One of the truths that is often neglected when it comes to the cultivation of militaries is that generally speaking, militaries tend to be skilled in one of two areas: either being used as political pieces in internal conflicts, or being skilled at dealing with the foreign foes of a generally united state. Where militaries tend to practice their skills mostly on unarmed pro-democracy protesters or armed insurgent groups, the result tends to be a state that lacks the unity to defend itself effectively against foreign invasion. On the other hand, where a nation’s military is viewed as a bulwark of humanitarian aid or a patriotic institution of a cohesive state that has widespread legitimacy and support for its constitutional order, it can effectively project power outside of its borders, both the hard power of invasion as well as the soft power of aiding other nations in the case of natural disasters. This dilemma between the uses of military forces exists in many areas of the world, but one of the most poignant areas it exists is in West Africa.

Recently, there was a coup in Niger that overthrew a democratically elected president who was apparently being judged as insufficiently strong against insurgent forces in the sparsely populated desert areas of the nation. Like other nations, including Mali and Burkina Faso–both of whom have also faced coups recently for similar reasons–there has long been ethnoreligious struggle within countries between peoples who dominate the cities and usually the political order of the country and those peoples who live in sparsely populated and largely neglected desert regions with large territories but small amounts of people and even less infrastructure. Like the Kurds of the Middle East, the Berber tribes extending from Morocco east to Libya and south to Mali and Niger are a stateless and generally neglected minority people who have a high degree of anger about the malapportionment of political and economic power within the countries where they reside, and they have for decades sought to improve their condition, often through insurgent campaigns that have shut down travel into regions that they control from other regions in the Sahel.

One of the aspects of the security dilemma that appears to be particularly difficult is the difference between the way that popular governments and military leaders prefer to deal with such internal security dilemmas. For democratically elected governments, there always exists the possibility that a compromise will decrease internal hostilities and will allow peoples who are now at cross-purposes with a government to accept some sort of autonomous or otherwise increased status within a nation and will be interested in entering into the political process for a cut of the aid and development pie. Mali’s elected leaders, before they were overthrown, had offered the promotion of largely empty Tuareg (Berber) regions to provincial rank to allow for an increased political profile for the Tuareg people when it comes to self-government in the Sahara regions they inhabit. While this may have proved acceptable to insurgents, such a change in the political order did not suit military leaders who preferred to solve internal political problems through force rather than through the working of messy politics. In these areas, armies have traditionally been used by strongmen or juntas against their own people, be they supporters of democracy or insurgents desiring to change the political order to provide for the well-being of often ignored minority groups.

This creates somewhat of a dilemma for Niger’s current government, as neighbor Nigeria (currently leading regional bloc ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention as a last resort if coup leaders do not act to restore democracy in a timely fashion and has already cut off the 70% of Niger’s electricity it supplies, besides other economic sanctions designed to freeze assets as well as aid to Niger while it is currently governed by illegitimate military forces. While Mali and Burkina Faso’s coup leaders have promised to support Niger in its struggle with the democratic governments of the Southern part of West Africa, nations like Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Benin have promised to support Nigeria’s efforts, leading to the possibility of a regional war between the democratic and authoritarian nations of West Africa. With their militaries focused on dealing with internal security difficulties, it is possible that they will find dealing with external military threats to be a difficult process in the face of the internal conflicts that they are already dealing with, and it is possible that insurgent groups in all three beleaguered nations will find allies of convenience in the invading forces from Nigeria and its allies. The fact that Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso are all desperately poor landlocked countries largely dependent on river trade may increase the difficulties faced by these nations in being able to successfully defend themselves against both internal and external threats.

This task is additionally complicated by the possibility that this regional war will attract larger global interest. If West Africa (especially areas like Mali and Niger) is not widely known by many ordinary people in the West, that is not so as far as military operations and foreign aid is concerned. The United States currently has a bit more than 1000 troops in Niger, with France having 1500 or so, to help Niger with its insurgency problem. Mali is currently in the process of seeking support from Russia’s Wagner group in replacing the French as military advisers of choice because of hostility to what it judges as French neocolonial efforts to preserve soft power and economic control of the destitute nation. Niger may possibly do the same thing, and so this brings with it the possibility that Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso will offer yet another proxy war between Russia and the West with regards to foreign economic and military aid to a conflict-prone area, with Western nations being more interested in supporting constitutional regimes and Russia being more friendly with militaristic authoritarian regimes that lack popular support.

It is hard to know whether these problems will lead to an all-out war or if both sides will stop short of the brink. It is possible that honor will lead both sides to be willing to fight things out because their reputation is viewed as being too much at stake. Nigeria has desires of being a regional hegemon with its massive economic, military, cultural, and demographic power in the region. Niger is a much poorer and less populated neighbor with a long border whose less successful political system makes it possible for problems to spread south in the way that Mexico’s lack of security provides a threat to the United States, or Afghanistan’s weakness provides danger to all of its neighbors. It remains unclear what modus vivendi ECOWAS forces would be able to have with insurgent groups, who are often tied to both ethnic militias as well as multinational forces of radical Islam which have been at times uncomfortable allies. The internal dynamic within Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the further regional divide between the military coups within landlocked nations of the region and the more democratic governments in coastal nations right now (other than Guinea, which has so far remained neutral in this crisis), and the possible interest of foreign actors like the United States, France, and Russia make this crisis one that seems ripe for misunderstandings and the possibilities for immense violence and suffering within a region that has known plenty of both for a long, long time.