We Have The War Upon Us: The Onset Of The Civil War, November 1860-April 1861, by William J. Cooper

The beginning of the Civil War is a subject that interests me and enough other people that there have been quite a few books about the subject that have been published. This particular book seeks to fill a very specific niche, and that is supplementing Freehling’s discussion of the ramping up of extremism on both the side of Republicans as well as fire-eaters in the South, showing how it is that the desires of Upper South and Border state conservatives for a peace that would answer the concerns of the South and preserve the antebellum Union were doomed to fail for two reasons: there was nothing that, by the time the Civil War started, could have brought the seven states back into the Union peacefully, and Republicans were understandably unwilling to do anything that might make anyone think that they were apologizing for their victory or refusing to take full advantage of the opportunity to enjoy holding power for the first time ever as a party. Ultimately, the Union would have to be preserved through a bloody war that would be far more transformative than any of the peace options that were on the table during that fateful winter between November 1860 and April 1861 when the election of the first Northern sectional party (not sectional because of its ideals but because of its support) was followed by treasonous behavior on the part of many Southerners and ultimately the powder keg that started war in Charleston Harbor at Fort Sumter.

This book is divided into seven chapters that cover between 250 and 300 pages of material. The book begins with a list of illustrations, maps, and a preface that shows the author’s interest in capturing the tense mood and uncertain mood of late 1860 and early 1861 when it was not quite clear that war was inevitable but where no reasonable basis for a compromise could be found that would please Republicans and concerned Southerners. Each of the seven chapters as well as the prologue and epilogue are titled with phrases from the primary sources that the author uses to give a complex picture of negotiations and backroom discussions and tense delays. The book begins with a look at the outgoing Congress that sat in session as Lincoln was elected (Prologue). This is followed by a detailed discussion of Lincoln’s position as a party leader and his refusal to try to calm Southern fears, which he considered unreasonable (1). The lack of leadership in Congress that would be capable of leading the United States to preserve the peace is noted (2), as well as the gloominess that followed the failure of the Crittenden compromise (3). The author then notes the course of secession in the Deep South which deepened the sense of crisis (4), while also noting that there was still a change, when Lincoln took office, to calm the storm of sectional hatred, though Southerners (and not just disunionists) were a bit disappointed in Lincoln’s flinty calls for what appeared like and would end up to be coercion (5). The author then discusses Lincoln’s first inauguration and its immediate aftermath (6), as well as the failed negotiations with Confederate commissions that would eventually lead to the efforts to resupply both Fort Pickens and Fort Sumter, which in Southern eyes could only mean war (7), which ominously begins as the book closes (epilogue). The book then ends with notes, acknowledgements, and an index.

There are at least a few aspects of this book that are particularly worthy of high praise. For one, the author has clearly done a lot of research into this period of time, from looking at the writings of the major political players involved on all sides as well as the secession commissioners who urged the Upper South to join the Deep South in rebellion. The author is especially conscious of the difficulties of Conservatives to try to hold the Union together in the face of Republican as well as radical Southern demands, and the way in which most of these Conservatives were unable to articulate a unified program that would have calmed the Deep South enough to avoid escalating the crisis. The Civil War could not have happened without both the headlong rebellion of enough states to make a Republic that seemed viable as well as the rejection by Lincoln and his administration of letting the South go in peace. Lincoln managed to maneuver the Confederacy into a place where it felt the need to force the issue at Fort Sumter rather than let South Carolina act on its own, and in so doing forged a Northern Unionist coalition that was able to hold on to the Border states, but in so doing the conservatives of the Upper South were unable to accept coercion and sided with their sister states to the South. And so the war began.