1. Introduction

Since 2017, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has evolved from a protest movement channeling southern grievances into a de facto governing authority across much of southern Yemen, especially Aden and surrounding governorates. In December 2025 it moved rapidly eastward, claiming control over Hadramawt and al-Mahra and asserting authority over nearly all the territory of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).

This paper examines:

The STC’s current and potential governance capabilities. Constraints and vulnerabilities in its institutional, security, economic, and diplomatic position. The legal-political prospects for international recognition of a revived South Yemen.

2. Historical Background: South Yemen and the Southern Cause

2.1 From PDRY to Unification

South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY) existed from 1967–1990 as a socialist one-party state, with Aden as capital. In May 1990, South and North Yemen unified into the Republic of Yemen under a unity constitution, but structural economic problems and political mistrust quickly surfaced. A 1994 civil war saw southern secessionists briefly declare a “Democratic Republic of Yemen” before being militarily defeated by northern forces, entrenching southern perceptions of domination and marginalization.

2.2 The Southern Movement and Emergence of the STC

The Southern Movement (al-Hirak) emerged in the mid-2000s, articulating demands ranging from federalism to outright independence. The current STC was founded in 2017 by Aidarus al-Zoubaidi and allies, with explicit backing from the UAE, to represent southern nationalist aspirations in the context of Yemen’s post-2014 civil war. In April 2022, STC leadership was formally integrated into the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized executive of Yemen, with al-Zoubaidi becoming a vice-president— institutionalizing the STC as both part of the official state and a de facto separatist authority.

3. The STC’s De Facto Governance Footprint

3.1 Territorial Control and Political Reach

Recent developments have dramatically expanded the STC’s control:

For several years, the STC has governed Aden (the interim capital) and held substantial sway in Lahij, al-Dhale, and parts of Abyan and Shabwah, often sharing space with other anti-Houthi factions. In December 2025, STC-affiliated forces launched a rapid offensive into Hadramawt and al-Mahra, displacing tribal and Islah-aligned forces and claiming authority over nearly all of former South Yemen, including key oil fields and ports.

This gives the STC:

Contiguity across almost all southern governorates. Control of strategic assets: oil-rich Hadramawt, export infrastructure, and major ports (e.g., Aden, Mukalla).

However, control is heterogeneous:

Some areas are governed directly via STC security formations and civil institutions. Others remain contested, with tribal forces, local elites, and PLC-aligned units reluctant to submit fully to STC authority.

3.2 Security Sector and Armed Forces

The STC’s greatest comparative strength is in the security arena.

UAE-trained units such as the Security Belt Forces and allied formations (e.g., parts of the Hadrami Elite and Shabwani Elite at various times) provide organized, ideologically motivated southern-nationalist forces. These forces have experience combating both Houthi units and jihadist groups such as AQAP, and they control key urban centers and transport corridors in the south. The December 2025 offensive demonstrated operational coordination, logistical reach into eastern governorates, and the ability to overrun rival units quickly—although at significant human cost.

Governance implications:

The STC can enforce order in core strongholds (especially Aden), but its model is security-heavy and often personality-based rather than rooted in stable, rule-bound institutions. Rival southern factions, especially Islamists and some tribal authorities, accuse STC forces of abuses, selective repression, and attempts to monopolize power.

3.3 Civil Administration and Service Delivery

The STC has progressively constructed quasi-state institutions in areas under its control, but these remain incomplete and resource-constrained.

In Aden, the STC has shaped local councils and governorate-level administration, but most civil servants are still formally employed by the internationally recognized government, leading to overlapping mandates. Public services (electricity, water, sanitation, basic education) are fragile and uneven. Chronic fuel shortages, crumbling infrastructure, and fragmented lines of authority mean the STC can influence but not fully stabilize service delivery. Education and health systems in southern governorates are heavily damaged; reconstruction and salary payment depend on external funding and humanitarian agencies rather than a consolidated southern treasury.

In governance terms, the STC functions as:

A political umbrella over a patchwork of pre-existing local administrations and donor projects. A regulator and security guarantor around key infrastructure, often negotiating directly with international organizations and Gulf donors.

3.4 Internal Political Pluralism

The STC claims to speak for the “southern cause” but is itself a coalition with internal tensions:

Dominant factions are associated with ex-PDRY elites, certain tribal groups, and UAE-aligned commanders. The 2023 “Southern National Pact” called for integrating broader elements of the Southern Movement in an “independent framework” in peace talks, implicitly acknowledging that many southerners remain outside STC structures. Salafi, Islamist, tribal, and technocratic actors variously cooperate with or resist STC dominance depending on local bargains and patronage flows.

Governance capability thus depends on whether the STC can:

Institutionalize power-sharing among southern constituencies. Avoid treating non-STC actors as mere instruments or adversaries.

