Executive summary

The Abraham Accords are a set of U.S.-mediated normalization arrangements launched in 2020 that pair a short Abraham Accords Declaration with country-specific bilateral normalization agreements with Israel. Initial signatories were the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain (September 15, 2020), followed by Morocco (December 22, 2020) and Sudan (which signed the Declaration on January 6, 2021, with full normalization contingent on domestic developments). On November 6–7, 2025, Kazakhstan moved to join the Accords in a largely symbolic step (it already had ties with Israel), signaling renewed expansion. 

The Accords’ terms emphasize mutual recognition, exchange of ambassadors, flights/visas, trade and investment, and cooperation across security, energy, health, and technology. Specific bilateral texts add commitments (e.g., UAE–Israel referenced the suspension of West Bank annexation in the run-up to signature). Economically, the Accords have catalyzed billions in trade and investment—tempered by periodic geopolitical shocks. Strategically, they rewire regional alignments, expand minilateral forums (e.g., I2U2), and carry domestic and diplomatic trade-offs (e.g., U.S. recognition of Morocco’s Western Sahara claim alongside Rabat–Jerusalem normalization). 

1) What the Abraham Accords are (structure & documents)

Two layers make up “the Abraham Accords”:

The Abraham Accords Declaration (a brief principles statement): affirms mutual understanding, peace, tolerance, and cooperation; it is not a defense pact or economic union, and it does not define membership criteria beyond willingness to pursue peaceful normalization with Israel.  Bilateral normalization agreements between Israel and individual states: UAE–Israel “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement” (Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization). It codifies mutual recognition; exchange of ambassadors; civil aviation; tourism/visas; trade/investment; science/health/energy/technology cooperation; and other peacetime ties.  Bahrain–Israel “Abraham Accords: Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations.” Similar normalization provisions tailored to Manama–Jerusalem relations.  Morocco–Israel (Tripartite Joint Declaration with the U.S., Dec. 22, 2020) to re-open liaison offices, establish full diplomatic relations, direct flights, and broad cooperation—paired with a U.S. proclamation recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.  Sudan signed the Abraham Accords Declaration (Jan. 6, 2021) and later announced a finalized agreement pending a civilian government; full implementation remains delayed by the country’s internal conflict. 

Key contextual term (UAE track): Israel suspended planned West Bank annexation as part of the 2020 breakthrough—a political commitment that underpinned early momentum. 

2) Who has joined (and when)

United Arab Emirates — Treaty signed Sept. 15, 2020; entered into force Jan. 5, 2021.  Bahrain — Declaration signed Sept. 15, 2020 (parallel to UAE).  Morocco — Dec. 22, 2020 Joint Declaration; U.S. recognition of Western Sahara announced Dec. 10, 2020.  Sudan — Signed the Abraham Accords Declaration Jan. 6, 2021; full normalization dependent on political transition.  Kazakhstan — Announced Nov. 6–7, 2025 it would join the Accords (largely symbolic given pre-existing relations). 

Note: Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) normalized ties with Israel decades earlier; while often grouped in analyses, they are not Abraham Accords signatories. (Background context only; not part of the 2020 framework.)

3) Who is eligible to join?

There is no treaty-defined eligibility clause. In practice, any sovereign state willing to (a) sign the Abraham Accords Declaration and (b) conclude a bilateral normalization arrangement with Israel can “join” the Accords family. The U.S. and Israel have at times prioritized Arab League and wider Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Oman, Mauritania, Indonesia) for strategic reach; 2025 discussions and public signals have continued to float these and others. 

4) Core terms found across the agreements

While each bilateral text differs, recurring substantive pillars include:

Diplomatic relations Exchange of ambassadors and opening of embassies/liaison offices; establishment of diplomatic, consular, and cultural ties.  Aviation, visas, and people-to-people links Regular direct flights; facilitation of visas/tourism; civil aviation cooperation.  Economic integration Commitments to expand trade, investment, financial services, standards, and regulatory cooperation across energy, health, agri-tech, water, logistics, and digital economy.  Science, technology, health, and environment Frameworks for R&D, health security, pandemic cooperation, water/food security, and climate-tech.  Security cooperation (non-alliance) Political consultations, counter-extremism language, and space for security/defense MOUs (especially visible in the Morocco track). These are not mutual defense treaties.  Regional de-escalation language The Declaration’s rhetoric commits parties to pursue broad peace, coexistence, and a tolerant interfaith vision (hence “Abraham”). 

