Executive summary

Albania’s government has floated creating a Vatican-style enclave—the “Sovereign State of the Bektashi Order”—on the grounds of the Bektashi World Headquarters (Kryegjyshata) in Tirana. Drafting began in late 2024; any such move would require amending Albania’s Constitution (which declares the state “unitary and indivisible”) and then constructing an external recognition strategy. Two realistic end-states exist: (1) a territorial micro-state created by Albanian law (a “Lateran-style” solution), or (2) a non-territorial sovereign subject of international law (an “Order of Malta-style” solution). The first is harder domestically but more straightforward internationally; the second is easier at home but requires creative diplomacy abroad. Based on current reporting and the constitutional hurdles, the earliest credible window for a durable legal settlement inside Albania is 2026–2027, with international recognition unfolding incrementally over several additional years—and UN membership is improbable; UN Observer-style arrangements are the most plausible ceiling in the medium term. 

1) Background: the Bektashi Order and its headquarters

The Bektashi Order is a Sufi (Alevi-Bektashi) tradition whose global administrative seat moved to Albania after Turkey banned dervish orders in 1925. Since 1930, its World Headquarters has sat on Tirana’s eastern edge; it includes a tekke, museum, archives, and administrative offices. 

In September 2024, Prime Minister Edi Rama publicly proposed transforming this site into a sovereign enclave, a plan endorsed in principle by Dedebaba Baba Mondi and framed as a symbol of religious tolerance. Reporting since then has described ongoing legal drafting and the need for parliamentary and constitutional change. Public reaction has been mixed, ranging from enthusiasm to skepticism about motives and feasibility. 

2) What “recognition as a state” would actually require

2.1 Domestic (Albanian) law

State creation by enclave would require, at minimum:

Constitutional amendment: Article 1(2) defines Albania as “unitary and indivisible.” A Bektashi enclave would need a qualified majority (two-thirds) in parliament to carve out a special sovereign area.  Organic implementing law: delineating borders (≈11 ha / 27 acres), competencies (tax, policing, civil/criminal jurisdiction, citizenship, entry/exit), and treaty-making capacity.  A Lateran-style bilateral instrument between Albania and the Bektashi State (or the Order as sovereign) to “lock” sovereignty, privileges, immunities, finance, and dispute mechanisms—mirroring how the Lateran Treaty (1929) settled the “Roman Question” and created Vatican City. 

2.2 International law

There are two principal models for international personality:

Model A — Territorial micro-state (Vatican-style).

A tiny, territorially sovereign entity created by domestic law plus a state-to-entity treaty, then third-state recognition via bilateral notes and treaty practice. UN membership is not required (e.g., the Holy See is a Permanent Observer State), and is highly unlikely for the Bektashi entity in the near term. 

Model B — Non-territorial sovereign subject (Order-of-Malta-style).

No sovereign territory, but sovereign subject status recognized through practice (diplomatic relations, bilateral agreements, permanent missions). The Sovereign Military Order of Malta holds UN Permanent Observer status (since 1994) without territory, reflecting functional sovereignty tied to humanitarian role. This path could fit a scenario where Albania retains full territorial sovereignty while conferring extraterritoriality to Bektashi premises. 

A third, sub-sovereign model—akin to Mount Athos—is a constitutionally protected autonomous religious jurisdiction within a unitary state. It is not international sovereignty, but it offers deep internal autonomy and has withstood EU integration and modern rights debates. This would be simpler to enact, but falls short of statehood. 

3) The current Albanian proposal: knowns and unknowns

Media and academic commentary since late 2024 agree on several points:

The concept is serious enough that legal drafting started in 2024; the site footprint is about 11 hectares (27 acres).  The enclave is pitched as Vatican-style, with citizenship limited to clerics/officials and no military or border guards; critics question necessity and political timing.  Analysts highlight an Order of Malta comparison (diplomacy without territory), suggesting Tirana could favor extraterritoriality + observer diplomacy over full territorial secession. 

Bottom line: the text of any amendment or enabling law has not (publicly) cleared parliament as of September 12, 2025. The next steps and sequencing therefore remain political. 

4) Recognition pathways: step-by-step

Path 1 — Territorial micro-state (Vatican-style)

Constitutional amendment (2/3 of MPs). Framework Treaty (Albania ↔ Bektashi State), codifying sovereignty, finance, security cooperation, dispute resolution, and transitional arrangements. (Lateran-style.)  Implementing legislation (customs, borders/entry regime, residency, registry, property/land cadastre).  Third-country notes: Target early recognizers (neighbors; OIC states with Sufi heritage; Italy/Vatican; EU partners). IGO engagement: pursue UN Observer arrangements (not membership), and selective entry into specialized agencies where feasible (UPU/ITU/WIPO precedents via the Holy See). 

Pros: Clear sovereignty; easiest to explain internationally.

Cons: Highest domestic legal threshold; risks domestic backlash over “state-within-a-state.” 

Path 2 — Non-territorial sovereign subject (Order-of-Malta-style)

Domestic law granting extraterritoriality and international capacity to the Bektashi Order headquarters while affirming Albania’s territorial sovereignty. Bilateral recognitions and diplomatic relations premised on the Order’s religious/cultural mission. UN Permanent Observer application framed around humanitarian, cultural, and interfaith engagement (mirroring the 1994 Order of Malta resolution). 

Pros: Avoids constitutional surgery; politically lighter; internationally precedented.

Cons: No classical “statehood”; recognition remains functional and may vary by country.

