1. Executive Summary

Sudan’s war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has become one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes: more than 11–13 million people displaced and over 30 million in need of aid, with widespread hunger, atrocities, and economic collapse. 

Despite multiple failed initiatives (the Jeddah, Geneva, AU/IGAD, and now Quad tracks), the basic diplomatic consensus is emerging around a phased roadmap: a humanitarian truce, a sustained ceasefire, and a civilian-led transition. Recent moves by the “Quad” (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) and by IGAD and the African Union point toward a three-stage process: a three-month humanitarian truce, a permanent ceasefire, and a nine-month political process toward a civilian government. 

This white paper proposes a more detailed, integrated framework that:

Locks in a robust humanitarian ceasefire as Stage 1, with verifiable corridors and economic stabilisation measures. Creates a monitored nationwide ceasefire and transitional security architecture as Stage 2. Launches an inclusive, Sudanese-led political process toward a new constitutional order, with strong safeguards against warlordism, de facto partition, and elite capture as Stage 3.

The framework assumes no purely military solution is viable and that any durable peace requires coordinated leverage by external actors, clear benchmarks, credible monitoring, and meaningful civilian ownership.

2. Background: The Current Conflict and Diplomatic Landscape

2.1 Conflict dynamics

Since April 2023, fighting between SAF and RSF (with complex local and foreign backing) has devastated Khartoum, large parts of Darfur, Kordofan, and other regions. Estimates suggest hundreds of thousands killed, over eleven million displaced, and deepening famine conditions. 

RSF’s recent seizure of key SAF positions in Darfur, notably around al-Fasher, has pushed Sudan toward de facto partition: RSF dominating much of western and southwestern Sudan, SAF holding the east and parts of central areas. 

2.2 Mediation attempts so far

Major efforts include:

Jeddah process (2023–2024) – US-Saudi-facilitated; produced short-term ceasefire and humanitarian agreements but implementation repeatedly failed, leading to suspension in late 2023.  IGAD & AU roadmap – Regional organisations adopted step-by-step plans emphasizing Sudanese ownership, IGAD Quartet mediation, and an inclusive transition, while endorsing the Jeddah process for cessation-of-hostilities issues.  Geneva framework (2024) – US-Swiss-Saudi initiative aiming to broaden participation but boycotted by SAF, partly over disputes about UAE’s role.  Quad roadmap (2025) – US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt proposed: (1) a three-month humanitarian truce; (2) a permanent ceasefire; (3) a nine-month transition to a civilian-led government. 

Recent reports indicate both SAF and RSF have at least in principle agreed to a humanitarian truce plan, with the RSF publicly accepting a US/Arab proposal for a humanitarian ceasefire and signalling openness to further talks. 

The opportunity—and danger—is that this evolving architecture could either harden a de facto partition or be harnessed to rebuild a unified, civilian-led Sudanese state.

3. Strategic Objectives of a Peace Framework

A viable framework should pursue interlocking strategic objectives:

Immediate protection of civilians and humanitarian relief Halt large-scale violence and atrocities. Ensure safe, predictable humanitarian access across lines. Preservation of Sudanese territorial integrity Avoid formal or de facto partition while recognising real regional grievances. Demilitarisation of politics Sequentially reduce the role of SAF, RSF, and other armed actors in governance. Inclusive civilian-led political order Reconnect with the spirit of the 2018 revolution and subsequent civilian movements, avoiding a narrow elite bargain.  Accountability and non-recurrence Address mass atrocities and war crimes in Darfur, Khartoum, Kordofan, and elsewhere, balancing peace incentives with credible justice mechanisms.  Economic stabilisation and reconstruction Reverse the 18%+ economic contraction and livelihoods collapse, address gold/oil resource predation, and rebuild basic services. 