5) Strategic and economic implications of joining

A. Economic dividends (with volatility)

Trade & investment surge: Multiple datasets and analyses show multi-billion-dollar flows since 2020; for example, Israel–UAE goods trade surpassed $3.2B in 2024, with billions more in investment and millions of travelers—though figures fluctuate with geopolitical risk.  Sectoral linkages: Cybersecurity, fintech, desalination/water tech, agri-food systems, healthcare, logistics, tourism, and aviation saw the earliest wins (e.g., rapid rollout of direct flights and VC licensing in Abu Dhabi).  Shock sensitivity: Wars and escalations (e.g., Gaza 2023–2025) cool deal flow and tourism without fully severing ties; several deals moved “quieter,” indicating resilience but reputational and regulatory headwinds. 

B. Diplomatic leverage & minilateralism

Broader coalitions: Joining increases access to new minilateral forums (e.g., I2U2—India, Israel, UAE, U.S.—for food corridors, energy, and tech projects) and working groups sometimes dubbed the “Negev Forum.” These platforms pool financing, logistics, and political backing for cross-border projects.  Washington relationships: Accords expansion has repeatedly intertwined with U.S. bilateral incentives (e.g., Western Sahara recognition paired with Morocco’s move), security cooperation, or trade sweeteners. 

C. Security calculus

Iran balancing & technology flows: Normalization often aims to counter Iranian influence and enable selective security collaboration, without formal alliances. Participation can improve access to U.S./Israeli tech, training, and intelligence channels.  Domestic & regional risk: Parties face internal opposition or conditionality (e.g., Sudan’s civilian transition; Gulf sensitivities over West Bank/Temple Mount). Escalation risks—annexation talk, civilian casualties—can trigger political blowback or threats to rollbacks. 

D. Palestinian track & conditionalities

The UAE-Israel breakthrough was accompanied by Israeli suspension of annexation plans, but enduring disputes over settlements/Gaza continue to shape public opinion and elite signaling; partners have warned that steps like West Bank annexation could cross “red lines.” 

E. Issue-linkage precedents

Morocco’s Western Sahara: U.S. recognition was explicitly linked to Rabat’s normalization, illustrating how Accords access can bundle unrelated but vital national aims with normalization decisions. For prospective joiners, analogous issue-linkage is a bargaining template. 

6) Considerations for prospective entrants

Benefits

Access to diversified capital & technology; accelerated aviation/tourism flows; visibility in U.S. strategic initiatives; and expanded public/private partnerships. 

Costs/Risks

Domestic political pushback (religious, nationalist, or solidarity-based). Reputational exposure during conflicts involving Israel; potential for boycotts or cyber campaigns. Diplomatic trade-offs with rivals (e.g., Algeria in response to Morocco’s move). 

Implementation checklist

Draft/signal intent to sign the Abraham Accords Declaration; negotiate a bespoke bilateral text with Israel (aviation, visas, trade chapters first). Identify quick-win projects (air links, tourism facilitation, water/agri-tech pilots). Build domestic consensus (religious leaders, business chambers, security services). Prepare communications & risk protocols for conflict-related shocks (trade compliance, travel advisories, export controls).

7) Current status snapshot (as of Nov. 8, 2025)

Active normalizations: UAE, Bahrain, Morocco; Sudan is signatory to the Declaration but awaits political conditions for full ties. Kazakhstan has announced entry (symbolic, building on long-standing ties).  Economic momentum: Significant but uneven since late 2023 due to the Gaza war; recovery prospects hinge on de-escalation and policy signals (e.g., on annexation).  Expansion watchlist: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Mauritania, Indonesia, and others are often cited as potential additions when conditions align. 

8) Appendix: Primary texts & authoritative resources

Abraham Accords Declaration (U.S. State Department / Gov.il).  UAE–Israel Peace Agreement (Sept. 15, 2020).  Bahrain–Israel Declaration (Sept. 15, 2020).  Morocco–Israel–U.S. Joint Declaration (Dec. 22, 2020).  Sudan—Abraham Accords Declaration (Jan. 6, 2021).  I2U2 overview (U.S. State Department).  Recent expansion: Kazakhstan announcement (Nov. 2025).  Economic impact snapshots (Atlantic Council; Reuters business impacts during Gaza war). 

Bottom line

The Accords are a flexible normalization framework rather than a rules-bound organization. Eligibility is therefore political and practical—anchored in a state’s willingness to normalize ties with Israel and to operationalize cooperation across aviation, trade, technology, and diplomacy. For states that can manage the domestic politics and regional optics, the Accords offer tangible economic gains, greater access to U.S. and Israeli technology and capital, and a seat in emerging minilateral projects—but those benefits are sensitive to conflict dynamics and may entail non-Middle East side-payments (as Morocco’s Western Sahara case demonstrates).