Introduction

On February 23, 2025, Germany held a snap federal election that marked a turning point in its postwar political history. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a far-right party once relegated to the fringes, emerged as the second-largest force in the Bundestag, securing approximately 19-20% of the vote and an estimated 140-146 seats. This result, driven by discontent over immigration, economic stagnation, and the collapse of the previous “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Greens, FDP), underscores the AfD’s growing influence in a republic long defined by centrist consensus and a firm rejection of extremism. Yet, despite this electoral breakthrough, the AfD remains isolated by a “firewall”—an informal pact among mainstream parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, FDP, and others) to exclude it from coalitions due to its radical positions. This essay examines the AfD’s current position in Germany’s parliamentary system, its potential to reshape the political order in future elections, and the circumstances under which this firewall might crumble, drawing on the 2025 election outcomes and broader trends.

The AfD in 2025: A Historic Ascendancy

The 2025 election, triggered by the disintegration of Olaf Scholz’s coalition in November 2024, saw the AfD double its parliamentary presence from 83 seats in 2021 (when the Bundestag had 735 seats) to 140-146 in a streamlined 630-seat chamber. Exit polls from ZDF and ARD pegged their vote share at 19-20%, with projections like YouGov’s MRP model estimating 142 seats. This surge reflects a stark regional divide: in eastern states like Saxony and Thuringia, the AfD topped polls, potentially securing up to 50 direct mandates—a leap from 16 in 2021—while its national growth signals broader voter frustration with establishment parties.

In the Bundestag, this translates to tangible gains. With roughly 22-23% of the seats, the AfD qualifies as a parliamentary group (Fraktion), entitling it to proportional speaking time, motion rights, and committee roles. Under the d’Hondt method, they could chair 3-4 of the 25 standing committees—possibly minor ones like Tourism, as in 2017-2021, given other parties’ efforts to limit their influence. They may also nominate a Vice-President to the Bundestag Presidium, though past rejections (e.g., 2017) suggest resistance will persist unless court rulings force acceptance. As the second-largest party, they might claim the mantle of the largest opposition faction if a Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU + SPD) forms, though a broader “Kenya” coalition (CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens) could complicate this.

Yet, their isolation remains absolute. The CDU/CSU, led by Friedrich Merz and poised to govern with 28-30% of the vote, reiterated its “resolution of incompatibility” with the AfD. The Grand Coalition, projected at 293-330 seats, likely secures a majority, especially if smaller parties like the FDP (4.5-5%) or BSW (4-7%) falter below the 5% threshold, redistributing votes to larger players. Alternatives like a Kenya or “Germany” coalition (CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP) further sideline the AfD, rendering their 19-20% a loud but impotent protest vote. This tension—between electoral strength and political exclusion—defines the AfD’s current state.

The Firewall: Origins and Resilience

The firewall against the AfD stems from Germany’s postwar commitment to prevent extremist parties from regaining power, a legacy of the Nazi era. Established as an anti-euro party in 2013, the AfD shifted rightward by 2015, capitalizing on the refugee crisis to adopt anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic, and nationalist rhetoric. Its eastern wing, led by figures like Björn Höcke, flirts with rhetoric deemed unconstitutional by Germany’s domestic intelligence agency (BfV), which monitors parts of the party as a “suspected extremist” group. This radicalism—coupled with policies like “Dexit” (Germany exiting the EU) and rejecting climate goals—places the AfD beyond the pale for mainstream parties.

The firewall’s resilience is evident in coalition dynamics. In 2025, even a slim Grand Coalition majority (e.g., 310 seats) avoids the AfD, while broader options like Kenya (~380-400 seats) or Black-Green (CDU/CSU + Greens, ~310-320 seats) remain viable despite ideological friction. The CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, under Markus Söder, vocally opposes Green partnerships but deems the AfD untouchable. This consensus holds across the spectrum: the SPD and Greens, rooted in progressive values, and the FDP, despite its libertarian streak, see the AfD as anathema. Even the insurgent BSW, led by Sahra Wagenknecht, shares no common ground with the AfD’s nationalism, preferring leftist populism.

Historically, the firewall has flexed but never broken. In 2020, a brief CDU-FDP-AfD alignment in Thuringia to elect a state premier sparked national outrage, forcing the CDU’s retreat. The AfD’s 19-20% in 2025, while unprecedented, falls short of forcing a rethink—yet it raises questions about its limits as the party grows.

Future Prospects: Pathways to Power

The AfD’s future hinges on its ability to climb from 19-20% to a vote share that disrupts Germany’s coalition arithmetic. To become indispensable, they must win enough seats that no majority forms without them, assuming the firewall holds. In a 630-seat Bundestag, 316 seats are needed; thus, the AfD needs a percentage where the remaining ~65-70% of votes split too thinly among others to coalesce.