4. Guiding Principles for a Sudan Peace Deal

Sudanese Ownership, International Backing Civilian forces, resistance committees, professional associations, women’s groups, and regional communities must shape the deal’s content. External actors (Quad, AU, IGAD, UN, EU, key Gulf and African partners) provide guarantees and leverage but do not dictate terms. Layered Legitimacy Combine international legitimacy (UN/AU endorsement), regional legitimacy (IGAD, neighboring states), and local legitimacy (customary leaders, committees, civil society). Phased, Benchmark-Based Progress No “big bang” settlement. Instead, staged commitments with clear benchmarks, verification, and conditional incentives/sanctions. Security First but Not Security-Only Humanitarian access and ceasefire are urgent, but must be tied to a credible transition roadmap to avoid “frozen conflict” or warlord entrenchment. Inclusion and Non-Impunity Structured participation for women, youth, ethnic and regional minorities, and displaced/refugee communities. No blanket amnesties for grave crimes; clear path to accountability. Regional Non-Interference and Responsibility Curb arms flows and proxy dynamics, including alleged support relationships (e.g., UAE-RSF, regional backers of SAF). 

5. Proposed Framework: Three Phases, Multiple Tracks

5.1 Phase I – Humanitarian Truce and Civilian Protection (0–3 months)

Objective: Rapidly reduce violence, stabilize front lines, and expand humanitarian access.

Key Components

Humanitarian Truce Agreement Builds directly on the Quad proposal of a three-month humanitarian truce.  Commitments: Immediate cessation of airstrikes and heavy artillery in urban areas. No offensive operations; defensive operations strictly defined. Prohibition of attacks on humanitarian workers, hospitals, markets, and IDP camps. Humanitarian Access Mechanism Joint Humanitarian Access Commission (JHAC) including: Representatives from SAF, RSF, other major armed actors (if applicable). UN OCHA, ICRC, key NGOs. Observers from AU/IGAD. Tasks: Map and formalise humanitarian corridors. Approve convoy movements, monitor obstructions, and report violations. Prioritisation of famine-threatened areas and besieged cities (e.g., parts of Darfur and Kordofan).  Civilian Protection Measures Demilitarised zones around hospitals, schools, major IDP camps, main water and power infrastructure. Rapid establishment of an AU/UN civilian protection mission with limited, clearly mandated presence in highest-risk areas. Special provisions to protect women and ethnic minorities from targeted violence. Initial Confidence-Building Steps Exchange of prisoners and detainees, especially civilians and political prisoners. Formal commitments to allow unhindered telecommunications, fuel imports, and market functioning in designated zones. Monitoring and Verification Mixed Monitoring and Verification Teams (MMVTs) composed of: AU/IGAD military observers. UN human rights monitors. Sudanese civil society observers (with robust protection). Public weekly violation reports; linkage to sanctions or aid conditionality when appropriate.

5.2 Phase II – Nationwide Ceasefire and Transitional Security Architecture (3–12 months)

Objective: Consolidate cessation of hostilities and begin restructuring Sudan’s security sector away from factional control.

Key Components

Nationwide Permanent Ceasefire Negotiated in the latter half of Phase I, entering into force at the end of the humanitarian truce. Detailed clauses on: Disengagement lines and cantonment of forces. Prohibition of forced recruitment and conscription. Ban on cross-border support, mercenary flows, and arms shipments. Security Arrangement Mechanisms Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC): SAF, RSF, other Sudanese armed groups. AU/IGAD military representatives, UN technical support. Mandate: Design and oversee cantonment, disarmament, and integration timelines. Verify drawdown of heavy weapons from urban centres. Security Sector Reform (SSR) Commission: Charged with designing a restructured, unified national army under civilian control within a defined timeline (e.g., 3–5 years). Clear criteria for integration vs. demobilisation of SAF/RSF personnel. Transitional Security Forces Creation of a Transitional Joint Security Force (TJSF) for limited, specified tasks (e.g., securing vital infrastructure and key cities), with: Mixed SAF/RSF contingents under unified command structure supervised by a civilian-led Transitional Security Council. AU/UN advisers embedded in headquarters. Priority to recruit from all regions and communities, including former rebel groups and community defence forces, to dilute narrow power bases. Demilitarisation of Urban Centres Gradual withdrawal of heavy assets from Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, el-Fasher, Nyala, etc. Deployment of TJSF and community policing units, trained in human rights and crowd control. Arms Management and Sanctions Regime Strengthening of UN/AU arms embargo mechanisms. Coordinated action by Quad, EU, and regional partners to: Suspend or control military aid and commercial arms flows to both SAF and RSF. Target financial networks tied to conflict gold and other resource predation. 

