Executive summary

Sudan’s war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF, led by Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo) has hardened into a multi-front conflict with heavy foreign involvement, catastrophic humanitarian conditions, and a battlefield increasingly divided into semi-autonomous zones. As of late October 2025, the RSF dominates most of Darfur and has recently claimed major gains in El-Fasher, while the SAF has clawed back parts of Gezira/Kordofan and retains Sudan’s internationally recognized seat of government and access to the Red Sea via Port Sudan. 

Key external enablers continue to shape the balance: multiple independent investigations have alleged or documented UAE-linked materiel flows to the RSF (which the UAE denies), while Iran and—at times—Russia have supplied the SAF, notably with drones. These pipelines, coupled with each side’s territorial depth and revenue sources, make a clean, country-wide victory improbable in the near term. 

Bottom line (12–18 month outlook):

Prolonged stalemate with de-facto partition into zones of control: ~55% likelihood. SAF operational ascendancy (not total victory) anchored on the east/Red Sea corridor and parts of Kordofan/Gezira: ~25%. RSF operational ascendancy (not total victory) consolidating Darfur and pushing deeper east: ~15%. Negotiated political settlement that meaningfully reunifies state authority: <5% (without major external leverage changes).

These estimates rest on the persistence of current external support patterns, the SAF’s access to the coast and state institutions, the RSF’s entrenched position in Darfur and use of mobile/droned-artillery tactics, and repeated failures of diplomacy to generate durable ceasefires. 

1) Order of battle and geography

SAF: controls the eastern heartland and Red Sea access (notably Port Sudan), fields armor/artillery, retains remnants of an air force, and since early 2024/2025 has benefited from Iranian-supplied UAVs (e.g., Mohajer/Ababil families) and other equipment delivered via the eastern corridor. SAF reported key recoveries in El-Obeid (North Kordofan) and offensives in Gezira, with episodic counter-pushes toward Wad Madani. However, Kordofan remains a contested battlespace subject to RSF drone/artillery strikes. 

RSF: dominates most of Darfur, has waged a prolonged siege against El-Fasher (North Darfur) and in late October 2025 claimed to have taken significant parts of the city. RSF tactical advantages include desert mobility, looting-fed logistics, gold-linked finance networks, and increasing use of armed drones against SAF rear areas and urban infrastructure. 

Other armed actors: The SPLM-N/al-Hilu faction holds territory in the Nuba Mountains/Blue Nile areas and generally stands apart from both warring parties, while the SPLM-N/Agar faction has aligned episodically with the SAF. These third-actor enclaves complicate any single authority’s attempt to re-centralize Sudan even if the main war frontlines froze. 

Current control picture: Late-October mapping shows SAF strength along the Nile and east, RSF dominance in Darfur and swathes of central/west, and contested Kordofan. This pattern has only modestly shifted in 2025 despite dramatic local offensives. 

2) External support and diplomatic track

RSF support: Multiple investigations (Amnesty, UK/UN-linked dossiers, major media reporting) have identified arms re-exports and supply chains allegedly linking the UAE to RSF equipment—claims the UAE rejects. The ICJ case Sudan brought against the UAE on genocide complicity grounds was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not merits—keeping the geopolitical cloud but removing a judicial lever for now.  SAF support: Iranian drone deliveries (and periodic Russian interest in a Red Sea foothold) have been documented/assessed by open-source and policy analysis organizations and reported by wire services. These capabilities help offset RSF’s mobility and urban micro-UAS use, particularly along the eastern corridor.  Diplomacy: The Jeddah process and regionally backed proposals have repeatedly stalled; new Quartet/AU/IGAD messaging in Sep. 2025 called for a truce and political process, but track-record suggests low near-term traction without enforcement and tighter controls on external arms pipelines. 

3) Humanitarian operating picture (constraints on strategy)

World’s largest displacement emergency: ~11.7 million forcibly displaced across and beyond Sudan as of Oct. 20, 2025; internal displacement remains unprecedented. Fresh displacements continue weekly.  Famine conditions: IPC Phase 5 famine has been confirmed/assessed in parts of North Darfur (e.g., Zamzam) and projected to expand at points in 2024–2025; siege tactics around El-Fasher and access denials elsewhere have created pockets of catastrophic hunger and excess mortality.  Targeting of civilians and health care: Documented drone/artillery strikes on IDP sites, mosques, and hospitals; systemic impediments to aid by both sides; and sustained atrocities in Darfur. These dynamics both shape operations (e.g., sieges, urban terror) and limit the feasibility of reconstruction/governance in recaptured areas. 

Strategic implication: humanitarian collapse reduces the “value” of holding terrain while increasing the reputational and political cost of offensive operations; yet both camps continue to exploit starvation and access control as instruments of war, reinforcing a war-of-attrition logic.

4) Campaign-level strengths and vulnerabilities

SAF strengths

State shell: international recognition, Port Sudan/Red Sea access for supplies and diplomacy, partial taxation and customs.  Heavier fires & drones (Iranian platforms), giving counter-mobility and interdiction advantages in open terrain and against RSF concentrations.  Allied/auxiliary factions (e.g., SPLM-N/Agar) at times augment manpower on select axes. 

SAF vulnerabilities

Urban legitimacy gap after 2021–23 politics; fractured command and contested cohesion; reliance on external suppliers vulnerable to sanctions/interdiction.  Expensive hold requirements in retaken cities (Wad Madani, El-Obeid), exposed to RSF drones/sabotage. 

RSF strengths

Deep embedding in Darfur with local patronage networks; access to gold revenue and cross-border logistics; high mobility and drone/artillery harassment tactics that punish SAF concentrations and rear areas.  Ability to impose siege warfare (El-Fasher) to create bargaining leverage. 