4. External Relationships and Their Impact on Governance

4.1 Dependence on the UAE

The STC’s rise is inseparable from Emirati support:

The UAE has financed, trained, and equipped key STC-aligned units and invested in ports and security infrastructure in Aden and other coastal areas. This assistance underpins the STC’s comparative advantage in security and naval/port control but also ties it closely to Emirati strategic interests, including countering Islamist factions and securing maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.

This dependency creates both capability and constraint:

Capabilities: coastal security, counter-terrorism, and revenue from ports and energy infrastructure are more attainable with Emirati backing. Constraints: perceptions of the STC as a UAE proxy complicate its claims to national southern legitimacy and generate suspicion from Saudi Arabia and some Yemeni factions.

4.2 Complex Relationship with Saudi Arabia and the PLC

Saudi Arabia convened the Presidential Leadership Council in 2022 precisely to reduce fragmentation and integrate the STC into a unified anti-Houthi front. The STC’s latest unilateral expansion eastward clashes with Riyadh’s preference for a centralized or at least coordinated Yemeni state structure. Saudi-backed forces are now massing near the border in response, and Riyadh has threatened airstrikes. A joint Saudi-Emirati delegation has gone to Aden seeking roll-backs or compromises, indicating significant external pressure on the STC’s recent moves.

This creates a key governance dilemma:

The STC’s military consolidation strengthens its bargaining power. But overreach risks provoking Saudi counter-measures, fracturing the anti-Houthi camp further and damaging the economic environment needed for sustainable governance.

4.3 International Community and UN Framework

The UN continues to recognize the Republic of Yemen as a single sovereign state, represented by the PLC; it has called for maximum restraint and a return to dialogue in the face of STC advances. International donors and agencies overwhelmingly structure aid around a unified Yemen framework, even while dealing pragmatically with de facto authorities at local level.

Thus, the STC can gain operational recognition as a partner in humanitarian access and local security, but political recognition as a separate government remains blocked by current UN positions.

5. Assessment of STC Governance Capabilities

5.1 Strengths

Security and Territorial Control Coherent security formations in key southern cities and corridors. Proven ability to project force across southern governorates and seize strategic assets. Coherent Political Narrative A clear secessionist project rooted in longstanding southern grievances, giving the STC a strong mobilizing frame compared to more ambivalent Yemeni factions. External Patronage UAE backing and growing outreach to Western actors (e.g., signaling readiness to partner with Washington against Iran-aligned Houthis and jihadist groups). Access to Resources Control over oil-rich Hadramawt and key export terminals gives the STC a potential fiscal base if it can normalize production and export flows.

5.2 Weaknesses and Gaps

Institutional Weakness Civil administration is fragmented, overlapping with PLC ministries and local councils; there is no fully consolidated southern bureaucracy and judiciary. Limited fiscal transparency and dependence on ad-hoc revenue (port fees, customs, external support). Limited Service Delivery Chronic power, water, and salary crises erode the STC’s ability to claim better governance than its rivals. Internal Southern Divisions Not all southern elites accept STC hegemony; Hadrami and Mahri leaders in particular fear domination by Aden- and Dhale-based factions. Reputational Risks Allegations of human rights abuses, arbitrary arrests, and suppression of rivals complicate the STC’s attempt to portray itself as a democratic alternative.

5.3 Opportunities

If the STC can stabilize the newly seized east, cut local power-sharing deals, and channel oil revenues into visible improvements in electricity, salaries, and infrastructure, it can greatly strengthen its governance credentials. A coherent southern reconstruction plan aligned with donor priorities (education, health, basic services) could attract sustained external support even without formal independence.

5.4 Threats

Direct confrontation with Saudi-backed forces or a serious breakdown with the UAE would endanger both territorial control and finances. Houthi exploitation of southern infighting could shift fronts or allow northern actors to gain leverage over contested areas. Internal southern backlash (tribal insurgencies, Islamist militias, civic protests) could undermine the image of a united southern project.

6. Prospects for International Recognition of a Revived South Yemen

6.1 Legal Framework

Under international law:

The UN Charter and prevailing state practice favor territorial integrity of existing states. Recognition of secessionist entities typically arises from: Forced dissolution of the parent state (e.g., Yugoslavia). Mutually agreed separation (e.g., Sudan/South Sudan). Long-term, effectively independent control combined with broad international consensus (e.g., Kosovo’s partial recognition).

For South Yemen:

The Republic of Yemen is still recognized internationally, despite its fragmentation. The STC is formally part of the state’s executive (PLC), complicating claims that separation is the only remedy.