The 33-35% Threshold

A vote share of 33-35% (210-225 seats) marks a tipping point. If the AfD hits 35%, they could secure 225 seats, leaving 405 for others. If these split among CDU/CSU (25%, 150 seats), SPD (13%, 85 seats), Greens (10%, 70 seats), and FDP (5%, 35 seats), with BSW or Die Linke taking scraps (e.g., 65 seats), no three-party coalition reliably exceeds 316 without perfect alignment. A Grand Coalition might muster 235 seats, a Kenya coalition 305—both short unless smaller parties collapse entirely, boosting larger players proportionally. At 33% (210 seats), the gap narrows further, especially if fragmentation (e.g., BSW at 7%, Die Linke at 5%) reduces coalitionable seats below 420.

This threshold could drop to 30-32% (~190-200 seats) if the FDP, BSW, or Die Linke falter below 5%, shrinking the pool. For instance, if only CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and AfD qualify, and AfD takes 30% (190 seats), the remaining 440 seats might split 180-130-130, leaving a CDU/CSU-SPD duo at 310—agonizingly close but insufficient. Adding the Greens might still fail if their vote dips below 10%.

Drivers of Growth

Reaching 30-35% requires amplifying current trends:

• Eastern Momentum: In 2025, the AfD dominated eastern Germany, reflecting economic discontent and anti-establishment sentiment. Winning 50 direct mandates—nearly a third of their seats—shows potential to monopolize this region, where voters feel ignored by western-centric policies.
• Immigration and Economy: The 2015 refugee crisis fueled their rise; ongoing debates over asylum (e.g., Scholz’s 2024 border controls) and economic woes (e.g., 2025’s sluggish growth) could push their ceiling from 20% to 25-30% if mainstream responses falter.
• Fragmentation: The traffic light’s collapse and BSW’s emergence signal a splintering electorate. If the SPD or Greens weaken further—say, to 10% each—the AfD could siphon their voters, especially in rural or post-industrial areas.

By 2029, if these factors align—perhaps amid a recession or EU crisis—the AfD could near 30%, testing the firewall’s mathematical limits.

Breaking the Firewall: Scenarios and Catalysts

The firewall’s durability assumes ideological purity and electoral pragmatism among mainstream parties. Its breach requires either desperation or a shift in political norms. Here are plausible scenarios:

1. Mathematical Necessity

If the AfD hits 33-35% (~210-225 seats), coalition options dwindle. A CDU/CSU-SPD duo might fall short (e.g., 290 seats), and adding Greens or FDP could fail if their vote shares drop (e.g., 8% each). Faced with paralysis—say, after months of failed talks à la 2017—the CDU might reconsider. Merz, a pragmatic conservative, could frame it as a “national emergency” to stabilize governance, though grassroots and CSU resistance would be fierce.

2. Regional Precedent

The firewall has wavered locally. In Thuringia 2020, the CDU and FDP briefly relied on AfD votes, sparking a backlash but proving feasibility. If the AfD dominates eastern state parliaments (e.g., 35% in Saxony by 2029), local CDU branches might normalize cooperation on issues like infrastructure, eroding the taboo incrementally. A federal breakthrough could follow if eastern CDU leaders pressure Berlin.

3. FDP Opportunism

The FDP, teetering at 4.5-5% in 2025, faces existential risk. If it clings to relevance in 2029 (e.g., 6%) and a CDU/CSU-FDP duo nears 300 seats with AfD at 25% (~160 seats), the FDP might pivot. Its libertarian wing shares AfD skepticism of climate policies and EU overreach, offering a ideological bridge. Christian Lindner, ambitious and unburdened by coalition loyalty post-2024, could champion a “stability pact” if the alternative is irrelevance.

4. Societal Shifts

A crisis—economic collapse, a migrant surge, or EU disintegration—could shift public opinion, pressuring parties to “listen to voters.” If the AfD moderates its rhetoric (e.g., dropping Dexit), it might gain tacit acceptance. Polls already show 20-30% of Germans view the AfD as a “normal party” in eastern regions; a national swing could force the CDU’s hand.

Likelihood and Timeline

A breach by 2029 is plausible if the AfD nears 30% and fragmentation deepens. Eurasia Group’s 2025 analysis gave a CDU-AfD federal coalition just a 5% chance, but this rises with vote share. A 35% AfD in 2033, amid a weakened SPD (10%) and Greens (8%), might push the CDU (25%) into a corner, especially if eastern gains make the party a regional juggernaut.

Implications and Conclusion

In 2025, the AfD stands as Germany’s second force, wielding 140-146 seats but locked out of power by a robust firewall. Its 19-20% reflects a protest vote with limited legislative clout—committee chairs and debate time amplify its voice, but coalitions like CDU/CSU-SPD (316+ seats) govern comfortably. Looking ahead, a 33-35% vote share could make the AfD indispensable, forcing a reckoning by 2029 or 2033 if eastern dominance and mainstream decline persist. Breaking the firewall—via necessity, regional precedent, or FDP opportunism—remains a long shot but grows conceivable as electoral math tightens and crises loom.

This trajectory challenges Germany’s postwar order. An AfD in power, even as a junior partner, would shift policies rightward on migration, climate, and Europe, testing democratic norms. For now, the firewall holds, but its fragility lies in the numbers—and the unpredictable currents of a polarized electorate.