RSF vulnerabilities

International isolation risks tied to atrocity allegations and embargo violations; dependence on covert air/ground resupply nodes that are targetable and diplomatically pressure-sensitive.  Limited capacity for coastal/eastern governance or sustained combined-arms operations beyond Darfur heartlands.

5) Scenarios and likelihoods (12–18 months)

Extended stalemate with de-facto partition (~55%) What it looks like: SAF retains the east/Red Sea corridor and key Nile cities; RSF holds Darfur and portions of central corridors; Kordofan oscillates. Third actors (SPLM-N/al-Hilu) persist in Nuba/Blue Nile pockets. Front lines freeze, humanitarian zones expand, smuggling and local fiefdoms proliferate.  Drivers: durable external lifelines to both sides; limited international enforcement; war-economy entrenchment; failed or symbolic diplomacy.  SAF operational ascendancy (~25%) What it looks like: SAF consolidates Kordofan-Gezira axes, secures El-Obeid–Export Road and sporadically reopens limited corridors toward Khartoum, while keeping Port Sudan open; RSF suffers attrition from air/UAV interdiction and financial squeeze. Political victory still elusive in Darfur’s interior.  Catalysts: tighter interdiction of RSF supply chains; sustained Iranian/Russian materiel; meaningful AU/IGAD pressure on foreign resupply.  RSF operational ascendancy (~15%) What it looks like: RSF fully consolidates Darfur (post-El-Fasher) and pushes east along key routes to harass/fragment SAF control in Kordofan/Gezira; drone/artillery strikes degrade SAF’s ability to hold retaken cities. SAF retains coast but bleeds.  Catalysts: sustained/covert replenishment of RSF arms; fragmentation within SAF; international paralysis or recognition bids for a “new authority” in the west.  Negotiated settlement with meaningful reunification (<5%) What it looks like: a monitored ceasefire; cantonment; phased disarmament; inclusive transitional authority. Why unlikely now: repeated Jeddah-track breakdowns; no consensus among external patrons; parties still believe they can improve position militarily. 

On formal partition: A de-jure split remains unlikely in the near term (regional bodies consistently affirm “unity and sovereignty of Sudan”), but de-facto partition—enduring zones of control with hardened borders, taxation, and parallel administrations—is increasingly the operative reality. 

6) Indicators to watch

Arms pipeline disruptions or confirmations (e.g., interdictions, new evidence on UAE–RSF chains; visible reduction in Iranian UAV sorties/logistics for SAF).  Control of chokepoints: Export Road (El-Obeid–Khartoum), Kosti/White Nile bridges, Atbara/Nile crossings, and Port Sudan corridors.  Status of El-Fasher and Darfur towns: whether RSF consolidates or faces attritional pushback/insurgency.  SPLM-N/al-Hilu posture: expansion or neutrality shifts that could reshape southern fronts.  Diplomatic inflection: enforceable AU/IGAD/Quartet mechanisms (e.g., verifiable truce with monitors, sanctions on violators, air-bridge deconfliction).  Humanitarian access corridors: durable openings into Darfur/Nuba; trends in IPC analyses and mortality. 

7) Policy implications (for mediators, donors, and analysts)

Prioritize arms-flow leverage: Without altering external supply dynamics, battlefield incentives favor continued attrition. Coordinated monitoring/interdiction—backed by targeted sanctions and naming-and-shaming grounded in credible investigations—offers more leverage than statements alone.  Humanitarian corridors with enforcement: Famine confirmation in parts of Darfur and siege-based starvation tactics demand enforced access guarantees (air/ground) and civilian site deconfliction backed by independent monitors.  Ceasefire realism: Given prior failures, near-term aims should be localized, monitored pauses tied to aid delivery and protection of specific urban/IDP zones (e.g., El-Fasher), while preparing for protracted de-facto partition management if national-level talks stall.  Plan for governance in fragments: Support basic services and civil administration in zones where access is possible (including SPLM-N areas), to reduce war-economy entrenchment and prevent complete institutional collapse. 

Appendix: Snapshot data points (Oct 2025)

Displacement: ~11.76 million forcibly displaced across/beyond Sudan (UNHCR operational portal, updated Oct 20, 2025).  Famine/IPC: Famine (IPC 5) confirmed in parts of North Darfur; projections of expansion in 2024–25; severe access denials around El-Fasher.  Recent battlefield headlines: RSF claimed major advances inside El-Fasher (Oct 26–27, 2025); SAF resumed Kordofan campaigning; El-Obeid remains SAF-held but under drone harassment.  Foreign supply allegations/documentation: UAE-linked materiel to RSF (denied by UAE); Iranian drones to SAF; ICJ case on UAE jurisdiction dismissed (May 2025).  Diplomacy: AU/IGAD back a Quartet call for truce and transition; little change on the ground to date. 

Judgement call on “victory vs. partition”

A decisive national victory by either camp would require (a) cutting the other side’s foreign supply for months; (b) sustaining combined-arms advances across multiple regions (Darfur for SAF; the Nile/Red Sea corridor for RSF); and (c) rapidly restoring governance in devastated urban centers to prevent insurgent relapse. None of these conditions appear imminent. The most probable path is a prolonged, harsh stalemate with durable zones of control—a de-facto partition that may last well beyond the next 12–18 months unless external patrons change course and a monitored ceasefire with enforcement teeth emerges. 

Note on sources: This assessment integrates late-October 2025 conflict mapping and reporting; humanitarian dashboards (UNHCR/IPC/FEWS); and analyses on external support and diplomacy (Amnesty, Reuters, AU/IGAD communiqués, and credible regional outlets). Key references are embedded inline after each paragraph.