Path 3 — Deep domestic autonomy (Mount Athos-style)

Constitutional article declaring the headquarters a self-governed part of the state under special religious privileges; Albania’s sovereignty remains intact. Organic law for internal governance, admissions (clerical “citizenship”), property, fiscal rules, and policing via protocols with Albanian authorities. 

Pros: Fastest domestically; lowest diplomatic risk.

Cons: Not international sovereignty; limited external personality.

5) Institutional design choices (whatever the path)

Citizenship & residency: Vatican-style limitation to clerics/officials is already signaled; admissions criteria and loss of status must be codified.  Security & policing: If territorial, a gendarmerie-lite or memorandum with Albanian police; if extraterritorial, rely on host-state policing with on-premise protective services.  Courts & dispute resolution: Territorial model needs at least civil/administrative fora and criminal MOUs; non-territorial model leverages Albanian courts plus arbitration clauses in treaties. Borders & mobility: Entry permit regime; Schengen/EU analogs suggest tailored carve-outs are workable even within larger legal areas. (Mount Athos demonstrates long-standing special regimes inside the EU.)  Finance: Endowment, donations, cultural tourism; customs/VAT arrangements depend on model. Foreign relations: From cultural agreements and mutual recognition of travel documents to missions dedicated to interfaith dialogue and heritage protection.

6) External recognition strategy

Phase 1 – Neighborhood & like-minded states. Quiet consultations with Italy, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece; outreach to OIC members with Sufi traditions (e.g., Albania’s Muslim partners) for early recognitions or practical accords.

Phase 2 – Functional multilateralism. Seek UN Permanent Observer status (not membership) by emphasizing humanitarian, cultural, and educational roles (Order of Malta and Holy See precedents). 

Phase 3 – Specialized agencies & regional bodies. Observer or participant status where mission-fit exists (e.g., UNESCO for heritage; WHO/UPU/ITU examples from the Holy See illustrate pathways). 

7) Risks and constraints

Constitutional politics in Albania. A two-thirds threshold, plus criticism about precedent and transparency, complicates a territorial solution. Election cycles can stall momentum.  Religious pluralism optics. Domestic Sunni and Orthodox sensitivities; Turkey’s Alevi/Bektashi politics; risk of regional misperceptions.  UN pathway realism. UN membership requires Security Council recommendation—unrealistic in the near term. Observer routes are viable but still political.  Precedent anxiety. Other religious communities may press for similar arrangements; Mount Athos illustrates how special regimes endure yet remain contested. 

8) Scenarios and timelines (as of September 12, 2025)

Scenario A — Territorial micro-state (hard road)

2025–H1 2026: Text of amendment + framework treaty finalized; parliamentary coalition building. Late 2026 / 2027: If a two-thirds majority materializes, constitutional amendment passes; implementing laws follow within 6–12 months. 2027–2029: First wave of bilateral recognitions; applications for UN Observer and select agency relationships. Probability: Low-to-moderate given domestic hurdles; payoff: true sovereignty. 

Scenario B — Order-of-Malta-style sovereign subject (pragmatic road)

2025–2026: Albania enacts extraterritoriality + international capacity statute; diplomatic outreach begins. 2026–2028: Accumulate bilateral recognitions; pursue UN Observer status, citing humanitarian/cultural mission precedents (1994 SMOM resolution). Probability: Moderate; payoff: international personality without constitutional rupture. 

Scenario C — Mount Athos-style domestic autonomy (fastest, non-sovereign)

2025–2026: Constitutional article + organic law confer self-governed status; Albanian sovereignty explicitly retained. 2026+: Stability, tourism, and heritage diplomacy; no separate statehood. Probability: Moderate-to-high if the goal shifts from “statehood” to “durable autonomy.” 

Earliest feasible milestone: even under optimistic assumptions, no earlier than 2026–2027 for a robust domestic settlement, with international arrangements maturing thereafter. 

9) Recommendations

Decide the model up front. If the political cost of territorial secession is too high, pivot early to an extraterritorial/sovereign-subject path modeled on the Order of Malta.  Table a complete legal package (amendment + treaty + organics) before the vote so MPs and the public see guardrails on security, finance, and rights. (Lateran Pacts are the benchmark for comprehensiveness.)  Build a recognition coalition: start with neighbors and interfaith partners; engage the Holy See and SMOM informally for technical lessons on micro-sovereignty and observer diplomacy.  Humanitarian and cultural first. Anchor the diplomatic pitch in heritage protection, education, and interfaith dialogue—the same functional logic that underpinned SMOM’s UN observer status in 1994.  Have a fallback. If votes stall, convert the package into a Mount Athos-style autonomy bill to secure most practical aims while preserving future optionality. 

Appendix: Key comparators

Vatican City (1929): Territorial micro-state born via Lateran Treaty; Holy See holds UN Permanent Observer status by choice; full diplomatic network.  Sovereign Military Order of Malta (since 1113; UN Observer 1994): No sovereign territory; recognized sovereign subject with >100 diplomatic relations and UN Observer status.  Mount Athos (art. 105 Greek Constitution): Self-governed religious territory inside a unitary state; demonstrates workable deep autonomy short of sovereignty. 

Bottom line

The Bektashi headquarters can plausibly achieve international personality—either as a micro-state or as a non-territorial sovereign—but each route demands specific Albanian legal acts and careful, staged diplomacy. As of today, with no constitutional amendment passed, 2026–2027 is the earliest plausible horizon for any durable domestic settlement, with observer-level multilateral recognition (not UN membership) the most realistic international ceiling in the medium run.