As a student of conflict, and sadly all too often a practitioner of it, there are many aspects of conflict studies that I ponder, and one of the more interesting ones (to me) is the art of coalition building. It is often the case in a given conflict that the core region that has the most conflict is not capable of waging successful conflict on its own unless it can gain support from less hostile groups to form a large enough coalition for successful operations. Sometimes (as in the case of the First Gulf War, for example), the coalition is not necessary for the purposes of success in the conflict, but for its legitimacy in the eyes of the world by virtue of the popularity of the cause. Therefore today I would like to examine two different forms of coalition-building difficulties that plague military affairs as well as more mundane personal concerns.

In a coalition it is often necessary to have a temporary friend. This is the sort of ally that shares a common current enemy but does not share a worldview that leads to deep trust and unity. Like Stalin in World War II for the United States and Great Britain, it may be necessary to work with worldview enemies in the pursuit of temporary alliances against more urgent enemies (like Nazism) but one should never be under any illusions about the long-term nature of their relationship. In fact, it would be better not to ally with these nations at all, even if it may be necessary to temporarily “associate” with them in the pursuit of shared goals before beginning one’s customary conflict.

In fact, this sort of phenomenon is a lot more common than one might think. Even fairly permanent coalitions (like political parties) tend to have “temporary” friends that vote together on election day but spend the rest of the time competing with each other for offices and nominations, in the hope that everyone within the coalition will support them against the common enemy of their rival coalitions. Sometimes these hopes may be realized, and sometimes they may not be–part of what makes politics so frustrating and so entertaining in a gladiatorial sense. This is not merely true of big-ticket politics but also organizational politics, as those who might cooperate against a given enemy or rival might also be highly competitive among themselves for positions and promotions and honor. We have to be aware that the successful resolution of one conflict often means the start of another based on somewhat different grounds based on the different worldviews and ambitions of people, and not to ever assume that people who stay together on one issue are going to agree on everything.

In looking at temporary friends, one has to seriously examine the basis of unity between them. What is the level of cohesion for the coalition? If it is united only by a common enemy, the successful campaign against that enemy will lead to an immediate fracturing of that coalition and the start of a new conflict (just like the Cold War immediately followed the successful conclusion for the Allies of World War II). If there is partial agreement in worldview within the coalition, we should expect a fairly permanent alignment where that worldview is shared along with disagreements where that worldview is not shared. In this common circumstance, we can expect moderate cohesion, but also a fairly permanent level of disagreement. In other cases worldview might be shared, but there might be disagreement on the tactical level–if some are more conflict adverse than others who are more willing to debate and argue over disagreements. In this particular case, we cannot let the different conflict tolerance obscure the fundamental agreement between sides.

And this leads us to the area of unnecessary enemies. An unnecessary enemy is someone who shares a worldview but who is so offended by presentation or behavior that there is no coalition possible on fundamental areas of agreement. This seems rare in geopolitics because much of politics seems less personal, but France’s refusal to stay with NATO during the 1960’s because of De Gaulle’s personal desire to seem independent from the US is an example of an unnecessary “rival” simply because of personal politics. In politics it is more common because prejudice, or false ideas of the prejudice of others, keep some potential allies on matters apart. This is an area that can be worked on, and increased knowledge and respect can serve to avoid such unnecessary conflict, so long as we are mature enough to move beyond identity politics to examine deeper worldviews.

This is an especially poignant issue for me personally, and I have many personal stories where worldview allies become actually estranged or enemies for a variety of reasons. Most of these are issues of personality rather than issues of belief, and it is frustrating to deal with such issues, such as disagreements with others because of issues of openness or problems with attitude and tactical issues on how to deal with one’s concerns. Honest and open communication is generally necessary to avoid unnecessary enemies, but when communication is not open between two parties but is open between one (or both) and others, it is easy for that awkwardness to lead to unnecessary conflict between people who should by all rights get along. And that is unfortunate.

In terms of coalition building, temporary friends and unnecessary enemies are both issues that have to be dealt with. One must pay attention both to behavior and worldview to deal with these matters. If someone is a worldview enemy and sees the world in a different way, any sort of coalition or alliance will be tactical in nature until a common enemy is dealt with. Likewise, if someone is a genuine worldview ally, it is important to keep behavior and misunderstandings from dividing those who should be genuine and long-term allies. Obviously, such matters are far more easier said than done, as I know all too well in my own life, but that does not make it any less important to point out.