5.3 Phase III – Inclusive Civilian-Led Political Transition (3–12+ months, overlapping with Phase II)

Objective: Establish legitimate, civilian-led political institutions that can negotiate a permanent constitutional order.

Key Components

Transitional Civilian Authority Formation of a Transitional Civilian Council (TCC), drawing from: Resistance committees, professional associations, women’s organisations. Political parties (with safeguards against war criminals holding office). Regions historically marginalised (Darfur, Kordofan, East). SAF and RSF excluded from decision-making roles, though they may be represented in advisory security bodies. Interim Constitutional Declaration Builds on prior transitional documents, updated to: Clarify the subordination of armed forces to civilian authorities. Provide for decentralisation and meaningful regional autonomy. Include strong protections for minorities and women’s rights. AU and UN provide constitutional advisory support; final ownership remains Sudanese. Roadmap for Elections Sequenced approach: Local and state-level elections first (once minimum security benchmarks met). National legislative elections next. Presidential or head-of-state arrangements deferred until basic institutions and courts are functional. Realistic timeline (e.g., 24–36 months) to avoid rushed, destabilising polls. Justice and Reconciliation Architecture Multi-layered approach: Hybrid Special Court for Sudan (possibly AU-UN-Sudan) focusing on senior perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission to address broader patterns of abuse, land grabs, and dispossession (especially in Darfur and conflict-affected regions). Community-level reconciliation mechanisms (drawing on local customary practices), with legal safeguards to protect victims and avoid coerced “reconciliation.”  Protection programmes for witnesses, human rights defenders, and local documenters (many already active through revolutionary committees).  Economic and Humanitarian Transition Package Comprehensive economic stabilisation/recovery package coordinated by: International Financial Institutions (World Bank, IMF), Gulf donors, EU, and regional banks. Priorities: Emergency food security and agricultural support. Rehabilitation of key infrastructure (power, water, transport). Debt and arrears relief conditioned on transparency and anti-corruption reforms. Strong safeguards against elite capture, including public procurement reforms and independent anti-corruption bodies.

6. Implementation Architecture and Guarantees

6.1 Institutional Architecture

Sudan Peace Implementation Council (SPIC) Core body coordinating implementation, comprising: Transitional Civilian Council (TCC) representatives. Chairs of JCC, SSR Commission, and JHAC. AU, IGAD, UN representatives. Functions: Set rolling 90-day implementation priorities. Resolve disputes between security and political tracks. Interface with donors and external guarantors. External Guarantor Group Formal grouping including: Quad states (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt). African Union and IGAD. UN, EU, and at least two additional African states not directly party to the conflict. Commitments: Jointly enunciate carrots (aid, investment, political support) and sticks (sanctions, arms limitations, legal measures). Speak with one voice on violations to avoid “forum shopping” by SAF/RSF.  Civil Society Oversight Forum Institutionalised participation for: Resistance committees, civil society coalitions, women’s networks, trade unions, IDP/refugee representatives. Advisory but powerful through: Mandatory public reporting. Right to request SPIC hearings on major violations or governance failures.

6.2 Incentives, Conditionalities, and Enforcement

Positive Incentives Phased lifting of targeted sanctions once specific benchmarks are verified: E.g., withdrawal of heavy weapons from cities, verified cantonment, opening of key corridors. Access to reconstruction funds tied to compliance. Security guarantees for leaders who comply with demobilisation and accept political marginalisation from high office (though not impunity for grave crimes). Negative Incentives Expanded targeted sanctions on individuals and entities obstructing peace, including: Travel bans, asset freezes, and restrictions on gold/oil exports tied to conflict actors. Referral or support for cases before the International Criminal Court where domestic mechanisms are insufficient. Compliance Metrics Publication of a quarterly Sudan Peace Scorecard, with indicators such as: Number and severity of ceasefire violations. Humanitarian access days lost due to obstruction. Progress on cantonment, demobilisation, and SSR benchmarks. Inclusion metrics (representation of women, regions, IDPs in institutions). Used to calibrate donor support and diplomatic pressure.