6.2 Political Conditions for Recognition

Recognition of a revived South Yemen would likely require:

Sustained, Stable Control over the South The STC (or a broader southern authority) would need to demonstrate durable, uncontested governance across former PDRY borders over several years. Inclusive Southern Political Settlement International actors will scrutinize whether Hadramis, Mahris, Socotris, Islamists, tribal leaders, and technocrats are included in designing a southern state— not just STC loyalists. Negotiated Framework with the North / Yemeni State A mutually agreed separation, possibly embedded in a UN-mediated political settlement after a broader ceasefire, would be the fastest path to recognition. Coercive unilateral independence in the face of strong northern and Saudi opposition would face significant diplomatic headwinds. Regional Consensus Saudi Arabia and the UAE would need at least a workable compromise—whether that means a recognized South Yemen, a confederal arrangement, or a federal Yemen with exceptional southern autonomy. Oman, which borders al-Mahra, would also be pivotal, given its sensitivities about cross-border tribal ties and security. Great-Power Alignment U.S. and European acceptance would hinge on assurances that a southern state would contribute to: Maritime security in Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. Counter-terrorism against AQAP and against Iranian influence via the Houthis.

6.3 Short- to Medium-Term Outlook

Given current dynamics, several scenarios are plausible:

De Facto Autonomy within a Nominally Unified Yemen (Most Likely in Near Term) The STC continues to expand administrative control and extract resources while remaining formally within the PLC framework. International actors work around legal constraints by engaging the STC as a “regional authority” without recognizing a separate state. Negotiated Federal / Confederal Settlement Peace talks eventually produce a highly decentralized structure: perhaps a two-region federation (North/South) or a multi-region system with the South as a powerful macro-region. This may partly satisfy southern aspirations without full UN-level recognition. Full Independence with Limited Recognition (Longer-Term Contingent Scenario) If Yemen’s central institutions collapse further or a northern-southern settlement breaks down irrevocably, the STC could declare a revived South Yemen. Some states (likely including the UAE and possibly others with strong maritime/security interests) might extend bilateral recognition, even if the UN as a whole hesitates. Rollback of STC Gains (Risk Scenario) Saudi military pressure or internal fragmentation could force the STC to withdraw from eastern areas, reducing its territorial and resource base and limiting the plausibility of full independence.

At present, most analyses see the STC’s eastward expansion as increasing fragmentation and threatening peace talks, rather than paving a clear path to recognized statehood.

7. Strategic Recommendations for Enhancing Governance and Recognition Prospects

7.1 For the STC and Southern Actors

Institutionalization over Personalism Codify roles, hierarchies, and chains of command in civilian administration and security sectors. Develop a transparent budget framework, especially for oil revenues and port income. Inclusive Southern Compact Convene a genuinely broad southern conference that includes Hadrami, Mahri, Socotri, Islamist, tribal, and technocratic actors to design a shared governance charter and transitional arrangements. Governance Demonstration Projects Prioritize rapid improvement in visible services (electricity reliability in Aden and Mukalla, teacher and health-worker salary payments) as proof of concept for southern governance capacity. Human Rights and Rule of Law Establish credible mechanisms to investigate abuses, standardize detention procedures, and open channels with international rights organizations to improve the STC’s external reputation. Calibrated External Posture Avoid provocations that could trigger Saudi airstrikes or direct confrontation. Present any outreach to Washington and European capitals as complementary to broader peace efforts, not as an alternative to UN frameworks.

7.2 For International and Regional Actors

Recognize De Facto Realities Without Premature State Recognition Engage the STC as a key stakeholder in southern security and reconstruction, while maintaining the unified Yemen legal framework until a negotiated settlement emerges. Embed Southern Questions into UN-Led Peace Processes Ensure that the “southern issue” is addressed in a distinct track or sub-framework, acknowledging the depth of southern grievances and the scale of STC control. Condition Support on Governance Benchmarks Tie increased direct assistance for southern reconstruction to progress on inclusivity, transparency, and human-rights protections. Coordinate Gulf Policies Encourage a Saudi-Emirati understanding on desired end-states in Yemen (federal, confederal, or partition) and align military and financial support accordingly to reduce proxy competition.

8. Conclusion

The Southern Transitional Council has moved beyond insurgent politics to become a powerful de facto authority over most of southern Yemen. Its security capabilities and recent seizure of strategic territory give it unprecedented leverage and make it central to any future settlement. Yet its civil institutions, service delivery, and internal inclusiveness lag behind its military prowess.

International recognition of a revived South Yemen is not imminent under current UN and regional preferences for Yemeni territorial integrity. However, if the STC can consolidate inclusive, effective governance, demonstrate responsible management of resources and human rights, and embed its project within a negotiated regional framework, the medium-term prospects for some form of recognized southern statehood—whether as a federated region or an independent country—will grow.

In the meantime, the key tests of the STC’s governance capabilities will be less about flags and declarations, and more about whether ordinary people in Aden, Mukalla, Hadramawt, and Mahra experience greater security, stability, and opportunity under its rule than they have under any alternative.