Executive Summary
This paper examines a governance weakness within the United Church of God (UCG): the absence of term limits or genuine accountability for Operations Managers, particularly those overseeing Ministerial and Member Services and Media and Communications Services. While the UCG was formed in response to prior authoritarian abuses within the Worldwide Church of God, its own governing structure has permitted long-term consolidation of administrative power. This paper demonstrates how this concentration of power in non-rotating managerial positions undermines transparency, spiritual health, and biblical principles of servant leadership, and it proposes structural reforms to restore accountability and prevent the calcification of authority.
I. Introduction
The United Church of God, established in 1995 as a biblically grounded, collegial alternative to hierarchically governed churches, sought to preserve doctrinal continuity while avoiding the centralization of power that had marked its predecessor. However, over time, the Church’s structure has allowed certain roles—especially Operations Managers over key departments like Ministerial and Member Services (MMS) and Media—to become semi-permanent and virtually immune to broad accountability. This paper explores the consequences of that entrenchment, critiques the constitutional and procedural design that permits it, and proposes reforms in alignment with biblical and organizational best practices.
II. Historical and Organizational Context
The UCG was formed following the doctrinal upheavals in the Worldwide Church of God. In an effort to prevent unchecked top-down authority, UCG established a Council of Elders elected by a General Conference of Elders (GCE), with a President appointed by the Council. However, the daily administration of the Church—particularly its ministry and public communications—is managed by Operations Managers. These men are appointed and reappointed internally, often from within a small leadership circle. Although their roles are administrative, they exercise disproportionate influence on the Church’s public image, ministerial culture, and internal communications.
Over the past two decades, these managerial positions have become de facto long-term offices, resistant to scrutiny and insulated from meaningful challenge. This development threatens to replicate the very kind of power centralization UCG was created to prevent.
III. Legal and Structural Overview
According to the UCG’s Constitution and Bylaws, the GCE elects the Council of Elders, which appoints the President. The President, in turn, oversees the Church’s administration with the help of appointed Operations Managers. The Constitution and Bylaws do not specify term limits for Operations Managers nor mandate periodic reviews or reappointment processes. Unlike the Council, whose members face re-election, and unlike pastors, who are subject to member feedback and ministerial review, these administrators operate in a realm of procedural opacity.
While the Council theoretically has the power to remove or replace Operations Managers, in practice such moves are rare and politically fraught. Long-serving individuals in these roles often shape the institutional culture to their own vision, marginalizing dissent and consolidating influence through internal promotions and informal networks.
IV. The Role and Power of Operations Managers
The Operations Manager for Ministerial and Member Services holds extraordinary sway over the spiritual climate of the Church. He supervises ministerial assignments, disciplinary procedures, credentialing, and field minister communication. This authority allows him to shape the doctrinal emphasis of the ministry and gatekeep the internal culture of the pastoral corps.
The Media and Communications Manager similarly holds the reins over UCG’s public image—producing Beyond Today, managing the Church’s digital and print presence, and directing responses to doctrinal controversies. This role, too, functions largely without structural oversight. The individual in this position can determine what the Church says, how it says it, and who gets to say it, all without input from the general membership or an independent editorial board.
Though these roles are administrative in theory, their impact is profoundly spiritual. They determine who is heard, who is promoted, and who is silenced.
V. Structural Weaknesses and Consequences
The consequences of having perpetual managers in such key positions are both organizational and spiritual:
No Term Limits: Without institutional rotation, Operations Managers can remain in place indefinitely. This fosters dependency, stifles innovation, and discourages emerging leaders from contributing new perspectives. Limited Accountability: There are no regular evaluations by the GCE. Council oversight is hampered by personal loyalties, lack of transparency, and reluctance to provoke internal conflict. Lack of Transparency: Operations Managers do not publicly report to the membership in a meaningful way. Their decisions are largely shielded from scrutiny unless a crisis prompts investigation. Conflict of Interest: Because many appointees come from within the same ministerial networks, a culture of mutual deference can prevent corrective action even when performance or decisions warrant review. Concentration of Influence: Media control means narrative control. Ministerial oversight means the shaping of theology and discipline. When combined in a handful of unchanging individuals, these powers make the church vulnerable to stagnation and groupthink.
VI. Theological and Ecclesiastical Implications
Scripture consistently presents leadership as a responsibility, not a personal possession. The New Testament pattern emphasizes rotation, plurality, and accountability. Paul and Peter both warn against lording it over the flock (1 Peter 5:1–3), and Christ commands His followers not to exercise authority as the Gentiles do (Matthew 20:25–28).
