, support staffing, academic services), though without UC-system assessments. USC timed its exit with the Pac-12 deal’s end to avoid heavy exit fees.  Non-revenue sport strain. Olympic-sport scheduling demands increase per-diem, academic support, and fatigue risk (qualitative but material), as noted widely when the L.A. schools announced. 

Oregon & Washington

Reduced Big Ten shares (transition period). Both accepted partial media shares—about half of a full Big Ten distribution—for multiple seasons, widely reported in August 2023, with figures “in the 30s” (millions) escalating over time and FOX support smoothing impacts. Some analyses place the TV piece roughly $35–40M/year during the ramp. (They still share fully in postseason distributions.)  Travel and support costs similar to UCLA/USC (charters, academic services, nutrition on the road), compounded by a broader Olympic-sport portfolio. Operating baselines. Public filings in 2024 showed Washington’s finances sensitive to campus support and Oregon operating at high revenue scale—context for absorbing near-term costs in exchange for Big Ten certainty. 

System-wide and intangible costs

Rivalries & regional identity. Traditional games (e.g., Apple Cup, Civil War, L.A. rivalries with Bay Area schools) face scheduling disruption, potentially affecting ticket demand and donor relations. (Some rivalries are being continued out-of-conference on ad-hoc terms.) Missed-class time & athlete wellness. Longer trips across four time zones raise fatigue and academic-continuity costs—precisely why UCLA’s approval included mandated investments and charters.  Governance scrutiny. UCLA’s process drew intervention from the UC Regents and political scrutiny, culminating in the $10M/year Cal payment and ongoing oversight triggers. 

Why they still moved

Massive, bankable media revenue & stability. The Big Ten’s rights are locked through 2029–30 with three national broadcast windows (FOX/CBS/NBC). That stability sharply contrasts with the Pac-12’s uncertain 2024-25 package, which topped out at $23–25M base per school and required subscriber milestones to approach Big 12/ACC ranges. Even with Oregon/Washington’s partial shares, expected annual distributions + postseason revenues meaningfully exceeded realistic Pac-12 outcomes.  National exposure and brand building. Regular network windows (including primetime on NBC) amplify donor interest, applications, and NIL attractiveness for recruits across football and Olympic sports. (The Big Ten deal explicitly created Fox/CBS/NBC Saturday windows.)  CFP economics. With the expanded CFP and an ESPN mega-deal from 2026–27 projected at ~$1.3B/year, anchoring in a top-tier league increases access to—and revenue from—the postseason “treasure chest.” (Newcomers share fully in postseason revenue even if their TV share is phased.)  Recruiting and NIL era positioning. Coast-to-coast visibility and guaranteed top-end media checks bolster facilities, staff, and NIL ecosystems—competitive necessities as SEC/Big Ten separation from other leagues widens. The Big Ten and SEC already out-earned peers pre-expansion, with gaps projected to grow.  Risk management vs. Pac-12 uncertainty. After USC/UCLA’s 2022 decisions, the Pac-12’s negotiating leverage eroded. By August 2023, its best option (Apple streaming) left members exposed to revenue downside and distribution risk, making a Big Ten landing spot a rational hedge even at reduced shares. 

Net assessment by school (2024–2030 window)

UCLA: New obligations of roughly $22M/year at the high end in the early years ($10M Cal payment + up to ~$12M athlete-support/travel) are offset by Big Ten media distributions that, once fully ramped, materially exceed any Pac-12 scenario—yielding a significant net gain in expected value and stability.  USC: Bears larger travel/logistics and Olympic-sport burdens, but without UC assessments; it receives full Big Ten shares from day one, maximizing upside.  Oregon/Washington: Accept near-term half-shares on the TV piece (reportedly ~$35–40M + full postseason shares), betting that brand lift, CFP economics and a ramp to full shares by deal-end dominate lost Pac-12 upside—especially given the Pac-12’s much lower reported offers. 

Conclusion

All four schools faced real costs to jump—UCLA uniquely so due to UC governance conditions and “Calimony”; Oregon and Washington via phased Big Ten shares; everyone via travel and athlete-support outlays. Yet those costs are—in sober financial terms—front-loaded premiums paid to exit an unstable media future and to buy into the Big Ten’s revenue certainty, national platforms, and postseason economics. The decision profiles differ at the margins, but the strategic calculus is the same: accept near-term pain for long-run financial and competitive security. 

Sources

Big Ten media deal and value: ESPN; Axios; industry tallies.  Apple/Pac-12 offer ranges and structure: CBS Sports; Sports Business Journal; SportsPro.  USC/UCLA move timing; travel-cost context: USC release; LA Times.  UCLA Regents conditions and Cal payments: LA Times; CBS SF/AP; UC/Regents materials; ESPN/ABC News.  Oregon/Washington admission and phased shares: ESPN/Thamel; On3; Front Office Sports (context on dollar ranges); discussion of postseason shares.  Athletic-department financial baselines: Sports360AZ (Oregon/Washington reporting).