One of the complaints that many progressives consistently have against the United States constitution, and have had for more than a century now, is that the United States government, as conceived in the Constitution, is too fragmented to work “decisively” or quickly on problems. Typically speaking, one needs at least four or six years of time to deliberate and for voters to determine if they want to make a wholesale change in leadership in the House and Senate, and it may take even longer to enact change in the courts. This is not by accident or mistake, but by design. The goal of the Constitution, for the United States, was to require a high degree of social consensus before drastic action could be taken, a consensus that was able to hold over a substantial amount of time. It was the job of fragmentation of power–what we call the division of powers–between different institutions that gave the time for this consensus to appear. The consensus would require the election of an executive with a certain degree of a mandate to solve a problem, as well as the support of two houses of Congress, one of which would ensure a majority of voters’ supported a policy, and the other requiring the majority of states.

It is not as if this design of fragmented government is isolated to the United States. The Swiss Republic, even after its increased central authority as a result of the Sonderbund War in 1848, is divided between a need to obtain a popular vote to rule as well as a majority of cantons. This sort of federalism that we find in the United States and Switzerland and other federal republics, which have a diverse group of territories that are sensitive about the possibility of majority tyranny, is an example of a deliberate attempt to fragment power within state institutions so as to make a wide consensus necessary to operate the full power of the government in any particular endeavor. This is a sensible and practical means that ensures that when government takes positions that it has broad support within the population and not merely a temporary bare majority, especially one whose voting margins can be increased by fraud and chicanery, as is often the case in immature and decadent republics where one regularly sees unpopular parties and longtime candidates receive unrealistic and obviously bolstered majorities.

But it is not only in constitutional republics where we find the fragmented state. I found, much to my interest, that this was the case in Bashir’s Sudan, and the reasons for it were somewhat similar to the reasons in a constitutional republic. Under Bashir’s rule, there were (reasonable, as it turns out) concerns that he could be overthrown by his military, and so he fragmented the power of the military, which in many states is the only notable government institution that can threaten one’s position of authority, into both a regular armed forces and what was called the Rapid Support Forces. He expected that the fragmentation of military power between these two institutions would preserve his own power, which did not prove to be the case, but was correct that the separation of military power would lead to instability given the difficulty two powerful people would have in working together, which has led to the current civil war in Sudan. If he did not coup-proof perfectly, he did at least ensure that Sudan would need a leader strong enough to pit two military figures against each other, since neither would be sufficiently powerful to rule on their own.

In institutions where power is too centrally located, it is easy to topple the figurehead at top and the head that wears the crown is too attractive of a target for those people who want to dominate the state and control its institutions. The safety of authority often requires its division into less tempting targets, which forces people to work together. Working together is hard, and coordinating and cooperating take a lot of effort and restraint and discipline, but it is far safer to require this coordination to operate the full power of government authority than to build up totalitarian regimes where toppling the leader in charge gives one the power needed to do whatever one wants, which makes such power an irresistible target to those who want to dominate an entire country. The collapse of states like the Inca and Aztec because of their excessive centralization of power demonstrates the weakness of the overly powerful state, and paradoxically show that more fragmented power is not only more safe for those who are under authority, but for those who possess it as well.