7. Risk Analysis and Mitigation

7.1 De Facto Partition and Warlord Entrenchment

Risk: RSF consolidation in western Sudan and SAF dominance in the east could harden into a “soft partition,” with each side monetising resources and taxing populations. 

Mitigation:

Explicit rejection of partition in all agreements. Economic package designed on a national basis, not factional. Regional and global actors commit not to recognise any breakaway or warlord proto-state.

7.2 Spoilers within SAF and RSF

Risk: Hardline commanders benefit from continued war and resource predation, undermining moderates.

Mitigation:

Targeted sanctions combined with credible inducements (e.g., security guarantees, rehabilitation of non-atrocity offenders into civilian roles). Internal vetting procedures for leadership positions in the unified army and transitional institutions.

7.3 Proxy Competition Among Regional Actors

Risk: Continued arms and funding flows from neighbouring states and other powers fuel mistrust and rearmament. 

Mitigation:

Binding, monitored commitments from key external actors in the External Guarantor Group. Regional security dialogue (e.g., Gulf–Horn compact) to address shared concerns (terrorism, migration, trade) without using Sudan as a proxy theatre.

7.4 Weak Civilian Capacity and Fragmentation

Risk: Civilian coalitions are fragmented and traumatised, making it easier for military actors to dominate the transition.

Mitigation:

Early investment in civilian capacity building: legal, administrative, and policy training. Inclusive processes that avoid repeating old elite bargains, with quotas or minimum representation thresholds for women, youth, and marginalised regions. International partners provide technical assistance to but not control over civilian institutions.

8. Operational Steps for the Next 6–12 Months

Assuming political will from key actors, the following sequenced operational steps are proposed:

Consolidate the Humanitarian Truce (Month 0–1) Finalise and sign detailed humanitarian truce text (Quad, AU, IGAD, UN co-facilitated). Establish JHAC and MMVTs; deploy initial teams to priority corridors. Launch Security and Political Preparatory Talks (Month 1–3) Parallel, but linked, tracks: Ceasefire and security arrangements (JCC/SSR technical talks). Political transition design (pre-TCC dialogues among civilian stakeholders). Agree on modalities for forming the TCC and drafting the Interim Constitutional Declaration. Adopt Nationwide Ceasefire and Announce TCC (Month 3) Ceasefire enters into force as humanitarian truce expires, with cantonment map agreed. TCC publicly announced, with clear membership and mandate. Begin Demilitarisation and SSR Processes (Month 3–9) Rollout of cantonment and disarmament in stages. Formation and deployment of TJSF to key cities and infrastructure. Launch Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms (Month 4–12) Establishment of hybrid court and national truth commission. Pilot community reconciliation initiatives in selected localities. Design and Begin Implementing Economic Recovery Plan (Month 4–12) Donor conference conditioned on concrete early benchmarks. Start quick impact projects (water systems, health centres, agricultural inputs).

9. Conclusion

Sudan’s war is not just a domestic power struggle; it is a regional and global crisis, with massive human cost and destabilising spillover. Existing diplomatic tracks—Jeddah, Geneva, AU/IGAD roadmaps, and the Quad initiative—have built fragments of a solution but have not yet coalesced into a robust, enforceable framework.

This white paper argues that a viable peace framework should:

Anchor itself in a three-stage roadmap—humanitarian truce, nationwide ceasefire/security restructuring, and a civilian-led transition—building directly on the Quad and AU/IGAD proposals but adding greater detail, accountability, and civilian ownership. Structure incentives and enforcement so that continued war becomes more costly than peace for all key elites, including their external backers. Give Sudanese civilians a central seat at the table, not merely as victims or observers, but as the decisive authors of their country’s next political settlement.

The window for such a settlement is narrow. Each month of delay deepens displacement, normalises atrocity, and entrenches war economies. But the recent convergence around a humanitarian truce and a clear three-stage roadmap suggests that the ingredients for a viable deal are present. The challenge now is to weave them into a coherent, enforceable framework that can carry Sudan from catastrophic war toward a fragile but real peace.