Operation Dragoon: The Allied Liberation Of The South Of France: 1944

It is perhaps unsurprising that the liberation of Southern France from the clutches of the Nazis is far more obscure than Normandy. Some historical accounts that I have read, giving short shift to the campaign, argue that it was a mere diversion from more important action elsewhere. The author of this book, who is fulsome and sincere in his praise of those who have written about the campaign before–sometimes quoting and referencing their work–comments at considerable length about the ambivalence that the British had for the campaign in particular, given that the British seem to have war aims that could have conflicted with Dragoon and siphoned away its necessary amphibious craft in order to seek to land in Northern Italy or in the Balkans, which might have greatly altered the way that the war ended out. It is noteworthy, though, that the insistence of both the Americans and the Free French on the campaign allowed for the effort to be undertaken despite the difficulty of getting everything set up and also allowed for the typical American focus on converging fronts to lead to a strong presence in France that had some major logistical benefits by including multiple ports from France to supply American efforts. If this did not immediately bear fruit in late 1944 as the Allied effort in Western Europe stalled, it certainly did allow for a creditable performance of the Allied forces in 1945 as the war ended and also allowed the French to repair the stain of their miserable performance in 1940.

One of the other things that this book does in great detail is to explain a few aspects of the operation that appear to be the subject of both considerable dispute and uncertainty. For one, the role of the French resistance, and the complexity of their organization, their weakness in fighting the Germans directly, and the political popularity of claiming ties with them on the part of the French as a means of avoiding collaborationist or semi-collaborationist obloquy is something that this book spends a great deal of time dealing with, especially at the beginning. This explanation is done in tandem with an explanation of the importance of American and British special forces in encouraging and aiding the French resistance as well as the early course of Operation Dragoon itself. Also of interest is the way that the author deals with the German leadership that was responsible for trying to slow down or reverse the American and French efforts. Ultimately, they were unsuccessful, but their effort was not a waste, and some of the Germans involved come off as somewhat noble in the author’s telling, which is all the more interesting in that the author is (not without reason) harsh about Rommel’s own place as a noble German in the military mythos of World War II, when there are better examples that could be found even within the German army in France.

In terms of its contents, this book is between 250 and 300 pages and is divided into sixteen chapters. Of note for reader is that a considerable majority of this book takes place explaining the context of Operation Dragoon and its planning and its controversy as compared to its actual operation, which is dramatic enough. The author begins with a set of maps as well as an introduction. This is followed by a chapter that discusses the “lost victories” of the Mediterranean front, specifically those that were lost because of failures of planning and strategy relating to Allied efforts in Italy especially (1). After this the author talks about the failures of Anzio, which heavily influenced the planning of Dragoon (2), as well as the tug of war between the British and the Americans over invading the South of France as a whole (3). This is followed by a discussion of the change of name of the operation from Anvil to Dragoon because of fears that the name Anvil had been compromised (4), along with a discussion of the German forces that operated in the south of France that the operation would be attempting to dislodge, defeat, and destroy (5). After this the author discusses the period in which the plan was considered to be ready to roll (6) as well as the planning of the landings within Allied command (7), especially involving cooperation between American and French forces along with British naval resources. The author talks about the planning of the battle being like a chess match (8) and also about the role of the French resistance just before the landings (9) as well as the French commandos in seizing islands just before the invasion (10) began. At this point, the rest of the book focuses on the operation itself, with a discussion of the initial assault, which involved three divisions over the area from a bit west of St. Tropez to just east of Canne (11). This is followed by a discussion of how Allied forces busted out of the bridgehead (12), wone the tough battle of Montelimar (13), and ended up taking the port of Marseilles intact (14). After this the author discusses the drive to Dijon (15) as well as the Champagne campaign that allowed the forces of Dragoon to link up with those from Overlord (16). The book ends with an appendix, a selected bibliography, endnotes, and an index.