By contrast, entrenched Operations Managers operate with a permanence foreign to the early Church. The biblical model does not endorse lifelong executive tenure without communal reaffirmation or review. Moreover, spiritual authority without spiritual accountability fosters abuse, even when intentions are good.
VII. Case Studies and Patterns
Though specific internal records remain private, several trends illustrate the dangers of the current structure:
Ministers who express dissenting views often find themselves reassigned, isolated, or quietly retired, even when they enjoy widespread respect. The Media Department has periodically downplayed theological issues or silenced voices that do not conform to the managerial narrative. Certain doctrinal initiatives, once launched by Operations Managers, have remained in place despite objections, indicating a top-down imposition inconsistent with the Church’s conciliar ideals.
These patterns suggest not merely individual failings but a systemic flaw in governance design.
VIII. Comparative Models and Best Practices
Other churches and nonprofits implement practices that balance stability with accountability:
Rotational Leadership: Term limits ensure that no one holds too much long-term sway. Independent Oversight Committees: Reviews conducted by members outside the immediate administrative circle. Member Engagement: Allowing congregants to give formal input on leadership performance. Transparent Succession Planning: Open processes for identifying and training new leaders.
While maintaining doctrinal integrity and order, these structures reduce the risk of ossification and abuse.
IX. Recommendations for Reform
Amend the Bylaws to Impose Term Limits Five-year renewable terms, with a mandatory sabbatical after ten years, would prevent undue entrenchment. Establish Transparent Review Mechanisms Annual reviews by the Council, informed by anonymous surveys of field ministers and relevant staff, should be codified. Separate Spiritual and Administrative Oversight The Council should more clearly distinguish between the strategic guidance of the Church and the day-to-day discretion of managers, reducing blurred lines of unchecked influence. Foster a Culture of Servant Leadership Leadership training should include explicit instruction on avoiding institutional idolatry and promoting transparency. Introduce Broader Involvement in Appointment Processes Involving more than the Council and President in appointments—such as advisory panels or confirmations from the GCE—would reduce the perception of backroom control.
X. Conclusion
The United Church of God has noble origins in resisting ecclesiastical overreach. Yet without meaningful reform, it risks reproducing the very patterns it once rejected. Operations Managers must not become unaccountable power centers. Instead, the Church must reaffirm its commitment to transparency, biblical leadership, and shared responsibility—lest spiritual stewardship be replaced by bureaucratic permanence.
References
United Church of God. (1995). Constitution and Bylaws.
General Conference of Elders. (Various Years). Annual Meeting Reports.
Council of Elders. (Various Years). Meeting Minutes.
Holy Bible, New King James Version.
Bandy, T. (2001). Moving Off the Map: A Field Guide to Changing the Congregation.
Greenleaf, R. (1977). Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness.

Armstrong specifically taught he was under no earthly accountability. It was the most important of the 18 “restored truths” — the “Government of God.”
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Thus, condemning both Tkach and the UCG Deep State, you’re also condemning one who was even more unaccountable — Herbert Armstrong. Even as I noted to LCG about their response to me on the succession question (preserved in my succession writeup), I will note to you: You might need to practice a little “hunter safety.” You forgot what lay beyond your intended target.
When talk of term limits went around UCG’s during its initial setup, I pointed out that, if indeed God was in charge of that church, not men, term limits would limit HIM in deciding who he wants to be in any given position. I did suggest, though, that you could have a provision whereby a term limit could be overridden by 2/3 vote (“ballot,” as UCG insisted on calling them then) of the GCE. This would have the pedagogic effect while leaving open the possibility of somebody staying in a position long-term. Just a thought. (And yes, I do have some reservations on the concept of constitutional term limits in our civil government. But on that, Deut 16:18ff would allow for a nation or community to do just about anything it wants in that regard. A “church,” though, is supposed to be different.)
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That would be the obvious solution, yes, to allow for an override just as COE members and presidents can be reconfirmed. As far as the rest, to quote Pittsburgh Steelers coach Mike Tomlin, “I said what I said.”
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Or,
“I have written what I have written.” — Pontius Pilate.
(Only maybe not as flattering.)
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Quite so. It would be admittedly difficult to be as flattering as what Pilate wrote though.
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You didn’t even try, though!
It might not be that difficult: “He was Moses.” “He was as God to you.” “He was the End-Time Elijah.” “He was God’s end-time apostle.” “He was the human head of God’s one and only True Church.” “He restored all things.” “He was the one the disciple saw when they spoke of ‘Elijah’ in the Transfiguration.”
Okay, that last one wasn’t official doctrine. As far as I know, anyway. WCG under Armstrong didn’t put out official doctrinal lists, so as not to limit him. Limit Armstrong, that is.
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